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NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD

THIRD DIVISION

Award Number 23918
Docket **Number** CL-23253

Rodney E. Dennis, Referee

(Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, (Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes

PARTIES TO DISPUTE:

The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company

STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Counittee of the Brotherhood (GL-8526) that:

- (a) Carrier violated the provisions of the current Clerks' Agreement at Bakersfield, **California**, on May 3, **1977**, **when** it notified Claimant J. J. Werla **that** he would not be allowed jury duty pay compensation for Monday, April **25, 1977**, for performing **jury** duty service, and
- (b) Carrier shall **now** compensate **Claiment** J. J. Werla for eight (8) hours' pay at the pro rata rate of his regular position, Crew Clerk Position No. 6273, for April 25, 1977, as a result of **violation** of Agreement rules, and
- (c) In addition to the money amounts claimed herein, the Carrier shall pay an additional amount of ten per cent interest per annum, compounded annually on the anniversary date of claim.

OPINION OF BOARD:

J. J. Werla. Claimant in this case, is regularly employed in clerk position No. 62'73 at Bakersfield, Ca., on the 11:30 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. shift. Tuesdays and Wednesdays were his rest days.

Claiment was called for jury duty. He worked from 11:30 p.m. on Sunday night to 7:30 a.m. on Monday morning. He reported for jury duty at 9:30 a.m. on Monday morning and remained there until 4:30 p.m.

Claimant requested that he be authorized a jury duty leave day under Rule 39 of the agreement **for** Monday, since he would again have 'to work all night Monday and report for jury duty on Tuesday **morning.** carrier denied Claimant's request on the basis that the jury duty did not **conflict** with the hours of his work assignment. Claimant **layed** off **Monday** night, but received no pay. He eventually filed the instant **claim** for one day's pay under Rule **39, Jury** Duty.

That rule reads in pertinent part as follows:

"When a regularly assigned **employe** is **summoned** for jury duty and is required to lose **time** from his **assignment** as a result thereof, he shall be paid for actual **time** lost with a **maximum** of a basic day's pay at the straight time rate of his position for each day lost less the amount allowed him for jury service for each such day, excepting allowances paid by the court for meals, adding or **transportation**, subject to the following **qualification** requirements and **limitations**."

The Organization contends that it is an unreasonable interpretation 'of Rule 39 to require Claimant to serve on jury duty and work an eight-hour shift within the same 24-hour period. It also argues that the identical case, occurring on this property with the same parties, has recently been decided by this Board (Award 22358, Lieberman). In that award, the Organization's position was upheld. Given the strong emphasis on precedent in this industry and the labor relations stability attributed thereto, this Board should sustain the instant claim.

Carrier, on the other hand, argues that Award 22358 is palpably erroneous and should not be **followed.** It cites Second Division Award 6295 (Bergman), to support **its**position.

After extensive **review** and discussion of the record and the cases submitted on both sides of the issue, it is the opinion of this **Board** that this claim should **be** sustained on account Claimant was required to appear for **jury** duty and was required to work **ll:30** p.m. - **7:30** a.m. Rational consideration would tell one that such a schedule could not be maintained for any length of time. As the union stated in its presentation, if Claimant had not been **granted** leave **for Monday** evening; he would have been allowed to rest five out of **40** hours. We think that such a situation does not fall within a reasonable interpretation of Rule **39**.

This **employe** was subject to long hours when the **time** serving on jury duty and time on the job were considered together and this is an **un**-reasonable application of Rule 39. As to petitioner's claim for interest, we find no **authority** in the Schedule Agreement to support such a demand.

FINDINGS: The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, **finds** and holds:

That the parties waived oral hearing;

That the Carrier and the Employes involved in this dispute are respectively Carrier and Employes within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934;

That this Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein; and

That Carrier violated the Agreement.

AWARD

Claim sustained in accordance with the Opinion.

NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD By Order of Third Division

ATTEST: Acting Executive Secretary
National Railroad Adjustment Board

Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 30th day of June 1980.