NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
THIRD DIVSION Locket Number MW-25626
Nicholas Duda, Jr., Referee
(Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
(Southern Pacific Transportation Company
(Eastern Lines)
STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood that:
(1) The dismissal of Welder Helper J. B. Hope for alleged violation
of Rules w801" and "802" was without just and sufficient cause and on the
basis of a hearing that was neither fair nor impartial (System Files MW-83-48
and MW-83-61).
(2) The claimant shall be reinstated with seniority and all other
rights unimpaired, the charges leveled against him shall be removed from his
record and he shall be compensated for all wage loss suffered beginning April
5, 1983.
OPINION OF BOARD: After receiving a certified letter dismissing him, Claimant
sent a letter to the Carrier requesting a hearing and that
"L. D. Hope be a witness'. Claimant concluded "Please advise time, date and
place hearing will be held with copy to Mr. J. R. Solares (Assistant Vice
Chairman) and Mr. W. E. Allen (General Chairman)". In reply, Carrier sent a
certified letter setting the time, date and place of the hearing. Although
Claimant did not appear, the hearing was conducted on April 26, 1983 without
his presence. His Assistant Vice Chairman was present and did participate by
asking questions of the three Carrier witnesses. The next day, April 27,
1983, the General Chairman wrote Carrier that Claimant had not received the
hearing letter until after the hearing, and the General Chairman had not yet
received it. The General Chairman requested ·another hearing
...
in order
for him (the Claimant) to face the witnesses who testify against him". On
April 29, 1983, the Carrier sent Claimant a letter sustaining the discharge
based on the hearing. Later the Carrier sent the General Chairman a letter
denying his April 27 request for another hearing.
The Organization presented two claims, one on the denial for rehearing and another on the
would be filed as one case before this Board.
The Organization seeks to overturn the dismissal on two grounds:
1. The hearing was neither fair nor impartial as required by
Article 14B because Claimant, who had not received notice until after the
hearing had begun 260 miles away, was not in attendance.
2. The dismissal was without just and sufficient cause.
Award Number 25810 Page 2
Docket Number MW-25626
Without prejudice to its position, the Organization also asserts
that dismissal was an excessive penalty. Carrier contends that the hearing
notice was proper and that evidence at the hearing clearly showed that
Claimant was guilty as charged. Furthermore says the Carrier, in light of
Claimant's previous disciplinary record, the penalty was not excessive. On
the latter point, the Organization claims that the prior discipline record
cannot be considered because it ·was not submitted to or discussed with the
organization during the handling on the property'.
In Third Division Award 13179, the functions of the Board were
stated as follows:
'in discipline cases, the Board sits as an appellate forum. As
such, our function is confined to determining whether:
(1) Claimant was afforded a fair and impartial hearing;
(2) The finding of guilty as charged is supported by substantial
evidence;
(3) The discipline imposed is reasonable."
Article 14 stipulates that an Employe dismissed:
'...will be advised of the cause for such action in writing ...[and]
shall, upon making a written request ...be given a fair and
impartial hearing... [at which] the Employe may be represented by
duly accredited representatives... of the B of M of W E...of his
choice.·
It is generally recognized that Article 14 entitles the Employe to
be present, participate and cross examine witnesses at the hearing. As
pointed out by the Organization, those rights cannot be effectively exercised
unless the Claimant is notified of the impending hearing. Therefore, the
critical question in regard to the alleged failure to give a fair and
impartial hearing is: Whether the Claimant was properly notified of the
scheduled hearing.
The Carrier sent the hearing letter by U. S. Postal Service
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, to the Claimant's last known
address on record. (The same method had been used successfully about three
weeks earlier to transmit the letter notifying Claimant of his dismissal;
the dismissal letter had been posted April 5, 1983 and received by Claimant
on April 7, 1983.) The hearing letter was posted by the Carrier on
Wednesday, April 20, 1983 notifying Claimant of the April 26, 1983 hearing.
The Claimant received the letter on April 26, a Tuesday.
Award Number 25810 Page 3
Locket Number Mw-25626
Carrier relies on a number of prior awards, particularly Award
Number 324 of Special Board of Adjustment No. 100 which considered a very
similar fact situation and claim. In that case, the Carrier sent an Employe
a Certified Letter, Return Receipt Requested, on a Saturday; the letter
stated that an investigation hearing on charges would be held the following
Tuesday morning, three days later. No one received the letter when the
Postman sought to deliver it on the next Monday, so the Postman left the
usual notice about the Certified Letter. The Employe did not receive the
letter before the hearing, which was held despite his absence. The Board
followed the presumption, long-accepted in railway labor law, of receipt by
the addressee of a letter properly addressed and desposited in the mail with
paid postage. The Award stated:
"When the postman notified the claimant there was a
certified letter waiting for him at the Post Office...
the Claimant was properly notified of the investigation,
barring extraordinary facts and circumstances which do
not appear to be present in the record.
"The Carrier is not an insurer of the Claimant's receipt
of notice of investigation. It cannot do more than
utilize reasonable and usual means of written communication to inform the Claimant of the impending
...."
In the case before this Board, the Claimant had requested the
hearing; he was expecting the notice which was sent to his address which he
included in his request letter. The Board notes that the Organization merely
relied on the receipt by Claimant after the hearing had begun and did not
raise a question or attempt to show that the notice was not timely sent; in
the absence of such claim and without any evidence by Claimant, the Board
will not consider that question. Furthermore, the record does not show that
Claimant offered any explanation for why he did not receive the letter until
six days after it was sent by Certified Mail. Under these circumstances, the
Board finds no basis to disregard the presumption of receipt. Accordingly,
the principle of constructive delivery applies; Claimant was properly
notified of the hearing. (Third Division Awards 24129 and 13685.)
General Chairman Allen said in his letter to the Carrier that his
office had not received a copy of the hearing notice. It is true that the
Carriers letter does not reflect that a copy was also being sent to the
Organization Office. Although the record does not show whether Vice Chairman
Solares received advance notice of the hearing, it does show that he was
present and participated effectively in the hearing. Therefore, to the
extent that an error may have been made in notice to the Organization, it was
not prejudicial.
Award Number 25810 Page 4
Locket Number MW-25626
The critical issue in this case is whether the finding of 'guilty
as charged' was supported by substantial evidence at the hearing on April 26,
1983. A finding of guilt required substantial evidence that Claimant had
been insubordinate and used vulgar language on March 18, 1983 in the District
Manager's Office at Shriever, Louisiana, as described in the Carrier's April
5, 1983 letter.
The evidence at the hearing consisted of the testimony of three
witnesses, District Manager D. F. Brown, Track Foreman M. H. Hime1, and Clerk
S. M. Underwood. The record of their testimony supports a finding by the
Carrier of insubordination and vulgar language by an uninvited visitor who
attempted to use the telephone. However, the Organization showed by the same
witnesses through cross-examination at the hearing on the property that the
association or
connection between
Claimant and the misconduct is highly
speculative and insubstantial. Specifically, the Organization established at
the hearing that the visitor had no identification even as an gnploye and did
not give his name; none of the three witnesses knew the Claimant. The only
evidence identifying the Claimant as the visitor is tenuous, contradictory,
and of questionable credibility.
Both Mr. Brown and Mr. Himel testified separately that Brown asked
the visitor "who he was". The following is taken from the Hearing Transcript:
'Brown: This man walked into my office about 3:00 p.m. he come
through the clerk portion of the trailer and walked into my
end of the office in sloppy manner, and when I say sloppy
manner I mean that the man had his belt unbuckled, his belt
was hanging out of his shirt was unbutton this man gave me
the appearance of a hobo an the man walked over to a vacance
phone that was on the wall I was on one and my clerk was on
the other phone. This man pick up the phone the clerk was on
when see that someone was on the line he slam the phone back
on the wall. Which at that time I stop my conversation
and ask the man what he was doing he told me he was trying
to call Mary Jane. I ask the man in a polite manner I wish
that he would tell me who he was and if he would ask to used
the phone the man stood there a minute just looking at me
in a staring manner and then he said well I don't have to use
your mother f------ phone. I told the man at that time if that
be the case then 1 would like for him to leave the office.
The man stood there a minute looking at me then started toward
the door and just as he started out the door he turn and looked
at me and said sorry mother f-----. When the man said this
I got up and walk up the door and ask him what his name was.
He was walking toward his car and still would not tell me
who he was. There was some man riding with him standing by
the car he told that man get in and lets get out this mother
f------ place. Through asking questions through other people
I found out that this man was working on Avondale district.'
Award Number 25810 Page 5
Locket Number MW-25626
Brown testified that he asked for identification twice, but the man
would not ·te11' either time. Mr. Himel had a different recollection:
"Question by Presiding Officer: ...tell me what (the visitor's)
reply was to Mr. Brown when Mr. Brown asked him who he was?
Hime1: He said he was a Welder Helper working on Steel Gang
on the Branch.'
Even if Hime1's recollection were credited, the evidence at the
hearing cannot support the identification of the uninvited visitor as being the
Claimant. This was brought out in the cross examination of Brown by Vice
Chairman Solares. Solares asked: ·How did you identify welder helper J. B.
Hope (Claimant) as the person in question?· Brown answered:
"After the man left my office I started asking questions to who the
man was M. Himel said that the man said he was a welder helper on
the steel gang. Through call avondale where the steel gang was
working I found out that there was only two welder helper on the
steel gang one was Mexican origin by the name of Garcia who I know
the other was a Black Man who was J. B. Hope. The party who enter
my office was a Black man that enter my office."
In other words, the uninvited visitor said he was a Welder Helper
and some unidentified person not present at the hearing told Brown that
Claimant was a black Welder Helper. From that flimsy hearsay, the Hearing
Officer concluded that Claimant had been the uninvited guest. There was not
even any evidence at the hearing placing Claimant in the vicinity on the
day in question.
When Brown asked for identification a second time, after expressing
criticism for use of the phone without permission and other conduct, the
visitor was alerted that Brown was at least displeased. The visitor could
have, but did not, give his name. On the contrary, his conduct indicated a
desire to leave quickly without being identified. Thus, Brown's version that
the visitor had not given any identification is plausible. However, even if Hime1
testified accurately when he said he heard the visitor say he was a Welder
Helper, the identification requires corroboration and specification. The
necessary further evidence was not shown in the record.
A simple, direct and effective identification could have been made
at a hearing where the witness and Claimant confronted each other. Claimant
and the Organization sought a rehearing where this would have been possible.
The Carrier refused that opportunity. As indicated above, the Carrier was
not required to conduct a rehearing, but it acted at its peril if the
evidence at the hearing was not substantial enough to support a finding that
Claimant had committed the misconduct. Inasmuch as the charge against
Claimant cannot reasonably be supported by the evidence at the hearing, which
was not substantial, the claim must be sustained. He is entitled to be made
whole for wages and benefits he lost less any monies he would not have
received but for the improper dismissal.
Award Number 25810 Page 6
Locket Number MW-25626
FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, after giving the
parties to this dispute due notice of hearing thereon, and upon the
whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:
That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are
respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor
Act, as approved June 21, 1934;
That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over
the dispute involved herein; and
That the Agreement was violated.
A
W
A R D
Claim sustained.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Third Division
Attest:7~.~ zz
4~0~
Nancy ver - Executive Secretary
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 12th day of December 1985.
;r-
CARRIER MEMBERS' DISSENT
TO
AWARD 2 810 DOC1fET MW-2 626
(Referee Duda
The Majority decision is in disregard of the Rules of Procedure of this Board
adopted more than 50 years ago in compliance with the requirements of the Railway
Labor Act, and followed uniformly in literally hundreds of Awards since that time.
What adds even greater injury to the insult is that the Majority selected an outof-service caPSe to
unfortunate opinion
.
The Majority finds that the Carrier did not support its determination that
Claimant was guilty of violating Carrier Rules with substantial evidence adduced
at the Investigation. Such position was not taken by the
Organization in
its handling of the dispute on the property, in its Submission to the Board, in its Rebuttal
Submission to the Board, in its oral argument before the Referee at the hearing it
requested, or in the panel discussion following the hearing. The Organization's
position and argument throughout the handling of this case was that the Carrier
violated the Agreement by not scheduling another Investigation following the one at
which the Claimant did not appear or, in the alternative, the Carrier violated the
Claimant's right to due process under the Agreement by holding the Investigation in
the absence of the Claimant. These were the only issues raised by the Organization
and, with respect to these issues, the Majority ruled in the Carrier's favor.
When the proposed Award was presented, a further panel discussion was requested
and held. Every scrap of evidence presented by the Organization on the property
was examined. Nothing could be found to support a conclusion that the Organization
had taken the position that the Carrier had not carried its burden of proof at the
Investigation that was held. Nor, for that matter, could anything be found in the
Organization's Submission or Rebuttal that dealt with the subject. The Referee was
Page 2
provided with a copy of Circular No. 1 of the Board, entitled "National Railroad
Adjustment Board Organization and Certain Rules of Procedure." The Circular was
issued by the Board a few months after the enactment of the Railway Labor Act in
1934, pursuant to Section 3, First(v) of the Act (45 USC Section 153, First(v))
which required the Board to "adopt such rules as it deems necessary to control
proceedings before the respective divisions ...." The Referee's attention was
directed particularly to the provisions of the Circular which provide the parties,
in taking a position before the Board,
"...must affirmatively show the same to have been presented to the
carrier and made a part of the particular question in dispute."
The Referee was furnished with numerous Awards of all Divisions of the Board that
have held, without a single exception, that the Board cannot consider positions,
evidence, or argument that the parties had not taken or made on the property. One
of the cited Awards was that rendered by the Referee in this case. Thus, in Third
Division Award 25647 (Duda), the Board stated:
~"It is well settled that new issues or defenses cannot be raised for
the first time before the Board. This principle applies to an
Employe's prior record as well as any other issue.' (Third Division
Award No. 24273)"
All to no avail.
The fundamental error of the Majority is highlighted in the Award itself.
Thus, the Majority seeks to justify its holding by asserting that the Carrier
"acted at its peril" by not holding another hearing as had been requested by the
Organization. The Majority conveniently forgets that the Organization had claimed
its right to another hearing solely on the ground that the first hearing violated
the Agreement because the Claimant was not present; and that such claim had been
denied by the Majority. In essence, the Award holds the Carrier responsible because
it was not clairvoyant in forseeing that the Majority, long after the fact,
Page
3
would find determinative an issue never considered to be significant by the Organisation and
regulation contained in Circular No. 1 of the Board, and the Awards thereafter, is
that the record on the property must show that the parties were given the opportunity
to respond to the position and arguments of the other side. In this case, the Carrier
never had reason to demonstrate that there was substantial evidence to sustain the
findings of the Hearing Officer because the Organization never raised the issue.
The Award in this dispute is arbitrary and capricious. It is in violation of -the
procedures of this Board which were formulated in accordance with the requirements of
Section
3,
First(v) of the Railway Labor Act as amended
(45
USC Section
153,
Firat(v)).
It is a prime example of an arbitration tribunal which refuses to recognize that it
"does not sit to dispense its own brand of industrial justice," a refusal that was
condemned by the Supreme Court long ago in Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car
Corp.,
363
U.S.
593 (1960).
We Dissent.
M. W F
h ~,ya,~
.
400
F. EUI
M. C. LESNIK
P
J. E. YOST