The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:

The carrier or carriers and the employee or employees involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employee within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.

This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.

Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.

Claimant is a Signalman at Carrier's Savannah Signal Shop with a 7:00 A.M. to 3:30 P.M., Monday through Friday tour of duty. There is no dispute that for some time prior to July 1, 1991, Claimant was absent from his position due to "a prolonged illness." On July 1, 1991, Claimant, with the help of his personal physician, completed paperwork to initiate his return to service. On July e, "as a result of the records submitted" Carrier's Chief Medical Officer advised Claimant that he was not considered "qualified" to return to service. Later on that same date, Claimant delivered a statement from his personal physician stating that his medical

restrictions had been "lifted," and he was able to return to service. Claimant was ultimately returned to service on August 9, 1991, however, he was again disqualified on August 20 due to "continuing medical problems."

On August 17, 1991, the organization initiated a claim contending that Carrier's "failure to promptly return Claimant to service" was in violation of Agreement Rule 15, "Work Week and Reduction of Hours," and Rule 16, "Rest Day and Holiday Service."

The organization maintained that Claimant had "followed Carrier's guidelines for providing information regarding his medical status" and should have been allowed to return to work when carrier was provided with a medical release on July 8. Carrier denied the claim submitting that Claimant should not have been returned to service at all, and Claimant's August 9, 1991 return to service was actually an "oversight" by the Medical Department.

On September 24, 1991, the Organization appealed Carrier's denial, which carrier subsequently affirmed maintaining that Claimant's release for duty by his personal physician "did not meet the requirements for determining his medical qualification.

"While you state that Claimant's personal physician allegedly released him to return to work, we might remind you that only Carrier's Chief Medical officer has that right. Claimant's personal physician may release him from his care, but knowledge of the job requirements dictate that approval to return to work come from the Chief Medical Officer. The rules cited by you do not support your contention that a rule violation occurred and none of those rules restricts the determination of Carrier's Chief Medical officer in regard to personal qualifications. Furthermore, the rules cited by you do not supersede Carrier's obligation and responsibility with regard to providing a safe working environment for its employees."

The organization predicated its primary argument on Carrier's "obligation to return Claimant to duty" on July 8, 1991, after being notified of his "non-restricted medical fitness for service." For its part, Carrier asserts that it has "the right to set medical standards for its employees and to ascertain that employees meet those standards."

So far as this record shows, Carrier was not remiss in its efforts to return this employee to service. Carrier examined Claimant's medical records, and determined that he was taking medication which made it impossible for him to safely perform his

rights, and is, in fact, obligated to determine the fitness of its employees for service. It is also understood that Carrier should not prolong the process of medical validation unreasonably. We find no abuse of managerial discretion in this case.

It was incumbent upon the Organization to prove, with a preponderance of record evidence, that Claimant was improperly held from returning to service in a timely manner. The Organization was unable to sustain that burden. Therefore this claim must be denied.

AWARD.