The record indicates that the "Chief Clerk and Assistant Chief Clerk" titles mentioned in paragraph 4.A. of the 1984 letter of procedures are now known as the Transportation Service Agent and the Assistant Transportation Service Agent.

It is the position of the Organization that, prior to December 16, 1988, both positions here in question were "headquartered" at Ravenna. However, by agreement of the parties, the TSA position was held at Ravenna and the ATSA position was thereafter "headquartered" at Patio, Kentucky, some 30 miles from Ravenna. Therefore, it argued, that Carrier was in violation of Rule 26, Section 2(b) of the Agreement when it laid in the TSA position at Ravenna and used the ATSA position at Patio to perform work of the TSA position. It contended that "Carrier had no contractual authority to use an employee outside the environs of Ravenna to perform duties assigned to TSA Lawson." (emphasis added). It charged that past practice "did not include areas outside a terminal."

The Carrier argued that because of the fact that the majority of the work to be performed on the holiday was at Patio, and because the incumbent of the ATSA position was "the only one of the two employees who was qualified to perform the duties at Patio," and because the incumbent of the ATSA position was also qualified to perform the work of the TSA position which was required to be performed on the holiday, he - the ATSA incumbent - was used in accordance with the provisions of the October 9, 1980 Agreement and the 1984 letter of procedures. Carrier continued its argument by contending that item 4.A. of the 1984 letter of procedures defines the two positions as being in the same "area in which work will be required" as set forth in the 1980 Agreement.

In its presentation to the Board, the organization submitted several Awards of the Third Division each of which, it says, supports its contention that when a position is not actually blanked on a holiday and is worked by another, the incumbent of the blanked position is entitled to eight hours at the punitive rate.

The Board studied all of the cited Awards and takes no exception to the logic or conclusions found therein. However, none of the cited Awards are representative of a fact situation which is similar to that which exists in this case. Here the parties' basic Agreement requires that when it becomes necessary to perform work of an assignment on a holiday, the incumbent of the position shall be given preference to the work. That basic Rule requirement on this property was amended by Agreement of the parties dated October 9, 1980, and Carrier was thereafter given the unilateral rights to decide the "areas" in which work would be required on a holiday and the number of employees which would be required to do the work. The 1980 Agreement clearly stipulates that the employee "who is qualified to perform all work required in that area" will be used.

In its implementation of this Agreement amendment, Carrier defined the two positions here in question as being in the same "area." It is interesting to note the choice of words used by the parties in the 1980 Agreement. The word "areas" was used. The words "headquarters" or "environs" or "terminal" were not used. These words clearly are not synonymous with the word areas and the usual and customary usage of these words is not the same. There is no evidence in the case record to support the Organization's contention of a practice of not including areas outside of a terminal when applying the holiday work Rules. There is no evidence in the case record to suggest that Claimant was "qualified to perform all work required" on the holiday. Neither is there anything found in the December 17, 1988 Memorandum Agreement, which changed the headquarters of the ATSA position to Patio, that in any way abrogated or otherwise impinged upon Carrier's right to define the "areas in which work will be required" on holidays.

Therefore, on the basis of the relative convincing force of Agreement language and evidence, it is the Board's conclusion that the use of the junior qualified employee to perform service on the holiday under the circumstances present in this case did not violate either the rights of Claimant or the terms of the Agreement. The claim as presented is denied.

AWARD