PARTIES TO DISPUTE: (Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen
 (:
 (Southern Pacific Transportation Company
 ( - Texas & Louisiana Lines

 STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the General Committee of the Brotherhood
 of Railroad Signalmen on the Southern Pacific
 Transportation Company (Texas and Louisiana Lines):

 Claim of SRS and former Houston Division Signelmsn Clarence Cunningham. Jr., for reinstatement to service with pay for time lost and with seniority unimpaired.

 OPINION OF HOARD: At the time this dispute arose Claimant was em.
 ployed by Carrier as a Signalman with seven years
 of service. Pursuant to notice of April 5, 19'/4, Claimant was charged
 with dishonesty, in violation of Rule 801 of the controlling Rules and
 Regulations, in connection with an incident which occurred on November
 21, 1973. Formal investigation was held on April 10, 1974 and Claimant
 was discharged on the same day. Rule 801 reads as follows:

The underlying facts are that on November 21, 1973, Claimant was arrested by the police on charges of property theft from Howard Discount Center. He appeared in Court with his attorney and was released on bond. The "property" inv Thereafter his case came before the Court on February 26, 1974, at which time his attorney entered a plea of guilty and Claimant was fined 44.70 plus court costs. On March 18, 1974, Carrier official was notified by the Police Department of the guilty plea and fine. On April 5, 1974, eighteen days later, charges were placed by Carrier against Claimant, as stated above.

 The pertinent language of Rule 700(a) of the controlling Agreement, which relates to "Discipline and resolution of this dispute depends), states that "Charges will be made in writing within twenty (20) days of knowledge of an offense...


It is not disputed that Carrier had knowledge of the arrest on the day it occurred - November 21, 1973. It is Petitioner's contention that such knowledge co Rule 700(a) and that this started the running of the prescribed 20 day period. Accordingly, Carrier having "failed to place charges" until April 5, 1974, it violated the Agreement. Claimant should therefore be reinstated with rights unimpaired and payment for time lost.

 Conversely, Carrier contends that the arrest was an accusation, not an offense; that the accusation ripened into "an offense" when the guilty plea was entered; that it then brought charges within the stated 20 day period; that the evidence adduced was conclusive on the charge of dishonesty; and that, accordingly, the discipline of dismissal was warranted under the Agreement and implementing Rules.

 We have carefully reviewed the entire record and the various precedents cited by Carrier and Petitioner, and particularly the evidence adduced at the investigation and the record of the court proceedings, on the basis of which we reach the following conclusions and findings.

 We acknowledge our obligation to interpret the Agreement as written and that the burden of proof in discipline cases rests on Carrier. We recognize, further, th was involved in the arrest of Claimant or in the court proceedings resulting therefrom. The criminal from a third party; the witnesses against Claimant were police officers and employees of the third party. In these circumstances, Carrier's knowledge of the incident on November 21, 1973 constituted knowledge that "an accusation" had been filed against Claimant, on which he was entitled to the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Carrier afforded him that right by withholding its charges until it acquired knowledge of the guilty plea. Only then did Carrier have factual "knowledge of m offense" under Rule 700(a), upon which its own charges and investigation relied of necessity.

 "Only then could it be ascertained, with arty degree of certainty, whether or not disciplinary action was indicated." See Public Law Board No. 716, Award No. 3 (Oilden, Chairman).

 "The investigation depended entirely on the court proceedings, in which Claimant pleaded guilty:." And "the convening of an investigation prior to final terminatio laches does not begin to accrue against Carrier until the court case has been adjudicated". See P. L. B. No. 1, Award No. 8 (Sempliner, Neutral) and P. L. B. No. 1316, Award No. 5 (Edwards, Neutral).


Petitioner cites several prior Awards which, it asserts, support its position here. However, ana they are not germane to this dispute. For example, Awards 12437 and 17081 relate to facts entirely dissimilar from the facts here. Additionally, 12437 dealt with dealt with an investigation held more than twenty days after Carrier "had factual knowledge" of the offense. In Award 6001 (2nd Division) the question of "knowledge" was not involved, the major issue being Claimant's refusal to testify at the investigation. Finally, in Award 20711 (lot Division), the Claimant was not charged with misconduct until 49 days after the guilty plea, although the Rule specified a seven day period.

 Factually, there was substantial probative evidence in the record to support the "dishonesty" charge against Claimant, which was buttressed conclusively by the criminal court proceedings and Claimant's plea of guilty. We are not persuaded by Claimant's asserted "ignorance" of these proceedings, nor by the fact that the plea was entered in his absence by his attorney. These were matters solely within Claimant's area of responsibility, for which he must assume the burden. Obviously, Carrier was in no way involved in these matters. Furthermore, the record is quite clear that Carrier acted in timely fashion, pursuant to the Agreement, once it acquired factual knowledge of the plea of guilty, which, as we have demonstrated above, constituted "knowledge of an offense" under the Rules.

 In consequence, therefore, we find that the charges against Claimant were properly brought and the investigation fairly conducted in conformance with the Agreement. Further, that the criminal court proceedings and Claimant's plea of
The principle has been well established that we will not disturb Carrier's decision on guilt or supported by substantial probative evidence and Carrier has not acted arbitrarily) unreasonably or contrary to due process. See Awards 3149 (Carter), 9422 (Bernstein), 10429 (Rock), 13674 (Weston), 15566 (Lynch), 19216 (Edgett) and 20189 (Sickles), among many others.

 Petitioner urges that the discipline of dismissal is excessive, but Rule 801, quoted above, clearly provides that "Employes will not be retained in service who are . .dishonest . . . Additionally, we have held repeatedly that a rule violation associated with dishonesty is a disciplinary act and, in proper circumstances merits dismissal. Furthermore, that "the comparatively small amount of the articles involved is not a mitigating circu 13674 (Weston), 16168 (Perelson), 16888 (Goodman), 19486 (Brent) and 20003(Blackwell), among others.


Finally, we find no basis in the record to support the issue of racial discrimination raised by Petitioner. The use of the word "colored" was for purposes of identification only, and the record is completely absent of any facts attributing bias to Carrier in its investigation or in its conduct of irrelevant here.

 Accordingly, based on the record evidence and controlling authority, we will deny the claim.



That the Carrier and the Employee involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employee within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

 That this Division of the Adjustment Hoard has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and






                      By Order of Third Division


        ATTEST: Executive Secreatry


        Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 14th day of November 1975.


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