The Third Division consisted of the regular members and in addition Referee Marty E. Zusman when award was rendered.
The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employee or employees involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employee within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934.
This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein. Form 1 Award No. 36525
This is a contract interpretation based upon undisputed core facts. The parties agree that the Claimants were assigned to a System Tie Gang working between Las Cruces and Albuquerque, New Mexico. On numerous dates between January 20 and February 28, 1997, these employees traveled from the Carrier designated lodging site to the work site. That time of travel varied, but in each instance, the Carrier deducted the first and last consecutive 30 minutes each way to and from the work site and thereafter compensated the employees. There is no dispute that the Claimants were due compensation. The dispute at bar is over the amount of compensation due the Claimants. The Carrier compensated each employee at their straight time rates of pay for all time over the eight hour work day, less the 30 minutes each way to and from their work site and lodging site. The Organization maintains that the proper compensation is at the overtime rate of pay.
The basis of the Organization's position on the property was contract language and past practice. The Organization points to Rules 25, 29 and Article XVII of the September 26,1996 National Agreement. Specific to each the language holds as follows:
The Organization holds as a starting point that the language is clear. The employees who traveled to and from their designated job site and as per Article XVII were properly denied payment for the first and last 30 minutes. However, as is also clear, the employees worked a basic eight-hour day (Rule 25) and for all other time should have been paid at the time and one-half rate of pay (Rule 29).
Additionally, the Organization maintains that there is ample precedent on this property for the payment of overtime. It holds that any time spent traveling between assembling points and work sites after the eight-hour work day has always been paid for at the overtime rate. This can be seen by clearly settled disputes on payment and in particular Third Division Award 8825 which sustained a nearly identical dispute on a predecessor property. Not only does the Organization argue that past practice and Award precedent support its position for overtime payment, but it maintains that the Carrier's defense based on Rule 35 is inapplicable. Rule 35 is shown to be inapplicable even by the Carrier's own letters of interpretation from BN Vice President DeButts.
The Carrier maintains that it properly paid the Claimants at the straight time rate of pay for their travel time to and from the work site. As for the Organization's positions, the Carrier notes that Rule 25 refers only to time worked and does not apply to time traveled. The Carrier argues that this is equally true of Rule 29, which provides for overtime for time worked and is not applicable to travel time to or from a work site. It further notes that Rule 29 provides for exceptions to overtime payment and one exception is Rule 35. The Carrier argues that "Rule 35 clearly provides that Travel Time will be paid at the straight time rate." The Carrier maintains that Article XVH did not create a penalty rate of pay for time spent traveling each way beyond the 30 minutes coming and going to the work site from the lodging site, but did amend Article VIII of the 1991 Imposed Agreement by changing what had been "previously unpaid time spent traveling . . . to no more than thirty minutes each way at the beginning and end of the work day." The Carrier certainly does not support the past practice argument of the Organization.
Despite the Organization's emphasis on Rules, practice and arbitral precedent, each is sublimated by the fundamental issue of the applicability to System Gangs. The various general Rules are not Rules that were propagated or supported by precedent in their applicability to these facts. The Board must note that there is no probative evidence of record that the past practice was the payment of overtime for travel in these instances. We find no payment records, letters from employees or any rebuttal from the Form 1 Award No. 36525
Organization to the Carrier's position that prior to 1991, this had been "previously unpaid time spent traveling ...." The Board read the Awards cited by the Organization and in particular, Third Division Award 8825, but it was not an Award dealing with the specific contract provisions at bar. Despite the lack of probative evidence for overtime, the Organization further asserts before this Board that Rule 35 lacks any applicability and points to the May 10, 1971 DeButts letter. We do not agree. The only provision of the Agreement that refers to the payment of travel time is Rule 35. Also, Rule 29 on Overtime, clearly states that overtime is paid "except as otherwise provided in this Agreement . . . . " Rule 35(e) is the exception and appears applicable herein. Rule 35 states throughout that travel time is computed at the straight-time rate of pay for numerous situations. We can find no instance presented by the Organization to support its burden that the proper application has recently been or currently is at the overtime rate for time spent traveling.
This Board, after consideration of the dispute identified above, hereby orders that an Award favorable to the Claimant(s) not be made.
LABOR MEMBER'S DISSENT
TO
AWARD 36525, DOCKET MW-35409
AND
AWARD 36526, DOCKET MW-35418
(Referee Zusman)
The above-referenced awards involved nearly identical disputes over the proper amount of compensation system gang employes were entitled to receive for work performed preceding and following their regularly assigned hours on various dates in January, February and June, 1997. These dockets were denied on the erroneous basis that the involved employes were not entitled to compensation at the time and one-half rate in accordance with Rule 35. As cited by the Majority:
The Majority, finding that Rule 35 was applicable is absolutely wrong and nothing in the record served to establish that any of the provisions of Rule 35 were applicable to these disputes. Therein lies the fallacy in the Majority reasoning. Incidently, it was the Carrier that raised the alleged applicability of Rule 35 to these disputes, not the Organization. Hence, in accordance with arbitral precedent so well established as to preclude the necessity of award citation, the burden was on the CARRIER to satisfy its burden of proving application of that provision.
Without fully regurgitating the Organization's position, it is important to understand that the Organization proved during the handling on the property that neither of the instant disputes fit the criteria of Rule 35. This was clear by a plain reading of the rule AND support therefore was presented in the form of a written letter dated May 10, 1971, from former Vice President, Labor Relations DeButts (Employes' Exhibit "D"). In that document former Vice President, Labor Relations DeButts clearly and unequivocally explained that the "travel time" provisions of Rule 35 do not in any manner apply to the type of situation that existed in the instant claims. Mr. DeButts explained the Carrier's interpretation of Rule 35 as follows: Labor Member's Dissent
A plain reading of the above clearly establishes the error in the Carrier's contention that the Claimants were entitled to only straight time pay in accordance with Rule 35. Obviously, Rule 35(a) and (b) could not apply since the Claimants were not assigned to fixed headquarter gangs that were required to leave their home station to perform service elsewhere. Moreover, they were not governed by sections (c), (d) or (e), since the travel was not in connection with the moving of outfit cars. In addition, section (f) could not be applicable since these instances did not involve the exercise of seniority or moves between an employes home and designated assembly point. Section (g) could not apply since none of the Claimants were filling a relief assignment or performing extra work. Lastly, it must be noted that former Vice President DeButts is the highest designated Carrier officer authorized to interpret the Agreement. It is apparent that the Majority Labor Member's Dissent
Carrier Members' Response
to
Labor Member's Dissent
to
Award 36525, 36526 (Docket MW-35409, MW-35418)
Referee Zusman