Award Number 54
Docket Number TD-57

NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD

Third Division

Paul Samuell, Referee

PARTIES TO DISPUTE:

AMERICAN TRAIN DISPATCHERS ASSOCIATION

NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY

DISPUTE.—"Contention by the train dispatchers that management violated the intent of Article 1V-(e) current Agreement on Rules, when, without seeking or obtaining an agreement to waive the application thereof, ordered a train dispatcher, in addition to his regular dispatching territory, to also handle the territory of another dispatcher so as to enable the latter to be off duty on his weekly rest days, and that the train dispatchers who, under the rule, would have worked in place of the dispatcher off duty be compensated for the wage loss suffered by them by reason of the dispatching territories being doubled for relief purposes."

FINDINGS.—The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:

The Carrier and the employees involved in this dispute are, respectively, carrier and employees within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934.

This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.

The opinion of Paul Samuell, Referee, is attached hereto and made a part of this award (see Appendix "A").

The parties to said dispute were given due notice of hearing thereon. Hearing was had on March 14, 1935, and later the Division was unable to agree upon an award on the merits of the case because of a deadlock. Paul Samuell was selected as Referee to sit with the Division and make an award.

This is an ex parte submission and the employees' "Statement of Facts" reads:

> "ARTICLE 1V-(e) of the current Agreement reads: 'The doubling of territory for relief purposes shall not be permitted.'
>
> "Mondays had been, and was on December 26, 1932, and on January 2, 1933, the regularly scheduled weekly rest day for the train dispatcher assigned to dispatch trains on the territory commonly known as territory (C), Rochester Division, and on such rest days that dispatcher was, by schedule, relieved by a rest day relief dispatcher in accordance with the rules (Article 1V-a) reading:
>
> "'Each regularly assigned train dispatcher * * * will be allowed and required to take one day off per week as a rest day * * *.'
>
> "Section (b) of the same Article reads:
>
> "'The Company will designate an established rest day for each position in accordance with the foregoing section * * *.'
>
> "Instead of permitting a relief dispatcher to work dispatching territory (C) on the days above shown, and without seeking or obtaining an agreement with the representatives of the organization to waive the application of Article IV-(e), management instructed the trick dispatcher handling the other dispatching territory to also handle territory (C) on those days, because of which the dispatcher who otherwise would have relieved the dispatcher on territory (C) suffered a monetary loss."

The carrier makes no "Statement of Facts" but sets up the contention that Monday, December 26, 1932, and Monday, January 2, 1933, being observed as holidays the business was light, and the territory being doubled on the preceding Sundays, as usual, *the Sunday assignment was not split* on these Mondays, and therefore there was no violation of Rule IV-(e).

The assignments of the two districts in question are:

Ontario District-Charlotte Branch and Balls Road (B), 8 A. M. to 4 P. M. week days only and in addition takes over the Auburn Road and Peanut (C) District for one hour each week day. Auburn Road and Peanut District (C)—7 A. M. to 3 P. M. week days, and on Sundays handles both territories—8 A. M. to 4 P. M.

A rest-day relief assignment regularly includes the relief of the dispatcher on the Auburn Road and Peanut District each Monday.

The Referee is of the opinion, in which a majority of the Third Division concurs, that the dispatching territory was doubled by the carrier on the dates in question in violation of Rule IV-(e) of the Train Dispatchers' Agreement.

AWARD

Claim sustained.

By Order of Third Division:

NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD.

Attest:

H. A. JOHNSON,
Secretary.

Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 25th day of June 1935.

APPENDIX A

OPINION RE TD-55, TD-56, TD-57, CL-63

Paul Samuell, Referee. May 27, A. D. 1935.

QUESTION INVOLVED

Has this Adjustment Board jurisdiction of disputes between employer and employee under the following general statement of facts?

While the Railway Labor Act of 1926 was in effect, four disputes involving seniority, violation, or other interpretation of rules or contracts arose between the employer and employee. These disputes were duly commenced in accordance with the practice and the law then in effect; that is to say, they were submitted in writing to or taken up in conference with the proper officers of the Division, and failing of agreement were carried to the System Board of Adjustment, and after failing there, transferred to the Board of Mediation where conciliation was attempted, but again failed. Whereupon arbitration was offered by the Board of Mediation, but carrier declined to arbitrate. The Board of Mediation then advised parties that all practical remedies provided in the 1926 Railway Labor Act had been exhausted in an effort to adjust the "differences in mediation" without effecting a settlement, and, therefore, the mediation service of said Board had been terminated under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act.

All these proceedings took place prior to the approval of the amended Railway Labor Act on June 21, 1934. The employees, through their representatives, claim that from time to time they insisted before carrier officials that these disputes be adjusted. However, nothing official or of record seems to have transpired after the Board of Mediation had written the letter to the parties as above indicated.

POSITION OF THE CARRIER

The carrier maintains that under such circumstances a dispute which arose under the Act of 1926 constituted a case under that law, was tried to a conclusion under the provisions of that law, exhausted all remedies and machinery provided by that law, and was ended under that law, and is not now within the jurisdiction of the National Board of Adjustment, or of any division thereof, under the new Railway Labor Act of 1934.

POSITION OF THE EMPLOYEE

The employees maintain that this Adjustment Board has jurisdiction by virtue of Section 3 (i) of the Railway Labor Act of 1934, and that this Board should take jurisdiction and dispose of the controversy in accordance with the facts contained in the record.

In support of its position the carrier contends that all legal remedies, as provided by the Act of 1926, have been exhausted; that the cases are at an end; that while the cases are "unadjusted", they are no longer pending.

Having reviewed the history of the Railway Labor Legislation in Case TD–38, it will be unnecessary to repeat. Suffice to say, the law has for its purpose, among other things, the avoidance of interrupted commerce and the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes covering rates of pay, rules, and working conditions. While it is conceded that the purpose is laudable, the disputants are unable to agree as to the extent or limitation of the purposes expressed in the present Act.

Section 3 (i) of the present 1934 Act provides in part as follows:

> The disputes between an employee * * * and a carrier * * * growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, *including cases pending and unadjusted on the date of the approval of this Act*, shall be handled in the usual manner, etc.

The carrier contends that the words "including cases pending and unadjusted" are clear and unambiguous. Standing alone this might be true, but such words must be construed in keeping with the general purposes of the Act. Such technical construction should not be indulged as to do violence to the express general purpose of the Act. In the citation of the carrier in Docket TD–38, being the case of *Peck* v. *Genuess*, 7 Howard, 612–623, appears language which follows:

> But it is among the elementary principles with regard to the construction of statutes that every section, provision, and clause of a statute shall be expounded by a reference to every other; and, if possible, every clause and provision shall avail and have the effect contemplated by the Legislature. One portion of the Statute should not be construed to annul or destroy what has been clearly granted by another. The most general and absolute terms of one section may be qualified and limited by conditions and exceptions contained in another, so that they all may stand together.

The reasoning contained in the opinion rendered in TD–38 with reference to the word "grievance" applies here as it does there.

The words "including cases pending and unadjusted" should be construed in connection with the intention of the Act. They have significant relationship to the words which follow: "on the date of the approval of this Act." These last-quoted words undoubtedly refer to cases or disputes which arose under the Act of 1926. Therefore it becomes timely to analyze briefly the Railway Labor Act of 1926. Some of the expressed purposes were "to settle all disputes" (Sec. 2, first); that all disputes "shall be considered, and, if possible, decided with all expedition in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer, respectively, by carriers and the employees thereof interested in the dispute" (Sec. 2, second); "that * * * it shall be the duty of the designated representative of such carrier and employees, within ten days after the receipt of a notice of a desire * * * to confer in respect to such dispute" at a certain time and place (See Sec. 2, Par. 4); that Boards of Adjustment shall be created by agreement between the carrier and the employee and which agreement shall provide that disputes between any employee * * * and a carrier * * * growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation * * * of agreements * * * shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the Chief Operating Officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, that the disputes shall be referred to the designated Adjustment Board by the parties or by either party, with a full statement of facts, etc.; that a decision of such Adjustment Board shall be final (Sec. 3); that the functions of the Board of Mediation shall be invoked in case the Adjustment Board cannot agree, and in case of the inability of the Board of Mediation to bring about conciliation through mediation, then the Board shall attempt to induce the disputing parties to agree to arbitrate (See Sec. 5, a, b, and c); but the agreement to arbitrate is optional for either party and the failure or refusal to submit to arbitration shall constitute no violation of any legal obligation. Thus we find a most peculiar situation in the event that arbitration is rejected by either party. No decision being reached along any of the stages of adjustment, the dispute thus stood in "mid air", so to speak, and undecided. It was not only unadjusted, it was likewise stalled. It is true that the Act did not direct the dispute to travel

elsewhere. It is equally true that under those circumstances no decision could be reached, although each disputant was entitled to a decision.

The Briefs in these cases indicate that there are a large number of cases stalled, undecided or "pending", according to the employees' interpretation of that word. When the amendment of June 21, 1934, was written, it was logical that Congress should attempt to correct this anomaly by creating legal machinery whereby this large number of accumulated and undecided cases might be promptly disposed of.

In the 1934 Act we find in Section 3 (i) that disputes between employer and employee growing out of agreements as to working conditions, rates of pay, etc., *including cases pending and unadjusted on the date of approval of the Act*, shall be handled according to the machinery therein set forth. It is self-evident, therefore, that the part of the Act above quoted contemplated that some disputes which had reached the dignity of a "case" should be disposed of by the Adjustment Board. The italicized words could not refer to a "case" before the Board of Mediation for the reason that under Section 4 it is provided "all cases referred to the Board of Mediation and unsettled on the date of the approval of this Act shall be handled to a conclusion by the Mediation Board." The Mediation Board shall take over all cases referred to the Board of Mediation which remain unsettled, while the Adjustment Board shall take over and settle those cases pending and unadjusted on the date of the approval of the Act.

The important question then to be decided is, what do the words "cases" and "pending" mean? In my opinion, "cases" are those disputes which have ripened into cases by passing through the various legal steps in an attempt to reach an adjustment as provided by law under the 1926 Act. The carrier interprets the word "pending" to mean "hanging on" or "to be suspended." There are other interpretations of this word. I find from my College Standard Dictionary that it also has the meaning of "to be awaited, adjusted, or settled", or "undetermined", "incomplete", "remaining unfinished or undecided." The cases at bar were originally disputes which were first presented in conference to the properly authorized and designated officials of the Railroad System, and failing there to obtain an adjustment, they were then referred to the System Adjustment Board, which deadlocked, and from there to the Board of Mediation, and there unable to obtain a decision. It is true that the cases at bar had passed through all the processes provided by the 1926 Act, but it is equally true that these cases remain unadjusted and undecided, and if the words "undecided" and "pending" are synonymous, then these cases remain "pending and unadjusted." It is self-evident that the Bill does not shine with clarity of language. We must again resort to what we conceive to be the meaning and intention of the Legislature. One of the principal purposes of law is to promptly and expeditiously settle disputes and cases. A dispute and/or case is not adjusted by permitting it to remain unadjusted. To hold that the disputes in the cases at bar have been settled by permitting them to remain undecided or pending is incongruous, inconsistent, and irrational.

It is to be noted that in the Committee hearings on the Bill the carrier presented an Amendment as follows: "Provided that no Board created under the provisions of this Section shall consider a grievance of any character, the cause of which arose more than two years prior to the effective date of this Act." By striking the proposed amendment, Congress apparently intended that there should be no statute of limitations as respects those disputes which have ripened into cases and which cases remain pending and unadjusted.

To hold that the cases at bar should not be considered by this Board on the theory that they have had their day in Court although they remain undecided and unadjusted renders vacuous the words "pending and unadjusted", or at least places upon them an unreasonable or irrational construction. In my opinion the carrier's contention that this Board is without jurisdiction is untenable, and I, therefore, hold that these cases should be taken by this Adjustment Board and decided upon their respective records.

(Signed) PAUL SAMUELI.,
Referee.