IN THE MATTER OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION
and
SOO LINE RAILROAD COMPANY
APPEARANCES
For the Union:
For the Company:
DANA EDWARD EISCHEN
Neutral Referee
HIGHSAW & MAHONEY, P.C.
by WILLIAM G. MAHONEY, ESQ.
JOHN O'B. CLARKE, JR., ESQ.
DONALD F. GRIFFIN, ESQ.,
of Counsel
BARRY MC GRATH, ESQ.
Assistant General Counsel-Labor
CATHRYN S. FRANKENBERG
Vice President-Labor Relations
2
PROCEEDINGS
In January 1988 the United Transportation Union (UTU or
Union) and the Soo Line Railroad Company (Company or Carrier)
agreed to arbitrate two (2) issues in dispute concerning the
interpretation and application of the Soo-UTU Employee Protective
Agreement (EPA), effective July 1, 1985. Article II, § 13 of the
EPA incorporates by reference arbitration procedures set forth in
Article I, § 4(1)-(4) of the New York Dock Conditions (NYDC) 360
ICC 60 (1979). The Parties jointly designated Dana Edward
Eischen to serve as Neutral Referee to hear and decide the
questions at issue in this arbitration.
A hearing date originally was jointly established for April
29, 1988 at Washington, DC, with exchange of pre-hearing briefs
and reply briefs prior to that date. The Parties jointly
adjourned that hearing, sine
djg,
due to supervening litigation
of related issues in the United States District Court, Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Thereafter, in January
1989 the Parties resumed arrangements for these arbitration
proceedings and, following exchange of pre-hearing briefs and
reply briefs, the hearing was held at Minneapolis, Minnesota on
April 6, 1989.
Both Parties were represented by Counsel at the hearing and
afforded full opportunity to present oral and documentary
evidence in support of their positions. The record was held open
for receipt of additional information and precedent decisions,
with closing of the record in mid-July 1989. The Parties jointly
3
stipulated to a relaxation of the time limits set forth in the
NYDC procedures.
QUESTIONS 1T 188UE
The Parties jointly stipulated that the following questions
are presented for determination by the Neutral Referee in this
arbitration proceeding; but that the question of remedial damages
or liability, if any, is not before the Neutral Referee for
determination at this time. Moreover, the Parties stipulated
that the following two (2) questions are independent of one
another and require separate answers, even though some of the
evidence and arguments may be similar:
1. Is the sale and implementation of that sale of the Lake
States Transportation Division by the Soo Line Railroad
Company to Wisconsin Central Limited a "Transaction" as that
term is defined in the Employee Protective Agreement for
employees in service as Trainmen, Yardmen and conductors on
the Soo/Milwaukee Operating System represented by the United
Transportation Union effective July 1,1985?
2. Do gross ton miles in the decline in business formula in
Appendix 3 of the above Agreement exclude ton miles
attributable to portions of the Soo which the Soo sold to
Wisconsin Central Limited?
CITED AGREEMENT PROVISIONS
EMPLOYEE PROTECTIVE AGREEMENT
This is an agreement between Soo Line Railroad Company,
The Milwaukee Road Inc. and employees represented by the United
Transportation Union (UTU) in service as yardmen, trainmen, and
conductors.
The purpose of this agreement is to provide pursuant to
49 U.S.C. Section 11347 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as
amended, for fair and equitable arrangements to protect the
interests of employees adversely affected by the proceeding
known as Finance Docket 28640 (Sub. No. 9M)l and to provide for
expedited changes in services, facilities, operations, seniority
districts and existing collective bargaining agreements to
enable the expanded railroad system created by the Soo Line's
acquisition of the Core Assets of the Milwaukee Road to be
operated in the most efficient manner, as one completely inte-
grated railroad.
ARTICLE I
Definitions. Whenever used in this agreement unless its
context requires otherwise:
(a) "Railroad" means the Soo Line Corporation and its
subsidiaries or affiliates, either before or after the
acquisition of the Core Assets of the Milwaukee Road.
(b) "Milwaukee Road" means the Estate of the bankrupt
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company.
(c) "Coca Assets" means the property acquired by the
Railroad from the Milwaukee Road on February 19, 1985.
(d) 'Employee' means a person with an employment relationship with the Railroad or Milwaukee Road, as of February
19, 1985, including an employee dismissed and later reinstated
with seniority unimpaired, whose rates of pay, cules and
working conditions ace subject to the UTU'a schedule agreement.
(e) 'Transaction' means a change in operations, services
or facilities of the Railroad arising from or growing out of
the Acquisition.
(f) 'Protected Employee' means an Employee of the Railroad or the Milwaukee Road who had an employment relationship
on February 19, 1985, with either the Railroad or the Milwaukee
Road (including such Employees who are furloughed or on leave
of absence with right to return to service) and who performed
Compensated Service for either carrier within the twelve (12)
calendar month period of February, 1981 through January, 19851
provided, however, that any employee who did not perform
Compensated Service within said 12 month period by reason of
being out of service due to injury, illness, discipline, leave
of absence for military service, or official duties with the
Railroad or UTU, and who are subsequently returned to service
with full seniority, or any Employee with a seniority date
prior to April 1, 1978, and who was in active service on lines
east of the Milwaukee Road on January 31. 1982, shall be a
Protected Employee.
Employees furloughed or on leave of absense for reasons
other than those specified herein shall be entitled to
applicable benefits under the New York Dock Conditions if
entitled thereunder.
(g) 'Acquisition" means the acquisition on February 19,
1985, of the Core Assets of the.Milwaukee Road by the Railroad
pursuant to the Order of the Reorganization Court entered
subsequent to the ICC proceedings referred to above.
ARTICLE II
1. After February 19, 1985, all Employees of the
Milwaukee Road are Employees of the Railroad, and are no
longer subject to Milwaukee Road Wage Reduction provisions.
2. After the effective date of this agreement, so long
as a Protected Employee is unable in the normal exercise of the
Employee's seniority under existing agreements, rules or practices, to obtain a position producing Compensation equal to or
exceeding that Protected Employee's monthly Job Security
Allowance, the Protected Employee shall be entitled to a
monthly guarantee payment equal to the difference between
Compensation received for the month and the Protected
Employee's Job Security Allowance (partial months shall be
calculated on a pro rata basis)t provided, however, that the
Protected Employee's Job Security Allowance due in any month
shall be reduced in an amount equal to 501 of the amount by
which total Compensation for the preceding 12 months has
exceeded total Job Security Allowances due during the same
period. Until a 12-month history exists, actual existing
months shall be used.
10. The right of Protected Employees to a Job Security
Allowance shall be reduced due to a decline in business as
determined by the formula established by Appendix 3 hereto.
Those Protected Employees whose benefits have been reduced will
have them restored in accord with the same formula.
12. (a) When the Railroad contemplates that effectuation of a Transaction may cause the dismissal or displacement
of Employees or rearrangement of forces involving such
Employees, it shall give at least ten (10) days written notice
of such Transaction by posting a notice on bulletin boards
convenient to the interested Employees of the Railroad and by
sending certified mail notice to the duly authorized General
Chairman of such Employees. Such notice shall contain a full
and adequate statement of the proposed changes to be effected,
including an estimate of the number of Employees of each class
affected by the intended changes.
(b) At the request of either the Railroad or the representatives of such interested Employees, negotiations for the
purpose of reaching agreement with respect to the application
of the terms and conditions of this agreement shall commence
immediately and continue for not more than twenty (20) days
from the date of the notice. Each Transaction which may
result in a dismissal or displacement of Employees, or
rearrangement of forces involving such Employees, shall provide
for the selection of forces from all Employees involved on a
basis accepted as appropriate for application in the particular
case and in accordance with Section 3 of this Article II, and
the permanent assignment of Employees made necessary by the
Transaction shall be made on the basis of Section 3 of this
Article II. If at the end of the twenty (20) day period there
is a failure to agree, any party to the dispute may submit it
for resolution in accordance with the procedures set forth in
Section 13 of this Article.
(c) Notwithstanding any of the foregoing provisions of
this Agreement, at the completion of the applicable notice
period provided for in paragraph (a) above, the Railroad may
effectuate the changes proposed in the transaction whether or
not an Agreement has been reached on the terms of the
applicable Implementing Agreement. If a proceeding under
paragraph (b) of this section results in displacement,
dismissal, rearrangement, etc. other than as proposed by the
Railroad at the time of the Transaction, pending the outcome of
such proceeding, all Employees affected by the Transaction
during the pendency of the proceeding shall be made whole;
16. At the time adversely affected by any Transaction,
any Employee, including .an Employee who has returned front leave
of absence for Northeastern Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad
Corporation, who is a dismissed or displaced employee as those
k Dock Conditions, may make a payments to which he or she
in lieu of a Job Security
Allowance oc any other payment hereunder; provided, however,
such New York Dock payments shall be subject to the following
modificationst
(a) The Employee shall not be required to exercise
seniority to a position at a work location that would require a
Change of Residence in order to continue eligibility for
payments.
(b) The Employee shall not be entitled to any moving
expense, Relocation Allowance or other 'payment for any Change
e
terms ace defined in the New Yor
one time election to receive th would be entitled thereunder,
9
of Residence that is not approved in writing in advance by the
Railroad.
(c) The Railroad, at its discretion, shall have the
right to require any dismissed employee, or displaced employee
who has not achieved 601 of his or her displacement allowance
in each month of the three consecutive calendar months
immediately preceding receipt of notification to relocate to a
work location selected by the Railroad, in which event the
Employee
will
be entitled to a Relocation Allowance.
If after receiving a Relocation Allowance hereunder, a
Protected Employee voluntarily elects to exercise seniority to
a work location other than that to which the employee was
relocated, the Protected Employee shall be deemed to have
earned compensation based on the earnings which the Employee
could have made at the work location to which he or she was
relocated or the work location to which the Employee voluntarily
transfers, whichever is greater.
(d) The Employee shall be entitled to refuse the
transfer and elect one of the alternatives established by
Section 11 hereof.
(e) The original claim made under the New York Dock
conditions shall be presented in writing to the Railroad within
120 days of the effective date of the Transaction or shall be
absolutely barred.
provided, however, in no event shall any Employee be entitled
to any payment of an amount greater than his or her Job
Security Allowance.
13. In the event the Railroad and its Employees or
their authorized representatives cannot settle any dispute or
controversy with respect to the interpretation, application or
enforcement of any provisions of this agreement, it may be
referred by any party to an arbitration board for resolution in
accord with the provisions of Article I, Section 4(1)-(4) of
the New York Dock Conditions.
N E W Y O R K D O C K
APPENDIX 2
Finance Docket Me. 28250
APPENDIX III
Laser Vreteetiee conditions to 1e Imposed in railroad
transactions parswnt to 49 D.l.C. 11343
~se". (feenarl sec-
tions
SO)
and
S(7)
of the Interstate Ce~ree let), except
for trackage rights and lease proposals which are being con
sidered elsewhere, are as fellows:
4.
Hakim& and laressent or Decision - (a) Each railroad
contemplating a transaction which is subject to these conditions and way gauge the dismissal or displaaeeent of any esPlerwas, or rearrangement of forces, shall give at least ninety
(9D) days written notice at such intended transaction by pasting a sallae ap bulletin beards convenient to the interestad
employees of to railroad and by sending registered mail notice
to the representatives of such interested employees. Such
notice shall eestain a full and adequate stathent of the preOnaed changes to be affected by such transaction, including an
estimate of the ember of employees of each class affected by
the Weeded changes. Prier to consummation the parties shall
negotiate la the following manor.
Within five (5) day#, fraa the date of receipt of notice,
at the request of either the railroad or representatives of
such interested eaployses, a place shall be soleeted to hold
negotiations for the purpose of raichleg agreement with respect
to application of the tens and conditions of this appendix,
and these negotiations shall eommonoo immediately thereafter
and continue for at least thirty
(30)
days. Cash t~snsadtiee
which
qty
result in a disalseal or displateaeat of iaployeas
or roarrangeasat of fare*@, shall provide for the seleetise
of forces from all eaployeoa involved en a basis accepted as
appropriate for application in the particular ease and any
assigameet of employees made necessary by the transaction
shall be made on the basis of an agreement or decision under
this section 4. I1 at the cad of thirty
(30)
days there is a
failure to agree, either party to the dispute gay submit it
for adjustaset In accord=** with the following procedures:
(1) Within five
(5)
days from the request
for arbitratiea the parties shall select a neutral
rotor** and in the event they are unable to agree
within said fire
(5)
days upon the selection of
said referee then the National Mediation board
shall Immediately appoint a referee.
(t) No later than twenty (t0) days after
a referee has been designated a hearing en
the dispute shall common**.
(3)
The decision of the referee shall be
final, binding and conclusive and shall be
rendered within thirty (30) days from the
couenceaent of the hearing of the dispute.
(1) The salary and expenses or the referee shall be borne equally by the parties
to the preceedingi all ether expenses shall
be paid by the party incurring thee.
(b) No change in operations, services, facilities, or
equipment shall occur until after an agreement Ls reached or
the decision of a referee has been randerod.
DECLINE IN BUSINESS
Appendix 3
The total gross ton miles in freight and passenger service on the Railroad and the Milwaukee Road for each month shall
constitute the monthly business level. The total gross ton
miles in freight and passenger service on the Railroad and the
Milwaukee Road in any month during the 12 calendar month period
of February, 1984 to January, 1985, inclusive, shall constitute
the minimum monthly business level for that calendar month. If
the Railroad abandons lines subsequent to February of 1985, the
minimum monthly business levels for each month shall be reduced
by the amount of gross ton miles attributable to traffic originated or terminated on the abandoned trackage during the test
period.
During the first three year period after the effective
date of this agreement, in the event of a decline in the monthly
business level in excess of 5· from the minimum monthly business
level for the same calendar month, all Job Security Allowances
due that month shall be eliminated; in the event of any such
decline during any calendar month in the next two year period,
any employee's Job Security Allowance due that month shall be
reduced by 501; provided. however, that at any time Job Security
Allowances are either eliminated or reduced hereunder, any Employee adversely affected by a Transaction shall be entitled to
those benefits to which he or she would have been entitled under
New York Dock Conditions, subject to all terms and conditions
of the New York Dock Conditions. In any subsequent month in
which the decline in business is 5% or less, all Job Security
Allowances due shall be reinstated. At the end of the five year
period following the effective date of this Agreement, there
shall be no further reduction to any Job Security Allowance for
any decline in business under this formula.
BACKGROON
f
Following two earlier bankruptcies and unsuccessful attempts
at reorganization, in December 1977 the Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul and Pacific Railroad Company ("Milwaukee") filed a petition
for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. By 1980,
the Milwaukee was abandoning and selling some 7,000 miles of
track and was reduced to reorganizing and operating just the
2,500 mile "core" of its former 9,800 miles of track. Between
1981 and 1984 the Milwaukee, under the aegis of the
Reorganization Court and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
conducted negotiations with various rail carriers for the sale of
these remaining "core" assets.
In 1983, the Soo Line Railroad Company (Soo) submitted a bid
to the Reorganization Court to acquire the former Rock Island
line from Minneapolis-St. Paul to Kansas City. Soo was
unsuccessful in its effort to acquire this line which was instead
sold to the C&NW. In January 1984 the Soo filed an asset
acquisition plan with the ICC for the purchase of the Milwaukee's
Core Assets. At that time, Soo operated 4,400 miles of track in
the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, South Dakota, North
Dakota, Montana and Illinois. The principal through traffic
routes over Soo territory were Portal, North Dakota to Chicago,
Illinois via Minneapolis-St. Paul; Noyes to Glenwood, Minnesota;
Minneapolis to Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan: Duluth-Superior to
Owen, Wisconsin and Argonne to Neenah, Wisconsin. Soo's traffic
base consisted primarily of farm products, paper and pulp wood,
14
and chemicals. In 1983 Soo had gross revenues of $293,230,000
and net income of $13,659,000.
On September 26, 1984 the ICC stated its preference for
either Soo's acquisition or reorganization applications over
those of the C&NW and the Grand Trunk. The ICC noted that Soo's
acquisition proposal would permit a newly formed subsidiary to
purchase Milwaukee's Core Assets for $150.2 million in cash plus
assumption of Milwaukee liabilities totalling $420 million.
Following ICC approval of Soo's application, the Reorganization
Court directed the Milwaukee trustee to convey the Core Assets to
either Soo or its subsidiary pursuant to a proposed purchase
agreement between the parties. The actual purchase price
totalled some $658 million, comprising $186 million in cash and
the remainder in assumption of Milwaukee liabilities. Soo
financed the cash portion of the Acquisition price by borrowing
$125 million under a newly renegotiated Revolving Credit
Commitment with several financial institutions.
On February 19, 1985 the Soo consummated its purchase of the
Milwaukee Core Assets and shortly thereafter began negotiations
with labor unions, including the UTU on labor protective
conditions. The Milwaukee bankruptcy judge had imposed New York
Dock protective conditions for employees affected by changes in
operations resulting from the Acquisition. However, the Employee
Protective Agreement (EPA) negotiated between the Soo and the UTU
provided effective July 1, 1985 protective benefits
which in
many
respects exceeded those contained in N2N York 2ock.
Financial
15
and marketing projections upon which Soo had
predicated its ICC application for the Milwaukee Core Assets
indicated an increase in net cash flow as a result of the
Acquisition. Due to a number of factors these expectations were
not realized. Actual revenue apparently was insufficient to
provide cash to cover the day-to-day operating requirements of
the Company which was already heavily burdened by the Acquisition
borrowing.. Soo resorted to traditional methods such as employee
reduction, service curtailment and tighter fiscal policies and
also established a separate business unit within the Soo system
in February 1986, called the Lake States Transportation Division
(LSTD). That division was 1,800 miles of track comprised of
substantial portions of extremely low density lines in the state
of Wisconsin and upper Michigan. After formation of the ISTD Soo
entered into discussions with several labor organizations,
including the UTU, in an effort to obtain new work rules and
lower rates of pay for employees in the LSTD operation. At the
same time Soo's revenue shortfall situation intensified to the
point that its creditors required immediate action. The efforts
to obtain work rule and pay concessions did not succeed and
within this economic and financial framework the Soo and its
creditors renegotiated the Revolving Credit Commitment at the
insistence of the bankers. By the end of 1986, the Soo
identified "all transportation assets not essential to the core
business of the Company" and developed marketing programs for
selling these properties. Among other assets the Soo sold its
16
headquarters building in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In December
1986 and January 1987 the Soo retained Shearson Lehman Brothers
to market the LSTD assets. On April 2, 1987, after negotiations
with several interested parties, the Soo signed a purchase
agreement with Wisconsin Central Limited (WCL) to sell
approximately 1,800 miles of track in Wisconsin, upper Michigan,
northern Illinois and eastern Minnesota, most of which had been
part of LSTD. Following review by the ICC, the sale of LSTD to
WCL was consummated on October 11, 1987.
The Soo did not treat the sale of LSTD as a "Transaction"
under the EPA. According to the Soo, UTU employees on the LSTD
were given an opportunity to work for WCL, to separate from the
Soo through a voluntary separation plan available in December
1987, or to remain with the Soo and relocate to a point where
their services are needed. Soo records indicate that some 14 UTU
employees accepted employment at WCL, 83 accepted the "voluntary"
separation plan, 52 "exercised seniority to core", 13 are on
railroad disability, 4 are on leave of absence, and 105 were
"direct relocated under EPA to core".
The UTU made timely invocation of the arbitration provisions
of the EPA, contesting the Soo's determination that the sale of
LSTD to WCL was not a "Transaction". In January 1988 the Soo and
the UTU agreed to arbitrate the two (2) issues which have been
submitted to me in this proceedings. Thereafter, the arbitration
proceedings were postponed while the UTU pursued efforts to
obtain injunctive relief requiring the Soo and WCL to negotiate
17
an implementing agreement prior to conveyance of ISTD. The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted
Soo's motion to dismiss the UTU complaint and later amended its
decision reversing an implied holding that the questions
presented before were not arbitrable. RLEA-ASoo
Line
Railroad
Co., No. 87-C-5293 (July 19, 1988, amended November 22, 1988).
Thereafter, these arbitration proceedings went forward in the
hearing at Minneapolis on April 6, 1989. In the meantime, on
October 19, 1988 the Soo commenced litigation against the WCL
alleging failure to comply with the Asset Purchase Agreement
(APA) dated April 2, 1987. Under date of December 28, 1988 the
WCL counter claimed against the Soo in this litigation in the
U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, Fourth Division.
Civil File No. 4-88-900. It should be noted that nothing in this
arbitration Opinion or Award under the EPA is intended to express
or imply an opinion or finding regarding the issues in dispute in
that Federal Court litigation.
gISITIONB
QZ
in
PARTIES
onion
Oueetion
ff2j_ ;:
The UTU submits that Soo's sale of the Lake
States Division to WCL was a "transaction" as defined in the
Protective Agreement. UTU maintains that this sale clearly
constituted a change in the operations of the SOO as a result of
the Milwaukee Acquisition.
18
Additionally, the sale of the Lake States Division "grows
out of" Soo's acquisition of the Milwaukee's core assets. The
lines sold to WCL were all made redundant by better alternate
routes obtained by the purchase of the core assets. Beside these
redundancies in rail lines discussed above, Soo also became
heavily indebted as a result of the acquisition. The sale of the
Lake States Division generated $133 million for Soo that was
directed almost entirely to reducing the debt assumed as part of
the acquisition and operation of the core assets.
In order to establish this causal link between the
acquisition of the core assets and the sale of the Lake States
Division to WCL, UTU need only show a "reasonable relationship"
between the acquisition and sale. Essentially, UTU must show
that the acquisition was a factor in Soo's sale of the Lake
States Division. The causal link is not severed if Soo can show
that other factors than the acquisition also motivated the sale.
In order for Soo to destroy the causal link, it must show that
the acquisition was n2t a factor in the sale of the Lake States
Division. (Emphasis in original.)
UTU submits that this causation standard is mandated by the
statutorily mandated employee protections contained in 49 U.S.C.
511347. Those protections comprise the basis upon which the
Protective Agreement rests. Although the Protective Agreement
provides benefits greater than the statutory minimum, UTU submits
that the statutory causation standards remain applicable to this
AGreement. Any contention that the more stringent causation
19
standards contained in recent ICC decisions should be applied is
in error. However, even if those erroneous standards are applied
to this dispute, UTU submits that the sale was "caused" by the
acquisition of the core assets.
Based upon the'causation standards set forth above, there
can be no reasonable dispute that the sale of the Lake States
Division "grows out of" the acquisition of the core assets.
Therefore, the sale was a "transaction" as defined in the
Protective Agreement.
Question No. 1: UTU also submits that the gross ton miles
attributable to the Lake States Division must be subtracted from
the monthly business level test period contained in Appendix 3 of
the Protective Agreement. The sale of the Lake States Division
was not a decline in business suffered by the Soo due to economic
factors beyond its control. Instead, the sale of the Lake States
Division was a volitional act on Soo's part that provided a
substantial cash and operational benefit to Soo. This type of
transaction is the antithesis of those events that ordinarily
comprise a decline a business.
Further, any analysis of the Protective Agreement that
characterized the sale of the Lake States Division as a decline
in business would be unreasonable and defeat the purpose of that
Agreement. The decline in business formula contained in Appendix
3 was a recognition by both parties that if events beyond Soo's
control made the protective obligations contained in the
20
Agreement unduly burdensome, Soo could obtain partial relief from
those obligations. If abandoned property is to be removed from
the base, surely property which is sold as a growing concern must
also be removed from the base.
Company
Question 1. J: Although it is a fact that considerable
debt was taken on when the Soo purchased the Milwaukee Road in
February, 1985, that debt was manageable based on the traffic and
revenue projections made to the ICC. The revenue shortfall
crisis detailed herein which led to the decision to sell Lake
States resulted from intense rate competition, the changing rail
transportation marketplace, and erosion of expected carloads.
The Soo's failure to achieve the debt-equity ratio (leverage
ratio) required in the various financial commitments was caused
by deteriorating rates and revenue all of which deviated
significantly from what had been projected by the Soo. The sale
of Lake States was disposal of assets to generate cash to meet
current financial obligations. Selling Lake States was a
responsible business decision made two and one-half (24) years
after the Acquisition based on a financial crisis growing out of
revenue shortfalls in an intensely competitive midwestern
marketplace.
The facts clearly demonstrate that the Lake States sale to
WCL was wholly independent and distinct from the Milwaukee
acquisition. It neither arose from nor grew out of that
zl
transaction, and had no connection with it nor was a result of
it. The record is replete with evidence that the application to
the Interstate Commerce Commission by Soo in seeking its approval
to acquire the Milwaukee road assets and the evidence in support
of the application did not contemplate the Lake States sale. As
a matter of fact, it was contemplated by Soo that the lines
incorporated in the Lake States property would continue to be
operated as part of the merged system, and as reflected in
revenue and traffic projections furnished to the Commission, it
was anticipated that substantial contributions would be
forthcoming from those lines. It was not until well after the
February 1985 Milwaukee acquisition that it became apparent those
projections were overly optimistic and that largely due to market
conditions, revenues were dropping precipitously, requiring Soo
to dispose of the Lake States property to generate sufficient
cash to meet its operating needs. It was not until late 1986 and
early 1987 that lending institutions and investment rating
organizations put pressure on Soo to generate more cash from sale
of assets to meet its current obligations.
In resolving similar issues, the ICC and arbitration
tribunals have ruled on the meaning of the term "Transaction",
which is used in a very similar context in the so-called New_ York
Dock Conditions currently imposed by the ICC in merger and
related transactions under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 USC
Sec. 11347. Thus, it is clear that the parties intended that
applicable ICC precedence in applying the Act should have a
22
bearing upon the outcome of interpreting and applying this
agreement. The ICUs decision in reviewing an arbitration award
in Finance Docket No. 28490, Atlantic Richfield Co. and Anaconda
Co. - Control - Butte. L. j Pac, g$,. etc. (decided February 17,
1988, served march ;2, 1988) is especially pertinent to the
issue.
There can be no question that "Transaction" as defined in
the EPA should be interpreted and applied in the same way. The
events must arise from or grow out of the acquisition transaction
to fit the definition. In other words, there must be a causal
nexus, which is wholly absent here.
Question 1. 1: By its express terms the only exception to
the calculation of the decline in business formula is gross ton
miles attributable to abandoned trackage, there being no
exception arising from line sales. Thus, line sales, as in the
instant case, are wholly omitted from the description exception.
The sale of assets such as Lake States is permitted in accordance
with 49 U.S.C. Section 10901, and line abandonments are covered
by an entirely different section, 49 U.S.C. Section 10903. They
are treated as entirely separate and distinct events under the
Interstate Commerce Act, which mandates the practice in the
industry. Clearly, then, it was the intention of the parties to
except only abandonments from the base comparison, since such
occurrences truly reflect at the outset a discontinuance of rail
23
operations, services and employment; whereas, line sales
contemplate continuation of those economic factors.
It is submitted, therefore, that this Arbitrator should
abstain from rewriting the decline in business formula and
confine the parties to the express language in their agreement.
Although UTU may not have foreseen the Lake States line sale when
they agreed to this formula, it is not up to this committee to
rewrite it to satisfy the organization's concepts of equity. The
Arbitrator's jurisdiction is confined solely to interpreting and
applying the EPA, not to writing a new one.
OPINION QZ M
ARH.=TRATOR
Question - TIM "Transaction" Issue
The starting point for determination of this issue is the
contractual definition of "transaction" upon which the Parties
agreed in Article I(e) of the EPA: "Transaction means a change
in operations, services or facilities of the Railroad arising
from or growing out of the Acquisition".
It can hardly be gainsaid that the sale of LSTD to WCL to by
Soo meant a "change in the operations, services and facilities"
of the Soo Line Railroad. According to Soo's 1987 Shareholders
Annual Report, the LSTD sale to WCL was "by far the largest asset
sale "of (sic) the Corporation in its history". Nearly 2,000
miles of former Soo Line track in four (4) states, together with
associated buildings, facilities, signals, adjoining property,
vehicles, tools, equipment, rolling stock and inventory all were
24
sold to WCL. Those rail lines had been a part of the Soo Line
system for over a century. The sale terminated all Soo Line
operations in the State of Michigan and disposed of nearly all of
Soo Line pre-Acquisition track in the State of Wisconsin. Fourth
and fifth generation customers and employees found themselves no
longer doing business with or employed by the Soo Line Railroad.
There is no question that this sale and implementation of the
sale crosses the threshold conditional phrase of Article I(e) of
the EPA. The critical question of fact and law presented in the
case, however, is whether the October 1987 sale and
implementation was a change covered by the restrictive adjectival
phrase "arising from or growing out of" the February 1985
Milwaukee Acquisition by Soo Line.
There can be no reasonable doubt that a causal connection or
link must be demonstrated between a subsequent change in
operations or facilities by the Soo and the February 1985
Acquisition in order for the change to come within the definition
of "transaction" covered by the EPA. In terms borrowed from the
Law of Torts, learned counsel for the Parties have contested in
this arbitration proceeding whether the appropriate causation
test under Article I(e) of the EPA should be "but for" or
"proximate" causation. That precise question has been addressed
and answered by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or
Commission) in several recent cases involving disputes over the
tar
York Dock definition of "Transaction". See Finance Docket
No. 28490, Atlantic Richfield Qz. = Anaconda
QqL _ Control
=
25
Butte.
gs §L
Pac. Railroad. etc., February 17, 1988 ("BAP");
Finance Docket No. 30965, Delaware And Hudson Railway
ease etc. - Sorinafield Terminal, February 17, 1988
("Springfield Terminal"); Finance Docket No. 28538 (Sub. No. 24),
Burlington Northern. Inc. = Control And Merger = St. Louis San
&_ Francisco Railway, June 8, 1988 ("Frisco").
The New York Dock definition was extrapolated by the ICC
from 49 U.S.C. 11347, -tQ w t: "Transaction means any action
taken pursuant to authorization of [the ICC] upon which [the New
York Dock] provisions have been imposed." UTU correctly points
out that the ICC did not impose New York Dock provisions upon the
Acquisition nor did the ICC formally approve the EPA. In lieu of
imposition of
NSA
Srk Dock, the Parties voluntarily negotiated
the EPA which differs in many respects from New York Dock,
specifically including the express wording of the definition of
"Transaction". UTU therefore urges that I reject these ICC
precedents on grounds that the EPA was not imposed or approved by
the ICC and, arauendo, that the ICC has erred in its
interpretation of the statutory language and associated
congressional intent of 49 U.S.C. 11347.
One need not admire the ICUs recent heavyhanded intrusions
into grievance arbitration proceedings under the Railway Labor
Act nor necessarily agree with the Commission's preemptive
interpretations of voluntarily negotiated agreements. However,
it would be both inappropriate and quixotic for an arbitrator to
reject out of hand the Commission's recent rulings on the issue
26
of causation in New_ York Dock cases. The recent decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversing the ICC
decision in Frisco was in my judgment correctly critical of the
ICUs deviation from normal standards of review of arbitration
awards. But that reversal does not negate the appropriateness of
the "reasonably direct causal connection" standard of causation
in MPA cases. = y
_t
10,
Civil Action No. 88-2120, 1989, U.S.
App. Lexis 13796 (C.A. 8th, September 13, 1989).
Even though, technically, the ICC did not ultimately impose
New yqrk Dock upon the Acquisition nor formally approve the EPA,
that Agreement by its literal terms rests upon 49 U.S.C. 11347.
Further, the EPA is permeated with references and incorporations
of provisions from
H2M
York Dock. Quite independent of the line
of ICC decisions, oer $g, the better reasoned and more recent
arbitral decisions in this arena also have tended to require a
real and discernible causal nexus between the subsequent adverse
effect (e.g., the 1987 sale of ISTD) and the earlier event out of
which such protection was generated (e.a., the 1985 Acquisition).
See
In
=g Matter
21
Arbitration Between Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company And American Train Dispatchers Association,
Finance Docket No. 27773 (Arbitrator Nicholas zumas, July 31,
1981):
In
=S
Matter
21
Arbitration Between United Transportation
Union And Maine Central Railroad Company, Finance Docket No.
29720 (Arbitrator Robert M. O'Brien, August 10, 1984):
In =
Matter
21
Arbitration Between United Transportation Union
Norfolk $ Western Railway Comranv, Finance Docket No. 29430
27
(Arbitrator Robert E. Peterson, August 29, 1986):
in
tjM to
gj Arbitration Between United Transportation Union
and
Chicago
and
Northwestern Transportation Company, Finance Docket No. AB-36
(Sub No. 2) (Arbitrator Gil Vernon); In tIM Matter 21 Arbitration
Between Brotherhood 2.f Maintenance 2.C Hay Employees
AW
Maine
Central Railroad Company, Finance Docket No. 29720 (Arbitrator I.
M. Lieberman, February 26, 1985). In sum, I am convinced from
the language "arising from or growing out of" used by the Parties
in Article I(e) that they intended to connote a causal link less
speculative or conjectural than mere "but for" causation.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I find that the
appropriate standard of causation under EPA Article I(e) is
essentially that utilized under ff2M York Dock cases:
Before an employee is entitled to benefits ...
there must be a reasonably direct causal
connection between the transaction and the injury
sustained; in other words the transaction must be
the proximate cause of the injury .. . If an
employee is dismissed or displaced for reasons not
connected with the transfer he is not entitled to
the benefits.
See $$p, Springfield Terminal and Frisco, supra. In terms
specific to the present case, I find that if the overall record
clearly and convincingly shows a reasonably direct causal
connection between the 1985 Acquisition and the 1987 Sale of
ISTDt in other words if the Acquisition was the proximate cause
of the Sale of 1STD, then Question No. 1 must be answered in the
affirmative. On the other hand, if the Sale of ISTD was caused
not by the Acquisition but rather by wholly new intervening or
28
superceding developments or events, then Question No. 1 must be
answered in the negative.
Application of the foregoing standards to the overall record
of evidence before me compels a conclusion that the UTU has
demonstrated persuasively the existence of a reasonably direct
causal connection between the Acquisition and the Sale of LSTD.
Proximate causation does not necessarily mean the subsequent
event must be intimately linked in temporal or spatial terms to
the precipitating event. Therefore, the fact that the Sale of
LSTD occurred some two (2) years after the Acquisition does not
obviate a causal nexus, so long as it is proven that the Sale
arose from or grew out of the Acquisition. Nor does the
existence of other causative factors which might well have played
a contributory
or
accelerating role in the Sale serve to sever
the causal nexus, so long as it is demonstrated that the Sale is
directly, primarily, and proximately linked to the Acquisition.
The UTU has demonstrated persuasively that the redundancy of
the acquired Milwaukee lines and the former Soo Lines in the
four-state Great Lakes area made severance and eventual sale of
ISTD a viable business decision for Soo. Standing alone,
however, the redundancy evidence smacks too much of the "but for"
standard and would be insufficient, without more, to forge the
direct causal link or nexus required under the "proximate
causation" standard. However, the record also persuasively shows
that the possibility or opportunity generated by this trackage
redundancy in 1985 ripened into a realistic necessity to sell off
29
LSTD
and many other severable Soo Line assets in 1986-87,
primarily, if not exclusively, because of the enormous credit
burden undertaken by Soo in 1985 to finance the Acquisition.
A real and direct causal nexus between the 1986-87 financial
straits of the Soo Line, which necessitated the Sale of
LSTD,
and
the Acquisition of the core assets in 1988 is clearly and
convincingly proven by the preponderance of evidence in the
record before me. Other factors, such as unanticipated postderegulation intramodal competition, falling revenues, and
inability to obtain economic concessions from some labor
organizations may well have been contributory factors in the
final decision to sell off
LSTD.
But from the evidence before me
these were subsidiary to the primary proximate cause of the Sale,
i.e., the debilitating debt load burden undertaken by Soo Line in
1985 to finance purchase of the Milwaukee core assets.
In that connection, unrefuted record evidence including
specifically ICC Finance Dockets, financial reports from Soo Line
auditors and Soo Line annual stockholder reports for 1985, 1986
and 1987, conclusively establish the following financial nexus:
1. In 1984, the last full year before the Acquisition, Soo
Line had no borrowings against its available Revolving Credit
Commitment with several financial institutions and long term debt
comprised only 26% of Soo's capitalization:
2. To acquire the core assets, Soo paid a total purchase
price of $658,000,000, comprising $186,000,000 in cash and the
30
remainder in assumption of current and long term liabilities of
the bankrupt Milwaukee Railroad;
3. Soo financed the cash portion of the Acquisition
purchase price by borrowing $125,000,000 under the new
$150,000,000 Revolving Credit Commitment, with the remaining
$25,000,000 paid from internal cash available:
4. In 1985, the year of the Acquisibion, long term debt
doubled from 26; to 55% of Soo Line's capitalization.
Conspicuously included in this "long term debt" accounting was
the $125,000,000 in cash Soo Line borrowed against the Revolving
Credit Commitment to finance the Acquisition. The 1986 Soo Line
stockholders annual report states: "The increase over 1984 debt
levels represent debt incurred to purchase the Milwaukee
Railroad";
5. Early in 1986 Soo Line created LSTD as a "stand-alone"
division comprising some 2,000 miles of now redundant pre-1985
Soo Line trackage, together with the Wisconsin River Valley and
North Milwaukee to Green Hay, Wisconsin lines of the former
Milwaukee Railroad purchased in the Acquisition;
6. By mid-1986 Soo Line was compelled to raise cash b
selling off all severable assets, including its Minneapolis
headquarters building. In late 1986 and early 1987, Soo Line
initiated the sale of LSTD for the avowed purpose of reducing
long term debt;
7. Of the $133,000,000 cash proceeds of the LSTD Sale, Soo
sod some $98,000,000 to pay down the $125,000,000 in bank loans
71
it had borrowed under the Revolving Credit Commitment to finance
the 1993 Acquisition.
This evidence o! record persuasively demonstrates that the
redundancy e! lines arising from or growing out
of
the
Acquisition wade it viable for
moo
to
mall
the
L9TD
and the
financial burden arising from or growing out
of
the Acquisition
made it necessary for Boo to mall the WTo. Thus, I as persuaded
that the sale of LSTD is causally linked in a reasonably direct
and proximate way to the Acquisition. Accordingly, I find that
the Sale of LSTD was a "Transaction" as that term is defined in
Article
I(a)
o! the SPA.
ouaetion
f
- W
the neelina
in laminae_ iaaus
An with most railroad industry protective labor agreements
negotiated by the Parties or imposed by the ICC* the SPA contains
a "decline-in-business" provision which grants Carrier a limited
*scope clause from the financial onus of job security allowance
benefits should future business volume decline from "tact period"
levels. Appendix Ho. 3 of the IPA is typical of such provisions.
The first paragraph of Appendix Ho. 3 defines the "test period"
and the "minimum monthly business levels" ter each month, against
which future monthly business is measured to determine whether
carrier can escape its job security allowance liability in a
given month. The last sentence of the first paragraph of
Appendix No. 7 constitutes an express g&ylj& upon carrier's
itili:ation of the "escape hatch", however, in the case of an
32
abandonment of lines by Soo subsequent to the Acquisition. In
the event of such an abandonment, the test period months minimum
business levels are reduced by the amount of traffic attributable
to the abandoned lines, thus making it less likely Carrier could
escape job security allowance payments consequent to an
abandonment.
In this particular case, UTU acknowledges that the sale of
ISTD was not an "abandonment" Der 12: but maintains that for
purposes of Appendix No. 3 the sale should be treated the same
way as an abandonment. The organization maintains that Soo
should be required to exclude LSTD gross ton miles from the
decline in business calculations, on grounds of "reasonableness,
fairness and equity".
The problem with the interpretive approach urged by the
organization is that this is a board of arbitration not a court
of chancery and the language of the Agreement is quite clear.
Appendix No. 3 expressly and specifically excepts "abandonment"
from the calculation of decline in business formula but says
nothing about "sales". The Interstate Commerce Act treats
"abandonment" and "sales" as separate and distinct events, =. 49
U.S.C. !10903 and 49 U.S.C. 510901. It is neither unrealistic
nor unreasonable to conclude that the able and experienced
negotiators of the EPA knew and understood the legal and
practical distinctions between the terms of art: "abandonment"
and "sales". Arbitrators have long applied the principle that
negotiators are charged with knowledge of the terms of their
33
agreement and when negotiators expressly include one or more
distinct members of a class in a written instrument they
presumably intend the exclusion of others. See Great g¢g ZM
Company, 46 LA 372, 374 (Scheiber, 1966) and other cases
collected in Elkouri & Elkouri,
H2X
Arbitration Works, 4th
edition (Washington, DC: 1985), p. 355.
The alleged "equities" of the situation do not really come
into play in such a case as this. Where the intent of the
Parties is clear from the use (or non-use) of certain specific
language, the Arbitrator must not legislate new language, for to
do so would usurp the exclusive prerogative of the Parties to
negotiate their own contract language. See Clean Coverall
SUDD1V
Company, 47 LA 272, 277 (F. Witney, 1966): Arbitration Between
Brotherhood 91 Railroad Carmen And Illinois Central
Gulf Railroad
(J. LaRocco, June 27, 1986).
Based upon all of the foregoing, therefore, I find that the
gross ton miles in the decline in business formula of Appendix
No. 3 of the EPA does not exclude ton miles attributable to the
LSTD sale by Soo to WCL.
AWARD
1. The sale and implementation of that sale of the Lake
States Transportation Division by the Soo Line Railroad company
to Wisconsin Central Limited is a "Transaction" as that term is
def in the Employee Protective Agreement for employees in
service as Trainmen, Yardmen and Conductors on the Soo/Milwaukee
Operating System represented by the United Transportation Union
effective July 1, 1985.
2. Gross ton miles in the decline in business formula in
Appendix 3 of the above Agreement do not exclude ton miles
attributable to portions of the Soo which the Soo sold to
Wisconsin Central Limited.
DstM:
SOP^
STATE Of N YOttt(
COUNTY OFF
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On this
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day of
Dana E Eiaefn
Arbitrator
11
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to me known and known to ms to M tM Inwidusl tlssaiAW Mnln ttnd who Mao,
I Ion and he
seknowhdqsd to ms that M saseulW IM assts.
F--T -NC.
Neurlt
rook. sub a
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No. 4M4=
auW11o4 In Tonp111n1
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expires",
as i.