Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.
At the time this dispute arose, Claimants had established and held seniority in the Maintenance of Way Subdepartment, Group 1 on the Jacksonville-Tampa Seniority District, and were all on furlough because of force reductions. On October 30, 1989, an outside contractor assigned by the Carrier, the Osmose Company, began performing track maintenance work such as in track tie treatment work beginning at Mile Post 5680.0 on the Wildwood Subdivision. Eleven employees of the Osmose Company who hold no seniority whatsoever within the Maintenance of Way and Structures Department performed in track tie treatment work using equipment such as an adzing machine, creosote sprayer, air compressor and pump. These eleven employees worked ten hours per day, six days per week, and as of the date of this claim had worked a total of 4400 hours consisting of 2992 hours straight time and 1408 hours overtime.
The organization maintains that the Carrier violated the Agreement because it did not afford Claimants an opportunity to perform this in track tie treatment work in accordance with their Maintenance of Way seniority, and that Claimants were fully qualified and readily available to perform this work had the Carrier afforded them an opportunity to do so. The Organization asserts that this dispute involves bad faith on the part of the carrier.
The Organization asserts that Claimants suffered economically from the Carrier's action through loss of their equal proportionate share of 4400 hours of pay at their respective rates. The carrier contends that because it had a right to contract out the in track tie treatment work, Claimants therefore experienced no such loss of earnings.
The organization claims that Rules 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Agreement provide that the type of maintenance work performed by the Osmose Company employees is reserved to the Carrier's Maintenance of Way forces, and that this type of maintenance work has been traditionally performed by such forces. The Carrier maintains that the type of work performed by the Osmose Company employees is not encompassed within the scope of the Agreement. The Carrier further contends that the type of maintenance work performed required the use of specialized equipment not owned by or available to the Carrier, and that such work required special licensing which the Carrier forces did not possess. Form 1 Award No. 29535
The Organization argues that Rule 5 of the Agreement specifically lists the types of Carrier owned equipment routinely used for such maintenance work, and that such equipment was used for the work performed by the Osmose Company employees. The Carrier contends that the work required a patented process and special skills not possessed by the Carrier forces. The organization maintains that such a change in the method of performing this work does not by itself remove such work from the scope of the Agreement, and that Carrier's argument regarding the lack of skills or proper licensing of its employees as well as the unavailability of the proper equipment is factually unsubstantiated.
The organization asserts that the Carrier violated the Agreement when it failed to confer and reach an understanding with the General Chairman prior to assigning the maintenance work to the Osmose Company employees as required under Rule 2 of the Agreement. The Carrier contends that it was not required to do so because the maintenance work involved was of a specialized nature.
Both parties have cited several Awards to support their respective positions. After reviewing said Awards, the Board finds that Awards cited by the Carrier, primarily Third Division Awards 29185 and 26032 to be dispositive in this case. Particularly relevant is the Third Division Award 26032 in which the Board denied a factually similar claim based upon the specialized nature of the work which was contracted out.
LABOR MEMBER'S DISSENT
TO
AWARD 29535. DOCKET MW-29700
(Referee DiLauro)
The Majority exceeded its jurisdiction and obviously erred in denying this claim about in-track tie treatment work performed outside Jacksonville, Florida, because in doing so it illegally adulterated the crystal clear controlling language of Rule 2. This award is palpably erroneous and should not be considered as precedent.
The Majority, in the fourth paragraph of Award 29535, sets forth the factual circumstances of the dispute as being that:
"RULE 2
CONTRACTING
Plainly, had the Majority read and given common ordinary meaning to the words of Rule 2, the track maintenance work involved was that which was contemplated by the parties when they negotiated the words all maintenance work. Hence, the Carrier was contractually required to assign such work to its employes who were subject to the Schedule Agreement. In this connection, and without getting into a lengthy restatement of our position regarding scope coverage of the track maintenance work in question, it is noteworthy that the instant dispute was "argued" on November 4, 1992, just weeks after an article concerning in-track tie treatment appeared in the September 1992 issue of "Railway Track & Structures" (RT&S) magazine. RT&S is recognized as an authoritative periodical throughout the industry. At Page 39, the RT&S article stated:
The salient point here is that maintenance of crossties is track maintenance work reserved to the Carrier's Track Subdepartment employes by Rule 2 unless/until express exceptions are shown.
For the Majority's edification, Rule 2 also provides exceptions to the requirement that all main subject to the Agreement, i.e., when special skills not possessed by the employees and the use of special equipment not owned by or available to the Carrier are involved. Those exceptions were where the Carrier belatedly hung its defensive "hat" during the onproperty handling of the dispute followed to deny the claim. The word "belatedly" is significant. Because there was NO dispute that the character of the work involved, i.e., in-track tie maintenance, had historically, traditionally and customarily been assigned to and performed by the Carrier's Maintenance of way forces, ANY special skills and equipment issues were plainly the exceptions contemplated by Rule 2, i.e., topics for good-faith discussions in conference BEFORE the Carrier's decision to contract out such work. For the Majority's edification, the Carrier's presentation of such issues ex post facto are simply EXCUSES to escape monetary liability for its violations of the Agreement. Again, Rule 2's language, clearly and unambiguously controls such instances by its terms which read: Labor Member's Dissent
The Majority could not have been faced with more explicit provisions. The word "will" simply man in such instances. Although the Majority remarked in the penultimate paragraph of its findings that no such conference had occurred relative to the track maintenance work in question, it chose to ignore the plain facts and the clear rule. In addition, although directed to Award 28486 involving this Carrier disposing of similar Carrier contentions in the Employes' favor, the Majority chose to ignore what is plain and clear even to those unschooled in Railroad arbitration. Again, Award 28486, held:
Had the Majority read the above-quoted Award 28486 and applied the well-reasoned principles enunciated therein to the factual circumstances, a sustaining award would have been inevitable. This is stated unequivocally because the factual circumstances considered by Award 28486 are virtu this award, i.e., Award 28486 considered 'patented' roadbed injection maintenance work and this award considered 'patented' crosstie injection maintenance work. However, the applicable controlling contractual language, at least from the Carrier's standpoint, is far more restrictive in the instant case with Rule 2 than in Award 28486 with Appendix 'B'. Notwithstanding, and incomprehensibly, the Majority chose to alter and amend Rule 2's terms "all maintenance work" to mean something other than, less than ALL MAINTENANCE WORK. Of course, the Majority does not have Labor Member's Dissent
the authority to alter or amend the language agreed upon by the parties to the Agreement. Hence, the Majority's decision in Award 29535 which failed to draw its essence from the Agreement, is illegal and of no precedential value whatsoever.
Perhaps more significantly, the majority failed in its obligation to serve the purpose of the procedures established by the Railway Labor Act. Instead, its nonsensical findings cast a cloud over the value of the award while leaving the circumstances relative to Rule 2 essentially undecided.
Further evidence that the Majority erred when it arrived at Award 29535 is found in the fact that they considered as precedent, facts and rules which bear little, if any, resemblance to those decided in the subject award. In this connection, the Majority purportedly reviewed the awards cited by both parties and found Award 29185 dispositive and Award 26032 particularly relevant in deciding this dispute. Award 29185 involved the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and a contracting out of concrete, anchor application and epoxy grouting work was very brief. Although the award concerned agreement rules which did not expressly reserve the work to maintenance of Way employes, its denial centered on that Carrier's proffer of past practice evidence, i.e., two hundred fifty-one (251) instances of contracting similar work over a twenty (20) year period, which went largely undisputed and was acquiesced Labor Member's Dissent
to by the Organization. Beyond the name of the outside contractor involved, i.e., ,Osmose", Award 29185 has NO APPARENT SIMILARITY to anything in Award 29535. Likewise, or similarly dissimilar is Award 26032, the opinion of which is a scant seventeen (17) lines but which the Majority nonetheless, found to be both "Particularly relevant" and "a factually similar claim based upon the specialized nature of the work which was contracted out." At this juncture, we are impelled to quote the entire "OPINION OF BOARD:" of Award 26032, which reads:
From a review of the foregoing, it is plain that the Majority compounded its failure to examine the plain facts together with the clear rule by its FAILURE TO EVEN LOOK AT WHAT IT WAS CITING AS CONTROLLING PRECEDENT in this instance. Suffice it to say that Award 26032 was denied for a lack of rule support and/or evidence, bears no factual similarity to the dispute decided by Award 29535 and should not have been cited as controlling precedent. Although the Majority grievously erred in Award 29535, the real travesty was the furloughed Claimants' real loss of work opportunity in this instance and their very real loss of monetary benefits accruing thereto. Unfortunately, the Majority by Award 29535 visited its own maverick brand of industrial justice upon the Claimants which only brings home the principle that an injury to one is an injury to all. Therefore, I am compelled to dissent.