This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.
It is undisputed that Carrier hired a scrap dealer to retire its Lewiston Yard. Carrier did not provide the Organization advance written notice of its plans to use the outside forces to remove substantial quantities of the yard materials even though some of the material retired was retained by the Carrier. According to the record, the Organization agreed it was proper for the contractor do handle its owned material. But the Organization disputed the contractor's handling and stockpiling of the material retained by the Carrier. The Organization cited Third Division Award 26673 in support of its position.
Carrier did not raise any "piecemealing" of work defense on the property. Although it did so in its Submission, the Board will not consider evidence and argument that was not part of the claim handling on the property. Carrier also properly asserted, without challenge by the Organization, that each of the Claimants was fully employed and compensated on the claim dates.
Under the unique circumstances of this record, we find that Carrier did violate the requirements of Article IV of the May 17, 1968 National Agreement concerning the contracting of work.
As to the remedy, however, it has been a well established principle of this Board to deny compensation for Article IV violations when no loss of earnings is demonstrated. This principle was clearly stated in Third Division Award 26673 cited by the Organization. Since there was no loss of earnings proven by this record, we must deny Part (2) of the claim.
This Board, after consideration of the dispute identified above, hereby orders that an award favorable to the Claimaot(s) be made. The Carrier is ordered to make the Award effective on or before 30 days following the postmark date the Award is transmitted to the parties.
LABOR MEMBER'S DISSENT
TO
AWARD 32019. DOCKET MW-31492
(Referee Wallin)
The Majority correctly found that the Agreement was violated when the Carrier assigned employes who hold no seniority under the Agreement to perform work without notifying the General chairman before it did so. However, the Majority's finding that no monetary remedy is warranted for such a violation is both poorly reasoned and clearly ignores the caveat found within the very award it cites in support of its position to deny said remedy.
The Majority's first error was its finding that there is a "well established principle of this Board to deny compensation for Article IV violations when no loss of earnings is demonstrated". That finding is plainly and simply wrong. What is perplexing is how the Majority arrived at this plainly wrong conclusion. There is no precedent cited in the award. However, a review of the record establishes that the following list of awards was cited to the neutral member by the Organization as precedent concerning this type of work, Third Division Awards 24280, 28611 and Award 21 of Public Law Board 4370. Typical thereof is Award 24280, which held:
connection therewith, and applied said authority to the circumstances in the instant case, it wo render the finding that it did.
Second, the Majority cited Award 26673 as part of the authority to deny the monetary portion of the claim. It is true in that case that the Board did not award a monetary remedy but it did go on to state:
Inasmuch as that award was adopted on November 23, 1987, more than five (5) years before this dispute arose, the caveat would have been satisfied and the damages portion of the claim in this case should have been enforced. Under such circumstances, a monetary award is not the equivalent of punitive damages. Instead, it is compensating the claimants for work they otherwise would have performed and wages they would have earned. That is precisely the theory upon which the vast majority of awards have relied to sustain monetary claims for fully employed claimants. Labor Member's Dissent
After all, if it were an established principle to deny a monetary award based on the claimants fully employed status, what sense would it make to there being such a dispute to the National Railroad Adjustment Board. All the Carrier would have to do is contract out the employes work with impunity while the forces were fully employed, ignore the notification provisions and receive a mere slap on the wrist from the Board for doing so. If that were the case, the Carrier would begin to cut back its forces even further than it has, and hire contractors to do all seasonal work while the skeleton work force preformed the basic maintenance. After that.the death of the Agreement would not be far off. Such a scenario is clearly not what the framers of the Railway Labor Act intended when it wrote Section 3 of the Act.