Form 1 NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
THIRD DIVISION

Award No. 39879
Docket No. MW-38782
08-3-NRAB-00003-050206
(05-3-206)

The Third Division consisted of the regular members and in addition Referee Peter R. Meyers when award was rendered.

(Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division –
(IBT Rail Conference
PARTIES TO DISPUTE: (
(Consolidated Rail Corporation

STATEMENT OF CLAIM:

"Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood that:

(1) The Agreement was violated when the Carrier assigned outside forces (MetroPlex) to perform Maintenance of Way work (moving approximately 200 yards of track) on the New Leg of the Y track in Pavonia Yard at Camden, New Jersey on December 15 and 16, 2001 instead of Messrs. W. Rankin, J. Ganzell, III, J. Castaldi, J. Hubler, W. Baals, L. Venable, G. Lee, M. McCarthy, C. Richardson and R. Cona (System Docket MW-0065).

(2) The Agreement was further violated when the Carrier failed to furnish the General Chairman with proper advance written notice of its intention to contract out said work and make a good-faith effort to reach an understanding as required by the Scope Rule.

(3) As a consequence of the violations referred to in Parts (1) and/or (2) above, Claimants W. Rankin, J. Ganzell, III, J. Castaldi, J. Hubler, W. Baals, L. Venable, G. Lee, M. McCarthy, C. Richardson and R. Cona shall now each be compensated eight (8) hours' pay per day at their respective time and one-half rates for

the time spent by the outside forces in performing the aforesaid work on December 15 and 16, 2001."

FINDINGS:

The Third Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:

The carrier or carriers and the employee or employees involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employee within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as approved June 21, 1934.

This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.

Parties to said dispute were given due notice of hearing thereon.

The Organization filed the instant claim on the Claimants' behalf, alleging that the Carrier violated the parties' Agreement when it assigned outside forces, instead of the Claimants, to perform the work of moving track in Pavonia Yard at Camden, New Jersey.

The Organization initially contends that the Carrier violated Rule 26(a) when it failed to timely deny the initial claim. Rule 26(a) specifies that if the Carrier does not respond in writing to whomever filed the claim within 60 days of its filing, then the claim will be allowed. The Organization asserts that the initial claim was filed on February 8, 2002, and the Organization informed the Carrier on September 5, 2003, that it had not yet received a response. On February 12, 2004, the Carrier responded with a letter and a copy of a claim denial dated February 20, 2002, and a certified mail receipt as alleged proof of a timely denial. The Organization points out, however, that the certified mail receipt is dated February 7, 2002, which is 13 days before the supposed denial was written. The Organization insists that there is no proof that the denial dated February 20, 2002, ever was sent to or received by the Organization. Citing a number of prior Awards, the Organization emphasizes that under Rule 26(a) the instant claim must be sustained as presented.

Turning to the merits of this matter, the Organization maintains that there is no dispute that the Scope Rule unquestionably encompasses work of the character involved here, and such work is contractually reserved to employees who have established and hold seniority within the Track Department. Pointing to prior Awards, the Organization maintains that it is fundamental that work of a class belongs to those for whose benefit the contract was made, and that delegation of such work to others not covered thereby is a violation of the Agreement. The Organization argues that the Carrier's assignment of an outside contractor to perform the work in question was in violation of the clear language of the Agreement. The Organization further asserts that there can be no question that work of the character involved here is reserved to Carrier forces in accordance with the clear language of the Scope Rule, as a number of Awards already have found.

The Organization then emphasizes that the second and third paragraphs of the Scope Rule are virtually identical to Article IV of the May 17, 1968 National Agreement. The Organization contends that this Rule clearly and unambiguously specifies that when the Carrier plans to contract out scope-covered work, it must notify the General Chairman, in writing, at least 15 days in advance of the contracting transaction. Moreover, the Rule requires that if the General Chairman requests a meeting, then the Carrier is obligated to meet and discuss matters relating to the contracting transaction.

The Organization argues that there is no evidence that the Carrier notified the General Chairman of its plans to assign an outside contractor to move 200 yards of track in Pavonia Yard on the claim dates. Contrary to the Carrier's assertion that this work was part of the large project listed in its February 26, 2001 notice to the General Chairman, the Organization insists that there is no evidence that the claimed work is the same as that identified in the Carrier's February 26, 2001 notice, nor is there any explanation as to why the Carrier would wait nearly ten months and then contract out only this portion of the large project prior to New Jersey Transit (NJT) starting on its project. The Organization points out that if, as the Carrier claimed, NJT delayed the project until at least April 8, 2002, then why would the Carrier assign a contractor to move only 200 yards of track nearly four months prior when it made no attempt to assign any of the work to anyone for more than 21 months.

The Organization argues that the work performed by outside forces on the December 2001 claim dates was not part of a large project subject to the February 26, 2001 notice. The Organization insists that this was a stand-alone project assigned to outside forces without any advance notice to the General Chairman. Moreover, this work easily could have been performed by the Carrier's Track Department forces in the same amount of time.

The Organization points to a number of prior Awards in contending that because there is no dispute that the work in question is encompassed within the scope of the Agreement, there can be no doubt that the Carrier's failure to provide advance notice requires a sustaining award here. The Organization further asserts that these prior Awards present ample evidence that the Carrier is a repeat violator of the notice provisions of the Scope Rule. The Organization argues that the essence of the Scope Rule is in the opportunity it affords the Organization to attempt to persuade the Carrier to assign work that the Carrier tentatively had decided to contract to an outside contractor to BMWE-represented employees. This opportunity was denied in the instant matter. The Organization asserts that the Carrier's failure to comply with the notice obligation requires payment of the instant claim as presented.

The Organization goes on to contend that as for the Carrier's assertion that it provided notice of its intent to contract out the subject work in its letter dated February 26, 2001, there are obvious problems with that notice. The Organization points out that the January 14, 1999 Implementing Agreement contains no provision whatsoever for the contracting out of BMWE work except specific work initially outlined in Article I, Section 1(h) none of which is applicable here. The Organization maintains that if the Carrier was referring to Article I, Section 1 (i)(1) and (5) these provisions allow for the distribution of certain Carrier BMWE work to NS and/or CSXT BMWE-represented employees, but not to outside forces.

As for the Carrier's assertion that it was necessary to contract out the work listed in the February 2001 letter, the Organization asserts that there are a number of problems with this assertion. The Organization contends that any lack of equipment or manpower due to the Conrail acquisition is to be addressed, pursuant to the January 14, 1999 Implementing Agreement, through the provisions allowing

NS and CSXT BMWE-represetned employees, but not outside forces, to perform certain work over and above certain routine Carrier maintenance work.

The Organization then points out that the Carrier knew in December 1999 that the track work in question had to be done, while its February 2001 notice states that NJT would complete its project in 2003. The Organization therefore asserts that at a minimum, the Carrier had at least three years to arrange for its employees to perform the work in question, but it made no attempt to assign any of the work to its own BMWE employees, or to NS or CSXT BMWE employees. The Organization emphasizes that the disputed work involved 16 hours for each of the named Claimants, and it was performed on the Claimants' rest days. The Organization suggests that if the Carrier, in three years' time, could not rearrange its work schedules to allow the Claimants to perform this work, then the work should have been made available to them as weekend overtime, as a number of prior Awards have held.

The Organization goes on to address the Carrier's argument that, having given notice of and discussed the project with the Organization, there was no reason to "piecemeal" this minor portion of the entire project. The Organization insists that, assuming notice was given, there simply was no reason for the Carrier not to "piecemeal" this "minor portion" of the entire project to its employees. This especially is true in light of the fact that the work could have been assigned to the Claimants without disruption of their normal duties. The Organization contends that the Carrier's so-called "piecemeal" defense is without merit because the Carrier did not show how this work and the larger project were interdependent and/or interrelated. The Organization points out that the Board regularly has disregarded this "piecemeal" defense where various phases of a project were not interrelated, and has required carriers to divide the work.

The Organization emphasizes that the Carrier never disputed the requested remedy, so the Claimants are entitled to that remedy.

The Organization ultimately contends that the instant claim should be sustained in its entirety.

The Carrier initially contends that this dispute involves the interpretation and application of the January 14, 1999 Implementing Agreement that was negotiated and arbitrated under the New York Dock Conditions, pursuant to Finance Docket 33388, Decision 89 of the STB approving the Conrail transaction. The Carrier asserts that the New York Dock Conditions contain exclusive arbitration procedures for the handling of disputes separate and apart from Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended. The Carrier argues that several NRAB Awards have held that the Board lacks authority to interpret a dispute involving the interpretation and application of a New York Dock Implementing Agreement, even if the claim arguably involves portions of the collective bargaining agreement.

The Carrier submits that although the Organization may attempt to portray this case as simply a contracting out case under the scope of the Agreement, the record makes clear that this case is inextricably tied to the provisions of the January 1999 Implementing Agreement. The Carrier emphasizes that in line with prior Board precedent, the Board should dismiss the instant claim for lack of jurisdiction.

Without waiving this argument, the Carrier goes on to assert that contrary to the misrepresentation in Part (2) of the claim, the Carrier complied with the procedures to be followed when it plans to contract out scope-covered work. The Carrier insists that, well in advance of contracting out the disputed work, it notified the involved General Chairmen of its intention to contract out work in connection with a major project in the South Jersey area. The Carrier also met and fully discussed this project with the Organization, but the parties were unable to reach an understanding regarding this contracting project. The Carrier nevertheless proceeded with the contracting as provided for in the Scope Rule, while the Organization exercised its right to file the instant claim.

The Carrier contends that the record establishes that it fully complied with the advance notice provisions of the Scope Rule. The Organization's allegation in Part (2) of the instant claim is totally devoid of merit and is without any factual basis whatsoever. The Carrier suggests that the Organization's attempt to interject this issue into the present dispute is, at best, carelessness or, at worst, a disingenuous attempt to obfuscate the record in order to disguise the weakness of its position.

The Carrier then contends that there can be no reasonable argument that the work at issue in connection with the NJT project was "over and above routine maintenance." The Carrier asserts that this is the type of work that the January 1999 Implementing Agreement stated was beyond the capability of Conrail – Shared Assets to perform. The Carrier argues that while the Implementing Agreement gave NS and CSXT the right to provide this type of work on Conrail's behalf, it did not prevent Conrail from contracting out this type of work so long as it was done as provided for in the Agreement, as happened in this case. The Carrier insists that the New York Dock Arbitration Award and the resulting Implementing Agreement recognize that Conrail no longer would be able to perform such large-scale projects and that such projects would have to be completed by another party or parties, be it NS, CSXT, or outside contractors.

The Carrier further asserts that even if the Implementing Agreement did not apply, the disputed work nevertheless was properly contracted out under the terms of the Agreement and in accordance with the criteria that have been applied on this property. The Carrier emphasizes that it has the right to contract out work when it does not have sufficient manpower or equipment to complete the project with its own forces. The Carrier contends that the work in question was a small and integral part of the entire project, and the Organization never has seriously refuted the fact that the Carrier did not have sufficient forces to complete the entire project. The Carrier also did not have the necessary equipment to dedicate exclusively to this project. The Carrier emphasizes that its manpower and its roadway equipment inventory were dramatically reduced on transaction day to reflect its new function as a switching and terminal company.

Pointing to a prior Award, the Carrier argues that the NJT light rail project certainly fulfilled the criteria for a large-scale project in that it was a multi-million-dollar project that would take more than three years to complete. The Carrier asserts that its post-transaction maintenance force in South Jersey certainly would not have been remotely able to handle this project.

As for the Organization's position that the Claimants should have been used to perform the work subject to the instant claim, the Carrier emphasizes that the Organization totally ignores the unrefuted fact that this work was but a miniscule

part of the multi-million-dollar project that took more than three years to complete. The Carrier insists that under the circumstances, it was not required to piecemeal small portions of the project to provide work for its own forces simply because the Claimants were on their rest days on these two particular days in a multi-year project. The Carrier asserts that a number of prior Awards have held that the Carrier is not required to piecemeal portions of a project that has been properly contracted out.

The Carrier then points out that the work performed in Pavonia Yard and the surrounding areas, as identified in the initial and subsequent notices, was performed only to allow NJT the ability to institute its River Line passenger service. The Carrier emphasizes that it had no need, insofar as its freight operations were concerned, to perform any of these reconfigurations and additions to its physical plant. None of this work would have been done absent NJT's light passenger rail project. The Carrier contends that the Board continually has held that the Carrier may contract out work that is not for its exclusive benefit.

The Carrier ultimately contends that the instant claim should be denied in its entirety.

The Board reviewed the procedural argument raised by the Organization with respect to timeliness, and finds that that matter was resolved in conference prior to July 27, 2004. The Agreement dated July 27, 2004, between the General Chairman and the Vice President of Employee Relations is contained in the record, and it states, in part:

> ". . . at the conference, it was agreed that this claim would be handled on its merits without reference to time limits by either party."

The Board reviewed the procedural argument raised by the Carrier relating to whether this contracting dispute falls under the Arbitrated Implementing Agreement. The Carrier contends that this Board lacks jurisdiction to consider the claim. The Carrier tendered Third Division Award 38988, which was adopted on

March 27, 2008. In that case, where the facts are very similar to the ones at issue here, the Board held, in relevant part, as follows:

> ". . . however, given the substantial jurisdictional question raised by the Carrier; the language in Article I, Section 1(h) of the January 14, 1999 Arbitrated Implementing Agreement; and the clearly established precedent that the Board has no jurisdiction to consider disputes arising under Implementing Agreements established pursuant to New York Dock, the question of whether the work in dispute fell within the purview of Article I, Section 1(h) of the January 14, 1999 Arbitrated Implementing Agreement can only be decided by a duly authorized Board constituted pursuant to New York Dock."

In the above Award, the Board relied on First Division Award 25983, wherein the Board held:

> "The Board reviewed the claim. It arose out of claims involving implementation of an Implementing Agreement under New York Dock. The Board has traditionally refused to accept jurisdiction of disputes that involve New York Dock Implementing Agreements. The claim listed here is therefore, dismissed. The Board lacks jurisdiction to do otherwise."

The Board also relied on Third Division Awards 36276 and 24804 in coming to its conclusion in Award 38988.

For all of the above reasons, the claim must be dismissed.

AWARD

Claim dismissed.

ORDER

This Board, after consideration of the dispute identified above, hereby orders that an Award favorable to the Claimant(s) not be made.

NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD
By Order of Third Division

Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 31st day of July 2009.

LABOR MEMBER'S DISSENT
TO
AWARDS 39877, 39878, 39879 AND 39880
DOCKETS MW-38780, MW-38781, MW-38782 AND MW-38815
(Referee Peter R. Meyers)

The Organization respectfully dissent from the Majority's findings that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve Scope Rule claims advanced by the Employes concerning the Carrier's subcontracting of maintenance of way work to third parties. According to the Majority, resolution of that dispute can only be had in an arbitration panel established under Article I, Section 11 of the New York Dock[1/] conditions imposed by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) as a condition of its approval of the Carrier's acquisition and division by CSXT and Norfolk Southern in STB Finance Docket No. 33888. As we will show below, a Section 11 panel does not have jurisdiction to resolve the disputes brought to this Board by the Employes and the Majority's failure to render a decision on the merits regarding these claims amounts to a failure of the Board to comply with its obligations under the Railway Labor Act. The Board is obligated by statute to comply with the commands and requirements of the RLA which means that it must apply and interpret the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Here, the Majority failed to comply with the requirements of the statute by not rendering decisions on disputes involving interpretation of the CBAs, by failing to decide matters within its jurisdiction and instead deferring to a body that lacks jurisdiction over the disputes, and failing to render a decision that draws its essence from the CBA. Instead, the Majority ignored the CBA and its statutory jurisdiction and based its decision on irrelevant considerations outside the CBA and the Railway Labor Act.

I. THIS BOARD'S JURISDICTION.

The Board was created by the 1934 Amendments to the Railway Labor Act. The Third Division of the Board has "jurisdiction over disputes involving . . . maintenance of way men . . ." Section 3 First(h). The "disputes" over which this Division has jurisdiction involve "disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . ." Section 3 First(i). When an employe raises a claim that the Carrier's actions violate a term of a collective bargaining agreement, the Board's jurisdiction to resolve that claim is exclusive. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 324 (1972). There is no other administrative agency established under law with jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning "the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions." In these cases, the Organization alleged violations of the Scope Rule of the parties' CBA as modified by an implementing agreement imposed by an arbitrator under the New York Dock conditions. The Majority mistakenly adopted the Carrier's argument that because the implementing agreement modified the Scope Rule an arbitration panel created to resolve disputes

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[1/] The conditions set forth in New York Dock Ry.—Control—Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Term., 360 I.C.C. 60, aff'd. sub nom. New York Dock Ry. v. U.S., 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979).

over statutory employee protective conditions contained in New York Dock has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes over the interpretation or application of the Scope Rule and other rules contained in the CBA between the Organization and Carrier. We will show that argument is both bad history and bad law.

II. EMPLOYEE PROTECTIVE CONDITIONS.

The New York Dock conditions imposed under the Conrail acquisition are the most recent refinement of employee protective conditions first established in the rail industry by agreement in 1936. In 1933, Congress passed legislation in the depths of the Depression that imposed a freeze on railroad employment. In 1936, the law was to expire and President Roosevelt persuaded management and labor to fashion a voluntary arrangement that would protect the economic interests of employees, yet permit the carriers to engage in business reorganizations necessary for their survival. The 1936 agreement, called the "Washington Job Protection Agreement" (WJPA) permitted carriers to engage in "coordinations" whereby operations were unified, consolidated, merged or otherwise combined. In return, employees economically harmed by such coordinations were to receive income guarantees for a fixed period of time so as to cushion the blow of job loss or income reduction.

The WJPA also contained provisions in Sections 4 and 5 for notice and negotiation between the parties over the effects on seniority caused by the coordination. Section 5 expressly required that "[e]ach plan of coordination which results in the displacement of employes or rearrangement of forces shall provide for the selection of forces from the employes of all the carriers involved on bases accepted as appropriate for application in the particular case." In the event the parties could not agreement on such an "implementing agreement" regarding employee selection, the WJPA provided for mandatory arbitration of the agreement.

The Transportation Act of 1940 made the imposition of employee protective conditions mandatory on railroad mergers and acquisitions. The statutory protective conditions required, at a minimum, that employees affected by a merger be protected economically for four (4) years after the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) approved the transaction. In virtually all such merger and acquisitions, the WJPA also applied as a matter of contract and the two (2) protective arrangements co-existed. In some cases, such as the so-call Oklahoma Conditions in 1944, the manner of the selection of forces and assignment of employees was set forth expressly in the ICC's order approving the transaction. In other cases, the selection and assignment was handled under the WJPA in a proceeding separate from the ICC imposed protective conditions.

In 1952, the ICC expressly incorporated a modified version of the economic protections contained in the WJPA as a condition of its approval of a transaction. In the New Orleans Union

Passenger Terminal case, the operating plan contemplated an adverse impact on some employees more than four (4) years after the ICC's approval of the transaction. To remedy that problem, the ICC also imposed the WJPA as a condition with the proviso for the first four (4) years, affected employees would obtain benefits under the statutory protections contained in the so-called Oklahoma Conditions. However, to the extent that such an employee would be entitled to further benefits under the WJPA, he could claim them as well. Additionally, employees affected more than four (4) years after the ICC's approval of the transaction were entitled to WJPA benefits. Finally, in 1967, the ICC expressly imposed Sections 4 and 5 of the WJPA relating to the procedures used to select and assign employees to a merged operation as a condition of its approval of the Southern Railway – Central of Georgia merger.

Following the Southern—Central of Georgia case, the development of employee protective conditions in the railroad industry moved temporarily from the ICC to the Secretary of Labor as conditions were developed for the creation of Amtrak from the passenger operations of the various rail carriers. The Secretary was charged with developing protective conditions consistent with the protective language contained in the Rail Passenger Services Act of 1970. Those conditions, known as the "Appendix C-1" conditions extended the protective period to a maximum of six (6) years from the four (4) provided under ICC conditions, provided for adjustment of economic benefits to take account wage increases, provided for negotiation or arbitration of an agreement regarding the selection of forces and assignment of employees resulting from Amtrak's takeover and contained a provision that preserved the "rights, privileges and benefits" accruing to employees under existing collective agreements. In the "4R Act" of 1976, Congress mandated the ICC to refashion employee protective provisions that incorporated both the Southern-Central of Georgia conditions and the Appendix C-1 conditions. The result of that effort is the New York Dock conditions created in 1979, which were imposed upon the CSX-NS-Conrail transaction. So, even if the Majority could look to the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) in making its decision; as a matter of law, an implementing agreement does not become a separate agreement regarding terms and conditions of employment; instead it modifies an existing CBA as necessary to allow a transaction to go forward without the CBA as an impediment. Simply put, the CBA is modified by the implementing agreement but it then continues to apply as any CBA does to all matters involving rates of pay, rules and working conditions.

III. THE INTERSECTION OF EMPLOYEE PROTECTIVE CONDITIONS AND THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.

Article I, Section 2 of the New York Dock conditions reads as follows:

The rates of pay, rules, working conditions and all collective bargaining and other rights, privileges and benefits (including continuation of pension rights and

> *benefits) of the railroad's employees under applicable laws and/or existing collective bargaining agreements or otherwise shall be preserved unless changed by future collective bargaining agreements or applicable statutes.*

That provision was adopted from the Appendix C-1 protections into ICC imposed statutory protections for the first time in New York Dock.

Beginning in the early 1980's, a series of disputes arose over the authority of an arbitrator to make changes in existing collective agreements while fashioning an implementing agreement pursuant to Article I, Section 4 of New York Dock, which in turn derived from the adoption of Sections 4 and 5 of the WJPA into the Southern-Central of Georgia conditions. Needless to say, the rail unions asserted the arbitrator had no such authority while the rail carriers said the arbitrator had such authority pursuant to both Section 4 and the so-called "cram down" provisions contained in the former Section 11341(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act [now Section 11321(a)] which exempted carriers participating in an approved transaction from the anti-trust laws and "all other laws" necessary to carry out the approved transaction. This dispute was played out before the ICC, the STB and the courts in the so-called Carmen cases beginning in the mid-1980's and continuing until 1998. The final pronouncement on this issue was made by the STB in CSX Corp.—Control—Chessie System, Inc., 3 S.T.B. 701 (1998) ("Carmen III"). The STB's decision in that case established the parameters of the arbitrator's authority in the Conrail implementing agreement arbitration and also described exactly what the implementing agreement did to existing collective agreements.

In Carmen III, the STB attempted to synthesize an earlier decision of the ICC in CSX Corp.—Control—Chessie System, Inc., 6 I.C.C.2d 715 (1990) ("Carmen II") and the Supreme Court's decision in Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117 (1991) ("Dispatchers"). According to the STB, Carmen II held that "in connection with an approved transaction, CBAs and collective bargaining rights could be modified without resort to RLA procedures, under the auspices of Section 11347 [now Section 11326] and the protective conditions imposed thereunder." Carmen III, 3 S.T.B. at 708. In Dispatchers, the STB noted that the "cram down" provisions of the former Section 11341(a) reached both the Railway Labor Act because it was a "law" and collective bargaining agreements negotiated under it "(because immunity from a law implies immunity from the obligations imposed by that law.)" Id. at 714. However, the STB also noted that the Court limited the effect of the "cram down" provisions to those "necessary" to carry out an "approved" transaction. Id.

After reviewing both decisions, the STB largely stayed with the ICC's analysis in Carmen II. The scope of the authority of arbitrators to modify CBAs while fashioning an implementing agreement under Section 4 would be defined by the authority exercised by arbitrators during the

period 1940 – 80 under both conditions imposed by the ICC and the implementing agreement arbitration processes under the WJPA, another CBA. 3 S.T.B. at 718. Additionally, the scope of that authority was further limited to its use in an "approved transaction" where the changes were "necessary" to carry out that transaction and the changes could not affect "rights, privileges or benefits" protected by Article I, Section 2 of New York Dock. Id. at 719. "Rights, privileges or benefits" protected by Section 2 are 'the incidents of employment, ancillary emoluments or fringe benefits—as opposed to the more central aspects of the work itself—pay, rules and working conditions.' Id. at 723, quoting, UTU v. ICC, 108 F.3d at 1430. Accordingly, the STB set the following standard for a Section 4 arbitrator operating under the New York Dock conditions. The arbitrator had the authority to make changes to a CBA, the changes had to be in the context of an approved transaction, the changes had to be necessary to carrying out the transaction, "rights, privileges and benefits" could not be changed and the arbitrator's overall authority to make changes was constrained by the practice of arbitrators in similar proceedings between 1940 and 1980.

IV. THE SECTION 4 ARBITRATOR'S MODIFICATIONS TO THE CONRAIL CBA IN FD 33888.

Following the STB's approval of CSX's and NS's acquisition of Conrail, BMWE and the three (3) carriers entered into negotiations, pursuant to Article I, Section 4 of the New York Dock conditions to devise an implementing agreement dividing the Conrail BMWE-represented workforce among the three (3) carriers. The parties could not reach an agreement and arbitrator William Fredenberger was selected by the National Mediation Board to fashion the implementing agreement. On January 14, 1999, arbitrator Fredenberger issued his decision. Arbitrator Fredenberger addressed the issue of changes to subcontracting rules in CBAs as coming within his jurisdiction thus:

> *The parties are in further dispute with respect to the use of outside contractors by NS and CSXT for rehabilitation and construction projects necessary to link the Carriers' system with allocated CRC lines and to upgrade track and increase capacity.* The Carriers emphasizes [sic] that these projects would be temporary and that under the BMWE's proposal it would be required to hire and then lay off substantial numbers of employees. Nor emphasizes the Carriers, does BMWE's proposal allow for NS, CSXT or third parties to perform maintenance of way functions for CRC as operator of the SAAs where those functions cannot be performed efficiently by the drastically reduced employee complement of CRC.*

> *Once again the Carriers' arguments are more persuasive than those of the BMWE. Restriction on contracting out, either through the scope clause of a CBA or a specific prohibition therein, is a common provision in railroad CBAs. As BMWE points out, it is entitled to respect and observance under the STB's decision in Carmen III. However, the application of such restrictions in the instant case would cause serious delay to implementation of the transaction insofar as capital improvements are concerned and would unduly burden CRC with an employee complement it could not keep working efficiently. Accordingly, elimination of those restrictions meets the necessity test set forth by the STB in Carmen III. ****

Following his memorandum opinion, Arbitrator Fredenberger attached an "Implementing Agreement" applicable to the Carriers and BMWE. Article I, Section 1(i) of that Agreement made the following changes to the Conrail, CSX and NS CBAs as they related to the use of third parties to perform maintenance of way work on Conrail operated territory:

> *The parties recognize that, after the transaction, CRC will no longer have the system support it formerly had available. Therefore, to permit operation of the Share Assets Areas in a reasonable and efficient manner:*
>
> *(1) Major annual program maintenance such as rail, tie, and surfacing projects will be provided by CSXT and/or NSR in accordance with their respective collective bargaining agreements and/or practices.*
>
> *(2) CRC will purchase continuous welded rail ("CWR") from CSXT and/or NSR.*
>
> *(3) CRC will obtain from CSXT and/or NSR, in accordance with their respective collective bargaining agreements and/or practices, services such as component reclamation and prefabricated track work.*
>
> *(4) CRC will obtain from CSXT and/or NSR, in accordance with their respective collective bargaining agreements and/or practices, roadway equipment overhaul/repair that cannot be accomplished on line of road by CRC forces.*
>
> *(5) Changes, additions, improvements, and rationalizations that are over and above routine maintenance will be provided by CSXT and/or NSR in accordance with their respective collective bargaining agreements and/or practices.*

BMWED submits that those modifications to the three (3) collective agreements then became part of those parties' agreements governing rates of pay, rules and working conditions under the Railway Labor Act. Note, that the Arbitrator fashioned his arbitrated "agreement" in the form followed by a voluntary agreement, i.e., the parties "recognize" that Conrail's status would be different after the transaction. The point that must be stressed is that in Carmen III, the STB clearly discussed the authority of a Section 4 arbitrator to "modify" an existing CBA. Implementing agreements made under Section 4, whether voluntarily or involuntarily through arbitration, effect changes to Railway Labor Act agreements. Section 4 agreements are not independent agreements somehow separated from other agreements between the parties made under the Railway Labor Act. Instead, the implementing agreements make "necessary" modifications to existing CBAs to permit the carrying out of "transactions" approved by the STB. Nowhere in Carmen III, Carmen II, or Train Dispatchers do the STB, ICC or Supreme Court even suggest that a completed implementing agreement is a special creature of the Interstate Commerce Act with a continuing dispute resolution process attached to it. Indeed, a comparison of the jurisdiction of arbitrators under Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act and Article I, Section 11 of the Interstate Commerce Act shows that there is no process under the latter act to interpret or apply the terms of an implementing agreement independently of the Railway Labor Act. So, to the extent that the Majority considered the implementing agreement, it completely failed to understand and essentially ignored its plain terms, as the implementing agreement expressly modified the CBA; it did not set up a parallel agreement.

V. AN ARBITRATOR ACTING UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF NEW YORK DOCK LACKS JURISDICTION TO INTERPRET AN EARLIER IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT'S MODIFICATIONS TO RATES OF PAY, RULES AND WORKING CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN A CBA NEGOTIATED UNDER THE RLA.

As we noted in Part I above, the Third Division of the NRAB has jurisdiction to adjust disputes "growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements governing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Sec. 3 First (i). That jurisdiction may be shared with an adjustment board created under Section 3 Second. No other forum has been granted jurisdiction to resolve the types of disputes presented to Section 3 panels. Here, the Majority assumes that another panel created outside the Railway Labor Act has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning the interpretation or applications of agreements governing rates of pay, rules and working conditions, so long as that agreement has been modified by an implementing agreement fashioned under protective conditions imposed by the ICC or STB. According to the Majority, that panel is one created under Article I, Section 11 of the New York

Dock conditions. A review of the history and application of arbitration under statutorily imposed employee protective conditions reveals otherwise.

In 1944, the ICC imposed conditions for the economic protection of employees affected by the acquisition of the Oklahoma Railway by the Santa Fe Railway and the Rock Island Railroad. These conditions came to be called the Oklahoma Conditions. The conditions themselves were contained in numbered paragraphs in the ICC's order approving the transaction. Paragraph 8 of the Oklahoma Conditions established the following arbitration provision:

> *In the event that any dispute or controversy arises with respect to the protection afforded by the foregoing Conditions Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7, which cannot be settled by the carriers and the employee, or his authorized representatives, within 30 days after the controversy arises, it may be referred by either party, to an arbitration committee for consideration and determination, the formation of which committee, its duties, procedure, expenses, et cetera, shall be agreed upon by the carriers and the employee, or his duly authorized representative.*

Conditions Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 concern the computation and payment of "displacement" or "dismissal" allowances to employees who suffered an adverse affect as to compensation as a result of the approved transaction.

In Southern Ry.—Control—Central of Georgia Ry., 331 I.C.C. 151 (1967), the ICC expressly incorporated the "implementing agreement" provisions of the collectively bargained WJPA into its order approving the transaction. The ICC noted that the economic protections afforded by its protective conditions were to be put into place after forces had been rearranged in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of the WJPA. Id. at 169-70. Article I, Section 6 of the conditions provided arbitration in the following manner:

> *In the event any dispute or controversy arises with respect to the protection afforded by these conditions or with respect to their interpretation, application, or enforcement, which cannot be settled by the carriers and the employe or his authorized representatives within 30 days after the dispute arises, it may be referred by either party to an arbitration committee for consideration and determination.*

The Appendix C-1 conditions imposed by the Secretary of Labor to apply to employees of railroads adversely affected by the creation of Amtrak also contained an arbitration provision in Article I, Section 11 that mandated arbitration of "any dispute or controversy, with respect to the interpretation, application or enforcement of any provision of this Appendix . . ." with the

exception of disputes involving the formation of implementing agreements under Article I, Section 4 or disputes over an employee's loss on the sale of his home under Article I, Section 12.

The New York Dock protective conditions which are an amalgam of Appendix C-1 and the Southern-Central of Georgia, conditions contains the following language mandating arbitration in Article I, Section 11:

> *In the event the railroad and its employees or their authorized representatives cannot settle any dispute or controversy with respect to the interpretation, application or enforcement of any provision of this appendix, except sections 4 and 12[2/] of this article I, within 20 days after the dispute arises, it may be referred by either party to an arbitration committee.*

The use of these arbitration provisions is a delegation by the ICC, formerly, or the STB, presently, of the agency's primary jurisdiction regarding employee protective conditions imposed as part of its approval of a railroad merger, consolidation, etc. Black v. S.T.B., 476 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2007). The primary purpose of such arbitration is to determine whether or not an employee, or a group of employees, are considered eligible for displacement or dismissal allowances under the imposed conditions. Additionally, arbitration can be used by the STB to resolve questions regarding the interpretation of terms contained within the protective conditions themselves. E.g., American Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. I.C.C., 54 F.3d 842, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(ICC properly delegated to arbitrator the task of determining the "total compensation" earned by an individual claimant.) What these arbitrations do not do and cannot do, is resolve disputes over CBAs modified under Article I, Section 4 of the New York Dock conditions.

A useful comparison can be made with the arbitration provisions of the privately negotiated WJPA from 1936. That protective agreement, which the ICC noted is separate and distinct from protective conditions required by statute, Southern-Central of Georgia, 331 I.C.C. at 169, also contains an arbitration provision like Article I, Section 11; however it differs significantly in the scope of matters subject to that panel's jurisdiction. Section 13 of the WJPA provides in pertinent part:

> *In the event that any dispute or controversy arises (except as defined in Section 11)[3/] in connection with a particular coordination, including an interpretation, application or enforcement of any provisions of this agreement* ***(or of the***

[2/] Section 4 concerns implementing agreements like the type fashioned by Referee Fredenberger. Section 12 concerns an employee's loss on the sale of his home.

[3/] The WJPA's equivalent to Article I, Section 12 of New York Dock.

> ***agreement entered into between the carriers and the representatives of the employees relating to said coordination as contemplated by this agreement)*** *(emphasis added) which is not composed by the parties thereto within thirty days after the same arises, may be referred by either party for consideration and determination to a Committee which is hereby established, composed in the first instance of the signatories to this agreement.*

In other words, the WJPA, a CBA concerning protective conditions, contains its own arbitration procedures established under Section 3 Second of the RLA. The jurisdiction of that arbitration panel to resolve disputes over implementing agreements made under the WJPA is that such agreements are made under the Railway Labor Act and outside of the statutory protective conditions. Here, by contrast, the implementing agreement was a product of the statutorily imposed protective conditions.

As we demonstrated in Part IV above, the implementing agreement made modifications to the Scope Rule in the BMWED-Conrail CBA. However, those changes are self-executing, they became incorporated into the CBA, they do not exist in some parallel statutory world that is separate, but somehow equal to, the CBA. Indeed, the correctness of this view is shown by noting the limited nature of Section 11 arbitration.

First, unlike the WJPA a Section 11 arbitration expressly does not have jurisdiction to interpret an implementing agreement. Jurisdiction is limited to interpretation of the New York Dock conditions. Indeed, Section 11 arbitrators expressly are divested of jurisdiction to resolve Section 4 disputes regarding formation of implementing agreements and lack jurisdiction to resolve disputes over losses from the sale of an employee's home. Therefore, the greatest jurisdiction the panel could exercise would be to interpret the modifications of the BMWE-Conrail CBA on the basis that the implementing agreement was an "application" of New York Dock. However, note the arbitration language in the WJPA which expressly confers jurisdiction upon the arbitration panel to interpret implementing agreements versus the silence on that point in Section 11. However, even if the Section 11 panel had jurisdiction to interpret the self-executing provisions of the implementing agreement, it certainly would not have jurisdiction to interpret and apply the parts of the Scope Rule not modified by the implementing agreement and all other provisions of the BMWED-Conrail CBA. That jurisdiction resides exclusively in arbitration panels established under Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act. The Section 11 panel cannot determine if the proper claimants have been invoked, if time limits under the CBA have been followed or even what has been the practice under the CBA both before and after its modification by the Section 4 arbitrator. All of those inquiries must be made and answered by the Section 3 arbitrator. Therefore, it makes common sense, in addition to good law, to presume that the implementing agreement made self-executing modifications to the CBA. Once those modifications were made, the Section 4 arbitrator

under New York Dock lost jurisdiction of the dispute and no other New York Dock arbitrator retained some residual jurisdiction over the implementing agreement process. Indeed, as we noted above, a Section 11 arbitrator has no primary jurisdiction over Section 4 disputes and there is absolutely nothing in the conditions that even implies a retained jurisdiction over the changes made to CBAs under Section 4. There is only one BMWED-Conrail CBA and one Scope Rule; there are not two, one under the Railway Labor Act and another one under the New York Dock conditions.

Therefore, the Board's failure to make a decision on the merits of the dispute brought under the BMWED-Conrail CBA, as modified, is a failure of the Board to comply with its jurisdictional command under the Railway Labor Act. The Board was required to resolve this dispute on the merits, its failure to do through an interpretation and application of the CBA created under the Railway Labor Act is a basis to set aside the awards as unlawfully issued. The awards failed to comply with the statute and did not conform to the Board's jurisdiction, the Board failed to perform its statutory duty under Section 3 and the Board failed to limit itself to the terms of the CBA in rendering its award.

Respectfully submitted,



Roy C. Robinson
Labor Member