CHANGES OF RESIDENCE DUE TO TECHNOLOGICAL,

OPERATIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

When a carrier makes a technological, operational, or

organizational change requiring an employee to transfer

to a new point of employment requiring him to move his

residence, such transfer and change of residence shall be

subject to the benefits contained in Sections 10 and il

of . the Washington Job Protection Agreement,

notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in

said provisions, except that the employee shall be

granted 5 working days instead of `two working days'

provided in Section 10 (a) of said Agreement; and in

addition to such benefits the employee shall receive a

transfer allowance of $800. Under this provision, change

of residence shall not be considered `required' if the

reporting point to which the employee is changed is not

more than 30 miles from his former reporting point. (As

amended by Agreement dated June 4, 1991.)"

Carrier's position in its denial of the requested reimbursement is that Claimant was not "required" to relocate to Mason City, but rather he "chose" to make that move rather than to follow his position from Chadron to Lusk. Carrier further contends that the change of headquarters from Chadron to Lusk was not a "technological, operational or organizational change" as that term is used in Appendix ''F." Carrier insists that "the decision to change Claimant's headquarters from Chadron to Lusk, Wyoming, was merely a business decision based on Claimant's primary work location on the Coal Line."

The Organization acknowledges that Carrier has the fundamental right to change the headquarters of any position which it chooses, but when such a change requires the relocation of the e=loyee's reporting point more than 30 miles, then the provisions of Appendix "F" become applicable. In this instance, it argues that the

relocation to Mason City rather than to Lusk does not negate the fact that a change of more than 30 miles was re~auired of the Claimant. It insists that "Claimant was left with no option in this situation; he had to relocate."

The Board's review of the fact situation in this case when considered in the context of the Agreement provisions leads to the conclusion that the Organization's position in this instance is more persuasive. This conclusion finds support in several prior arbitral decisions on this issue including Third Division Award 30745 which involved the same parties as are involved here. In that Award, the Board held as follows:

"As in most such cases, the determining factor is whether Claimant's change of residence was proximately caused by a `technological, operational or organizational change' within the meaning of that quoted term in Appendix F. Consideration of the plain language of Appendix F persuades a majority of the Board that the change of more than 100 miles in Claimant's headquarters required him to transfer to a new point of employment requiring him to move his residence. The simultaneous abolishment of 31 positions and a 100 mile change in headquarter points is clear evidence of a rearrangement of forces representing a fundamental reorganization by Carrier. Arbitral precedent from similar disputes clearly indicates that departmental rearrangements of this type and magnitude are considered organizational changes covered by Appendix F of the Agreement. See Public Law Board No. 3402, Award 20, Special Board of Adjustment No. 606, Award 132, and Third Division Award 21189. Claimant was not required to displace to a lower-rated job at the old headquarters to relieve Carrier of its Appendix F obligation and his subsequent exercise of seniority and transfer of residence to obtain a like position at Missouri Valley was directly causally linked to the transfer of headquarters to Cedar Rapids, i.e., it would not have occurred but for that change of his original headquarters.,,

And again in Third Division Award 28390 it was held that:

"There is no question that the reorganization of territories by Carrier on February 5, 1982 was an `operational change' within the established meaning of that term in the industry. SBA 605, Award 235. Nor can there be any doubt in objective minds that the operational change was the proximate cause of the invocation of Rule 65 rebulletining which led directly to

and, in a practical sense, 'required' Claimant's change of residence from Lapeer to Lansing. In our judgment it would be contrary to the letter and intent of the Agreement language to allow Carrier to bootstrap its position in this Claim on the sophistic theory that Rule 65 rebulletining was a separate and independent cause o= Claimant's change of residence. See SBA 605, Award 165."

"As we read the language, therefore, the only question remaining is whether Claimant's move to Stockton was caused by the transfer of his former reporting point from Sacramento to Greenville. Of course, had Claimant move to Greenville this would have been a simple and more straightforward case, virtually on all fours with Award No. 132 of Special Board of Adjustment No. 605. On the facts of record before us, however, we are still persuaded that but for the organizational change which transferred his former position to Greenville Claiman= would not have moved to the Stockton position. For that reason we conclude that his move to Stockton in order ro retain a STF position was required' by the organizational change."

A similar conclusion is inescapable in this case. B;:= for the change of headquarters from Chadron to Lusk, which chayc= was an organizational change, Claimant would not have been entitled to move to the Mason Citv position. He was "required" to make a move because of the organizational change. The provisions of Apt=radix "F" are applicable to that required relocation. According!-:, the claim of the organization is sustained.

AWARD Claim sustained.