RATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
THIRD DIVISION Docket Humber W-22347
(Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
(Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific
( Railroad Company
STATEMENT
OF CLAIM: "Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood
that:
(1) The claim* as presented by the General Chairman on
February 26, 1976 to Roadmaster J. E. Ely shall be allowed as presented
because said claim was not disallowed by Roadmaster J. E. Ely in
accordance with Rule 47 1 (a) (System File C#15-Tisconsin/D-1949).
*The letter of claim will be reproduced within our
initial submission."
OPINION OF HOARD: The letter referred to in Statement of Claim
charged Carrier with violating the effective
Agreement by havingfailed to assign furloughed track laborer
E. E. Erickson to the temporary position of laborer in accordance with
his seniority, at Westby, Wisconsin on January 19, 1976 and thereafter,
and demanded, as remedy, reimbursement to Erickson "for the earnings he
would have received had he been assigned to this position as of
January 19, 1976." The letter contended that Rules 2, 3, 8 "among
others" were violated by Carrier's actions in this matter.
Inasmuch as the claim now before the Division is based on an
alleged procedural default by Carrier, our examination of the record
is addressed to the events involving the handling of the foregoing
claim. In chronological sequence, these steps are:
1. The original claim letter was sent under date of February 26,
1976 from General Chairman R. 0. Chambers to Roadmaster J. E. Ely,
charging denial of assignment and demanding reimbursement therefor in an
amount equivalent to that which he would have earned if he had been
assigned.
2. In its statement to us, Carrier describes its reaction as
one of having realized that employe Erickson should have been called
in for the vacancy in question and so offered to pay his loss of 5 days'
pay (January 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, 1976) by Permitting him to work an
additional week with a section of the crew at Tomah, Wisconsin after
the abolishment of the panel gang he had been working with in March 1976.
Award Number 22551 Page 2
Docket Number
mw-a2347
3.
Carrier includes in the record a copy of a letter, under
date of March
23, 1976,
from Mr. Erickson to General Chairman
R. 0. Chambers of B.M.W.E., showing that copy was sent to J. E. Ely,
Roadmaster. In this letter Mr. Erickson, referring to the subject
claim, states, in part:
"Please drop this claim as I have been duly
compensated by Roadmaster J. E. Ely who
allowed me to work an extra week longer with
the Section crew at Tomah, Wisc. after the
conclusion of the panel gang which I worked
in during the month of March
1976."
4.
However, under date of May
6, 1976,
General Chairman
Chambers wrote to Roadmaster Ely that Ely had not "responded to this
claim in accordance to Rule
47
of the schedule of Rules governing the
employes in the maintenance of way department. The claim is now in
default." The letter quotes Rule
47
and goes on to ask when the
remuneration requested in the original claim will be paid.
5. By letter dated May
21, 1976,
Mr. Ely responded to
Mr, Chambers that he had not regarded it as necessary to "respond" to
the claim, "inasmuch as I accepted Mr. Erickson's letter, copy to me,
of March
23, 1976
as settlement of the grievance and due to the fact
that said letter was addressed to you, I had considered the letter as
proper acknowledgement and handling of the claim."
6.
Further exchanges of letters followed between Carrier and
organization in which are argued essentially their present pastures
before us on the procedural consequences of the alleged individual
"settlements" by Claimant.
Rule 47-1(a) states:
"All claims or grievances must be presented in
writing by or on behalf of the employee involved,
to the officer of the Carrier authorized to receive
same, within
60
days from the date of the occurrence
on which the claim or grievance is based. Should
any said claim or grievance be disallowed, the
Carrier shall, within
60
days from the date same is
filed, notify whoever filed the claim or grievance
(the employee or his representative) in writing of
the reasons for such disallowance. If not so
notified, the claim or grievance shall be allowed
as presented, but this shall not be considered as
Award Number 22551 Page 3
Docket Number NW-22347
"a precedent of waiver of the contentions of
the Carrier as to other similar claims or
grievances."
Organization calls particular attention to that part of the
Rule which requires that (a) when claim is disallowed, Carrier shall,
within 60 days from the date such claim is filed, give written _ _.
notification to "whoever filed the claim," of the reasons for such
disallowance, and (b) if "not so notified, the claim or grievance
shall be allowed as presented..."
Organization notes that although the original claim was
filed with Roadmaster Ely by letter dated February 26,
1976,
Mr. Fay
did not respond to communicator of claim until his letter of May 26,
1976,
eighty-five days later, nor in their view, actually disallow
the claim until a letter from him dated August 27,
1976,
almost 3
months after that, wherein he stated to General Chairman (after
exposition of Carrier's position in respect to Rule 47-1(a)) that
claim is "declined."
Carrier emphasizes that the procedures relied on in Rule \
47-1(a) by Organization refer to "...Should any such claim or grievance'
be disallowed..." In their view, the subject claim was not "disallowed";
it was, in fact, "allowed" by means of the settlement reached between
both the "employee involved" and this Carrier. Accordingly, the claim
is regarded as having been rendered moot by the elimination of an
"employee involved" as well as the absence of a "disallowed" claim -
inasmuch as the claim was timely satisfied by the arrangement made
for and accepted by Claimant (in a letter of March 23,
1976
to
Organization General Chairman - an elapsed. time of less than 30 days
from date of original claim).
Because the claim which has reached us relies only on a
contention of procedural violation, we are confined to making a
judgment solely on that basis; we cannot reach examination of the
merits of the original work-denial claim.
It mist also be stated that the "settlement" of the original
claim which was reached between Carrier and the individual Claimant
must be declared not to constitute an "allowance" of claim which
Organization originally served on Carrier. That claim expressly
demanded payment of a sum of money as reimbursement in compensation
for the alleged work-deprivation. The "settlement" arranged, instead,
for future extra work time equivalent to the time allegedly lost by
Claimant. We must resist analysis of whether such arrangement might
be regarded as a "Just" disposition of the claim; the fact is that it
did not grant said claim.
Award Number
22551
Page
4
Docket Number
Mid-22347
Accordingly, we must reject Carrier's position that it had
"allowed" the claim and that the subject thereby became moot.
We must also find as a matter of plain fact that Carrier
failed to meet its obligation to react explicitly and with direct
responsiveness by the Carrier official addressed to the Organization
official awaiting disposition of the claim seat by the latter, within
the 60 days required in Rule
47.
Here, there are also factors which
might seem capable of reconstruction into an equivalence of such
compliance. This comes from the fact - not refuted by Organization -
that less than 30 days after the claim had been submitted by General
Chairman Chambers to Roadmaster Ely, the employe-on whose behalf the
claim was made, sent a letter to Mr. Chambers, instructing him to drop
the claim inasmuch as a settlement had been reached satisfactory to
him. Again, there is some appeal to "logic" or "moral equivalency"
in an argument that might run: 'What's the difference? The individual
on whose behalf the Organization had acted stated that he no longer had
a claim and notified both organization and Carrier representatives on-___
-the Ievel which
claim
had then reached.. Should not this be allowed to
stand in place of the 'fume tionary-to-flmotionary' response requirement?"
Or looked at another way: "Inasmuch as Claimant declared himself no
longer a Claimant, was that not the end of the whole subject with any
need to go further rendered academic?"
r
We believe that there is much to be said for these arguments,
but we mast take it for granted that Rule
47
means exactly what it
says. Properly to comply with the provisions therein, Mr. Ely
should have gone through what may have appeared to him a redundant act,
but is in the Rule for good and sufficient reasons of orderly and
protected procedures and mandated recognition by law of Organization
as the exclusive bargaining agent for its constituents employed by
Carrier.
Inasmuch as Rule
47
is quite specific in its requirement of
consequence when there is failure to comply with the 60-day procedure
therein mandated, we have no choice bat to regard the situation as
showing a forfeiture of "disallowance" and a consequent compelling of
"allowance" of claim.
FI1®IHGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole
record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
Award Number
22551
Page
5
Docket Number
W-22347
That the parties waived oral hearing;
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute
are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway
Labor Act, as approved June 21,
1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction
over the dispute involved herein; and
That the Agreement was violated.
A W A R D
Claim sustained.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Third Division
ATTEST:
Executive Becretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 28th day of September 1979.