Before
ROBERT J. ABLES
Arbitrator
_--_---------_---_-------------------x
CSX Transportation, Inc.,,
Employer
and
American Train
Dispatchers Association,
Organization
Proceedings:
Date of Decision:
Dispute Concerning
New York Dock
Conditions
Robert J. Ables, Washington,
D. C., appointed by the
National Mediation Board
on April 27, 1988, as neutral
referee to decide this dispute.
Pre-hearing submissions by
each party received by the
neutral referee on June 16,
1988. Arbitration hearing:
Jacksonville, Florida; June
23, 1988. Post-hearing
submissions concerning Public
Law Board No. 3829 received
by the neutral referee on
June 30, 1988. Post-hearing
briefs received: July 25, 1988.
Carrier submission with respect
to the decision in Public Law
Board No. 3829 received by
the arbitrator: October 11, 1988.
November 11, 1988.
CSX Transportation, Inc.
and
American Train Dispatchers Association
Dispute Concerning New York Dock Conditions
OPINION
I. ISSUE
This dispute is simple to identify but difficult to
resolve.
It is, after authorized merger of railroads, the next
step in a series of steps to effect the efficiencies and
economies contemplated by Interstate Commerce Commission
when it authorized the merger, with certain built-in,
2
statutory, protection for employees adversely affected
by the merger (consolidation, coordination, etc.), requiring
thereby an award favoring the carrier. In the alternative,
it is such a big step as to constitute a difference
in kind, raising very large questions about the fundamental
relationship of labor and management during active merger
action in the railroad industry, requiring, possibly,
an award favorable to the union.
In a metaphor, the question is whether railroads,
such as this one, propose to get a foot in the door
to potentially big, big changes in employee protective
considerations after merger and, if so, what to do about
it, and, if not, to help stop so much litigation about
what is a relatively small labor problem in the scheme of
things for the four employees involvt.:d in this dispute,
represented by their union, American Train Dispatchers
Association (ATDA).1/
The arbitrator's vantage point is as author of probably
the first published treatise of employee protection in
the railroad industry in the United States and service
as neutral referee in subsequent evolving problems.
Report of the Presidential Railroad Commission,
Appendix Volume III, "The History of and Experience
Under Railroad Employee Protection Plans" (1962).
3
II. FACTS
CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), one of the nation's
largest railroads, evolving after mergers of the Seaboard
Coastline Railroad and Louisville and Nashville Railroad,
which merged with the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad and
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, asks to have it determined
in this proceeding that the "New York Dock" employee
protection conditions prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, when it authorized the underlying railroad
mergers, which were exempted from the anti-trust laws,
should be considered such that the work of four,
union,
high-ranked dispatchers (of locomotive power)!/ in the
coal producing area around Corbin, Kentucky, be transferred
to Jacksonville, Florida where the company is near completing
plans to centralize, for the entire system, all such
power distribution, and where the work in dispute would
be performed by non-bargaining unit employees (noncontract dispatchers).
The fundamental dispute between the parties, CSXT
and ATDA, is not so much the content or application
of New York Dock protective conditions for the four
contract dispatchers affected by the planned change,
as it is the right of the company to abolish those four
jobs at Corbin, Kentucky and not give the work of those
2/
Now known as "Assistant Chief/Power" or, as in this
proceeding, "contract dispatchers".
4
jobs to contract dispatchers, at Jacksonville, since
dispatching of locomotive power is still required in
Corbin as much, if not more,. as before.
The contest is not new.
For 10 years, the parties have been locked in arbitration
proceedings, or in court, whether the classification rule of one
of the parties' collective bargaining agreement must be construed
to preserve the dispatching work for contract dispatchers, as
the union maintains, or not, as the carrier maintains.
The latest round in this litigation favors the carrier.3/
3/
Very pertinent to the question and to the present proceeding is that, in October, 1988, CSXT submitted to this
arbitrator the decision of Herbert L. Marx, Jr., chairman
and neutral member of Public Law Hoard No. 3829, concurred
in by the CSXT representative of that board, favoring the
carrier's position on the question. After a long recitation
of previous litigation in the question, the arbitrator,
in his findings, noted: that there exists, now, in
Jacksonville the position of Power Coordinator -- a management job; the union's argument was unpersuasive that such
management work duplicates, replaces or substitutes for
covered -- contract -- dispatcher jobs; and that the
carrier was persuasive "the new positions, at or near the
top of the management hierarchy of the Operations Control
Center, are concerned with overall system-wide control and
direction, overseeing the continuing functions of those in
the Train Dispatcher Group". Opinion p. 9. Arbitrator Marx
concluded the union had not shown that the management level
positions established at Jacksonville fit the definition of
positions, the duties of which fall within the scope of the
train dispatcher group. Thus, he denied the claim to classify
dispatching work in issue as within the train dispatcher
classification.
5
The union, considering the contingency of an adverse
finding under Public Law Board No. 3829, argues, in
the present proceeding, that the present arbitrator
may still find under New York Dock that "the work of
power distribution now being performed at Corbin should
be performed by agreement employees at Jacksonville
because the carrier cannot show that to do otherwise
is necessary to effectuate the Commission's original
order". It argues further that, because there are assistant
chief positions at Jacksonville, "it is the carrier's
burden to convince this panel that depriving agreement
dispatchers of their work is necessary to effectuate
the Commission's control order". ATDA pre-hearing submission,
Opinion, pp. 7 and 14.
'rile union has b,!t_-u
011
a failing track on neutral
decisions on these matf_Ars. It points to no recent
decision by court, arbitrator, Interstate Commerce Commission
or other neutral tribunal, preserving work of the kind in
issue under New York Dock or other employee protective
conditions, upon authorized merger.
The carrier, to the contrary, is alive with decisions
supporting its asserted right to take implementing action
to effect economies and efficiencies of operations.
It argues here that precedent is so clear and
substantial, stare decisis controls, obviating thereby
need to examine further the legal basis of its decision to
6
transfer locomotive power dispatching work from Corbin to
Jacksonville under systemwide, centralized, control.4/
In any event, the carrier argues the implementing
agreement it proposed to the union following it having
served a New York Dock Article 1, Section 4 notice on the
ATDA on February 12, 1988 ("to transfer certain work
associated with train operations to Jacksonville, Florida",
proposing in this respect the abolishment of four (4) CSXT
Assistant Chief/Power positions at Corbin, Kentucky)
"fully and adequately protects the interests of the
affected employees" and is consistent with conditions
imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission in relevant
proceedings (Finance Dockets 30053, 31033 and 31106) and
"with implementing agreements previously negotiated
between the parties in similar transactions". Pre-hearing
submission, pp. 3 and 4.
In support of its argument that proposed actions
under New York Dock conditions (New York Dock Ry-Control -Brooklyn East. Dist. 60 I.C.C. 60 (1979)) are not different
from previous authorized actions involving this and
other merged railroads, the carrier relies primarily on
the following referee decisions: David H. Brown (December
16, 1986); H. Raymond Cluster (November 23, 1982);
Transfer of other than locomotive power dispatching duties
by Assistant Chief/Power is not involved in this dispute
because unit employees have been assigned such work.
7
Robert 0. Harris (May 19, 1987), sustained by the Interstate Commerce Commission, with dissent, on June 10,
1988;5/ and Robert E. Peterson (May 24, 1982).6/
The ATDA has advised it will appeal this decision.
6/
Special deference at the "trial" level is given to
decisions of labor arbitrators as contrasted, for
example, with the Interstate Commerce Commission decisions
which lately seem to treat decisions of neutral arbitrators,
who are selected by the parties or appointed by the National
Mediation Board, as decisions by Interstate Commerce
Commission Administrative Law Judges, with "remand" and
other like actior. s:e, for example, I.C.C. Decision,
Finnr,:e D(,
.':-2t
'_1~. : , `OJ (Sub. No. 22) , CSX Corp. -
Control - Chessie System, Inc. and Seabord Coast Line
Industries, Inc. (June 8, 1988). At the arbitration
level, the railruad ii.3ustry should enjoy no special
status. Arbitrators who decide cases about the
operation and therefore the safety of nuclear power or
ammunitions plants, deep coal mining operations and
the like, or whether thousands of employees should lose
their pensions on a buy-out, need no special review
cushion before appropriate court consideration to
maintain the essence of arbitration, which should be
final and binding decisions, with very narrow exceptions,
recognizing that difficult questions in dynamic
times -- like employee protection after merger -may produce unclear and, possibly contrary, results,
to be resolved by new agreements, changes in law, etc.
8
III. FINDINGS
A series of favorable awards on the application of
New York Dock conditions is better than none but none of
those referenced awards is hard precedent, on-point,
concerning transferring work which clearly has been
done by contract employees and where that work remains to
be done after the consolidating action, as here.
Arbitrator Brown, in a dispute between this company
and the UTU on New York
Dock
conditions, had before him the
question whether a tentative agreement for the selection
and assignment of conductors and trainmen was equitable.
The ultimate decision allocating work on a percentage
basis between these two covered crafts does not reach the
question of abolishing work of covered employees to
be done by
non-contract employees
.
Arbitrator Cluster was concerned with the
number of
yard assignments resulting from a consolidation. The
arbitrator made a series of findings on: protection
for (covered) engineers off the consolidated railroads;
an order selection list to fill regular and extra yard
engineer positions in the consolidated terminal; home road
rules under "schedule", i.e., union agreements; and
certain travel allowances under consolidated yard conditions.
None of these findings reaches the present question.
9
Arbitrator Harris, in a dispute concerning New York
Dock conditions between the Norfolk and Western Railway
Company, Southern Railway Company, and the American
Train Dispatchers Association, had before him a proposed
transfer of work "of supervising the locomotive power
distribution and assignment from the N&W System Operations
Center in Roanoke, Virginia, to Southern's Control Center
in Atlanta, Georgia".
Opinion, p
. 2. The N&W, a product
of earlier mergers, did not itself have an agreement
with the ATDA but the union had agreements with each
of the railroads which had merged into the N&W. When
the merged company proposed to assign power distribution
in a "power bureau" to non-ATDA dispatchers, the ATDA,
in a dispute before the Third Division of the National
Railroad Adjustment Board, prevailed, following which
the parties agreed that "supervisors" who worked out
of such power bureau would be represented by ATDA. The
Southern Railroad, however, controlled its distribution
of power out of Atlanta, with non-contract dispatchers.
The question before the arbitrator was the effect on
bargaining rights when the merged carrier proposed to
concentrate power distribution for the entire system
in Atlanta using
non-contract dispatchers
. The arbitrator,
noting the "unusual rearrangement" (p. 9) concerning
contract and non-contract dispatchers, decided that
the "central issue" (p. 11) in the case was the
reconciliation of Sections 2 and 4 of Appendix I to
New York Dock./
Concentrating on this issue of relative authority
under the Railway Labor Act and the Interstate Commerce Act
for a substantial part of his opinion, the arbitrator
then reaches what was the question in dispute, which was
whether the resulting work of distributing power was to
be done by contract or non-contract dispatchers. In an
opinion going off on representation rights, to be determined
by the National Mediation Board,!' but noting that the
carrier, in its last proposed implementing agreement,
offered to consider awarding new dispatcher positions
in Atlanta to covered dispatchers, the arbitrator concluded
he could not change the terms of New York Dock and,
because the union proposed an implementing agreement
_7/
This is a heavy litigated matter involving the precedence
of the Railway Labor Act or the Interstate Commerce Act in
New York Dock employee protection conditions, where the
parties cannot agree on an implementing agreement following
an authorized merger. The question, following a number of
arbitration and court decisions, seems settled in favor
of the Interstate Commerce Act.
The Interstate Commerce Commission found this explanation
to be "confusing". I.C.C. Decision, Finance Docket
No. 29430 (Sub. No. 20, Norfolk Southern Corp. -
Control - Norfolk & Western Railway Co. and Southern
Railway Co. (June 10, 1988), p. 5.
and one such by the carrier being beyond the terms of
New York Dock, they could not be acted on, but that the
carrier's second proposal "will be placed in effect"
(p. 17). Presumably, the carrier's second proposal was
adopted on the basis it did not exceed New York Dock,
although such presumption is by inference, since the
opinion does not identify the basis for the
conclusion.
The employee member, in a strong dissent, did not accept
the arbitrator's decision favoring the carrier's position.
Arbitrator Peterson, in a dispute between the Southern
and N&W Railroads as the employer and the Railroad Yardmasters of America, had before him whether proposed
implementing agreements provided an appropriate basis for
the selection of forces. lie adopted a "fair and reasonable"
standard, noting that "consideration could not be given to
a supposed superiority of rights for represented employees
to retain job opportunities to the detriment of nonrepresented,
non-contract, employees
by the same job
class or craft" (p. 17) where the union contract provides
that non-contract employees -- presumably doing the
same work as contract employees -- "shall have afforded
substantially the same levels of protection as afforded to
members of labor organizations" ibid. in selection of
forces. Since the union held no representation rights
at the surviving yard under the proposed rearrangement
of forces, the union agreement could not be extended
to the yard.
The Brown decision did not involve work transferred
to uncovered employees. The Cluster decision was a
garden variety dispute under New York Dock as to which
covered employees get resulting work. Harris was lost -which happens to all arbitrators in different cases,
during changing times, in cases argued by very able
attorneys -- as here -- with a dizzying array of court,
arbitration and agency awards. The Peterson case did not
involve management people doing scope work.
These are not ringing decisions demanding their
adoption in this dispute, as the carrier argues
Each of such decisions however is a bit in a mosaic
favoring the consensus of neutrals that a railroad should
have reasonable opportunity to effectuate the improvements
of operations and cost it persuaded the Interstate Commerce
Commission was the object of the proposed merger sufficient
to be granted authority to make implementing changes
without undue concern about restrictions under otherwise
applicable anti-trust law.
But the question remains: how far?
For the first time under New York Dock, based on the
sophisticated submissions of the parties, the question
is clear: can contract jobs be abolished and the work,
still to be performed in those jobs, be transferred
to non-contract employees at a different location ?
It must be clear. The work in issue is not to
be done by unrepresented, non-supervisory, employees, or
union employees represented by another craft off another
railroad, or by road and yard employees with different
seniority rights. The work is to be done by managers,
"low level" managers, as the carrier makes clear -but managers.
Scattering its shots somewhat, the union here argued
various theories to support its claim that the employer
was violating applicable agreements by not letting contract
locomotive power dispatchers at Corbin follow their
work to Jacksonville. It argued precedence of the Railway
Labor Act over the Interstate Commerce Act and of Section
2 over Section 4 of Article I of New.York Dock, and
the scope rule, with many footnoted references to court
decisions on employee protection conditions upon authorized
merger. In its pre-hearing brief, the union made what
may be taken as a collateral argument on the effect
of the carrier's action on the union, as distinct from
employees affected by this transaction. It notes that,
although the centralization of train dispatching functions
was contemplated, "de-unionization of an integral part
of the operation -- the distribution of locomotive power -was in [no] way alluded to" by the Commission authorizing
the overall consolidation. (p. 10.)
By the time of post-hearing brief, the union argued
strongly that the effect of the carrier's proposal "is
to take the work out of the union's jurisdiction" and
that if the carrier's position in this dispute is
accepted:
The carrier can use New York
Dock time after time as a tool
to reduce its organized work
force and the influence and
ability of this organization
to represent its employees in
the process. (pp. 3 and 4).
The union's concern is -real -- which is not to say
sufficient to sustain its claim.
A "coordination" was a term more commonly used than
merger, in earlier times going back to the Washington Job
Protection Agreement of 1936, describing changes to
make railroad operations more efficient and less costly.
They frequently were limited to consolidating yards or
tracks. Now, whole companies are absorbed in mergers,
sometimes repeatedly. Displacement of employees and concomittant need for protection from the effects of such
actions, as prescribed by statute9/ and underlying protective
conditions prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission
or Department of Transportation (for airline mergers)
are now much more widespread.
49 U.S.C. & 11341, et seq.
As a determined tide is hard to stop, it is with
increasing difficulty neutrals can see a particular
consolidation, change in operation, purchase of new
equipment, or application of new technology, as not being
within the intent of the Commission's blessing when it
approved the merger. The Commission could not reasonably
anticipate all the changes -- either in kind or degree -that would logically flow from its authorization to
merge carriers. Absent the parties themselves agreeing
how to accommodate the changes, neutrals are hard-put to
consider substituting their judgment for that of carriers
why the change either will not effect the economies
and efficiencies projected or that some artificial bar,
like limits of New York Dock conditions or the public
interest connection between authorized mergers and changes,
prevent the proposed operational changes.
In this case, the carrier's action may be seen as a
first new step, having the potential of union busting.
It will not be found however that this was a purpose of the
carrier. (If so, the decision might have gone for the
union.)
Despite protestations to the contrary, the union
relied heavily on a favorable award in the scope dispute
before arbitrator Marx. If the union had prevailed, the
decision here could have flowed logically that distribution
of power, at least in Corbin, Kentucky, should be done
by contract dispatchers, particularly as the carrier
accepts such operations as being "unique" to other
carrier operations, with its special requirements for
movement of coal, often inter-divisional as well as local.
That decision having gone against the union, the only
basis for deciding this New York Dock question in the
union's favor is to find the coal movement work so special
that only Corbin locomotive power dispatchers can do
the job (at Jacksonville),1O-1 or that the Interstate
Commerce Commission order permitting this underlying
merger contained at least an implicit bar against allowing
consolidations permitting transfer of bargaining unit
work to managers.
The union has not shown either of these conditions.
Clearly, distribution of power for locomotives
at Corbin can be done at Jacksonville, the same as
presently -- or soon will be -- done for all other points
on the entire system, permitting obvious efficiencies
and thus economies, as information about all power needs
is centralized with the dispatchers and policy deciders in
one place to make rational decisions that far-flung,
complex operations seem to require.
Where this power distribution work is to be done no longer
is in question. It will be done in Jacksonville.
It is also pertinent in the carrier's favor that CSXT
has used non-contract power distribution dispatchers at
Jacksonville for a long time, thus eliminating any thought
that, in this operation, it is consolidating power
dispatch responsibilities with a purpose of taking the
work from the union.
As to the Commission's order containing any bar to
the disputed transfer, the Commission traditionally has
shied away from being too specific in these matters and
there is no history, precedent or other legal basis to
infer that the Commission intended to include a bar. to
disputed transfer.
That part of the organization's case, therefore,
asking that New York Dock conditions be interpreted or
applied to require Corbin, Kentucky contract locomotive
power dispatchers to follow the work to Jacksonville is
denied.
the
Subject to this finding, there is no legal or fair
reason not to authorize the protective conditions for the
four identifiable assistant chief/power dispatchers at
Corbin the same protective conditions as was extended to
about 20 other unit employees under an implementing agreement
by the parties on January 9, 1988.11/
The parties disagree whether the agreement on January 9,
1988 was meant to apply to the four unit employees involved
in this dispute. Except for following the work, as the union
urges in its proposed implementing agreement -- but which is
denied -- the question is academic because the carrier is
willing to extend the same protection to the four unit
employees at Corbin, Kentucky as it provided to other unit
employees not involved in this dispute.
IV. DECISION
The claim that four Assistant Chiefs/Power at Corbin,
Kentucky shall follow their work to Jacksonville, Florida
is denied.
Subject to this denial, the implementing agreement of
tie parties on January 9, 1988 shall apply to such unit
employees.
ex. , , ~'
Ables
Neutra~-'Ref eree
Dated: