NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
THIRD DIVISION Docket Number CL-20789
(Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship
( Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station
( Employes
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
(Burlington Northern Inc.
STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood
(GL-7614) that:
1. The Carrier violated, and continues to violate the rules
of the Clerks' Agreement, when it denied Mr. Adolphus Vargas the position of Car Distributor No. 005
Nebraska.
2. The Carrier shall now be required to place Mr. Vargas
on the position of Car Distributor No. 005 and reimburse him for any
loss of compensation incurred as a result of having been denied the
position.
OPINION OF BOARD: In September, 1968, as a result of an amalgama
tion of car distributor positions, a Central Car
Distribution Department was established at Omaha. In March, 1973, by
agreement and Letter of Understanding between the parties, this de
partment was realigned to around-the-clock service and three additional
Car Distributor positions were established. These positions were duly
placed on bulletin and Claimant was one of the applicants for the
position of Car Distributor No. 005. Claimant was interviewed, his
background was reviewed, but he was not assigned; it having been de
termined by Mr. Collins, the Regional Manager Freight Equipment, that
he did not possess sufficient fitness and ability.
In fact, on April 19, 1973, this job was awarded to Kaup,
with seniority date of March 19, 1956, which was inferior to Claimant's
seniority date of May 1, 1952. Petitioner asserts, among other allegations, that Claimant was the se
him this position, Carrier violated the Clerk's Agreement. Demand is
made that Claimant be so assigned and that he be compensated for any
wage loss incurred.
Formal hearing, as requested under the Rules, was held on
May 9, 1973, and on May 25 Claimant was advised by the Superintendent
that the decision of Mr. Collins would not be reversed. The dispute
was then progressed to this Board through various intermediate appeal
procedures.
Award Number 20916 Page 2
Docket Number CL-20789
As a matter of primary consideration, asserted by Carrier
as jurisdictional in impact, it is contended that Petitioner's appeal
on the property from the employing officer directly to the Vice-President Labor Relations bypassed t
officer".
Further, that such "bypassing" violated Rule 56 and Carrier's letters of February 9 and May 5, 1
appeal procedures to be followed in respect to designated Carrier
officials. Accordingly, Carrier contends that this claim is fatally
defective and must be dismissed.
We note, however, as asserted by Petitioner, that Rule 58
which applies to "GRIEVANCES" provides that "An employe who considers
himself otherwise unjustly treated" must make "written request. . .
to his immediate superior . . " . (Emphasis supplied). Additionally, Carrier's letters of Feb
1970, specifically state that:
"In other than discipline cases there will
be only two steps for the handling of claims
and grievances. They should be initially filed
with the employing officer of the individually
named Claimant. If not settled at that level
such claims and grievances may be appealed to
Vice President-Labor Relations at St. Paul,
Minnesota."
The conflicting aspects of this issue are argued vigorously by both principals and many prior Aw
We are persuaded, however, that this is not a discipline case and that
in view of the express language of Rule 58 and the above quoted
letters of Carrier, the procedures applicable to "Grievances" were
complied with by Petitioner. In short, that the bypassing of the
"intermediate appeal to a regional officer" did not render this claim
jurisdictionally defective. Accordingly, we do not sustain Carrier's
objection on this issue.
Petitioner, on its part, raises the objection that Claimant was denied due process in that Super
the decision rather than the hearing officer. We do not agree. This
Board has held repeatedly that such procedure is not improper. Moreover, there is no rule in the Agr
conduct hearings and who shall render the decision. We do not, therefore, sustain Petitioner's objec
See Awards 16347, 15714, 14021, and 20828, among many
others.
Award Number 20916 Page 3
Docket Number CL-20789
We proceed, therefore, to the merits of this dispute, in
connection with which the following Letter of Understanding, agreed
to by both principals, sets forth the procedures to be followed in
filling the new "car distributor" positions:
"March 15, 1973
File: CL-4
Mr. R. M. Curran, Genl Chrmn
Bro of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks
540 Endicott Building
St. Paul, Minnesota 55101
Dear Sir:
This will serve to confirm conference between Messrs.
Williams and Memcok March 15, 1973 covering the establishment of additional Car Distributor position
Omaha.
As explained to Mr. Williams, the present staffing at
Omaha consists of two Car Distributors working 8:00 AM
to 5:00 PM, one worked from 9:00 AM to 6:00 FM and one
working from 2:30 FM to 10:30 PM. In order to establish 24-hour service, it is proposed to assign th
additional Car Distributor positions on or about May 1. i
In order to familiarize the successful applicants with
the work requirements of the Car Distribution Center,
it is proposed that the successful applicants be
assigned in advance of the actual commencement of the
24-hour operation with the present car distributors,
which will result in these applicants temporarily work
ing hours other than those advertised for a period of
some two to three weeks.
At the conclusion of the discussions, it was agreed that
such temporary .assignment would not be the subject of
claims on the part of any employees.
If the above is in accord with Mr. Williams' understanding
of the discussion, I would appreciate your so indicating by
signing this letter in the space provided below and returning one copy to the undersigned.
Yours truly,
T. C. DeButts /s/
T. C. DeButts
Vice President"
Award Number 20916 Page 4
Docket Number CL-20789
"CONCURRED IN:
Robert M. Curran /s/
General Chairman, BRAC
Additionally, since Claimant's bid for the disputed position was rejected by Carrier under Rule
Rule 7, which reads as follows:
"Rule 7.
PROMOTION
"Employes covered by these rules shall be in line
for promotion. Promotion shall be based on seniority, fitness and ability; fitness and ability
being sufficient, seniority shall prevail, except, however, that this provision shall not apply to e
"NOTE:
The word 'sufficient' is intended to more
clearly establish the right of the senior clerk
or employe to bid in a new position or vacancy
where two or more employes have adequate fitness
and ability."
Basically, it is Petitioner's contention that Claimant
did not receive a "fair interview"; that as senior employe he was
entitled to the assignment; shat, in any event, Claimant should have
been given the assignment and afforded a two-week period in which
to familiarize himself with the work fequirements of the new position
so that he could be properly trained; that Claimant "need not be
immediately qualified" but "must be assigned so he can prove whether
or not he has that fitness and ability"; and, finally, that Claimant
was discriminated against" because of his "Spanish-American descent".
We stress at the outset that seniority alone was never
intended as the sole determining factor in making promotions. Rule 7
is precise on this issue. "Promotion shall be based on seniority,
fitness and ability; fitness and ability being sufficient, seniority
shall prevail. . .". Thus, Claimant was required as a matter of
first priority to qualify under the "fitness and ability" standard.
The record evidence is conclusive that he failed to meet this test.
He was afforded a fair and impartial interview, on the basis of which
it was determined that he did not possess the necessary qualifications
to meet the requirements of the new position.
Award Number 20916 Page 5
Docket Number CL-20789
Indeed, his own testimony at the hearing fully supports
the latter conclusion. He testified to his service "as stenographer",
as "crane operator", as "chief clerk", as a "yard clerk and mail
handler", did "typing", kept records and acted as "timekeeper",
worked on "payrolls and preparation of forms", and that he had "a
little knowledge of some car distribution", which was in fact handled
by others. In short, that he did not possess the necessary qualifications of fitness and ability to
greater responsibilities of Car Distributor.
We cannot agree with Petitioner's contention that, under
the above quoted Letter of Understanding, Claimant, as senior employee,
should have been assigned and then afforded a two week trial period
in which to qualify. The Letter is precise that such trial period
will be given to the "successful applicant". Obviously, this did not
apply to Claimant for he failed to qualify; nor is there anything in
the record which entitled Claimant to a "training" period merely on
the basis of his seniority. Conversely, the record is amply clear
that quite a number of other employes were interviewed and that
the final decision on the assignment was made primarily on the basis
of fitness and ability, and, secondarily only on seniority.
Carrier cites a host of precedents substantiating its
contention that the procedures it followed here were well within its
Management prerogatives and in full conformance with the Agreement.
We quote from only one, Award 16480 (Dorsey), which involved the same
Organization and which fully sets forth the applicable an controlling
principles:
"This Board has been petitioned to interpret and apply
rules identicallor similar to Rule 6 in a great number
of disputes. In essence;we have held in such cases
that: (1) the-current possession of fitness and ability
is an indispensable requisite that must be met before
seniority rights become dominant; and (2) this Board will
not set aside Carrier's judgment of fitness and ability
unless it is arbitrary or capricious or has been exercised
in such a manner as to circumvent the Agreement. See, for
example, Award Nos. 11941, 12461, 13331, 14011, 15164. Also,
we have held that for us to set aside a Carrier's judgment
the record must contain substantial evidence of probative
value that the claimant possessed, at the time, sufficient
fitness and ability to perform the duties of the position
which he sought. Id.
"The record in the case before us is barren of evidence that
would support a finding that the Claimant possessed the indispensable fitness and ability. In fact t
whole can be construed as an an admission by the Claimant that
he was lacking in the requisite. For the foregoing reasons
we will deny the claim."
Award Number 20916 Page 6
Docket Number CL-20789
The above quoted language is unique in that it is precisely
applicable to the Claimant in this dispute.
We acknowledge the many prior Awards cited as precedent
by Petitioner as to "the true meaning of fitness and ability"; that
Claimant need only possess "the potential" in order to qualify. We
point out again that the record evidence in this dispute does not
show that Claimant possessed the necessary qualifying "potential".
The difficulty, however, lies in interpretation of the word "potential";
and, additionally, who is to make such determination. The overwhelming
weight of authority supports the proposition that such right of determination falls within the purvi
if fairly and reasonably exercised. Such is the case here.
See Awards 3273, 3283, 10225, 12450, 14736, 17192, 18463,
18774, 18802 and 19129, among a host of others.
Finally, on the issue of "discriminatory treatment", the
record is replete with assertions and declarations by Petitioner
that Claimant was discriminated against because of his "Spanish-American descent'.'. In point of fac
the requirement of substantial probative evidence necessary to support
such contention. The record is completely absent of such proof and
speaks to the contrary. Particularly is this true in the light of
Carrier's statement of Equal Employment Policy dealing with promotions, and quoted verbatim in the r
Accordingly, on the basis of the record evidence, established precedent and the foregoing findin
compelled to deny the claim.
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the
whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
That the parties waived oral hearing;
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes
the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; an
That the Agreement was not violated.
Award Number 20916 Page 7
Docket Number CL-20789
A W A R D
Claim denied.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
/~' By Order of Third Division
ATTEST:
40,14#40
Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 16th day of January 1976.