( Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes PARTIES TO DISPUTE:


STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood, GL-


1. The Carrier violated, and continues to violate, the rules of the Clerks' Agreement when it denied Helen F. Grunke the Class "A" Accountant position, Customer Acc Minnesota.

2. The Carrier shall now be required to place Helen F. Grunke on the Class "A" Accountant position, and reimburse her for any loss of wages resulting from her being denied the right to exercise seniority on the Class "A" Accountant position.

OPINION OF BOARD: Claimant commenced employment with Carrier on August 9,
1962. Thereafter, she worked in many different positions, the last one of which being a clerk in the BNAPI (Burlington Northern Air Freight), where she remained until, as a result of a Carrier operational change, BNAFI was transferred to Los Angeles, thereby making Claimant a free agent.

When Claimant became aware of the fact that she was a free agent and as such would have to exercise seniority, she attempted to exercise seniority rights by displaci
Claimant's written request for the Class "A" Accountant position was rejected by Carrier; the determining factor being her failure to successfully pass a written test.

On February 26, 1974, Claimant wrote to Carrier requesting a hearing under the provisions of Clerks' Agreement Rule 58, entitled, "Grievances". A hearing was then held on March 6, 1974. As a result of this hearing, Carrier issued a decision on March 21, 1974, sustaining the original decision to reject Claimant's request for the Class "A" Accountant position.

Claimant and Carrier have held conferences, but have been unable to reach a solution resolving the dispute. Hence, this claim has been referred to the Board.



Carrier has raised certain procedural objections concerning the Claimant's method of prosecuting the claim, and the parties have debated that question at length. However, our disposition of this dispute on its merits makes it unnecessary to rule on the procedural question.

In urging that the claim be sustained, Claimant has cited the following two (2) Rules:











In regard to Rule 7, Claimant argues that "fitness and ability" means Claimant need only possess potential to be able to perform the duties of the position within reasonable time.

Now, it is true that Awards 14762, 13850, 8197, and 5348 have held that it is not necessary for an applicant to be immediately qualified to assum all the duties of a. position without some assistance or training, or at least a break-in or trial period. However, there must be a reasonable probability that the employs would be able to perform all the duties of the position within a reasonable period of time. If the employe is obviously unfit or unqualified, as in a situation where the job in question requires a high degree of skill which can be acquired only after a long period of training and there is no evid skills, then carrier is not required to give him or her a trial period.



Claimant had only worked previously as machine operator and a timekeeper in the Material Bureau, Bill Bureau, AFL Billing, and BNAFI. Yet, Class "A" Accountants, because of their experience, handle major accounts; difficult cases; issue waybill corrections; write letters, and use the telephone to deal with big shippers.

After reviewing Claimant's attendance, punctuality, and general work habits, Carrier determined that Claimant had to obtain at least a score of 70 on a job-related test dealing with Customer Accounting before she could qualify for the trial period.

Claimant did not successfully pass the test, and this was made the determining factor by Carrier that she did not have sufficient fitness and ability.

A determination of how much weight should be given test results, along with other relevant factors, is a matter of judgment. When such judgment is exercised hone action even though there may be room for two opinions.

There is nothing in the record which indicates unjust treatment or an arbitrary and or capricious judgment on the part of Carrier. This Board will not set aside Carrier's judgment of fitness and ability unless it is arbitrary or capricious or has been exercised in such a manner afi to circumvent the Agreement. We are not permitted to blithely substitute our judgment for that of Carrier in disputes of this type under our limited review authority.

Moreover, we have held that for the Board to set aside a Carrier's judgment the record must contain substantial evidence of probative value that the Claimant possessed, at the time, sufficient fitness and ability to perform the duties of the position which she sought. The record in the instant case is barren of such evidence that would support a finding that Claimant possessed the indispensable fitness and ability. Claimant herself testified that she would need "a small length of time and some help" in order to do the work in the department.

Finally, on the issue of "discriminatory treatment", Claimant argues that since the test was not properly validated in accordance with Title 41, Chapter 60 of the Federal Code, and therefore, also violates Rule 2 on Non-Discrimination.

This Board is not empowered to interpret or enforce federal laws or regulations dealing with test validation. Claimant must apply to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is that regard..



As far as Rule 2 is concerned, the record does not show substantial probative evidence necessary to
The record shows that of the seven (7) or eight (8) employes who took the test, two (2) passed. Five (5) of the employes who took the test were women, and only one (1) of them passed. No minorities took the test.

This test sample is too small for the Board to come to the sweeping generalization that Carrier's te meaning of Rule 2.

Furthermore, it is worthy of note in regard to the alleged "discrimination" that Claimant herself st definitely" job related.'

In fact, Claimant's suggestion that the test "should be more in regard to general knowledge rather than Customer Accounting knowledge" would leave Carrier more open to a charge of "discrimination", since the teat would be less job related.

Accordingly, on the basis of the record considered as a whole, established precedent, and the foregoing findings and conclusions the Board is compelled to deny the claim.





That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and





Claim denied.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
ATTEST: IV* &M4GW By Order of Third Division



Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 29th day of June 1976.