NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD

THIRD DIVISION

Award Number 20917 Docket Number CL-20842

Louis Norris, Referee

(Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship (Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and (Station **Employes**

PARTIES TO DISPUTE: (

(Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis

<u>STATEMENT OF CLAIM</u>: Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood (GL-7636)that:

1. **Carrier** violated and continues to violate the **Agreement** between the parties when, commencing on November 30, 1972, it removed the work of operating remote contml interlocking machine at SH Tower, Venice, Illinois, from the Scope thereof and assignedit to employes not covered thereby (Carrier's File **013-255-13**).

2. Carrier shall, as **a** result, compensate the senior idle Telegrapher, extra in preference, eight hours' pay at the rate of **Leverman-Operator,** which he vould have received if permitted to perform this work, for each shift commencing **November 30, 1972** until the **violation** is corrected.

OPINION OF **BOARD:** The Statement of Claim sets forth generally the nature of the dispute here involved. Its reference, hoverer, to removing "the work of operating remote control interlocking machine" at SH Tower is somewhat misleading. Actually two types of machines are involved. The first being a remote control interlocking machine (RCM, for brevity) operated by Towermen or Levermen "by means of levers" under the general direction of a Train Dispatcher. Such work has normally been performed by Levermen Operators under their Agreement with Carrier dated October 1, 1957 (the controlling Agreement in this dispute..)

The second machine is a never and more complicated machine, installed on the property of this Carrier for the first time on **November** 30, **1972.** This is a **Centralized Traffic Control System (CTC) controlling the movement** of trains by automatic signal device from a designated point, superseding time tables **and** use of train orders. The latter machine **is** operated automatically by push button method and **not "by** means of levers".

Basically, it is Petitioner's contention that the disputed work belongs exclusively to the **Levermen** Operators under the Scope Rule of their **1957** Agreement; that the **work** involved is identical; and that the CTC merely replaced the **RCIM** without changing the nature of the **work**.

Carrier responds that the installation of the CTC **machine** constituted **work** different in nature from the **RCIM** and eliminated the need for

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the Leverman Operator position at SH Tower, without reduction in force; that it is well established that where a CTC panel is located in an office in which Train Dispatchers are employed, said panel is to be operated by Train Dispatchers; a&that such work is specifically covered by the Scope Rule of the Train Dispatchers Agreement with effective date of January 1, 1965.

obviously, the Train Dispatchers Organization is an Interested party **in** this dispute. Accordingly, pursuant to invitation of this **Board**, the latter Organization has Piled its written Submission, which is **now** part of the record before us and which is basically in accord with Carrier's position as stated above.

Hence, due **process having** been observed and complied with, we deem it to be within the jurisdiction of this Board to **resolve** this dispute on Its merits, with **binding** effect upon both Organizations and upon Carrier. The foregoing conclusion on the principle of "due process" is **fully** supported in <u>Award No. 1</u>, <u>P.L.B. No. 964</u>, citing <u>T.-C.E.U.</u> <u>vs. Union Pacific</u> <u>R. co., 385 U.S. 157, (U.S. Supreme Court, 1966</u>). Before proceeding to the merits, however, reference is made to several general principles of construction which Petitioner asserts are **controlling in** this dispute.

We do not quarrel with the concept that this **Board** is not clothed with authority to revise, delete from or add language to the controlling Agreement. This **Board** has consistently adhered to this principle **in inmmerable** prior Awards and has **no intention** to depart therefrom in rendering this decision.

Petitioner urges further that the place of performance of work determines the craft or class of employes to whom It belongs. However, Awards 864, 2693, 14907 and 14884, cited by Petitioner, deal with entirely dissimilar factual situations and do not support the latter contention which, in any event, is not determinative of the issues in this case.

Additionally, we do **not** dispute the general principle, or the voluminous precedents cited by Petitioner **in** support thereof, that **positions** or work once within the Agreement **cannot** be removed therefrom **arbitrarily** or unilaterally and the work assigned to persons excepted from the Agreement. The correlative to this **principle**, however, is the controlling procedural rule that each agreement and each Scope Rule must be separately reviewed as against the particular facts of each case. Thus, we can ascertain whether or not the disputed work is **in** fact within the specific coverage of the particular Scope Rule and whether one Organization or another has exclusive rights thereto.

In this context, we do not find the cases cited by Petitioner germane to the dispute **now** before us. Thus, for example, **Award No.** 5787 is a discipline case; **No. 1314** deals with clerical work assigned to others

in violation of the Agreement; No. 7129 relates to clerical work which was being performed by Clerks "at the time the Scope Rule was agreed upon"; No. 7168 deals with transfer of covered work solely because of Carrier's "transfer from Boston to Chicago"; No. 7349 similarly relates to transfer of location; No. 2253 dealt with violations of a specific <u>Memorandum</u> Agreement; No. 11127 dealt with assignment to others of clerical work "exclusively" covered by the Clerks Agreement; and No. 11586 related to reassignment of work in violation of a specific Scope Rule.

Moreover, we have **no** quarrel with Petitioner's contention that the Agreement supersedes Carrier's **operating rules** or general orders, nor with the cited supporting precedents. However, this general principle must be weighed against **inherent prerogatives** of **Management**; for example, the **discontinuance** of Specific positions and **reassignment** of job **functions** where not specifically restricted by the Agreement. But this is not the main issue before us in this dispute. What is here involved is resolution of a long standing jurisdictional dispute as to CTC operation; more specifically, application to the **disputed** work of the separate **Agreements** of Carrier with the Clerk-Telegraphers **and** with the Train Dispatchers, respectively, and of their respective Scope Rules.

This brings us directly to the basic issues which are at the core of this dispute; i.e., the Scope **Rules** of both Organizations. The Scope Rule of the Train Dispatchers Agreement reads as **follows**:

"ARTICLE 1

(a) - SCOPE:

The rules of this agreement shall govern the hours of service, compensation and **working** conditions of all persons who perform service as train dispatcher. The **term'train** dispatcher' as used herein shall include trick, relief, aud extra dispatchers.

(b) - DEFINITION - TRICK DISPATCHERS, RELIEF DISPATCHERS, EXTRA DISPATCHERS:

This class **includes positions in** which the duties of incumbents are to be **primarily responsible** for the movement of trains by train orders, or otherwise; to supervise **forces** employed in **handling** train orders; to keep necessary records incident thereto; and to perform related work.

Note: Nothing in this Section (b) shall be considered as changing the present work jurisdiction of train dispatchers.

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"(C) - RETITLING POSITIONS:

Established positions shall **not** be **discontinued and new** ones created **under** a different title **covering** relatively the same class or work, which will have the effect of reducing rates of pay or evading the application of these rules."

It is true, as contended by the Train Dispatchers, that "the **movement** of trains by train orders, or otherwise" is included in the above **Scope Rule, but we find no specific provision therein that the disputed** work is <u>exclusively</u> theirs to perform, nor &es the quoted Scope Rule constitute an "exclusive work reservation rule", particularly as to the work here in issue.

For facility of comparison, we quote the Clerk-Telegraphers' Scope Rule:

"ARTICLE 1 SCOPE

(a) It is agreed by and between the **Terminal Railroad** Association of St. Louis and The **Order** of Railroad Telegraphers that the following shall govern the employment and working conditions of employees coming within and **performing** the duties of the following **classifications**:

(b) This agreement shall **not** apply to the operation **of** printer teletype machines used solely for the purpose of communicating between offices on this **Terminal** property where such **machines** are not located in telegraph offices and provided such machines are not connected to reperforators, reprinters or through circuits.

"(c) The word 'employee as used in this **agreement** shall include **all** classifications and assistants thereto **named** in Paragraph (a), unless **a** specific classification or classifications are set forth. The word 'station' **means** the **location** at which an employee performs service.

(d) **Positions** covered by this agreement must be **filled** by employees coning within the scope of the agreement. The work covered belongs to the employees herein classified and shall not be **removed from** the scope except by **agreement** between the parties."

There then follows the Wage Schedule of the covered **employes**, but this neither enlarges nor **limits** the Scope Rule Itself. We note Petitioner's contention that subdivision "(d)" is a "special Rule", precise in nature, **in** that it states that "The work covered belongs to the **employes** herein classified". Rut we are constrained to point out that the "work covered" is not specifically described; **nor** is there any exclusive "work reservation rule" **or** any other specific provision in the Agreement which exclusively reserves the disputed work to the Clerk-Telegraphers.

We note, further, that there is no reference to "movement of trains" in the latter Agreement. Further, that there is no reference to CTC systems or operations in <u>either Agreement</u>.

In these **circumstances**, we have held repeatedly that where the Scope Rule is general in nature, as is the case here as to both Scope Rules, the burden of **proof** is on the Organization **claiming** the **work to** establish by **substantial** probative **evidence** that the **employes** it represents have **per**formed such work **bistorically**, **traditionally** and exclusively, and **system**wide.

See Awards 10389 (Dugan), 13579 (Wolf), 15383 (Ives), 15539 (McGovern), 16609 (Devine), 18471 (O'Brien), 18935 (Cull), 19576 (Lieberman) and 19969 (Roadley), among a host of others.

Neither Organization has sustained such burden of proof; nor can we conclude that the principle of "exclusivity" has been successfully established by either of the contesting Organizations. Furthermore, in similar cases before this Board, involving either or both of the abovequoted Scope Rules, the same conclusion as to non-exclusivity was reached.

See Awards 4452 (Carter), 4768 (Stone), 6224 (McMahon), 11821 (Christian), 14341 and 14342 (Perelson), and 19594 (Brent).

Petitioner cites several prior Awards as controlling here on the merits, only one of which is **somewhat** in **point**. That **Award**, **No**. 18884 (Cull), **involved** a **CTC** system **and** precisely the same Carrier and the **same**

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Scope Rule of the Train Dispatchers as in this dispute. The claim presented by the **Train** Dispatchers was in fact denied, based on the conclusion that the **CTC** machine **did** "essentially the **same** work as was performed by the machine operated by the **Leverman** Operator at the West Market Street Tower before it was retired" and the fact that such work was performed by "three **Leverman** Operators cn a seven day basis". However, there **was** no analysis of the Scope Rule in the latter opinion, nor any **reference** at all to prior Awards as precedent.

Curiously, the Referee did make the following statement:

"The issue in this case is a <u>narrow one</u>. It does not involve the jurisdiction of the Dispatcher at SH Tower over the **movement** of trains." (Emphas is supplied)

The latter conclusion seems **diametrically** opposed to the conclusion reached by **several Referees** in other Awards, which will be referred to in detail hereinafter. In any event, we consider Award **18884** as being limited to the **peculiar** facts and the **"nerrow** issue" there involved. We do not consider It controlling **upon** this dispute, nor does it accord with the weight of authority on the principles governing the disputed work.

Carrier, on its part, cites some twenty-one prior Awards as precedent for its position. In the main, these are germane to this dispute and merit detailed analysis. Several of these Awards contain excellent analysis of the CTC system, the pertinent Scope Rules and time same disputed work, but they do not serve as controlling precedents. For, in each case, the question of the Board's jurisdiction was raised in relation to "jurisdictional disputes", and each case was "remanded" for "further negotiations" or for submission to the National Mediation Board for resolution of the jurisdiction Issue.

In the latter context, on "remand", we refer to Awards 4452, 4768, 4769, 8413, 8458, 8460, 9709, 10725, 14459 and 14461.

Award 9209 (McMohon) is of significance in the respect that although it was found "that the operations here do not constitute CTC operations", the claim was nevertheless remanded. The Labor Member' 8 vigorous dissent agreed that the disputed work was not CTC, but stressed that it involved operation of switches and signals by means of levers from a central point, which had been so performed by telegraphers for over ten years, and thus was theirs to perform. (Emphasis supplied). Assumedly, bad CTC been involved, which does not require operation by means of levers, no dissent would hove been filed.

On the merits, we are not persuaded that recommendations in the last cited Awards, which remanded for "further negotiations", have had any

practical effect. The **same** issues continue to plague the Board, as witness the instant dispute in which we are faced with a **236** page Docket **and** a voluminous number of asserted precedents. Moreover, as pointedout above, both contesting Organizations are **now** properly before the Board. We are mandated, therefore, to resolve the issue.

The following cases **are** germane and bear materially upon the disputed work with which we are now concerned. **Thus**, in Award **8544** (McCoy) wherein the Telegraphers claimed the same disputed work, we held:

"In the case before ua it appears that the Carrier has contracted with the Dispatchera for this work to be performed by dispatchera when the CTC machines are located in dispatchers' offices. **Since**, under the authority of Awards Nos. 4452 and 4768, the work is **not** exclusively that of the Telegraphers under their Scope Rule, the contract with the Dispatchers is valid and &es **not** violate the Agreement with the Telegraphers. The claim **will** therefore be denied."

Similarly in point is Award 8660 (Gutbrie), which denied the Telegraphers' claims to precisely the same type of CTC work, finding "no provision in the Telegraphers Agreement or in past practice on this property which gives the telegraphers exclusive right to this work". Additionally, we held that "where the CTC control board is located in a dispatchers' office the dispatcher operates the board, and where it is located in a telegraph office it is operated by a telegrapher under the direction of the dispatcher".

Award 10303 (Mitchell), involving the Telegraphers and the identical CTC system, held precisely to the same effect, citing Awards 4452, 8544 and 8660, supra. Here, the Telegraphers claim was again denied.

To the same effect, and on precisely the same issue, see Award **11161**(Moore), which denied the Telegraphers claim, **citing** Awards 4452, 4768, 854.4, 8660 and **10303, and** stating:

"We agree with those which hold that the Agreement was not violated."

Also to the same effect, see Awards 11821 (Christian), 14341 and 14342 (Perelson), 19068 (Dorsey), 19594 (Brent) and 19767 (Rubenstein).

We conclude, therefore, that where, **as** here, the CTC control board is located in the dispatcher's office the assignment of the disputed work to dispatchera is in accord with the Train Dispatchers Agreement and is not in violation of the Telegraphers' Agreement. We concur with those who bold

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"that the Agreement was mt violated."

Accordingly, on the basis of the entire record, on the above **findings** and conclusions, and in **view** of the **controlling** weight of authority, we are compelled to deny this **claim**.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds and holds:

That the parties waived oral hearing;

That the Carrier and the **Employes** involved **in** this dispute are respectively Carrier **and Employes within** the **meaning of**the Railway **Labor** Act, as approved June 21, **1934**;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That the Agreement was mt violated.

AWARD

Claim denied.

NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD By Order of Third Division

U.W. Pa ATTEST:

Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 16th day of January 1976.