Arbitration Committee
Established Under Article I, § 11
of
"New York Dock" Protective Conditions
In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
CSX Transportation, Inc. (formerly
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company)
- and -
Transportation Communication
International Union
ARBITRATION COMMITTEE:
Subject: Test Period Average of
Clerk G. L. W'imsatt
Cassaundra D. Anderson,
Manager Employee Relations, Carrier Member
Carl Brockett,
International Vice President, Union Member
Dana Edward Eischen, Neutral Chairman
A2cea ra,aces
For the Company:
For the Union:
James A. Bowen, Jr.,
Manager Employee Relations
Darwin B. Kubasiewicz,
Assistant to the General Chairman
2
PROCEEDINGS
A dispute arose between the Transportation Communications
International Union, C & O System Board of Adjustment (TCU or
Union) and the CSX Transportation Company, Inc. (CSX or Carrier)
concerning the interpretation and application of the second
paragraph of S 5 (a) of the New York Dock Conditions (NYD), which
had been incorporated by reference in a memorandum Agreement
between these Parties, effective October 24, 1987. Pursuant to S
11 of the NYD, the Parties mutually designated Dana Edward
Eischen to serve as Chair and Neutral Member of an Arbitration
Committee to hear and determine that dispute. By agreement of
the Parties, the arbitration hearing was held at Richmond,
Virginia on April 2, 1992, prior to which prehearing briefs were
submitted and exchanged. At the hearing on April 2, 1992, both
Parties'were represented and afforded full opportunity to present
oral and documentary evidence in support of their positions. The
record was closed with submission of additional documentation
received by the Committee in mid-April 1992. The Parties
acquiesced in an extension of time to render the Award and
Opinion of the Arbitration Committee.
ISSUE
The Parties were unable to stipulate to a joint framing of
issue for submission to the Arbitration Committee. At the
hearing the TCU framed the question as follows: "What is the
proper method for computing test period averages when the test
3
period includes both agreement and non-agreement earnings?" For
its part, CSX proposed that the following question was at issue
in this-case: "Was the Test Period Average of Clerk G. L.
Wimsatt properly arrived at by the Carrier's method of
computation?" The Chair of the Arbitration Committee observed
that there was no substantial or material difference in the
respective formulations of issue put forward by the Parties, but
suggested that each might be embraced within a statement of issue
posited in terms of whether the Carrier violated its contractual
obligations in this case, as follows:
1. Did the Carrier violate S 5 (a) of the New York
Dock Conditions in its computation of the Test
Period Average of Clerk G. L. Wimsatt?
2. If so, what shall be the remedy?
PERTINENT
CONTRACT PROVISIONS
MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT
Effective October 24, 1987
BETWEEN
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
(formerly The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company)
(formerly Seaboard System Railroad)
AND THEIR EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED BY
TRANSPORTATION COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL UNION
Whereas, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT) served
notice July 23, 1987 pursuant to Article I, Section 4
of the "New York Dock" Labor Protective conditions of
its intent to transfer, coordinate and otherwise
reorganize certain clerical functions presently being
performed for the CSXT (formerly Chesapeake and Ohio
Railway,,hereinafter referred to for convenience as
C&O) by employees located on the C&O Western Division,
District No. 7, at Cincinnati, Ohio, with certain
4
clerical functions being performed for CSXT (formerly
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, referred to for
convenience as L&N) by employees located on L&N Corbin
Division District
No. 12
at Corbin, Kentucky.
4. CSXT (former C&O) employees assigned by
bulletin to positions, including guaranteed extra board
positions, located on C&O District No. 7 will be
afforded the opportunity to bid on advertised positions
which are to be established at Corbin, Kentucky. Those
employees not awarded any of positions as their jobs
are abolished will exercise their seniority in
accordance with the terms of the C&O Clerks' General
Agreement.
10. (a) Employees adversely affected as a result
of the implementation of this agreement will be
entitled to the protective benefits of the New York
Dock Conditions or option to elect benefits existing
under other job security or protective conditions as
more specifically set out in Section 3 of the New York
Dock Conditions.
NEW YORK DOCK CONDITIONS
Finance Docket
No. 28250
APPENDIX III
5 IUisplacement allowances.-(a) So long after a
displaced employee's displacement as he is unable, in
the normal exercise of his seniority rights under
existing agreements, rules and practices, to obtain a
position producing compensation equal to or exceeding
the compensation he received in the position from which
he was displaced, he shall, during his protective
period, be paid a monthly displacement allowance equal
to the difference between the monthly compensation
received by him in the position in which he is retained
and the average monthly compensation received by him in
the position from which he was displaced.
5
Each displaced employee's displacement allowance
shall be determined by dividing separately
by
12 the
total compensation received
by
the employee and the
total time for which he was paid during the last 12
months in which he performed services immediately
preceding the date of his displacement as a result of
the transition (thereby producing average monthly
compensation and average monthly time paid for in the
test period), and Provided further, that such allowance
shall also be adjusted to reflect subsequent general
wage increases.
It a displaced employee's compensation in his
retained position in any month is less in any month in
which he performs work than the aforesaid average
compensation (adjusted to reflect subsequent general
wage increases) to which he would have been entitled,
he shall be paid the difference, less compensation for
time lost on account of his voluntary absences to the
extent that he is not available for service equivalent
to his average monthly time during the test period, but
if in his retained position he works in any month in
excess of the aforesaid average monthly time paid for
during the test period he shall be additionally
compensated for such excess time at the rate of pay of
the retained position..
10. Should the. railroad rearrange or adjust its
force in anticipation of a transaction with the purpose
or effect of depriving an employee of benefits to which
he otherwise would have become entitled under this
appendix, this appendix will apply to such employee.
11. Arbitration of diseutes. - (a) In the event
the railroad and its employees or their authorized
representative cannot settle any dispute or controversy
with respect to the interpretation, application or
enforcement of any provision of this appendix, except
Sections 4 and 12 of this Article I, within 20 days
after the dispute arises, it may be referred by either
party to an arbitration committee. upon notice in
writing served by one party on the other of intent by
that party to refer a dispute or controversy to an
arbitration committee, each party shall, within 10
days, select one member of the committee and the
members thus chosen shall select a neutral member who
shall serve as chairman. If any party fails to select
its member of the arbitration committee within the
prescribed time limit, the general chairman of the
6
involved labor organization or the highest officer
designated by the railroads, as the case may be, shall
be deemed the selected member and the committee shall
then function and its decision shall have the same
force and effect a though all parties had selected
their members. Should the members be unable to agree
upon the appointment of the neutral member within 10
hays, the parties shall then within an additional 10
days endeavor to agree to a method by which a neutral
member shall be appointed, and, failing such agreement,
either party may request the National Mediation Hoard
to designate within 10 days the neutral member whose
designation will be binding, upon the parties.
(b) In the event a dispute involves more than one,
labor organization, each will be entitled to a
representative on the arbitration committee, in which
event the railroad will be entitled to appoint
additional representative so as to equal the number of
labor organization representative.
(c) The decision, by majority vote, of the
arbitration committee shall be final, binding, and
conclusive and shall be rendered within 45 days after
the hearing of the dispute or controversy has been
concluded and the record closed.
(d) The salaries and expenses of the neutral
member shall be borne equally by the parties to the
proceeding and all other expenses shall be paid by
party incurring them.
(e) 'In the event of any dispute as to whether or
not a particular employee was affected by a
transaction, it shall be his obligation to identify the
transaction and specify the pertinent facts of that
transaction relied upon. It shall then be the
railroad's burden to prove that factors other than a
transaction affected the employee.
the
BACKGROUND
Mr. G. L. Wimsatt, (Claimant) began his career in May, 1971,
as a yard clerk on a CSX predecessor line. IN 1976 he was
promoted to a non-contract supervisor and in 1982, he was
a
transferred to Corbin, Kentucky as an Assistant Trainmaster.
7
During the second half of
1987, CSX
Transportation, Inc.
implemented a systemwide force reduction of its management (noncontract) work force. The Carrier initially offered voluntary
separation allowances equaling one year's salary to employees
with five years or more service and one-half year's salary for
employees with less time with the Company. The number separated
in this fashion did not equal the target number of management
employees to be reduced. Carrier then applied a system of rating
and ranking, and any additional cuts deemed necessary within each
department or office were made on the basis of the scores
obtained during the rating and ranking process. Any employee
whose position was abolished as a result of this downsizing had
several options, among them exercising whatever seniority he held
or accepting separation pay in the same amount that was
previously offered on a voluntary basis.
As a result of his relatively low ranking (as compared to
other non-contract supervisors in like job categories)
Claimant's position of Assistant Trainmaster at Corbin, Kentucky
was abolished on September
20, 1987.
Mr. Wimsatt elected to
exercise his clerical seniority at Cincinnati, Ohio, in lieu of
accepting separation pay as provided in the offers made to
management employees. He returned to contract status effective
October 1, 1987.
In the meantime, at about the same time Mr. Wimsatt returned
to the clerical craft, the Carrier coordinated certain clerical
functions at its facilities at Cincinnati, Ohio, and transferred
8
some of those duties to its offices at Corbin, Kentucky.
-Following extended negotiations, on October 24, 1987 CXS and TCU
executed the Implementing Agreement in connection with this
coordination of work. That Agreement read in pertinent part as
follow:
4. CSXT (former C&O) employees assigned by bulletin
to positions, including guaranteed extra board
position, located on C&O District NO. 7 will be
afforded the opportunity to bid on advertised positions
which ar to be established at
Corbin, Kentucky
. those
employees not awarded any of the positions as their
jobs are abolished will exercise their seniority in
accordance with the terms of the C&O Clerks' Agreement.
10. (a) Employees adversely affected as a result of
the implementation of this agreement will be entitled
to the protective benefits of the New York Dock
conditions or option to elect benefits existing under
other job security or protective conditions as more
specifically set out in Section 3 of the New York Dock
conditions.
(b) Each employee entitled to the protective
benefits 'and conditions referred to in subsection (a)
above and who is also otherwise eligible for protective
benefits and conditions under other protective
agreements or arrangements shall within thirty (30)
days from date affected be notified of his monetary
protective entitlement under this agreement. Within
fifteen (15) days of being advised of their monetary
protective entitlement under the provisions of the
attached Protective Benefits, such employee(s) will
elect between the Protective Benefits and conditions
attached hereto and the protective benefits and
conditions under such other arrangement. Should any
employee fail to make an election of benefits during
the period set forth in this subsection (b), such
employee shall be considered as electing the protective
benefits and conditions attached hereto.
As a result of the exercise of seniority rights and
9
progressive displacements ensuing after the implementation of
this Agreement, Claimant Wimsatt was displaced form his
assignment of Relief clerk at the Piggyback Ramp at Cincinnati,
Ohio by Clerk K. A. White on December 9, 19P. As Ms. White was
a "displaced employee" as defined in Article I, Section 1 (b) of
the conditions of New York Dock Labor Protection Conditions,
Claimant Wimsatt was extended an election of benefits as
reflected in Section 10 of the Memorandum Agreement, effective
October 24, 1987 (supra).
The following letter of March 9, 1988 from Carrier,
extending NYD benefits to Mr. Wimsatt, set forth a method of
calculating his Test Period Average (TPA) which generated the
present dispute:
It has been determined the you'(were) affected on
December 21, 1987 and are therefore entitled to the
protective conditions provided for in Section 10 of the
aforementioned agreement (October 24, 1978 Implementing
Agreement). In order to compute a Test Period Average
(TPA) under the New York Dock Protective Agreement it
would be necessary to average your clerical earnings
for the twelve (12) months prior to December 21, 1987.
However, it has been determined that you were working
as a non-contract official until October 1987.
Therefore, in order to properly compute your TPA, TPA's
were computed for the clerical employees immediately
above you and below you on the seniority roster for the
ten (10) months you had no clerical earnings. These
two figures were then averaged and your actual earnings
were added to determine the NYD benefits
shown
on the
attached option sheet.
On March 9, 1988, carrier also advised Claimant that,
by its method of calculation, he was entitled to a monthly
guarantee of $2,425.43. Claimant and the Organization took
exception to harrier's calculation and, by letter of June 7,
1988, the TCU Local Chairman/Vice General Chairman filed a claim
reading in pertinent part as follows:
The Carrier figured Mr. Wimsatt's base period
average compensation by averaging the employee salary
ahead of him on the roster and the employee behind him,
This procedure is not mentioned in the Finance docket
No. 28250. They arrived with a monthly compensation of
$2,425.43. Mr. Wimsatt's guarantee by Section 5 of the
New York Dock Conditions should be $3,503.97 per month.
It is our position that the Carrier violated the
New York Dock Conditions and continues to do so by the
way they computed Mr. Wimsatt's average monthly
compensation. It is our further contention that the
Carrier should figure Mr. Wimsatt's average monthly
compensation as stated in Section 5 of Finance Docket
No. 28250.
The issue thus was joined on the property and remained
unresolved through all levels of appeal until eventually the
organization invoked the arbitration provisions of Article I,
S
il of NYD. Subsequently, the Parties mutually created this
Arbitration Committee to resolve the questions at issue in final
and binding arbitration.
POSITIONS OF
THE PARTIES
The following statements are extrapolated and edited from
the respective prehearing submissions of the Parties.
Union
Briefly stated, Article I, § 5 (a) of the New York Dock
(NYD) conditions was modeled by the ICC After Section 6 (c) of
the Washington Job Protection Agreement of May 1936 (WJPA).
Numerous awards of the WJPA.Section 13 Committee have decided
what constitutes the basis of the TPA of the displaced employee.
See Dockets No. 62 and 63.
The Carrier, in its placement of Claimant Wimsatt in an
arbitrary status in regard to position and compensation utilizing
this as the basis of his TPA, has attempted to add exceptions to
the conditions under which he gained protection where no such
exceptions were expressly stated. The implementing agreement
concerning the coordination created no exception, nor modifications, to the method and procedures provided in
NYD
for the
calculation of the protected individual's TPA. Further, the
accepted mode and method was, and still is, fundamentally setforth in the conditions of New York
Dock
Labor Protection
Conditions - Article 1, Section 5 (a).
Of concern to the Carrier, as reflected in its declination
of this claim dated May 11, 1989 is that Claimant Wimsatt might
gain a "windfall" in monetary protective benefits by his being
affected by the coordination and the subsequent loss of his
position. A universal accepted meaning of the term "windfall" is
that of an unexpected piece of good fortune, or a sudden and
large increase. In the Claimant's case, the elements made the
basis of the calculation of his TPA do not fall within the
accepted meaning of such a term as they correctly reflect his
compensation received during his measurement period. It is also
not an unexpected piece of good fortune but a benefit mandated by
the provisions of the ICC imposed conditions of
NYD
in response
to the Carrier's contemplated changes in operations.
Additionally, it is not a sudden and large increase as it is the
normal compensation that the Claimant received in his various
positions held during the measurement period. There can be no
question that the benefits described in Article I, Section 5 of
New York
Dock
are the price to be paid (shared jointly by the
employee in his loss of employment opportunities, as well as the
employer in the mandated level of monetary protection), even if
only borne by the employer for a limited period of time, for the
meditated actions of management - actions that go on forever.
Clearly, the conditions of
NYD
are now, in the present, the
extension of the WJPA and the basis of the elements to be
included in the formula and subsequent figures arrived at in the
individual's Test Period Average are historically well settled.
Any support cited should address those specific provisions and
benefits, not other provisions and benefits arising from disputes
not associated with the matter at hand.
The salient fact of the dispute before you now is that the
Claimant was affected by the transaction and there should not be
a dispute in regard to the calculation of his monthly
displacement allowance. The method and elements to be used are
well defined in Article I, Section 5 of NYD and have long been
applied uniformly throughout the rail industry. To rewrite the
conditions of,NYD, as the Carrier has attempted to accomplish by
the stoke of its compensation pen, is well outside the
jurisdictional parameters and managerial prerogative that any
Carrier might dope to enjoy.
Turning to supportive
NYD
arbitration awards, reference is
made to Arbitrator John B. LaRocco's decision in case
No. 4,
Award No. 5 of the Arbitration Committee between TCU and the MP
railroad (March 1, 1988).
Finally TCU relies heavily upon the decision of Arbitrator
Lamont E. Stallworth in the Arbitration Committee TCU and the UP
Railroad (February 28, 1988).
As the Organization points out, the language of
these sections sets forth a formula for calculating
monthly allowances based upon `total compensation' in
the service of the Carrier `during the last twelve.
months ... immediately preceding the date of his
displacement as a result of the transaction.' The
committee concludes that the literal language of this
section reguires the Carrier to calculate benefits
based upon all the jobs, agreement and non-agreement,
held by an affected employee in the service of the
carrier for the year prior to the transaction.
LUnderscorinq addedl
Arbitrator Stallworth, based upon the literal language of
Article I, Section 5 of
NYD
and the intended wishes of the ICC,
found in his award that: "The proper method for computing test
period averages is to include both agreement and non-agreement
compensation earned during the test period." The Organization
fully supports this decision and has continually expressed its
direct and logical application to the carrier in relationship to
the case before you. However, the Carrier has chosen to
disregard the pure logic and application of this and all the
other historically applicable awards entwined within this
dispute.
TCU respectfully submits that the proper method as found in
the arbitration awards cited and with the historic perspective
couched therein - there exists but one correct method for the
calculation of Claimant Wimsatt's TPA. That method is to apply
the literal language of Article I, Section 5 of the New York Dock
Protective Conditions and allow all railroad earnings by Claimant
Wimsatt as a CSXT employee, whether it be on agreement or nonagreement positions, to become equally weighted elements in the
proper calculation in arriving at the Claimant's entitlement.
This calculation is literally described and prescribed in the
Conditions of
NYD
as it relates to the transaction that affected
the Claimant on December 8, 1987. Further, the Carrier should
now retroactively pay Claimant Wimsatt that past due allowance
since the December 21, 1987 inception of the erroneous
calculations to which the Claimant has been subjected.
Carrier
Ideally, the Claimant's TPA should have been drawn from
earnings made as a clerk at Cincinnati for the test period
December 22, 1986, to December 21, 1987; however, the Claimant
was working in a non-contract capacity during most of that time.
In such situations, most awards on the subject have advocated
going back to an employee's time in the craft to determine his
TPA. In this regard, we direct the Board's attention to Special
Board of Adjustment No 605 Award No 433 (Eischen). See also
Award No 434 (Eischen). However, since it had been many years
since Mr. Wimsatt had worked as a clerk, the necessary payroll
records to calculate his TPA in that manner were no longer
available.
The Carrier has faced this situation at other times in the
past and has developed such TPA's by averaging the TPA's of
employees above and employees below the individual on the
seniority roster. As was explained in Carrier's letter dated
March 9, 1988, the earnings of the clerical employees directly
above him and below him on the seniority roster for the period of
December 22, 1986, to October 1, 1987 were averaged to calculate
a portion of the Claimant's TPA.
The way in which Mr. Wimsatt's TPA was developed is
consistent with prior arbitration awards on the subject. See
Award No. 1 of Special Board of Adjustment No 860 ConraillTCU (J.
Seidenberg. November 20. 1976), as follows
In light of the existing payroll record, the Board
concludes that the fairest and most reasonable
resolution of the issue is to construct a base period
earnings figure from date that should reasonably
approximate the Claimant's earnings during the base
period.
The Carrier's Post Hearing Brief contains average
monthly guarantee figures for six passenger conductors
as of January 1, 1975 on the same seniority roster as
the Claimant. Even though the Claimant had no test
period earnings as a passenger conductor, the Board
finds that it would be it would be appropriate to use
the average monthly guarantee of the two conductors
immediately receding the Claimant and the two
conductors immediately following the Claimant on the
roster, and thus construct both an average monthly
guarantee and the average time paid as the protected
hours during the base period, based on this data.
The Board finds that this is an appropriate resolution
of the matter in dispute in view of the lack of
substantial conclusive and probative evidence to
sustain the position of either party.
Arbitrator Seidenberg also found in a New York Dock arbitration
between this Carrier and the IAMAW on October 3, 1990.as follows:
In light of the aforestated Findings, the Committee
finds that the Carrier could properly construct the
Claimant's protected rate based on the earnings of
those Machinists who occupied positions immediately
above and below him on the Machinist Seniority roster
at Louisville at the time of the coordination since the
carrier had no record of his machinist earnings when he
worked as a machinist.
Given the limitations in the instant case, i.e., that the.
Claimant had not worked as a clerk for several years and records
of his earnings were no longer available, The Carrier took the
most reasonable and fair course of action by developing his TPA
using the average of the TPA's of the employees above and below
the Claimant on the seniority roster.
It is clearly stated in the New York Dock Conditions that
the protection afforded therein is meant to guard against the
adverse effects resulting from covered transactions only. 5e
g
Article I, Section 1 (b), which provides:
`Displaced employee' means an employee of the railroad
who, ,as a result of a transaction is placed in a worse
position with respect to his compensation and rules
governing his working conditions. (Underscoring added)
It is the Carrier's position that for the displacement
allowance to cover more than an adverse effect resulting from the
transaction would clearly violate the intent of'the protective
conditions.
The Carrier has shown that the Claimant's entitlement to
protection derives from protective conditions executed in
connection with the transfer of work from Cincinnati to Corbin.
on this basis, the Carrier acted correctly in developing Mr.
Wimsatt's test period average hours and compensation based on the
approximate amount of work he would have had as a clerk in the
twelve months prior to the transfer of work using the wages of
the clerks just senior and junior to him on the seniority roster.
OPINION
OF THE CHAIRMAN
Both Parties recognized that the fundamental issues which
are presented for determination in this case are not questions of
15
first impression by Boards of Arbitration in the railroad
industry. Related, if not similar, disputes have arisen in the
past under various protective conditions and have been arbitrated
before various tribunals. Accordingly, the Parties to the
present dispute each have presented the Committee with voluminous
citations of authority which, they argue, support the
countervailing positions they advance in this matter. In
pursuing their "battle of awards", one or sometimes both of the
Parties has cited as "authoritative precedent" one or more of the
following interpretations of protective conditions by arbitration
tribunals: Washington Job Protection Agreement of May 1936 (WJPA
§ 13 Committee Dockets 62 and 63); February 7, 1965 National
Preservation of Employment Agreement (SBA No. 605, Award
Nos.
130, 195, 433 and 434); 1966 Merger Protection Agreement between
the former Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the New York Central
Railroad (SBA No. 860, Award No. 1); New York Dock Conditions (UP
Railroad/Bond, Topolasky, et. al., ICC Fin. Doc. No. 30,000,
Arbitration Committee Chair Lamont E. Stallworth, September 25,
1985), (Norfolk & Western Rwy./Huggins, et. al., ICC Fin. Doc.
29455, Arbitration Committee Chair Robert O. Harris, November 24,
1985), (Delaware & Hudson Rwy./Gilchrist, ICC Fin. Doc.
No.
29772, Arbitration Committee Chair Jacob Seidenberg, December 2,
1985), (Missouri Pacific Railroad/Currley, et. al., ICC Fin. Doc.
No. 30,000, Arbitration Committee Chair David H. Brown, May 11,
1987), (UP Railway/BRAC Kelly, ICC Fin. Doc. No. 30,000,
Arbitration Committee Chair Lamont E. Stallworth, June 15, 1987),
16
(Delaware & Hudson Railway/Adams, et. al., ICC Fin. Doc.
No.
29720, Arbitration Committee Chair Robert M. O'Brien, November
27, 1987), (UP Railroad/Maeser, et. a1., ICC Fin. Doc. No.
30,000, Arbitration Committee Chair Jacob Seidenberg, December
17, 1987), (Missouri Pacific Railroad and UP Railroad/TCU, ICC
Fin.
Doc. No. 30,000,
Arbitration Committee Chair John B.
LaRocco, March 1, 1988), (UP Railroad/BLE, ICC Fin.
Doc. No.
30,000, Arbitration Committee Chair Lamont E. Stallworth, April
5, 1988), (UP/TCU, ICC Fin. Doc.
No. 30,000,
Arbitration
Committee Chair Lamont E. Stallworth, February 28, 1989),
(Norfolk and Southern Corporation/TCU, ICC Fin.
Doc.
No. 29430,
Arbitration Committee Chair George S. Roukis, April 19, 1989),
(CSX/IAMAW, ICC Fin. Doc. Nos. 28905 and 30053, Arbitration
Committee Chair Jacob Seidenberg, October 3, 1990); Mendocino
Coast Line Protective Conditions (Boston & Maine Railroad/UTU,
ICC Fin. Doc. No. 30965, Arbitration Committee Chair Robert E.
Peterson, August 30, 1990).
Each of the Parties argues that one or more of the above
cited antecedent cases requires an outcome favorable to their
respective position, asserting the legal principles of
stare
decisis and/or res
judicata.
Strictly speaking, the court-developed doctrines
of stare
decisis and res judicata do not apply in labor-management
arbitration.
No
later arbitrator is bound in any legal or
technical sense to follow the decision of a predecessor. Yet
although prior arbitration awards are not binding in exactly the
17
same way that authoritative legal decisions are, as a practical
matter they do have considerable authoritative force. In that
connection, a leading commentator on the arbitration process
makes the following important distinction: Giving authoritative
force to prior awards when the same issue subsequently arises
(stare decisis) is to be distinguished from refusing to permit
the merits of the same event or incident to be relegated (res
judicata). Where a new incident gives rise to the same issue.
that is covered by a prior award, the new incident may be taken
to arbitration but it may be controlled by the prior award. See
Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, pp. 421-22, 4th edition
(BNA, Washington, DC., 1985). See also Timkin Roller Bearing
Company, 32 LA 595, 597-599 (Boehm, 1958).
Where a prior decision covers the same parties, issues,
facts and contract language, a subsequent arbitrator often will
consider that earlier award a binding part of the agreement.
Even those who refuse to hold prior awards binding would give
them serious and weighty consideration. One of the pioneer
labor-management arbitrators stated the majority view to be:
"Where a prior decision involves the interpretation of the
identical contact provision, between the same company and union,
every principle of common sense, policy and labor relations
demands that it stand until the parties annul it by a newly
worded contract provision." Pan American Refining Core., 2 ALAA
q 67,937, q 69,464 (Whitley McCoy, 1948). Time and again
reported decisions by respected arbitrators have reaffirmed the
18
notion that an arbitrator with a proper regard for the
arbitration process and for stability in collective bargaining,
even though not technically bound, should accept an
interpretation by a prior arbitration, if in point and if based
in the same agreement, as binding. O & S Bearing Company, 12 LA
132, 125 (Russell Smith, 1949); Brewers Board of Trade. Inc., 38
LA 679, 680 (Burton Turkus, 1962). It is not necessary that the
subsequent arbitrator endorse all of the reasoning expressed in
the earlier opinion. What is important is that the earlier award
contains a holding which is not erroneous. Lehigh Portland
Cement Co., 46 LA 133, 137 (Clair Duff, 1965). In such
circumstances, arbitrators generally conclude that it would be a
disservice to the parties to subject them to the unsettling
effects of conflicting and inconsistent interpretations of the
same contract language in the same set of circumstances.
This Arbitration Committee has scrutinized the entire
voluminous record, including hundreds of pages of antecedent
decisions cited by the Parties and described above. Careful
analysis reveals that most of these cases are distinguishable
from the present case on the basis of fact, questions at issue,
contract language and/or protective condition language. Of the
many precedents cited, only two (2) directly address the
interpretation and application of NYD i 5 (a) in circumstances
like those presented by Mr. Wimsatt's situation.
One of these colorably authoritative precedents, upon which
TCU chiefly relies, is the decision of Arbitrator Lamont E.
19
Stallworth and UP Railroad/TCU, ICC Fin. Doc. No. 30,000, Award
No-. 2, February 28, 1989) ("Stallworth Decision").
In
the
Stallworth Decision the Arbitration Committee was presented with
the question: "What is the proper method for computing Test
Period Averages when the test period includes both agreement and
nonagreement earnings?". The Stallworth Decision considered and
discussed the identical arguments raised by the Parties in the
present case before answering that question as follows: "The,
proper method for computing test period averages is to include
both agreement and nonagreement compensation earned during the
test period".
On
the other hand, the other colorably
authoritative precedent, upon which CSX chiefly relies, is the
decision of Arbitrator Jacob Seidenberg in the CSX/IAMAW, ICC
Fin. Doc. Nos. 28905 and 30093, October 3, 1990 ("Seidenberg
Decision"1). In the Seidenberg Decision the Arbitration Committee
was faced with the following question: "Should the literal
language of Article I, S 5 (a) of the New York Dock Conditions be
applied in determining Claimant's Test Period Average earnings?".
In the Seidenberg Decision the Arbitration Committee answered
that question as follows: "The literal language of Article I, §
5 (a) of the New York Dock Conditions may not be applied in
determining this Claimant's Test Period Average earnings."
(Emphasis added) It is not surprising that each of the Parties
to the present dispute takes comfort in their respective
colorably authoritative precedent. They have presented this
Arbitration Committee with the task of choosing which is
20
appropriate and controlling in the facts and circumstances
presented by Mr. Wimsatt's situation.
A careful reading of the Stallworth Decision and the
Seidenberg Decision, however, readily reveals that only the
former stands as an authoritative interpretation and application
of NYD S 5 (a) in circumstances identical to those presented by
Mr. Wimsatt's situation. In short, a careful reading shows that
the Seidenberg Decision is not authoritative precedent on the
issue presented in the present case. In the Seidenberg Decision
the Arbitration Committee did not even apply NYD § 5 (a) at all,
because it held that the New York Dock Conditions did not apply
in that case, as shown in the following excerpt from pages 14-15
of the Seidenberg Decision:
The Committee finds that the New York Dock Conditions
are not applicable to the Claimant because he was not
disadvantaged or adversely affected as a result of a
"transaction" as defined in New York Dock nor was he
"employee" within the meaning and purport of NY Dock.
On the contrary, the Committee finds that whatever
protection benefits the Claimant derived, he derived
them from the provisions of the May 29, 1987
Implementing Agreement. While this Implementing
Agreement may have granted a form or type of NY Dock
protection, nevertheless it was not the New York Dock
protection that was prescribed by the ICC in 1980 and
1982 when it approved the several mergers that
culminated in the establishment of the CSX
Transportation, Inc.
There are other significant factual differences between the case
decided by the Seidenberg Decision and that with which this
Arbitration Committee is now presented. But the above-quoted
distinction makes it absolutely clear that the Seidenberg
Decision is of no authoritative value whatsoever in deciding the
an
21
proper interpretation and application of NYD § 5. (a) in this
matter now before us.
Unlike the Seidenberg Decision, in the present case there is
no question and no dispute between the Parties that Claimant
Wimsatt was entitled to New York Dock protection benefits. The
only dispute is whether, in computing the TPA under NYD § 5 (a),
nonagreement earnings as well as agreement earnings during the
past twelve-month period must be counted. That is preciselythe
issue faced, considered fully and decided authoritatively by the
Stallworth Decision. It is worth quoting extensively from the
opinion of the unanimous Arbitration Committee in the Stallworth
Decision to demonstrate how it is "on all fours" with the facts,
issue and circumstances now before us in Mr. Wimsatt's claim:
THE OPINION
This case involves the proper method of calculating test period earnings in order to determine the
monthly allowances of employees affected by a New York
Dock transaction. The issue is whether the allowances
should be based upon compensation earned in both nonagreement and agreement positions.
The Claimants in this case all held non-agreement
positions during the year prior to the transaction
giving rise to this dispute. Sometime during that year
each Claimant moved to an agreement position. These
initial moves are not the New York Dock transaction(s)
at issue here. Rather, once the Claimants entered
their agreement positions, they were subsequently
displaced or dismissed by a merger-related transaction
that the Parties agree entitled them to New York Dock
benefits. The question then is whether the Claimants'
monthly allowances authorized because of this
transaction should be based in part on compensation
earned in their agreement positions.
22
The Committee concludes that the literal language
of these sections should be applied, and that all of a
Claimant's earnings with the Carrier during the prior
year, whether from agreement or non-agreement
positions, are to be included in the test period
earnings.
As the Organization points out, the language of
these sections sets forth a formula for calculating
monthly allowances based upon "total compensation" in
the service of the Carrier "during the last twelve
months ... immediately preceding the date of his
displacement as a result of the transaction." The
Committee concludes that the literal language of this
section requires the Carrier to calculate benefits
based upon all the jobs, agreement and non-agreement,
held by an affected employee in the service of the
Carrier for the year prior to the transaction.
The Committee is bound to apply the literal
language of the New York Dock Conditions, unless the
carrier can show a compelling reason why this
straightforward interpretation does not reflect the
actual intent of the Parties. The Committee concludes
that the Carrier has not met this burden.
The Committee concludes therefore that nothing in
the language of the New York Dock Conditions suggests
that the Parties intended to exclude wages earned from
a job other than the job held at the timing of the
transaction. Furthermore, nothing suggests that there
was an intent to differentiate between compensation
earned in agreement as opposed to non-agreement jobs.
The Carrier argues, however, that to permit
calculations based upon an employee's non-agreement
income would provide a "windfall" to the Claimants. As
the Carrier also acknowledges, however, the unusual
employee who was earning more as an agreement employee
than in his former non-agreement job would suffer a
hardship under the Organization's formula for
calculating allowances.
The assumption behind the Carrier's position is
that the New York Dock agreement demands that an
employee should be in the same position -- no better
and no worse -- after a transaction than if he had
continued to work in his job. Allied Services
Division/Brotherhood of Railway. Airline and Steamship
Clerks. Freight Handlers. Express and Station Employees
23
vs. Western Railroad Association, (Dennis, Ref.).
Although there is some logic to this argument, in fact
the New York Dock Conditions state only that an
employee should not be placed in a worse position as a
result of a transaction.
Furthermore, even if the Carrier's interpretation
were correct, the issue here may be cast as "what is a
'better or worse' position?" The Carrier urges that
the Committee compare a Claimant's position on the day
before the transaction with the day after. The
organization measures the Claimant's position on the
basis of the year before the transaction date. The
language of the Agreement supports the latter position.
In conclusion, the Committee determines that the
literal language of the New York Dock conditions
applies, and the monthly allowances must be based upon
all compensation received by the Claimants for service
to the Carrier in the applicable year.
We find that the above quoted Arbitration Committee decision
in "on all fours" in every material aspect with the facts,
contract language, protective condition language and questions at
issue which are presented in the present case concerning Mr.
Wimsatt's S 5 (a) calculations. Significantly, it should be
noted that the Stallworth Decision was a unanimous decision by
that Arbitration Committee. Whether we would have reached the
same result if faced de novo with the question at issue is not
relevant. The Stallworth Decision is carefully reasoned, fully
supported by the evidence, and contains no glaring or palpable
error. We are not technically bound to follow the teachings of
the Stallworth Decision, but the principles enunciated above
favoring stable labor management relations and predictability in
contract interpretation dictate that this Arbitration Committee
24
follow the same course in the present case as was followed in the
Stallworth Decision. On the basis of all of the foregoing, we
conclude that Carrier must apply NYD S 5 (a) literally in
computing Claimant Wimsatt's TPA for the twelve months in which
he performed agreement or non-agreement services immediately
preceding the date of his displacement.
25
AWARD OF THE ARBITRATION COMMITTEE
1) The Test Period Average of Clerk G. L. Wimsatt was
not properly arrived at by the Carrier's method of
computation.
2) Carrier violated
S
5 (a) of the New York Dock
conditions in its computation of the Test Period
Average of Clerk G. L. Wimsatt.
The remedy for the violation and the proper method
of computing
NYD
S
5 (a) Test Period Averages,
when the test period includes both agreement and
non-agreement earnings, is to include both
agreement and non-agreement compensation earned
during the test period.
4) Carrier is directed to compute G. L. Wimsatt's
Test Period Average in accordance with the
directive of the Arbitration Committee-set forth
above.
5) Carrier shall implement this Award of the
Arbitration Committee within thirty (30) days of
its execution by a majority of the Committee.
Dana Edward Eischen, Chairman
Signed at Ithaca. New York on July 4. 1992
Union Member
Signed
'^'J'""'
on
Company Member
Signed
on