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SPECIAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT N0. 922
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 11(a) OF THE NEW YORK DOCK II CONDITIONS
Between
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION
and
NORFOLK
a
WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY
QUESTION AT ISSUE: Is Mr. P. M. Anderson entitled to the benefits of
the protective conditions set forth in the New York
Dock II Conditions in view of the NW and IT
decision to consolidate their respective
facilities, operations and services at St. Louis,
Missouri and Decatur, Illinois on May 8, 1982?
BACKGROUND: The instant claim originated as a result of the
coordination of operations on the Norfolk and Western Railway Company
(NW) and Illinois Terminal Railroad Company (IT), which was approved by
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in its decision in Finance
Docket 29455. Conditions for the protection of employes enunciated in
New York Dock Ry. - Control - Brooklyn Eastern District, 360 ICC
60(1979) (New York Dock Conditions) were imposed in connection with
this transaction.
Upon receipt of the ICUs approval in June of 1981, carrier issued
notices as set forth in Section 4 of the New York Dock II Conditions
and began negotiations toward reaching implementing agreements with the
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various labor organizations involved. Once this process was completed,
coordi-nation was effectuated on May 8, 1982.
The claimant commenced his employment with Illinois Terminal
Railroad Company as a switchman on March 7, 1978, at which time he was
assigned to the extra board at St. Louis. On February 8, 1980,
claimant sustained an injury to his back while on duty with his
employer. He subsequently recovered from such injury and returned to
the service of carrier; however, on March 23, 1982, he again injured
his back and was unable to perform his duties as a switchman.
Consequently, on May 8, the date the coordination of the two railroads
was implemented, Mr. Anderson was marked off because of his injury. He
remained off duty in such status until June 1, 1982, at which time he
returned to duty on the extra board. At such time he was notified that
he was furloughed.
Although Mr. Anderson had received no previous notification of
having~been furloughed, on May 9, 1982, carrier notified all other
employees below Rank No. 182 IL. D. Webster) that they were
furloughed because of excessive forces due to the consolidation. Mr.
Anderson's rank on the seniority roster is No. 227, and he had
reported for duty on June 1 in response to the direction of carrier's
medical examiner and with the latter's certification that Anderson was
able to work as a switchman as of such date.
On June 6, 1982, Mr. Anderson filed, on the form provided by
carrier,.a "REQUEST TO BE RECOGNIZED AS A PROTECTED EMPLOYE UNDER NYD
II." Carrier responded to such request on August 9, 1982, advising
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that such request was denied "in view of the fact that he was off due
to a-personal injury at the time of the consolidation". Under date of
October 5, 1982, such denial was appealed, the letter of appeal setting
out the argument that since employes both junior and senior to claimant
had been certified as protected employes Mr. Anderson should receive
the same consideration.
Carrier responded that in view of the fact that Anderson "did not
hold a position on May 8, 1982, there was no way he could meet the
criteria of either a 'displaced' or a 'dismissed' employe as defined in
section,l(b) and (c) of Appendix III of the New York Dock II
Conditions." .
The language of the New York Dock II Conditions most directly
involved herein reads as follows:
1. Definitions.-(a) "Transaction" means any action taken
pursuan au orizations of this Commission on which these
provisions have been imposed.
(b) "Displaced employee" means an employee of the railroad
who, as a result of a transaction is placed in a worse
position with respect to his compensation and rules governing
his working conditions.
(c) "Dismissed employee" means an employee of the railroad
who, as a result of a transaction is deprived of employment
with the railroad because of the abolition of his position or
the loss thereof as the result of the exercise of seniority
rights by an employee whose position is abolished as a result
of a transaction.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: The "transaction" involved herein was the
coordination which took place on May 8, 1982, a coordination of
activity and operations which resulted in a substantial reduction in
the number of emloyees required. Carrier therefore immediately
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furloughed a number of employees, some of whom were senior to, and some
of whom were junior to, claimant on the newly combined seniority list.
Thereafter, carrier approved the certification as protected employees
of certain employees junior to Mr. Anderson as well as those senior to
him on such list.
The critical language involved herein is that found in Section
1(b). Was Switchman Anderson a "displaced employee" under the
definition set forth in New York Dock II? Without such definition we
might be justified in viewing displacement simply as a forced move
directly resulting from the exercise of seniority by one or more senior
employees and caused by a reduction in force made necessary by a
diminished need as a result of the coordination of work activity.
Indeed, some referees have looked for a chain of bumps to support a
direct causal relationship between the transaction and the claimed
diminution of earnings or adverse effect of rule changes. However, we
think the true intent of the applicable language is made plain in
question and answer No. 6 of the agreed-upon interpretations of New
York Dock II Conditions, reading as follows:
"Q. It is necessary that an employee be displaced from his
assignment or position in order to establish eligibility for
protective benefits under New York Dock?
A. No, provided it can be shown that as a result of the
involved 'Transaction' such employee 'is placed in a worse
position with respect to his compensation.'"
In spite of such interpretation, however, and in spite of
carrier's concession that the protective agreement was "designed to
a
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provide protection to employees against adverse effects flowing from
the specific transaction involved", carrier advances the following
argument:
"...carrier submits that in order to be recognized as either a
"displaced" or a "dismissed" employe one must be able to
establish a direct causal relationship between the transaction
and the alleged adverse effect. However, in the instant claim
neither the Organization nor Mr. Anderson have yet to
establish such a link. Rather, they have been content to
progress Mr. Anderson's original allegation that he was
adversely affected on May 8, 1982, in spite of the fact that
he was then out of service due to a personal injury and as
such, did not hold a position with either Carrier at the time
of the transaction.
With this in mind, the Carrier submits that the accepted
touchstone for determining whether an employe qualified for
either a displacement or a dismissal allowance, is the loss of
a regular job, or the loss of earnings due to being involved
in a chain of displacements that resulted from the
transaction. However, Mr. Anderson neither held a regular job
nor was he involved in a chain of displacements that resulted
from the transaction and, as such, failed to establish a
causal connection between his situation on May 8, 1982 and the
transaction."
Carrier does not argue that claimant suffered no adverse effect
from being furloughed. Instead, it pleads the absence of a causal
relationship between the transaction (which, of course, substantially
reduces the need for switchmen) and the furloughing of Switchman
Anderson.
What, then, precipitated the furloughing of claimant? Had there
been no coordination would not claimant have been working from the
extra board at St. Louis on June 1, 1982, or as soon thereafter as he
stood first out? If switchmen both senior and junior to claimant were
adversely affected by the coordination and therefore certified as
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protected employees, how could claimant suffer no adverse effect
although furloughed just as were his colleagues?
The burden of the carrier's position is that at the exact time the
transaction takes place the employee must be in "a regular job" which
he loses or from which he is moved with resultant loss of earnings.
This argument presupposes that the effect must be immediate. However,
we view such reasoning as a strained interpretation of the applicable
language.
"'Displaced employee' means an employee of the railroad (which, as
of May 8, 1982, Mr. Anderson was) who, as a result of a transaction
(here a coordination resulting in less work for employees on the
seniority roster) is placed in a worse position with respect to his
compensation (he was furloughed without pay, but would not have been
had the coordination not taken place)..."
Carrier dogmatically asserts that under New York Dock II an
employee cannot be protected from adverse effect of the transaction
unless on the very date of the transaction he held a position or
regular job with one of the merging carriers. However, such language
cannot be found in New York Dock II Conditions or in the agreed-upon
interpretations of its language.
Section 1(b), in defining "displacement", really makes no mention
of position or job. It refers only to "employee". Now, it cannot be
doubted that on May 8, 1982, and at all other relevant times, P. M.
Anderson was an employee of the Illinois Terminal or its merged
successor.
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It
will
at the same time be noted that in the definition of
"dismissed employee" in Section 1(c), "position" is twice mentioned,
each time in connection with the abolition of the same. Such language
makes readily identifiable the dismissed employee, but such language is
irrelevant to the issue before us now.
We hold that, subject to proof of actual reduction in earnings as
contemplated under Appendix III of Finance Docket No. 28250, Mr.
Anderson is entitled to the benefits of the protective conditions set
forth in New York Dock II Conditions.
A further question is raised by reason of the fact that for most
of the year immediately prior to May 8, 1982, Switchman Anderson had
no earnings because he was out of service due to his injury.
The governing language is found in Section 5(a) of New York Dock
II Conditions, reading in pertinent part as follows:
Each displaced employee's displacement allowance shall be
determined by dividing separately by 12 the total
compensation received by the employee and the total time for
which he was paid during the last 12 months in which he
performed services immediately preceding the date of his
displacement as a result of the transaction (thereby
producing average monthly compensation and average monthly
time paid for in the test period), and provided further, that
such allowance shall also be adjusted t~ ect su sequent
general wage increases.
We understand carrier's position to-be that in this case the 12
month period for computing average monthly compensation would be the 12
month period immediately preceding May 8 or perhaps June 1. It is
readily apparent that any such rule would eliminate Mr. Anderson from
protection. Such an interpretation would effectively deny protection
for an employee unable to work for any considerable period of time
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because of an injury suffered while serving his employer. This is
manifestly unfair and certainly was not intended by the framers of the
agreement. Therefore, any such substantial period of time should not
be counted, particularly since it would not consist of "months in which
he performed services". The date of Mr. Anderson's displacement was
June 1, 1982. Prior to his second injury on March 23, 1982, he
performed services during a period of approximately (3) weeks. His
last 12 months of service would include such period together with a
sufficient amount of the period immediately preceding his first injury
on February 8, 1980, to total 12 months. Under Section 5(a) his
compensation during such period should be adjusted so as to reflect
subsequent general wage increases, and from such can be determined his
average monthly compensation and average monthly time paid for in the
test period.
AWARD: Subject to his showing of loss of compensation, Mr. P. M.
Anderson is entitled to the benefits of protective conditions set forth
in the New York Dock II Conditions.
DAVID H. BROWN, Chairman and Neutral Member
C- EDWARDS,
Carrie-F14*06
St. Louis, Missouri
January 28, 1985
L. W. SWERT, Organization Member