In The Matter Of Arbitration Between:
Norfolk and Western
Railway Company
Interstate Railroad
Company, and
Southern Railway Company
and
Trainmen and Conductors
Represented by the United
Transportation Union
Arbitration Panel:
Appearing For
The Carriers:
Arbitration Pursuant to
Action By the National
Mediation Board and
Notice of the Interstate
Commerce Commission
in Finance Docket Number
30582 (Sub-No. t)
Robert J. Ables, Neutral
Referee, Washington, D. C.
David N. Ray, Carrier Member,
Director, Labor Relations,
Southern Railway Company
L. W. Swert, Employee Member,
United Transportation Union,
Vice President
Jeffrey
5.
Berlin, Esq.,
Washington, D. C.
Rusell E. Pommer, Esq.,
Washington, D. C.
William P. Stalismith, Jr., Esq.,
Norfolk, Virginia
Also Present or
Testifying for
The Carriers:
Appearing For The Union:
Also Present
or Testifying for
The Union:
Proceedings:
Date of Decision:
T. E. Gurley, General Manager,
Eastern Region, N 8 W
Robert S. Spenski, Assistant
Vice President, Labor
Relations, Southern
E. M. Martin, Regional Director,
Labor Relations, N E W
J. R. Binau, Assistant Director,
Labor Relations, Southern
K. J. O'Brien, Assistant Director,
Labor Relations, Southern
M. C. Kirchner, Director, Labor
Relations, Norfolk Southern
Clinton J. Miller, III, Esq.,
United Transportation Union,
Assistant General Counsel,
Cleveland, Ohio
A. Smith, UTU General
Chairman, Southern
R. F. Spivey, UTU General
Chairman
Neutral referee appointed by
the National Mediation Board:
June 13, 1985. Pre-hearing briefs
received: August 26, 1985.
Arbitration hearing: Atlanta,
Georgia; August 28, 1985.
Transcript received: September 3,
1985. Post-hearing briefs
received: September 9, 1985.
September 25, 1985.
ARBITRATION AWARD
Norfolk and Western Railway Company
Interstate Railroad Company
Southern Railway Company
and
Trainmen and Conductors Represented By
The United Transportation Union
OPINION
I. JURISDICTION
This dispute between railroads and their employees is another
round of an old fight fought on the same battlefield. Each side
has had enough victories to encourage It to persist In the contest.
Neither side seems to want to change either its strategy or tactics,
and neutrals, like arbitrators and judges, have not seemed to be
able to make a decision to put the issue to rest. The decision
here is not likely to do more.
At issue Is the right of railroad employees represented by
their labor organization, the United Transportation Union (Union)
in this case, to say to their employer railroad(s), the Norfolk
and Western Railway Company (N 8 W), Interstate Railroad Company
(Interstate) and Southern Railroad Company (Southern) (Carrier or
Carriers), after consolidation authorized by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC or Commission), with labor protective conditions
that, if pay, rules, working conditions, etc., in an existing
collective bargaining agreement would be changed as a result of
changes made by the Carrier authorized by the consolidation,
such pay, rules, working conditions, etc., can be changed only
by further collective bargaining under the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act (RLA), and not under the arbitration provisions of the labor protective conditions specified by the ICC
in the event the parties are not able to make an agreement to
implement the consolidation.
There Is respectable judicial and arbitrai authority to support
the Union's position that the RLA controls.
There Is respectable judicial and arbitral authority to support
the Carriers' position that the arbitration provisions control.
7.
ICC Conditions
The dispute on this point seems to flow not from any challenge
of the right of the ICC to specify labor protective conditions
upon authorizing a railroad consolidation (or exempting it from
regulation), but. from the kind of such conditions specified.
Despite a record of proceedings approaching those In hotly
contested cases appealed to a U. S. Court of Appeals, V it is
not clear why the ICC persists in specifying labor protective
conditions that perpetuate the problem.
a.
Section 2 Conditions
On the one hand, the Commission regularly specifies the
following condition in labor protective conditions:
The rates of pay., rules, working conditions
and all collective bargaining and other rights,
privileges and benefits (including continuation
of pension rights and benefits) of railroads'
employees under applicable laws and/or
existing collective bargaining agreements or
otherwise shall be preserved unless changed
by future collective bargaining agreements
or applicable statutes.
Including pre-hearing briefs, transcript, post-hearing briefs,
countless references to court and arbitrators' decisions and
many other exhibits.
Typically, the ICC specifies, this condition In Article i, Section
2 (Section 2) of its protective conditions, like the
Mendocino
Coast conditions applicable here.J
The clear implication of this condition is that the essence of
an existing collective bargaining agreement (pay, rules, working
conditions, pension rights, etc.), if not the agreement itself, continues after consolidation ("shall be preserved") unless changed by
"future collective bargaining agreements". This latter phrase has
two Important implications: any new agreement must be different
from the existing agreement and it has to be bargained for -which by definition means agreement or resort to authorized
statutory actions to break the deadlock.
Labor (or employee) protective conditions now authorized in
the Interstate Commerce Act, resulting from railroad merger,
consolidation, acquisition (including trackage rights), etc.
("consolidations"), date back, at least, to The Washington
Job Protection Agreement of 1936. In the present dispute,
the ICC adopted the "Mendocino" conditions (Mendocino
Coast R y. -- Lease
and.Operate -- Callfornia-Western .R.,
54 732 978 ,.
modified, 653, (1980), a
sub nom. Railway Executives' Assn. v. United States,
675 rEd 248.( .. c. 1982 ,.an . Norfolk .an Western
R . -- Tracka a RI hts 354 -Burlin.ton ort ern nc.
e605 (1978
,:
mo su nom. Mendocino Cons;
R . -- Lease and O orate.
--.
MM1tMa Western . , _ 360
653. 1980 , a . Sub nom. Railway Labor xecutivea'
Ass'n v. United States, b75-Fan 48 Ur. 82 ).
New York oc c con lions are also specified by the ICC for
similar authorized changes. They are virtually the same as
the Mendocino conditions.- There have been - and there
presently are -- a number of differently named conditions all
having the same purpose of specifying protection of railroad
employees adversely affected by consolidations. The kind or
adequacy of labor protective conditions in the present dispute
are not in Issue.
Thus, Section 2 applicable here in the Mendocino conditions
provides substantial leverage for the Union arguing that certain
changes desired by the Carriers under its ICC authorization
(exemption) cannot be- made unless both parties agree to the
changes.*/
b.
Section 4 Conditions
As the Union draws comfort in this dispute from Section 2,
the Carriers emphasize that Article 1, Section 4 (Section 4), of
the Mendocino conditions controls.
The parties have agreed on all provisions except one. The
27 trainmen on the interstate Railroad who are being
consolidated into the N b W and Southern coal rail operations at coal sources in Southwest Virginia object to working
under the N t W schedule of agreements (collective
bargaining agreement or contract) and prefer to continue
working under their own contract. In the alternative,
the Interstate employees are willing to work under the
Southern contract. According to the Interstate employees,
working under the N 8 W contract would -- or probably
would -- require a change in home base with associated
problems of moving families from Andover, Virginia to
Norton, Virginia, about a 4S-minute drive in these
mountainous, narrow, coal traffic roads. That this Is a
relatively small railroad has no bearing on the intensity
with which each party has argued Its case. The Issue
being the same as. (n much larger consolidations,' each side
has brought out. its heavy legal artillery to argue the case.
This section provides in pertinent part that where the
Carriers contemplate an authorized transaction which
will result in a dismissal or displacement
of employees or rearrangement of forces
negotiations for the purpose of reaching an implementing agreement
are required. If, at the end of a 20-day period the parties fail
to agree, negotiations are to terminate and either party to the
dispute may submit the dispute for adjustment, in accordance with
designated procedures, including designation of a neutral referee
whose decision "shall be final, binding, and conclusive".J
The clear implication of this Section 4 condition Is that a
"transaction", such as here contemplated, of at least rearranging
forces,!-*Jwas envisaged by the ICC when it granted the Carriers
The Carriers, here, Invoked this authority by petition to the
National Mediation Board. The Union opposed the petition.
Such Board appointed this arbitrator to help resolve the
dispute. At the arbitration hearing, the Union agreed with
the Carriers to proceed on the basis of a Tri-Partite Arbitration
Panel but. held to its position that this panel had no authority
to decide the question of applicability of contract.
The Carriers contemplate consolidating Interstate employees
into the N 6 W Pocahontas Division. Although Interstate
employees will have certain priority rights to work they performed
before the consolidation and certain "equity" when the work Is
performed by N b W employees, seniority rosters will be
Integrated and assignments can vary off the property before
the consolidation.
the authority ,(exemption) to consolidate and it anticipated inability
of
the parties to negotiate an agreement to implement such transaction or changes from past operationsV by prescribing an
arbitration procedure to resolve the dispute.
Under the logic
of
this condition, it is almost inconceivable
the Commission would not have known that pay, rules, working
conditions, etc., under an existing contract, would not be affected
by the transaction. Thus, the Commission intended to give priority
to its statutory base for authorizing the consolidation with protective conditions, namely, the Interstate Commerce Act, over
anything in conflict under the Railway Labor Act.
c. Section 2. and Section. 4
impasse
of Reso ve y
Such long-time apparent, sharp inconsistency existing in its
labor protective condition between Section 2 and Section 4, it
would seem the Commission would have cleared up the matter one
way or the other. It has not.
Whether the Commission Is skittish about taking a firm position
on a question which Involves administration
of
a statute (RLA),
Considering, among other things, that the purpose
of
the
request to consolidate was to take advantage
of
the best'grades
of
the respective railroads and to otherwise make the operation
less costly and more efficient.
over which it has no responsibility, may only be speculated. It
may even be that the Commission has been Inattentive to the
discrepancy.'
The Commission may even have decided to defer to the courts
the question of the applicability of the RLA, upon consolidation,
In view of the substantial litigation and conflicting decisions on
this and related points.
A summary of the development of labor protective conditions
by arbitrator Zumas -- drawing on analyses by other .
arbitrators - is
a
basis .for this speculation. In The Matter
of Arbitration Between Norfolk. and .Western Rail wa . om n and
Illinois Terminal rcail roa om n . v.. ro er o mot Iva
Engineers an United Transportation non, ec d ruary 1,
1982. Also, see, decision y arbitrator Seidenberg In The Matter
of Arbitration Between Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Com n
Newbu an re R.W. . Coal an Brother ood of
Maintenance
o a Employees and-United tee or ers o
mer ca
, decided August 31, 1983.
In the Seidenberg award, the arbitrator reports that Section
2 of the New York
Dock
Conditions was newly added to the
varied set of such conditions developed by the Commission since
the Washington Job Protection Agreement of 1936. The New
York Dock Conditions were prescribed by the Secretary of
Labor (not the ICC) for those agreements whereby carriers
discontinue their inter-city rail passenger service which was
assumed by AMTRAK. The dissimilarity Is apparent between
such change In railroad operations and the Instant case
involving like operations' In the same area and affecting
only 27 employees.
Whatever the reason the Commission has not reconciled Sections
2 and 4, the question has come around again in this proceeding:
Does this arbitration panel have jurisdiction to consider the content
of an implementing agreement where an existing contract would be
changed and, if so, what shall be the contents of that implementing
agreement?
3.
Arguments
The Carriers are the moving party. They argue that:
(a) It would be inappropriate for the arbitration
panel to decide the jurisdictional question
because Section 4 provides required authority
to fashion an implementing agreement without
need to regard the "extrinsic" question on
jurisdiction, leaving the disappointed party to
take appropriate appeal to court.
(b) In the event the arbitration panel considers
the jurisdiction question posed by the UTU,
the Union's argument is defective because a
tentative implementing agreement was reached
by the parties on April 17, 1985, In bargaining
under applicable Mendocino conditions, not
under the RLA, which is not required. Also,
the Carriers argue that a recent decision by
the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, on which the Union heavily
relies, actually supports the Carriers' position
because, implicit in the remand of the case to
the ICC to make certain findings of "necessity",
was the conclusion that the Commission had the
authority to decide as It had, but that It had
not satisfied certain preconditions. The
Carriers urge reliance on an earlier decision
in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals which
is said to be more on point on the jurisdiction
question.
(c) The Carriers were not precluded from going
forward with preferred changes under Section
4 of Mendocino because
of
the Commission's
finding on April 3, 1985 in the underlying
case in this proceeding that "(n]o evidence
has been presented to demonstrate that
involved railroads intend to abrogate the
contractual or statutory rights of employees".
According to the Carriers, ail this finding
suggests is that allegations of a conflict
between employees' RLA rights and a carriers'
plans to effectuate an ICC authorized trans
action are not to be resolved In an administrative
proceeding In which the ICC passes upon the
applicability or Inapplicability of a blanket
Section 10505 exemption.
The Union argues that:
(a) Section 7
of
Mendocino precludes this
arbitration panel deciding that Interstate
railroad employees must operate under the
N 3 W contract, relying in this conclusion
on a series
of
supporting awards by
arbitrators and that contrary awards by
arbitrators have been eviscerated by the
recent decision
of
the Court oVAppeals for
the District
of
Columbia Circuit.
(b) In any event, the ICC notice
of
April 3, 1985,
concerning the absence
of
Carrier Information
on intention to abrogate contractual or
statutory rights of employees shows that the
Commission did not intend that there be an
exemption from the requirements
of
the
Railway Labor Act with respect to changes
of
pay, rules and working conditions.
4.
Arbitration and Court Decisions
Arbitrators' decisions have not been dispositive of the Section
2, Section 4 impasse.J
Decisions by experienced and respectable arbitrators Zumas
and Seidenberg,
supra, do not settle the matter. Each arbitrator
decided against jurisdiction based on Section 2 but proceeded to
require changes such as merging seniority rosters as part of an
implementing agreement. Seniority rights being arguably the
most important contract right for an employee, it Is difficult to
see a basis for deciding a Section 4 question in view of the
arbitrator's decision on Section 2.
A more recent decision by arbitrator (judge) Brown on which
the Carriers rely also cannot be accepted as new reasoning on the
Section 2, Section 4 controversy. That arbitrator accepted jurisdiction on the strength of Section 4, adopting the argument that
the ICC had plenary and exclusive authority In the field.
In The
Matter of Arbitration Between Union Pacific Railroad Company and
rUnited Transportation Union
, decided January 1985. The difficulty
with that decision is that, subsequently, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, with respect to the same underlying
The parties cited a number of arbitration awards on point.
The majority of awards cited favor the Union's position -but not overwhelmingly: The arbitration decisions reported
are typical of the findings.
consolidation, decided, in a split panel, that the Commission had
completely failed to justify the necessity for waiving the Railway
Labor Act respecting crew selection, following certain trackage
rights granted to other railroads affected by such consolidation, and the
court remanded the dispute to the Commission to consider whether it
was necessary to waive the RLA to effectuate the transactions
at issue in that consolidation.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
v. ICC, 761 F.2d 714 (D. C. Cir. 1985), modified -- F.2d -(July 12, 1985), referred to hereinafter as "BLE".*1
The Carriers here urge adopting the .decision of the Court of
Appeals in the case of .Brotherhood of. Locomotive En ineers v.
S Er
Chica o and North Western
Railway Company, 3 4 .2 424
8t r.) Cart. denied 375 U 819 1963) . in that case,
the action was yrailroad against the union for a judgment
declaring rights of the parties with respect to procedures to
be followed in adjusting seniority rights of employees affected
by consolidation of railroad yards. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court (202. F.Supp.277) that statutory
authority conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission
to approve and facilitate merger of carriers includes power
to authorize changes in working conditions necessary to
effectuate such mergers and the Commission acted within its
jurisdiction in providing for adjustment of labor disputes
arising out of the approved merger. The Court of Appeals
noted that, under the Railway Labor Act in a major dispute,
employees cannot be compelled to accept or arbitrate as
to new working rules or conditions, 45 U.S.C.A. 5151 et
., but. that, as a result of the authorized merger In
~t case, the railroads and unions were relieved from requirements of the RLA by the Commission's authority under the
Interstate Commerce Act concerning merger of carriers.
Interstate Commerce Act 55 (2)(b), (c)(4).
As modified, the Court vacated the Commission's 1983
orders and remanded the case to the Commission. Supporting
such decision, the Court said:
The Commission is not empowered to rely
mechanically on Its approval of the underlying transaction as justification for the
denial of a statutory right. On remand,
to exercise its exemption authority, the
Commission must explain why termination
of the asserted right to participate in crew
selection is necessary to effectuate the procompetitive purpose of the grant of trackage
rights or some other purpose sufficiently
related to the transaction. Until such a
finding of necessity is made, the provisions
of the Railway Labor Act and the Interstate
Commerce Act remain in force.
5. Arbitration Panel Has Jurisdiction
To
Order implementrn-q--Kg-reement
Whatever arguments remain on the merits of the split decision
in the BLE case, it can no longer be argued sensibly that, simply
because the ICC has authority to Impose protective conditions in
railroad consolidations, RLA rights may be disregarded. But
that is not to argue that the BLE decision puts the RLA back In
the stream of things in consolidations of the kind in issue. The
majority of the BLE court - with a very strong dissent -- remanded
the case
to the ICC to make findings It had not previously made
with respect to RLA rights. The majority decision, therefore -
as well as the minority decision - may be taken for the conclusion
that the ICC can take all necessary action to authorize a
consolidation, including labor protective conditions and procedures
to resolve disputes on implementing agreements, including arbitration without deference to RLA collective bargaining rights. The
only imperative is that the ICC make required findings, not that
it is not authorized to make them.
As it can be accepted that the ICC has authority, i.e.,
jurisdiction, to effectively make a package deal on consolidations,
labor protective conditions and procedures to resolve disputes on
implementing agreements - based on both the Eighth Circuit
and D. C. Circuit opinions -- there is no logical reason not to
accept that an arbitration panel, authorized under the ICC
consolidation action, would not have jurisdiction to order changes
to meet the purposes and objectives of the consolidation.
On such reasoning, this panel has jurisdiction to take Section
4 action in this case.
Carriers.
Such conclusion does not close the door in favor of the
The Union argues, with some persuasion, that, by not
presenting their RLA arguments to the Commission, the Carriers
did not argue their case at the time and place to have accomplished
their objectives.
It is most troublesome that, at the time the Railway Labor
Executives' Association (RLEA), on behalf of employees in this
dispute, argued RLA rights to the ICC, the Commission not only
commented that "[n]o.evidence has been presented to demonstrate
that the involved railroads Intend to abrogate the contractual or
statutory rights of employee" (ICC Notice, Finance Docket No.
30587 (Sub No. 1), April 3, 1985), but added in the same notice
that, although exemptions under 49 U.S.C. 10505, do not operate to
relieve carriers of applicable laws and agreements relative to
labor relations
This proceeding is not the appropriate
forum to resolve the issue of whether
applicable laws and labor agreements
require the railroads to obtain the consent
of employees before making employment
changes under either the exempted
contract to operate or the trackage rights.
If the Commission meant that the appropriate forum was an
arbitration panel, as here, the Commission was ducking .its clear
responsibility to complete the package to satisfy its statutory
responsibilities.
If the Commission meant that the appropriate forum was the
courts, it was ducking the same responsibilities.
If the Commission meant to leave the parties to their RLA
rights, it was ducking the same responsibilities.
Actually, It seems that the Commission was just ducking.
There Is no need or reason for this arbitration panel to duck.
The ICC had jurisdiction to complete the action; thus, the
panel has jurisdiction to complete the action.
An implementing agreement will be ordered.
II. IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT
No responsible court would ultimately refuse to order an
implementing agreement under the disputes settling provisions of
Section 4. Only the 27 trainmen off the Interstate Railroad who
did not ratify the tentative agreement of April 17, 1985, are
holding out on working under the N b W contract. All the other
unions in this case have accepted the same or similar agreement,
including organizations representing firemen, engineers, clerks
and maintenance of way employees.
Labor protective conditions are in place.
There Is no legal, public policy, or common sense reason not
to decide at this level of proceedings what will eventually be
decided, Le., an implementing agreement to accomplish the purposes
of an authorized consolidation.
The proposed joint operation of the Interstate Railroad
properties, which are located in the coal fields of Southwestern
Virginia, following a consolidation in 1982 of N 6 W, Southern
and their respective subsidiaries, including Interstate, under the
control of Norfolk Southern Corporation, is intended to take
advantage of better grades and operating routes for traffic moving
from Interstate origins to points on the N b W and Southern
and to achieve certain economies and efficiencies in interstate
operations.
Among changes proposed by the Carriers to realize the advantages of such joint operation are consolidating the seniority
rosters of Interstate train and engine service employees with
those of N b W Pocahontas Division train and engine service
employees. At present, Interstate crews do not work on N 6 W
lines or vice versa. Upon consolidation, interstate crews will
operate off the Interstate territory. They would work shifters in
the area that can work both interstate and N 6 W mines.
According to T. E. Gurley, General Manager, Eastern Region,
N 6 W Railroad, who testified at the arbitration hearing, in future
operations, it is not contemplated that Interstate crews will be
operated separately from the crews of the N 6 W. Rather, It Is
contemplated that the crews will be combined on shifters in the
Norton and Andover, Virginia area, based on their seniority
on both N 8 W and Interstate. If the Interstate trainmen did
not operate under the N 6 W contract but, rather, operated under
their present Interstate contract, important contract problems
would develop, including observance of the Hours of Service
law; different reporting locations for crews operating the same
territory; differences of total hours worked each week (referred
to as "gouging"); differences on opportunities to bid for and
displace a junior employee on a job preferred by a senior employee;
and different operation of extra boards. If, however, the N 8 W
contract were applicable (for the 27 Interstate trainmen and the
existing 816 N E W trainmen), employees, including present
Interstate employees, would be able to draw assignments throughout the territory (which Is considerably larger than the territory
presently operated by Interstate employees). Differences between
the N 6 W and Interstate contracts, such as deadheading, filling
vacancies, meal times, selection of vacation times and arbitraries,
which would create friction as between N 8 W and Interstate
crews working the same territory if the employees worked under
different contracts, would be eliminated. Also, Interstate
employees would enjoy the higher basic rate of pay presently
applicable In the N 6 W contract.
According to A. Smith, General Chairman for the trainmen
and conductors on both the Interstate and Southern railroads,
the Union offered to work under the Southern agreement, which
would accomplish exactly what the Carriers intend under the
proposed implementing agreement, including the N b W contract.
According to this official, there would not be, for instance, a
provision for gouging or a provision that a senior brakeman could
displace a junior brakeman. There would be a deadhead rule
and extra boards would not be different. And there would be
no difference in meal allowances or in bidding for vacant positions.
Moreover, the Interstate employees would get a raise under either
the Southern or N 6 W agreement.
Further, to the question asked by counsel for the Union:
"With the Southern Agreement being applicable, could the employees
of the Interstate be required to report to Norton?" The answer
was: "Yes, sir." (Transcript, page 100).
On close questioning why the trainmen on the Interstate
resisted accepting the tentative implementing agreement reached
by the parties on April 17, 1985, the Union representative testified
that the Interstate employees had worked previously with the
Southern agreement and were more comfortable with it, but that
their major concern was the possibility of having to move from
their home area in Andover, Virginia to another point on the
consolidated operation, with all of the adverse implications for
families involved in such move.
In negotiations leading to the tentative Implementing agreement,
upon the insistence of Union negotiators, a seniority provision was
agreed to in order to keep a fair balance between bidding rights
of the relatively small number of trainmen off the Interstate as
compared to those rights of about 816 trainmen off the N 5 \W.
If, as the Union now accepts, Interstate trainmen might be
required to move their home base under the Southern contract
(which Is acceptable to the union), and there is no substantial
reason not to accept the N 8 W contract on the other differences
between the two contracts, there is no reasonable basis to reject
the tentative implementing agreement of April 17, 1985. Recognizing,
again, that labor protective conditions are in place and that,
zo
on its face, provisions in the N b W contract may actually be
favorable to the interstate employees, the tentative implementing
agreement of April 17, 1985 is fair, equitable and reasonable and
will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the transaction
exempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission when it authorized
the consolidation underlying the proposed joint operation of Interstate properties.
AWARD
1. This arbitration panel has jurisdiction to consider an implementing agreement under Article 1,
Section 4 of the
Mendocino Coast labor protective
conditions.
av .
ay
Carrier Member
Dated:
The Carriers are authorized to put into effect
the tentative implementing agreement of the
parties, dated April 17, 1985.
oaerc
~. r,o
Neutral ef ee
Dated:
4Aet_~/~
.. h.ll~ J
IM
,war
Employee Member
Dated:
a
&dl0
19~
specific order concerning Railway Labor Act rights cited at page 15, and
after finding the ICC "ducked" the issue, decided it nonetheless had
authority to change the contract on the property. This Board has no more
authority than the ICC; and where the ICC has "ducked" this issue
specifically, this Board may not resurrect it without acting outside the
scope of its jurisdiction. BLE v. ICC, supra.
L. W. Swert, Vice President
United Transportation Union
Employee Member