NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJIMTMEWT BOARD
THIRD DIVISION Docket Number-CL-23301
Josef P. Sirefmsn, Referee
(Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks,
Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employee
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
(Louisville and Nashville Railroad company
STATEMNT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood
1. Carrier acted in an arbitrary, capricious and unjust manner and
violated the Agreement between the parties when it Qisaissad Clerk-Operator
J. L. Hart from the service of the Company
effective July
5, 1979.
2. In view of the foregoing arbitrary, capricious and unjust action
of the Carrier, it shall now be required to:
(a) Restore Clerk-operator J. L. Hart to service of the Carrier
immediately.
' _ (b) Pay Mr. Hart for all time lost commencing with July
1979, and continuing until he is
restored to
service.
(c) Pay Mr. Hart any amount he incurred for medical or surgical
expense for himself or dependents to the extent that such
payments would have been paid by Travelers Insurance
Company under said policy. In addition, reimburse him for
premium payments he may have made in the purchase of substitute health, welfare and life insurance.
(d) Pay Mr. Hart interest at the statutory rate far the State
of Alabama far any amounts due under (b) hereof.
OPINION OF BOARD: Claimant J. L. Hart, a Clerk-Operator, was charged in an
October 19, 1978 letter as follows:
"Sfoti aiei,charged with cashing or causing to be cashed at
First National Bank, Brewton, Alabama, on September 29,
1978a~LM Pay Draft No. 7130 payable to you and covering
your~i;st period September, 1978 earnings, which had been
altereW from $35.29 to $835.29 after issuance of .the draft
by this company."
After a number of postponements the hearing was held on June 18,
1979 and Claimant was dismissed on July 5, 1979.
.·\
The pertinent portion of Rule 43 (a) provides that:
Award Number 23500 Page 2
' Docket Number CL-23301
w
"Employees who have been in service more than 60 days
will not be daserited, disciplined, or discharged without
just cause. When such act becomes necessary, the accused
shall be duly apprised in writing within ten days after
knowledge of the occurrence of the charge that is brought
against him, and within ten days after such notification,
the employee shall be given a fair and impartial hearing
or investigation by the proper officer of the railroad,
at which time all evidence in the case shall be submitted."
On October 4, 1978 the Carrier's Paymaster wrote to the Director
of Special Services that the pay draft in question "appears to hove been
altered to read $835.29 and bears the endorsement of J. L. Hart on the back".
The local Special Services officer was notified by written instruction from
the Director on October 9, 1978 to investigate. After interviewing bank
personnel,
Claimant, and the keeper of payroll records, Special Services
issued its report to the Carrier on October 16th, and the letter of charges
was issued three days later.
It is contended that the Carrier knew of Claimant's involvement on
October 4th end that Rule 43 (a) required that he be notified of the
investigation by October 14th. Instead the notification was on October 19th,
five days late rendering the imposition of discipline improper ab initio.
In the opinion of this Board the term "knowledge" presupposes
dependable information beyond mere assertion without proof, and contemplates
a reasonable period of investigation to obtain such information. The record
establishes that on October 4th Carrier knew of Claimant's endorsement on the
check but did not know when the alteration had taken place. Therefore
further investigation was indicated. Knowledge that Claimant had cashed an
already altered check was the conclusion of the inquiry and once this
knowledge was gained the carrier acted in timely fashion. The record
further establishes that the amount of the altered check was significantly
higher than any previous check received by Claimant in the prior twenty months,
that Claimant had never before received a check in an amount in excess of
his earnings, that the alteration was apparent on its face when Claimant
cashed it. Thus, there was substantial evidence to sustain Carrier's
decision to discipline Claimant. In view of the seriousness of his misconduct
termination is reasonable.
,~ .. .
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon theehole record
and all the evidence, finds and holds:
That the parties waived oral hearing;
Award Number 23500
. Docket.Number CL-23301 Page 3
That the Carrier and the Bmployes involved in this dispute are
respectively Carrier and Employee within the meaning of the Railway Labor
Act as approved June 21, 1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over
the dispute involved herein; and
That the Agreement was not violated.
A W A R D
Claim denied.
NATIONAL RAILRQAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Third Division
Attest:
Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 8th day of January 1982.
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LABOR DiEMBER'S DISSENT
TO
AWARD 23500, DOCKET CL-23301
(Referee Sirefman)
Award 23500 is in palpable error. Rule 43 of the agreement
is clear. Carrier had ten days to act once it had knowledge of
an altered check. Carrier did not act within ten days. Carrier
admitted that it did not act within ten days but argued it acted
within ten days of the date an~officer "with authority" became
aware of the occurrence. In accepting this argument the Board
read additional language into the rule - "knowledge" is qualified
by "dependable."
We cannot change the rule by interpretation. We cannot amend
the rule by interpretation. The drafters of the agreement were
capable of qualifying "knowledge" with "dependable." They did
not do so, the Board should not have done so.
It is the strict policy of the Board to require the parties
to comply with contractual time limitations. When time limitations, for the performance of an act, a
to comply with them. Whether the limitations are found in
practice to be harsh, not equitable, or unreasonable is no
concern of this Board.. The remedy for such ills is negotiations
between the parties. Our function is by statute confined to
interpretation of the contract. We cannot by decision alter,
vary, add to or subtract from the agreement of the parties.
We have no power to dispense our sense of what we might consider
just and equitable under the circumstances--the terms of the
contract are absolute. See Awards 11757 (Dorsey) and 19851
(Rubenstein).
Furthermore, express time limitations/in grievance procedure have been many times held to be enf
because the parties by including them in their agreement intended thereby to expedite the orderly ha
Application of such rules is sometimes harsh but in the interest
of efficient, proper procedure they must be applied. We are
not granted the discretion to extend such statutes of limitations
as the parties have fixed on themselves. We can only apply
their own rule. See Awards 18352 (Dorsey) and 22162 (Weiss).
The Award is in palpable error and requires dissent.
J. C. Fletcher, Labor Member
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- 2 - Labor Member's Dissent to
Award 23500, Docket CL-23301