(Clarence Brown PARTIES TO DISPUTE: (REA Express, Inc.

 STATEMENT OF CLAIM: This is to serve notice as required by the rules of
 the National Railroad Adjustment Board of my inten
 tion to file an ex parte submission on July 3, 1974 covering an unadjusted
 dispute between my client, Clarence Brown, and the Railway Express Agency
 involving the question of wrongful discharge from the Railway Express Agency.

 OPINION OF BOARD: Claimant was employed by Carrier on July 6, 1965 and re
 mained in service until December 22, 1968, when he was
 furloughed. On December 16, 1969, Carrier sent Claimant a telegram recall
 ing him to service as of December 23, 1969. Claimant failed to report on
 said date. On December 23, 1969, Carrier sent Claimant a second telegram
 advising him that he was being dismissed from service due to failure to
 report for work, in accordance with Rule 3 (o) of the Agreement between
 the parties. Both telegrams were sent to Claimant at his residence address
 then on file with Carrier.

 Claim was initiated on behalf of Claimant on January 29, 1970, by letter of the Local Chairman, alleging that both telegrams had not been received by Claimant "becaus and compensated for time lost." Thereafter, appeals were made on the property up to and including th appeals were declined by Carrier, the final declination being dated July 10, 1970.

 On August 15, 1973, Claimant's attorney appealed to Special Board of Adjustment No. 752, and, upon being advised by Carrier that such Board was then in inactive status, he submitted the dispute to this Board on June 3, 1974.

 At the outset, Carrier raises objection to the propriety of this appeal on the ground that it is time barred under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act. It is conceded that no specific time limit is set forth in the Act. However, one of its stated purposes is the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes. A period of 37 months elapsed between the final rejection of Claimant's appeal on the property (July 10, 1970) and his appeal to the Special Board (August 17, 1973). Carrier urges that this period of 37 months is an unreasonable length of time to perfect an appeal, and is not in compliance with the Railway Labor Act stricture on "prompt" settlement of disputes.


Carrier cites, among others, two prior Awards of this Board which are pertinent to this dispute. In Award No. 8162 (Bailer) we stated:






In Award No. 6229 (McMahon) we affirmed this principle, as follows:






attorney's submission, that he was "misled" or that "he was not notified of
 the rejection of the said claim." The facts speak to the contrary, for cn
 Jvne.19, 1970 Claimant filed a complaint of discrimination with the
 New York State Division of Human Rights "after failing to receive his union
 to represent him." This in spite of the fact that the fro nizat'ion :.as -
 engaged at that very time in the processing of its appeal to the Carrier.
 For it was not until one month later, on July 10, 1970, that the final
 appeal on the property was rejected. He knew then and prior thereto
 that his auveal was being rejected by Carrier, as witness his filing of the
 complaint of discrimination on June 19, 1970, and the statement therein
 contained as to "terminating me from employment."

 In view of the above cited precedents, therefore, and the foregoing facts and circumstances, we Beard of Adjustment was in violation of the spirit and stated purpose of the Railway Labor Act. His claim is therefore time barred and must be dismissed.

 Ordinarily, the foregoing would terminate our Opinion at this point. However, various issues are raised in Petitioner's submission which.merit comment.

 1) The Claim of No Investigation.
submission. "Iritially, it is conceded that there is a provision in the
 Union contract which empowers respondent to terminate the employment of any
 employee who fails to respond to a call ordering him to return to work
 after a lay-off." The, specific_provision_of the Agreement ne_re app=cable__
 is Rule 3 (o) which reads as folraows:




Nevertheless, it is urged that Claimant was entitled to an "3nves-, tigation" under Rule 11. We cannot agree. Rule 11 is entitled "Discipline, Grievances and Witnesses" and is specifically designed to cover discipline cases based on offenses. Claimant was not disciplined under Rule 11 and consequently there was no re terminated under Rule 3(o), which is clear and unambiguous and does not require an investigation pri respect is therefore without merit and is disallowed. 2) The issue of the telegrams and claim of "wrongful discharge." Four dates in the record are significant here: a) December 22, 1968 - The date on which Claimant was furloughed. b) October 21, 1969-- The date on which he moved to a new address.

Rule 3(o) provides specifically that a furloughed employee who fails "to return to service within seven calendar days after being notified (by mail or telegram sent to the last address given) or give satisfactory reason for not doing so will be considered out of service." (underlining supplied). The record shows that Claimant was so notified by telegram sent to the last address given. He failed to respond and was ruled out of service.

 Claimant attempts to show "satisfactory reason" for not responding by claiming that he notified the Brotherhood as to change of address. This, however, does not constitute notice to respondent Carrier. He states further that "on November 25, 1969, he notified respondent by a written notice of the said change of address" but he fails to state specifically whom he notified, nor does he subm denies ever having received. Additionally, the letter of the Local Chairman, dated January 29, 1970, contains the statement that Claimant "on or about


November 15, 1969 corrected his address in Room 4, Pennsylvania Express Terminal." This is a purely self-serving statement without any supporting proof in the record and is not consistent with other statements of Claimant referred to above.

 Claimant moved on October 21, 1969 from his address on record with Carrier. He was a furloughed employee; notice of recall to service could come at any time. His responsibility, therefore, was a simple one - to notify Carrier promptly of his change of address. This he failed to do at any time prior to date of the first or second telegram. The record indicates no evidence to the contrary. The convincing, nor do they constitute proper proof of "satisfactory reason" for not responding.

 The Carrier fulfilled its obligation under Rule 3(o) by sending its telegram to Claimant "to the last address given." The fault for its nonrgceipt must rest upon Claima discharged is without merit.

 Accordingly, we find that this claim must be dismissed. Firstly, because it is time barred, and secondly, because the evidence on the merits clearly preponderates in favor of Carrier.



That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

 That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and






                          By Order of Third Division


ATTEST':- j/ ~I~.~
 Executive Secretary

        Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 31st day of August 1978.