Form 1 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
THIRD DIVISION
Award No. 37259
Docket No. TD-36870
04-3-01-3-485
The Third Division consisted of the regular members and in addition Referee
Edwin H. Benn when award was rendered.
(American Train Dispatchers Department
( Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
(The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
"The Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Company (hereinafter
referred to as "the Carrier") violated the current effective
agreement between the Carrier and the American Train Dispatchers
Department, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (hereinafter
referred to as "the Organization"), Articles 3(b), 7(a), 12(a), the
Letter of Agreement dated May 31, 1973 and the Memorandum of
Agreement dated March 5, 1974, Item 2 in particular, when on June
24, 2000 (not "June 26, 2000", as the Carrier's declination states),
the Carrier allowed and/or required a junior train dispatcher to
protect the position of 2d Trick Brush and provided compensation at
the overtime rate of pay, rather than allowing train dispatcher K. E.
Hand, the senior qualified train dispatcher available under the
Hours of Service Law, to protect the aforementioned position at the
overtime rate of pay."
FINDINGS:
The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the
evidence, finds that:
The carrier or carriers and the employee or employees involved in this dispute
are respectively carrier and employee within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act,
as approved June 21, 1934.
Form 1 Award No. 37259
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This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute
involved herein.
Parties to said dispute were given due notice of hearing thereon.
On June 24, 2000, a vacancy arose on the second trick Brush Dispatcher
position at the Carrier's dispatching office in Ft. Worth. The Carrier could not fill
the position with a qualified employee from the extra board. Rather than calling the
Claimant who was observing a rest day, the Carrier assigned K. D. McCully (who
was junior to the Claimant and assigned to work another second shift Dispatcher
position in the same office) to work the second trick Brush Dispatcher position and
compensated McCully at the overtime rate. In this claim, the Organization
contends that the Claimant should have been called for the second trick Brush
Dispatcher position rather than assigning the work to junior Dispatcher McCully.
Article 2(e) provides:
"(e) SERVICE ON POSITIONS OTHER THAN SENIORITY
CHOICE
An assigned train dispatcher required to work a position other than
the one he obtained in the exercise of his seniority, except an
assigned train dispatcher who is used on the position of chief
dispatcher, or assistant chief dispatcher, shall be compensated
therefor at the overtime rate of the position worked; however, except
as provided in Article 18, no additional payment shall be made to
such train dispatcher due to not having worked his regular
assignment."
The May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding provides:
"This refers to our exchange of correspondence ending with my
letter dated April 27, 1973, and discussion in conference on May 23,
Form 1 Award No. 37259
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1973 at which I was represented by Mr. K. A. Voelk, in connection
with your proposal of October 26, 1972, to amend the existing
agreement applicable to filling temporary vacancies and to define
who is entitled to a sixth or seventh day in the absence of an extra
train dispatcher who has not performed five days' service within
seven consecutive days.
At the conclusion of the discussion, it was agreed that when there is
no extra train dispatcher available who has not performed five days'
dispatching service within seven consecutive days, dispatchers will
be called for service in the following order:
1. The regular incumbent of the position.
2. The senior regular qualified train dispatcher available under
`Hours of Service Law.'
3. The senior qualified extra train dispatcher available under the
`Hours of Service Law.'
The above understanding serves to dispose of the proposals to
change the existing agreement as set forth in your letter of October
26, 1972, and except as specifically provided herein, this
understanding does not modify or in any manner affect schedule
rules or agreements."
The Organization argues that under language in the May 31, 1973 Letter of
Understanding (". . . when there is no extra train dispatcher available who has not
performed five days' dispatching service within seven consecutive days, dispatchers
will be called for service in the following order . . . [t]he senior regular qualified
train dispatcher available under `Hours of Service Law"' [Emphasis added]), the
Claimant was entitled to work the second trick Brush position instead of junior
Dispatcher McCully. On the basis of prior precedent, we disagree.
The Board previously addressed similar disputes between the parties. In
Third Division Award 34144, rather than using the senior claimant therein who was
working the first trick, the Carrier moved a junior Dispatcher assigned to the first
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trick to fill a vacancy in another position on the first trick and compensated that
employee at the overtime rate and utilized an extra board employee to work the
resulting vacancy. The Board denied the Organization's claim that the senior
claimant should have been transferred under the provisions of the 1973 Letter of
Understanding finding that ". . . the Letter of Understanding is reasonably read to
cover situations in which dispatchers are called in to work":
"The Board sees no conflict between Article 2(e) and the 1973 Letter
of Understanding. Article 2(e) is a pay provision. It provides
penalty pay to an `assigned train dispatcher' who is `required' to
work a position other than the one selected by the dispatcher
through seniority exercise. This can only be read as a deterrent to
the Carrier from removing a dispatcher from a regularly assigned
position. It follows that, as a pay Rule, it is silent as to any order of
selection for such `required' move.
The May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding, as the Organization
asserts, is mandatory in its terms. The Board, however, notes that it
is applicable `to filling temporary vacancies and to define who is
entitled to a sixth or seventh day.' There is no indication that these
two conditions are considered separately. Put another way, the
Letter of Understanding is reasonably read to cover situations in
which dispatchers are called in to work.
Does the Letter of Understanding apply to the reassignment of a
dispatcher during the dispatcher's regular duty hours, as here?
There is no basis to draw this conclusion, especially in view of the
provisions of Article 2(e). As noted above, the inference to be drawn
from Article 2(e) is that a dispatcher may be `required' (thus,
involuntarily) to move to another assignment temporarily, with the
condition that the dispatcher receives premium pay for so doing.
Here, the move was to another assignment on the same trick, and no
extra hours of work were involved. The Board finds no barrier to
the Carrier's selection of such a move as may be most efficient and
without regard to seniority. There is no way, in fact, to determine
whether the senior of two qualified employees, if preference could be
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made, would elect not to move to another assignment to fill a onetrick vacancy or would wish to transfer for the sake of the additional
pay.9
In Third Division Award 36519, again between the parties, rather than using
the claimant therein who was senior and on a rest day, the Carrier covered a
vacancy that occurred during a shift by using on duty Dispatchers. The Board
denied the claim, relying upon Third Division Award 34144:
"The May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding, containing the Order of
Call, is a mandatory provision. The Carrier must strictly comply
with the enumerated items in the Letter of Understanding.
However, a prior decision between these same parties (Third
Division Award 34144) interpreted the same Rules and held that the
mere occurrence of a vacancy does not presumptively trigger the
mandatory terms of the May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding ....
The holding in Award 34144 applies to the facts in this case
inasmuch as the carrier did not call Dispatchers into work.
Pursuant to the ruling in Award 34144, the May 31, 1973 Letter of
Understanding does not apply to the reassignment of a Train
Dispatcher during the Dispatcher's regular tour of duty."
Third Division Awards 34144 and 36519 previously decided between the
parties are not palpably in error and control this matter. The reassignment here
occurred during the second shift and involved Dispatchers on that shift. No
Dispatchers were called in. As found in Third Division Award 36519 "[p]ursuant to
the ruling in Award 34144, the May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding does not
apply to the reassignment of a Train Dispatcher during the Dispatcher's regular
tour of duty." On the basis of those Awards, this claim shall be denied.
Other Awards between the parties cited to us do not change the result and are
distinguishable. In some cases, the results support the Carrier's position and our
conclusion in this particular case. For example, in Third Division Award 35987, the
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facts showed that the claimant was called for a different vacancy than the one in
dispute and declined the offer, which then exhausted the list of qualified Dispatchers
under the Hours of Service Act. Other Dispatchers were then called to fill
vacancies. After reporting, one of the Dispatchers did not feel "comfortable"
working the vacancy and was permitted to work his regular assignment. The
Carrier then directed the Dispatcher on duty who was junior to the claimant to fill
the vacancy. The Board denied the claim on the grounds that ". . . no explanation is
offered as to how the Claimant could have been `available' to fill a vacancy on a
trick that had already commenced." But the point is that the Carrier utilized a
junior Dispatcher from the trick and made the assignment. That is consistent with
the result in this case. Third Division Award 36224 - also a denial Award - involved
a dispute over whether the Carrier was required ". . . to offer an overtime
assignment in another position when such assignment would prohibit the employee,
under the Hours of Service Law, from meeting the obligations of his regular
assignment." That is not this case. Third Division Award 34003 involved a
situation where there was a one shift vacancy on the first trick and rather than
calling in the claimant who was a second trick Dispatcher and available, the Carrier
held over a third trick Dispatcher for five hours and called in a second trick
Dispatcher three hours earlier to fill the vacancy. Clearly, under the May 31, 1973
Letter of Understanding the claimant who was senior and available should have
been called - and the Board so found. But again, those are not the facts in this case.
The vacancy in this case occurred on the same shift and the Carrier simply moved
personnel on that shift and "did not call Dispatchers into work." Third Division
Award 36519, supra.
Third Division Award 36985 with this Referee participating is also
distinguisbable. There, the claimant was called on two occasions to fill vacancies
and declined the offers. Another vacancy occurred and the Carrier bypassed calling
the claimant because of the prior refusals of offers. There, we sustained the claim
noting the obligation to call under the May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding and
concluded "[tlhe Claimant in this matter did not indicate her "`non-availability on
the date in question,' she just turned down specific offers for specific jobs." Once
again, that is not this case. Finally, as we have in this case, Public Law Board No.
6519, Award 12 relied upon Third Division Award 34144 and found that
Award ". . . finds that the Carrier is not required to use the senior train dispatcher
when it requires a train dispatcher to move to another assignment on the same
shift."
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AWARD
Claim denied.
ORDER
This Board, after consideration of the dispute identified above, hereby orders
that an Award favorable to the Claimant(s) not be made.
NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Third Division
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 5th day of November 2004.
Labor Member's Dissent
To Third Division Award Nos. 37259 & 37260
Docket Nos. TD-36870 & TD-36917
(Referee Edwin H. Berm)
These claims involved the filling of vacancies that occurred when there were no extra train
dispatchers available. Instead of using dispatchers on their rest days the carrier moved
dispatchers, who were already scheduled to work, off their regular assignment and then used
other dispatchers to fill the resultant vacancies. The May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding ('73
LOU) established a defined order of call and is quoted in its entirety in Award 37259.
In denying these claims, the Majority incorrectly deemed Third Division Awards 34144 and
36519 as controlling precedent. This is the only reason for the Majority's justification for
denying these claims.
The Organization cited Third Division Awards 35987, 36224, 34003, 36985 and Public Law
Board 6519, Award 12 because of the consistent interpretations of the '73 LOU, The Majority
suggests that these Awards have no bearing because the facts involved in those cases are
distinguishable from the facts in the instant claims. But, what about the facts involved in Awards
34144 and 36519 as compared to the facts involved in the claims at bar? Were they the same?
Or, were they distinguishable?
In Third Division Award 34144, the Board described the facts involved as being:
"On January I, 1997, a vacancy occurred in a first trick dispatcher position.
There were no qualified extra board dispatchers available to fill the vacancy at the
straight time rate, and there were no regularly assigned qualified dispatchers
available under the Hours of Service Law to fill the positions. The Carrier elected
to move an employee already assigned to the first trick to fill the vacancy and
utilized a qualified extra board employee to work the resulting vacancy. The
Claimant, also assigned to and working the first trick, was senior to the
transferred employee and was qualified to fill the initial vacancy. The
Organization argues that the Claimant, rather than the other employee, should
have been transferred to the vacancy on the same shift, thus being enabled to earn
premium pay, as provided in Article 2(e). For the alleged requirement to transfer
the senior qualified employee, the Organization relies on the May 31, 1973 Letter
of Understanding .... The Organization argues that this Letter of Understanding
requires filling the vacancy under the second numbered order; that is, the
Claimant as `senior' employee."t
' As can be seen from this excerpt, the Carrier exhausted the
'73 LOU
before it moved a dispatcher off assignment
to fill the vacancy. The dispute centered on whether the
'73 LOU
required the Carrier to use the senior qualified
dispatcher off assignment under Article 2(e). It found that the
'73 LOU
did not apply to moving dispatchers off
their regular assignment. In a subsequent decision involving the identical facts
of
Award
34144, PLB 6519,
Award
12 (cited by the Organization as support for its position that Award
34144's
findings were only applicable to moving
dispatchers off (heir regular assignment) found, "Third Division Award
No. 34144 is
applicable and we do not find
it palpably erroneous. It is directly on point to the instant facts. It finds that the Carrier is not required to use the
senior
I
rain dispatcher when
it
requires a train dispatcher to move to another assignment on the same shift ...."
1
Labor Member's Dissent
To Third Division Award Nos. 37259 & 37260
Docket Nos. TD-36870 & TD-36917
(Referee Edwin H. Benn)
In Third Division Award 36519 the Board described the facts involved as being:
"On July 3, 2000, at the Carrier's Train Dispatcher office in Ft. Worth, Texas, the
incumbent Train Dispatcher assigned to the third trick Oregon Branch position
became ill four hours into her eight-hour shift, and so, she went home.
,2
However, in the instant claims a vacancy occurred and there were no extra train dispatchers
available to fill the vacancies. The vacancies were known ahead of time and did not occur with
short notice. The Carrier had ample time to fill the vacancies using the '73 LOU order of call but
opted instead to fill the vacancies by moving dispatchers off assignment and paying them in
accordance with Article 2(e).
Instead of adhering to the clear and unambiguous language of the '73 LOU, the Majority opted
to deny the claims on the basis of what it referred to as "prior precedent", Awards 34144 and
36159. Even though the facts involved in the so-called precedent Awards 34144 and 36519 are
not only distinguishable from the facts involved in the claims at bar, but also starkly different.
As previously noted, the Awards cited by the Organization
3
were referenced because of what the
Board said in each of those Awards about the interpretation of the '73 LOU. An analysis of
these Awards, as well as those relied on by the Majority" interprets the '73 LOU as follows:
Third Divison Award 34144:
"The May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding, as the Organization asserts, is
mandatory in its terms. The Board, however, notes that it is applicable `to filling
temporary vacancies and to define who is entitled to a sixth or seventh day.'
There is no indication that these two conditions are considered separately."
Third Division Award 36519:
"The May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding, containing the Order of Call, is a
mandatory provision. The Carrier must strictly comply with the enumerated items
in the Letter of Understanding."
Third Divison Award 35987:
"The May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding provides that a vacancy is initially
filled with an available extra Train Dispatcher with less than five days'
dispatching service within seven consecutive days; if no such extra Train
Dispatcher is available, then the position is offered to the regular incumbent.
Absent the incumbent's availability, the Letter of Understanding calls for offering
the position to `the senior qualified train dispatcher available under the Hours of
2
As can be seen from this excerpt, this involved a vacancy that occurred during the shift.
' Third Division Awards 35987, 36224, 34003, 36985 and PLB 6519, Award 12.
" Third Division Awards 34144 and 36159.
2
Labor Member's Dissent
To Third Division Award Nos. 37259 & 37260
Docket Nos. TD-36870 & TD-36917
(Referee Edwin H. Berm)
Service Law.'... In the absence of other circumstances the Organization would
be on firm ground in arguing that the Carrier violated the Letter of Understanding
and that remedy is due to the Claimant. The difficulty with the Organization's
position, however, is that there were factors in the situation here under review that
clearly left the Carrier with no alternative and warranted the action taken ....
While the Organization's reading of the Letter of Understanding is accurate, no
explanation is offered as to how the Claimant could have been `available' to fill a
vacancy on a trick that had already commenced."
Third Divison Award 36224:
"The. Carrier and the Organization agree that the document covering the filling of
such temporary vacancies is the mutually signed Letter of Understanding dated
May 31, 1973 ...."
Third Division Award 34003:
"The Organization states without contradiction there was no Extra Train
Dispatcher available on straight time, and the regular incumbent was not
available. Thus, the Organization argues that the Claimant should have been
called, noting the use of the mandatory `will be called.'... In sum, there .is no
showing that the 1973 LOU has been superseded as to the filling of short, nonbulletined vacancies by qualified employees."
The Board has consistently held that the '73 LOU is "mandatory"; that "it is applicable to filling
temporary vacancies and to define who is entitled to a sixth or seventh day"; that the parties
"agree that the document covering the filling of such temporary vacancies is the mutually
signed" '73 LOU and that "there is no showing that the 1973 LOU has been superseded as to the
filling of short, non-bulletined vacancies." All of which the Majority disregarded in deciding the
instant claims.
Finally, in the most recent decision involving the '73 LOU between these parties, Third Division
Award 36985 interpreted the '73 LOU as follows:
"The May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding is clear - `...dispatchers will be
called for service in the following order ....' (Emphasis added) Given the phrase
`will be called,' there is no discretion on the Carrier's part .... The Carrier was
therefore obligated to follow the clear terms of the May 31 1973 Letter of
Understanding for each call - ...dispatchers will be called for service in the
following order ....' The Claimant was not called. The claim therefore has merit.
To rule otherwise would cause us to change the mandatory language of the May
31, 1973 Letter of Understanding concerning the order of call. We do not have
that authority."
3
Labor Member's Dissent
To Third Division Award Nos. 37259 & 37260
Docket Nos. TD-36870 & TD-36917
(Referee Edwin H. Berm)
As can be seen from the above, Award 36985 interpreted the '73 LOU as leaving "no discretion
on the Carrier's part" and that the "Carrier was obligated to follow the clear terms" and that it
contained "mandatory language." (Emphasis added.) This is the interpretation of the '73 LOU
based upon its clear terms. However, the Majority exercised authority it didn't have in the
instant claims and did exactly what the Board refused to do in Award 36985; it changed "the
mandatory language of the May 31, 1973 Letter of Understanding concerning the order of call."
The Majority's decision is contrary to the clear terms of the '73 LOU and Board precedent
concerning the interpretation of the '73 LOU. Therefore, these Awards are palpably erroneous.
I dissent.
David W. Volz
Labor Member
4