NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
THIRD DIVISION Docket Number MS-22361
James F. Scearce, Referee
(Howard L. Wallace
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
(Delaware and Hudson Railway Company
STATEMENT OF CLAIM: "l. Whether the Railroad acted properly in
discharging Mr. Wallace as Supervisor and Signal
Foreman and as an employee in September, 1972.
2. Whether, even assuming that such discharge was proper,
the Railroad should have reinstated Mr. Wallace because it did not
respond to his grievance which was properly filed with the Railroad, and
therefore the grievance was automatically allowed pursuant to Rule 75
of the Agreement between the Railroad and the Brotherhood of Railroad
signalmen dated January 18, 1963.
3. Whether Mr. Wallace, because of the Railroad's failure
to reinstate him, is entitled to back pay and the fringe benefits for
the period from September 19, 1972 to the present."
OPINION OF : Based upon our review of the record in this case and
from the oral presentations made by the parties, we
find a series of clearly defined circumstances, to wit:
In September, 1972, Claimant Wallace occupied a non-agreement
Supervisor's position.
Claimant Wallace, while occupying the non-agreement .
Supervisor's position, retained seniority in the Signalman's craft.
Effective September 19, 1972, Claimant was notified that he
was "dismissed from all services of the Delaware and Hudson Railway
Company.'.
Claimant attempted to exercise his craft seniority under the
provisions of Rule 48 of the Signalmen's Agreement but was denied such
right.
By letter dated October 11, 1972, Claimant's counsel wrote to
Carrier, in pertinent part:
Award Number 22598 Page 2
Docket Number MS-22361
"* * this letter is forwarded to advise that
Mr. Wallace shoud be immediately returned to
service either in his former position as Supervisor
or as Signal Forman (sic), as his chose in his
letter of September 19, 1972.
"This is to advise that I am going to diary this
file until October 17, 1972, to await some reply
from you. In the event of your failure to take
any affirmative action, there will be no alternative but to commence an action to compel compliance
with the terms of the agreement between the railroad and the union."
On July 17, 1973, Claimant entered suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York in connection with
an alleged injury sustained on or about January 28, 1972. This suit
was settled on September 7, 1976 by payment to Claimant of $190,000.00
on the basis of permanent disability which prevented the performance of
say gainful occupation.
Under date of August 8, 1973, Carrier received advice from
the United States Railroad Retirement Hoard that Claimant Wallace had
been granted a disability annuity by the Railroad Retirement Board
effective October 1, 1972.
By notice dated November 16, 1977, Claimant's counsel informed
this Board of their intention to file an ex pane submission with the
Third Division, National Railroad Adjustment Board.
The jurisdiction and authority of this Board is derived from
Section 3, First of the Railway Labor Act, as amended.
Section 3, First (i) of that statue provides:
"(i) The disputes between an employee or group
of employees and a carrier or carriers growing
out of grievances or out of the interpretation
or application of agreements concerning rates of
pay, rules or working conditions, including cases
pending and unadjusted on the date of approval of
this Act, shall be handled in the usual manner up
to and including the chief operating officer of the
carrier designated to handle such disputes; but,
failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the
disputes may be referred by petition of the
Award Number
2259$
Page
3
Docket Number
MS-22361
"parties or by either party to the appropriate
division of the Adjustment Hoard with a fU77
statement of the facts and all supporting data
bearing upon the disputes."
This Hoard is not a court of equity. Its function is to
interpret rules and agreeements as made by and between the various
Carriers and employes through their representative organizations.
From the record in this case, it is obvious that at the time
that Claimant Wallace was dismissed from Carrier's service he was
assigned to an official position for which there was no agreement
"concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions" as those terms
are used in Section
3,
First (i) of the Railway Labor Act.
A review of the record before our Hoard clearly indicates
that the letter dated October 11,
1972
from Claimant's counsel does
not rise to the stature of a claim. It is a request that one of two
actions be pursued by Carrier. It clearly indicates that if no
"affirmative action" was taken by Carrier, then steps would be
initiated "to commence an action to compel compliance, etc.".
The only subsequent action in regard to this request which is
reflected in the record of this case consists of a second letter from
Claimant's counsel dated January
15, 1973.
Section
2,
Second of the Railway Labor Act, as amended,
contains the following:
"Second. All disputes between a carrier or
carriers and its or their employees shall be
considered, and, if possible, decided, with
all expedition, in conference between
representatives designated and authorized so
to confer, respectively, by the carrier or
carriers and by the employees thereof interested
in the dispute."
As previously noted, Section
3,
First (i) of the Railway
Labor Act requires that all disputes must be "handled in the usual
manner" on the property before such dispute may be submitted to this
Hoard.
These requirements of the Law require a minimum of handling
which the parties cannot waive. In an earlier Award of this Division
(Award No.
10852
with Referee McGrath) we said:
Award Humber
22598
Page 4
Docket Number
MS-22361
"Section 2, Second is definitely mandatory when
it says that all disputes between a Carrier and
its Employes shall be considered and if possible
decided in conference * * *.
"To hold that a conference is not mandatory would
not only change the intent of the law but also
nullify some of its mandatory provisions. This
of course this Hoard has no power to do."
(Emphasis in original)
Again, in Third Division Award No.
17166
(Jones) we said:
"The Railway Labor Act requires that before a
dispute should be appealed to the Board for a
decision, the parties to the dispute should
hold a conference on the property to try to
reach settlement. This concept was upheld by
the United States Supreme Court in Brotherhood
of Loccmotive Engineers vs. Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Company,
373 U.S. 33.
The
reasoning behind this provision is simple--to
ensure that the parties meet and try to reach
some agreement between themselves in as
harmonious fashion as possible. It is only
after such a meeting or conference is held and
only after the parties cannot reach agreement
on the ro ert that this Board's jurisdiction
becomes valid. (Underscore ours)
See also Third Division Award Nos.:
11896 (Hall) 137
(Spencer)
5077
(Coffey)
among others too numerous to require complete citation.
On this basis alone, i.e., the failure of the parties to meet
in conference on the property and the total failure of the moving party
to the dispute to even attempt to meet in conference with the respondent,
is sufficient to justify dismissal of the instant case.
Award Number 22598 Page 5
Docket Number MS-22361
However, even if we were somehow able to overcome the fatal
defect of non-compliance with the provisions of the Federal statute,
we would still be faced with another serious problem.
The Statement of Claim as listed with this Board poses three
(3) questions, name3.y:
"l. Whether the Railroad acted properly in
discharging Mr. Wallace as Supervisor and
Signal Foreman and as an employee in
September, 1972.
2. Whether, even assuming that such discharge
was proper, the Railroad should have reinstated
Mr. Wallace because it did not respond to his
grievance which was properly filed with the
Railroad, and therefore the grievance was
automatically allowed pursuant to Rule 75 of the
Agreement between the Railroad and the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen dated January 18, 1963
(hereinafter the "Agreement").
3. Whether Mr. Wallace, because of the Railroad's
failure to reinstate him, is entitled to back pay
and fringe benefits for the period from September 19,
1972 to the present."
For our purposes we will address these questions in reverse
order starting with the issue of back pay, etc.
The record before us clearly shows that at no time on the
property was the issue of "back pay and fringe benefits for the period
September 19, 1972 to the present" broached. Even if we were to
consider the rearaest as made by claimant's counsel on October 11, 1972
as a claim, there was no indication contained therein relative to pay
of any kind. This issue is being raised for the first time before this
Board and, therefore, cannot be entertained. See Third Division Award
Nos.:
22199(Roukis) 22063 (Yagoda) ?1966 (Sickles)
among others.
In addition, it is apparent from the record that the rersonal
injury action which was initiated and resolved in Claimant's favor on
the basis of permanent disability which caused Claimant to sustain "a
complete loss of earning power as a result of his injuries" estoppes him
Award Number
22598
Page 6
Docket Number MS-22361
from now claiming back pay and fringe benefits. What was said in Jones
vs. Central Georgia Railway Company, 220 F Supp. 990 (1963) is endorsed
here. There we find:
"It seems to this Court the applicable rule of law
is firmly established that one who recovers a
verdict based on future earnings, the claim to
which arises because of permanent injuries, estops
himself thereafter from claims the right to
future re-employment, claiming that he is now
physically able to return to work. Scarano vs
Central RR of New Jersey, 3 Cir. 2135 2d 510,
..... once he had declared in the State Court that
he was permanently disabled and unable to, in the
future, perform work as a switchman and offered
proof in substantiation of his disability, he
was no longer in position to claim with respect
to any alleged future rights or privileges,
further employment under his prior employment
contract "
If, for our purposes of deliberation and decision, we were to
presume that Rule
48
of the Signalmen's Rules Agreement were applicable
in this situation, we could only conclude that, by its very language,
Rule
48
precluded Claimant from exercising displacement rights into the
Signalman's craft on or about September 19, 1972, because it limits
such exercise of displacement rights to situations in which the supervisory position is abolished or
Neither of these situations applied to Claimant.
Therefore, inasmuch as Rule
48
precluded Claimant from returning to the Signalman's craft under the circumstances here involved
of the provisions of.the Signalman's Rules Agreement were applicable to
him - including Rule 75.
Based on the state of the record before us, it is clear that
the provisions of Section 3, First (i) of the Railway Labor Act have not
been complied with; that mandatory conferences were not held on the
property; and that the Claimant is estopped from claiming any re-employment right with this Carrier.
justify a dismissal of this claim. When considered in consort, we are
left with no alternative but to dismiss the claim en toto.
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving
the parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon,
and upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
Award Number 22598 Page 7
Docket Number MS-22361
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute
are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway
Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Hoard has jurisdiction
over the dispute involved herein; and
That there was no violation of the Signalmen's Rules Agreement.
A
W A R D
Claim dismissed.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By order of Third Division
ATTEST.
leal P
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 30th day of October 1979.