As Third Party in Interest, the Transportation Communications International hniou, Carmen's Division was notified of the pendency of this dispute, but chose not to rile a Submission with the Board.
In this case the Organization alleges that Carrier used Shop Craft employees (Carmen) to perform work which is reserved to AIofW employees by the Scope Rule. Claimants J. Bradley and W. Love Jr. have established and hold seniority in the Track and Welding Subdepartments, respectively. At the time of this dispute, Claimant Bradley was on furlough status.
By letter dated April 1, 1991, the General Chairman filed a claim asserting that on three consecutive days in late February 1991, Carrier "allowed" Car Department employees to cut up old rail and haul rail, crossties and scrap when clearing the rightof-way at Car Chairman, Carrier violated Rules 1, 2(d) 22(e) and 38(b) of the Agreement when it allowed Carmen to perform work "accruing" to Maintenance of Way employees.
In his reply to the Organization's assertions the Roadmaster advised the General Chairman:
Predicated on that information, the Division Engineer denied the Organization's claim maintaining that:
On December 3, 1991, the General Chairman submitted a statement ostensibly signed by three MOW employees asserting that they had "observed two Car Shop employees loading and hauling scrap rail and used crossties out of the C-Yard at Radnor on February 21 and 22, 1991." In his final declination, Carrier's highest appellate officer stated that he was "not impressed" by the proffered statements "submitted some 5 months after the alleged incidents."
As the moving party, it %-,as incumbent upon the Organization to prove the material aspects of its claim by a preponderance of probative evidence on the record. The rather tardy statement signed by three NloiNV employees is insufficient to effectively refute the Roadmaster's statement that Car Shop employees did their work in cleaning the Yard and did not perform %lof%1Vwork.
On balance the Board is faced with an irreconcilable conflict of material fact which redounds to the detriment of the Organization which has the burden of persuasion on that fact. From the state of this record, we are unable to make an informed judgement as to whether the Agreement was violated or not. Therefore, we must dismiss the claim for failure of proof.
This Board, after consideration of the dispute identified above, hereby orders that an award favorable to the Claimant(s) not be made.