In the Matter of Arbitration
between
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE AND STEAMSHIP
CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION
EMPLOYEES
and
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY
Pursuant to Article 11 of the New York Dock II
Conditions which were imposed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission in connection with its
Order in Finance~Docket 29430 (Sub-No. 1), approving the coordination of operations on the
Norfolk and Western Railway Company and the
Southern Railway Company.
QUESTION AT ISSUE:
"Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood that:
1. Carrier violated the Agreement between the parties when it de
clined to allow benefits claimed by Agent-Operator L. E. Fitzgerald,
Manassas, Virginia as a result of his being displaced on September 19,
1982, from his position of Clerk-Operator at Monroe, Virginia.
2. Carrier shall now be required to allow any and all benefits to
Agent-Operator L. E. Fitzgerald due under provisions of the New York
Dock Conditions as a result of said transaction."
FINDINGS
AND
AWARD
FINDINGS:
The dispute here at issue concerns a determination as to whether
Claimant is entitled to the protective benefits of the New York Dock
Conditions as a consequence of being displaced from his clerical position following Carrier's abolishment of another contract position at
Monroe, Virginia on September 19, 1982.
It is the Organization's contention that the job abolishment
should
have been treated as a "transaction" subject to the protective conditions
imposed upon the coordination of operations of the rail carriers. In
this regard, in arguments to the Board, the Organization states: "While
Claimant suffered no monetary loss insofar as compensation is concerned
up to this point, he still suffered a monetary loss when the Carrier
failed to properly comply with the provisions of the New York Dock
Conditions which would have provided him with benefits as to moving
expenses and allowances under Section 9 thereof."
Section 9 of Appendix III of the New York Dock Conditions reads,
in pertinent part, as follows:
"9. Movinc expenses.-Any employee retained in the
service of the railroad or who is later restored to
service after being entitled to receive a dismissal
allowance, and who is required to change the point
of his,employment as a result of the transaction,
and who within his protective period is required to
move his place of residence, shall be reimbursed
for all expenses of moving his household and other
personal effects for the traveling expenses of him
self and mer,:ners of his family, including living
expenses for himself and his family and for his own
actual wage loss, not exceed (sic) 3 working days,
the exact ex_ent of the responsibility of the rail
road durinc -the time necessary for such transfer and
for reason=_:.^'_e time thereafter and the ways and means
of transpor-.a=ion to be agreed upon in advance by the
railroad and the affected employee or his representa
tives: ore= =ed, however, that changes in place of
residence w -=h are not a result of the transaction,
shall not Za =onsidered to be within the purview of
this secticn; * * * No claim for reimbursement shall
be paid unde_ the provision of this section unless
such clair. _= presented to railroad with (sic) 90 days
after the ___= on which the expenses were incurred."
We would note that the basis for there being no claim for compensation stems from the fact that Claimant displaced onto a position 0roducing compensation equal to or exceeding that of his. position at Monroe, Virginia. The rate of pay of the Clerk-Operator position from
which he was displaced was $92.26 per day, whereas the rate of pay
for the Agent-Operator's position to which he exercised seniority at
Manassas, Virginia is $94.85 per day. However, the Claimant submits
that such exercise of seniority necessitated he sell his home and incur moving expenses in going from Monroe to Manassas, a distance of
132.5 miles.
In support of its contention that Claimant was "adversely effected" by the coordination, the Organization directs attention to various
changes in rail traffic involving Monroe, offering interchange re
ports, switch lists, interchange corrections, etc., maintaining that
by reason of traffic by-passing Monroe following the coordination the
Carrier has affected the amount of work which had previously been re
quired of employees at that location. Essentially, the organization
urges that the rerouting of cars has caused one entire yard shift to
be abolished as well as three jobs in the mechanical Department in
addition to the clerical position involved in this dispute. It dis
putes Carrier allegations that the position abolishment was, as Car
rier states, "due.to a serious and pervasive decline in the Carrier's
business," and challenges Carrier as having "dealt totally in general=
ities and not in specifics." In this latter regard, the Organization
asserts that the claim should prevail account the Carrier not having
met its burden of proof, the Organization citing Section 11(e) of Ap
pendix III of the New York Dock Conditions, which reads:
"(e) In the event of any dispute as to whether or
not a particular employee was affected by a trans
action, it shall be his obligation to identify the
transaction and specify the pertinent facts of that
transaction relied upon. It shall then be the rail
road's burden to prove that factors other than a
transaction affected the employee."
The Carrier states that upon receipt of Claimant's "Request for
Entitlement to Benefits" form it reviewed its records and determined
that Claimant's displacement was a direct result of the declining
economy and not the consolidation as was alleged by Claimant. In this
respect, Carrier wrote Claimant under date of February 18, 1983, stating in pertinent part the following:
"On your form you state that you were first placed
in a worse position on September 19, 1982 when you
were first displaced by J. H. Wilkes. You also state
that the diversion of traffic to the NW caused a drop
in work at Monroe. A review of the details concerning your situation reveals that your displacement was
due to the 7 A.M. Chief Clerk's position at Monroe
being abolished because of the economy. The Carrier
experienced a serious business decline in 1982 and
thusly had force reductions to help reduce expenses.
The abolishment of the chief clerk position started
the chain reaction that resulted in your displacement
which was due to economic reasons and not because of
the merger."
In support of its contentions, the Carrier directed attention
to statistical information it had provided to the Organization during the handling of the claim on the property, arguing that the
data supports a finding that the business decline at Monroe as well
as on the Carrier's system properties began long before the consolidation of properties on June 1, 1982. In this connection, Carrier
submitted that "Revenue-Ton-Miles" had declined (1982 vs. 1981), 6.9
percent in June, 17.6 percent in July, 17.1 percent in August, and
19.2 percent in September, or the month in which it had abolished
the clerical position at Mo--oe. As concerned "Cars Handled/Engines
worked" at Monroe, Carrier showed that there had been a decline in
cars handled commencing in December 1981 through September 1982, except as concerned May 1982, with the monthly decreases (1982 vs. 1981)
ranging from 13.9 percent to 29.8 percent, the latter reflecting
the decline as between Augusz 1981 and August 1982.
In addition to the above, the Carrier also maintained that any
traffic that may have been diverted from Monroe as a result of the
consolidation had been codpe_^s ated for by the addition of a new switcher
between Monroe and Danville. -he Carrier also directed attention to
the following statement frog _=s letter of January 18, 1984 to the
organization:
"The claimant at-_s-_!==s to support his argument that
interchange at Rice_-_on Junction as a diversion away
from Monroe is a -_=or cause for the loss of a job
at Monroe. He poi-=s up the interchange of 66 loads
and the return of 6E emptys in the month of August
1982 at this station. This total of 132 cars handled
in said month amounts to an approximate average of
4.3 cars per day. This certainly is not enough diversion, if such was the case, to impact substantially on
the nubmer of clerks jobs to be maintained at Monroe,
Virginia."
Bascially, the Carrier urges that Claimant's employment status
was not altered as a result of any action taken by it in connection
with the consolidation, but rather, by what it states, "the normal
ebb and flow of seniority which is dictated by the volume of traffic
handled by the Carrier." It thus submits that there is no merit to
the claim.
The Board has given careful and studied consideration to all the
arguments and data submitted by the parties. We do not find this record to support the conclusion Claimant be considered a "displaced employee," as that term is defined in the New York Dock Conditions, since
we think it evident Claimant was not placed in a worse position as the
result of a "transaction" flowing directly from the coordination of the
two rail carriers. To the contrary, we believe the record supports a
holding Claimant was displaced from his position as a consequence of
Carrier having found it necessary to reduce its work force at Monroe
coincident with a general decline in business and, in particular, a
substantial decline in traffic at Monroe both before and after the
consolidation on June 1, 1982, as well as at the time the abolishment
was announced to be effective September 19, 1982.
Thus, while it might be held that there was some minor diversion
of traffic from Monroe as a consequence of the coordination, it was not
of sufficient nature to hold that a causal nexus existed between the
job abolishment and the consolidation of the rail carriers. In this
respect, we think it noteworthy that heretofore the weight of most
arbitral authority has been to the effect that a remote or tangential
affect cannot qualify an individual as having been adversely effected
by a transaction. It will, therefore, be the Board's finding that
Claimant was not adversely effected coincident to a transaction so as
to be eligible for protective benefits under the New York Dock Conditions and the claim will be denied.
AWARD:
The Question at Issue is answered in the nenative, i.e., Claimant
is _not found to meet the necessary requirements in order to be entitled
to the protection afforded by the New York Dock Conditions in relation
to his exercise of seniority from Monroe to Manassas.
D. R Johnson, Carrier Member
Atlanta, GA
October,Z3 , 1984
Robert E. Peterson, Chairman
and Neutral Member
E.~. N . Emp yee Member
In the Matter of Arbitration
between
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE AND STEAMSHIP
CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION
EMPLOYEES
and
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY
Pursuant to Appendix III, Section 11 of the
New York Dock Employee Protective Conditions
(Imposed by the Interstate Coma=rce Commission
in Finance Docket 28250)
QUESTION AT ISSUE:
"Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood
1. Carrier violated the Agreere=t(s) between the parties when it declined to allow Claimant T. E :enne his rightful displacement allowances for March ($191.69), Ac=--'l' ($278.93), may ($365.42), and June
1982 ($278.93).
2. Carrier further violated t-_ Agreements) between the parties when
it failed or refused to compute the Average Monthly Compensation due
Claimant T. E. Venne in a prc=--- manner.
3. Carrier shall now be required to allow Claimant T. E. Venne his
displacement allowances enur.e> -e3, supra, in Item No. 1 and shall
further be required to compute _s Average Monthly Compensation in
the proper manner as contempla=ed and mandated by the Agreement(s)
FINDINGS
and
AWARD
/G
that:
FINDINGS:
By Decision and Order dated December 8. 1981 in Finance Docket
No. 29690, the Interstate Commerce Commission approved application of.
the Southern Railway Company and the Kentucky and Indiana Railroad
Company for a coordination of operations, facilities, services and
work forces of the two rail carriers.
In regard to the imposition of employee protective conditions,
the ICC Decision and order reads as follows:
"Emplovee protections. - Our approval of SOU's purchase of KIT must be conditioned on SOU's agreement
The
negotiated
protection
Applicants
to provide a 'fair arrangement at least as protective of the interests of employees who are affected
by the transaction' as the labor protective provisions imposed in control proceedings prior to February 5, 1976. 49 U.S.C. 11347. In New York Dock Ry.-
Control-Brookyln Eastern Dist., 360 I.C.C. 60 (1979)
(New York Dock), affirmed sub. nom. New York Dock Ry.
v. United States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979), we described the minimum protection to be accorded employees
under the statute in the absence of a voluntarily negotiated agreement. 4! We may, if we choose, fashion
greater employee protective conditions, tailored to the
special circumstances of an individual case. Burlington Northern. Inc.-Control s Merger-St. L., 360 I.C.C.
784, 94.6 (1980).
SOU estimates that SO employee positions will be abolished in Louisville and New Albany. Seven SOU agency
clerks and 1 SOU agent at Louisville will be transferred.
Six new positions will be created: 1 yard foreman, 2
yard helpers and 1 yard engineer at Louisville, and 1
Labor Relations Officer and 1 Director of Labor Relations in Washington. DC. Ail of these changes will occur in the first year."
above referenced footnote. _4Y, stated: "Applicants have not
any agreements with labor unions which establish employee
in excess of the protections provided in New York Dock.
have commenced negotiations with labor unions to obtain
implementing agreements to effectuate the proposed transaction..."
In this latter respect, the Carrier and the Organization party to this
dispute entered into an Implementing Agreement under date of February 26, 1982.
Almost one month after the ICC approved coordination, and by letter dated January 6, 1982, Claimant was advised by the Carrier, as concerns this dispute, that his then current position of SLipervisor of Data
Processing (an appointed, non-contract position) was to be abolished
on January 31. 1982 and that he was being appointed Project Analyst,
Accounting, at Atlanta, Georgia, effective February 1, 1982, at a
salary of $2,220.00 per month. This letter further stated:
"Acceptance of this appointment will involve a change
of residence. Therefore, if you accept the appointment, you will be subject to the benefits of Southern's
relocation policy, which is attached.
If you choose not to accept this appointment, you may
opt to have Southern pay you a one-time cash payment
of 12 months pay.
In order to simplify your handling of these options. I
have provided below two spaces with which you may signify your election...
If you accept this offer, your new Department Head will
be in touch with you regarding the details of your relocation and assumption of your new position.
I would appreciate your advice and indication no later
than January 27, 1982."
r date of January 14, 1982, the Claimant wrote Carrier as
Under
follows:
"This has reference to your letter dated January 6,
1982, File LF 338-10-L.
I cannot accept or sign the two (2) options you are
offering because as I see them either option would
make me worse off than when I was working for K.6I.T."
responding
to Claimant's declination of the two options, the Car
rier, =_- letter dated January 22, 1982, essentially reminded Claimant
that s-_ce he held seniority as a clerk under the KsIT Agreement at
Louts -tee, Kentucky, that he did, of course, have the right under the
Agreer..e_m·_ to exercise seniority to a clerical position. In this same
co.^.^e -:=.^., the Carrier letter further stated: "You should understand
that scald you elect to displace a junior clerk that such action on
your p__= is a voluntary choice in lieu of accepting the protective
benefits contained in my letter of January 6, 1982." The letter con
cluded:
"In the event you change your mind and decide to exer
cise one of the two options contained in my letter of
January 6, please recall that I need your advice and
indication to do so not later than January 27, 1982."
On January 27, 1982, Claimant advised the Carrier that he wished
to exercise his seniority rights, stating he would displace a junior
employee from his position effective Monday, February 1, 1982. The
Carrier acknowledged receipt of Claimant's notice of displacement on
January 28, 1982.
- 4 -
Under date of April 12, 1982, Claimant filed with Carrier copy of
a form known as a "Request for Entitlement to Benefits" form. The
Claimant indicated on the form it was being filed account: "Placement
in a worse position with respect to my compensation and rules governing my working conditions." In response to a question on the form as to
the date he had first been placed in a worse position, Claimant stated
it was February 1, 1982 and March 21, 1982 account his position abolished. The Claimant listed the position he held immediately _=for to the
dates shown above as "Per Diem s CMO" (the position to which he had exercised seniority to on February 1, 1982), and listed his =rent position as that of "City Clerk."
Upon receipt of the above form, albeit Carrier subsequently maintained it was by wrongful action, Claimant was notified by letter dated
April 26, 1982, that a "preliminary investigation" showed -s approximate average monthly earnings in the twelve-month period ~=._~ing February 28, 1982 to be $2,181.71, and that this would "hereaf==-- [be] referred to as [Claimant's] test period average."-
A little over six weeks later, on June 11, 1982, Car=ie= addressed
the following letter to Claimant:
"This is in reference to your request for Enta_ _._at
to Benefits received in this office April 12, 1:_:,
and our letter to you dated April 26, 1982.
You were inadvertently advised of your test pa=_=_
average in the above correspondence. This was _ -
proper due to the fact that you were on a nonsc=e_-_,1ed position with the K&IT and were offered a ocs_=ion
with Southern as a Project Analyst which you declined.
Subsequently, you elected to exercise your rights to
a scheduled job.
You will recall after you made said election that
Mr. D. H. Watts, Vice President - Personnel, explained
to you in his letter of January 22, 1982 that your action was a voluntary choice in lieu of accepting the
protective benefits as explained in his previous letter to you of January 6, 1982.
If you had accepted the Project Analyst position as
offered, you would be currently employed with your
protection rights intact. Hence, the Carrier cannot
now be held liable for your protection.
For the reasons given above, you (sic) claim is invalid and accordingly declined."
Carrier's declination of the claim was thereafter appealed on
behalf of Claimant by the Organization to designated appeals officers
for the Carrier, and by agreement to this Arbitration Hoard in pursuance of the grievance procedures of the New York Dock Conditions.
It is the Organization's contention that when Claimant's position
of Supervisor of Data Processing was abolished at Louisville he became
a "displaced employee" as that term is defined in Section 1(b) of Appendix III of the New York Dock Conditions and "clearly eligible far
benefits, _.e., 'Displacement allowances' as contemplated in Appendix III, _ection 5," of the New York Dock Conditions.
Appendix III, Section 1(b) reads:
"'Displaced employee' means an employee of the
railroad who, as a result of a transaction is
placed in a worse position with respect to his
compensation and rules governing his working
conditions."
Apce:__x III, Section 5, reads in pertinent part:
Disolacement allowances - (a) So long after
displaced employee's displacement as he is un-^.le, in the normal exercise of his seniority
rights under existing agreements, rules and prac-ces, to obtain a position producing compensation
s=ual to or exceeding the compensation he received
the position from which he was displaced, he
shall, during his protective period, be paid a
=nthly displacement allowance equal to the dif-
=-ence between the monthly compensation received
c:: him in the position in which he is retained and
_ne average monthly compensation received by him
_n the position from which he was displaced.
(b) If a displaced employee fails to exercise
ha seniority rights to secure another position
available to him which does not require a change
in his place of residence, to which he is entitled
under the working agreement and which carries a
rate of pay and compensation exceeding those of
the position which he elects to retain, he shall
thereafter be treated for the purposes of this
section as occupying the position he elects to
decline.
(c) The displacement allowance shall cease prior
to the expiration of the protective period in the
event of the displaced employee's resignation, death,
retirement, or dismissal for justifiable cause."
On the one hand, the Organization argues "it is obvious that
the Carrier has attempted to 'put the cart before the horse.'" In
this regard, it submits that the provisions of the Implementing
Agreement of February 26, 1982 "were not even in effect at the time
Claimant was given his two (2) options either to move to Atlanta or
resign and remain in Louisville and even if it had been it would not
have been applicable to him due to the fact that he was not covered
by the Schedule Agreement on the K&IT." It urges, therefore, "the
Carrier was, if effect, attempting.-.to force Claimant to make a move
from Louisville to Atlanta under provisions of a non-existent a;=eement."
Conversely, the Organization states that "another remedy supports
the position of the Employes." In this respect, it directs att==.=ion
to Appendix III, Article IV of the New York Dock Conditions, s- _ing:
"This clearly gives to the Claimant the same rights and benefi=s and
affords him the same protection as if he were, in fact, covers= by the
Collective Bargaining Agreement."
Appendix III, Article IV, reads:
"Employees of the railroad who are not represented
by a labor organization shall be afforded substantially the same levels of protections as are afforded to members of labor organizations under these
terms and conditions.
In the event any dispute or controversy arises between the railroad and an employee not represented
by a labor organization with respect to the interpretation, application or enforcement of any provision
hereof which cannot be settled by the parties within
30 days after the dispute arises, either party may
refer the dispute to arbitration."
The Carrier submits "that while it may be true that Mr. Venne was
affected by the transaction in question, he was not adversely affected
by it." It urges that when Claimant "elected not to accept an offered
comparable non-contract position with the Southern Railway Company or
a lump-sum separation allowance, his actions from that point forward
were no longer a result of the transaction." It also argues that "in
order for this Board to identify Mr. Venne as either a 'displaced' or
a 'dismissed' employee, it would have to expand the definitions of
these terms."
- 7 -
It is the Carrier's further position that employee protection
agreements, as well as the New York Dock protective conditions, "were
designed to provide protection to employees against adverse effects
flowing from the transaction involved and not adverse effects arising
from other unrelated causes, as in the instant case." It asserts the
Claimant neither lost a regular job, nor was he involved in a chain of
displacements that resulted from the transaction. It submits that
Claimant, occ_=,ring a non-contract position, was precluded from taking
advantage of any of the benefits the Organization secured for its members for th_s particular transaction, thus making any arguments which
the Organization would offer relative to alleged violations of the
February 26, 1982 Implementing Agreement moot.
In the Eoard's view, while it may be that Carrier decided to
abolish Clai==V.='s former non-contract position as a consequence of
the coordination, there is no valid basis to support the contention
a direct ca_sa: relationship or nexus exists between that abolishment
and any loss == compensation or earnings Claimant may have sustained
on the basis c= his voluntary exercise of seniority rights to a contract position. The change in the employment status of Claimant from
a non-coat== to a contract position must, in our opinion, be treated
as outside t..e protective pale of the New York Dock Conditions. In
this respect, -w= think it evident Claimant had the opportunity to be
afforded su===anzially the same levels of protections as are offered
to members c: labor organizations by having accepted one of the two
options accorded him relative to his employment status at the time o_'
the coordination as a non-contract employee. Certainly, absent any
probative evid=ence that exercise of seniority to a contract position
was also a proper alternative available to Claimant, it must be held
that Claimant waived such non-contact protective status. At the same
time, the Board believes it must be concluded that any effort to identify a tangential effect as flowing directly from abolishment of the
non-contract position to Claimant's voluntary exercise of seniority to
a contract position, and thereby application of the Implementing Agreement of February 26, 1982, must likewise fail absent a clear showing
that such Agreement has application to non-contract positions the
same as contract positions.
Since the Board fails to find any proper basis to hold Claimant
is entitled to a displacement allowance under the terms and conditions
cited from the New York Dock Conditions and the Implementing Agreem=ent,
we have no alternative but to deny the claim as presented.
AWARD:
The Question at Issue is answered in the negative. The Claimant
is not found to be entitled to a displacement allowance as claim:_ in
the Question at Issue.
4;?KP4=
Robert E. Peterson, Chairman
and Neutral Member
D. R.
1)
'16 J hnson, Carrier Member
Atlanta, GA
October,23 , 1984
E. 1, nployee Member