SPECIAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT NO. 605
PARTIES ) Fort j·torth and Denver Railway Company
TO THE ) and
DISPUTE ) Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
QUEST1014S
AT ISSUE: 1. What is the meaning and application of
the third paragraph of Article V, Moving
Expenses and Separation Alloaances, of
the February 7, 1965 Agreement?
2. Should the separation allowance to which
Claimant J. R. Carlton is entitled be
computed as follows:
Daily rate (computed from the monthly
rate) times 30 (days) times 12 (months)?
OPINION This is an individual claim for compensation which
OF BOARD: involves Article V of the Agreement. That is how it
was progressed on the property. The parties differ
over the amount due Claimant, flowing from the third paragraph
of Article V, which refers to Section 9 of the
:9ashington Agree
ment.
The claim was originally filed on .:arch 22, 1967.
it was denied by Carrier at each step,
including the
letter of
Division Engineer T. L. Kanan on June 26, 1967. Timely appal
was not made thereafter. Rule 33 (b) of the agreement between
the parties provides that "if a disallowed claim or grievance
is to be appealed, such appeal must ...be taken within 60 days
from receipt of notice of disallowance." However, on March 22,
1968, nine months later, the Employes did file an appeal with
Carrier's highest officer designated to handle labor relations
matters. In view of Rule 33(b), Carrier denied this appeal as
untimely as well as on its merits.
The issue of timeliness centers about the provision on page 18 of the Interpretations of November 2:, 1965,
entitled "Handling of Claims or Grievances." It states that
AWARD
NO.
Case
No. ;G:1-36-i'7
individual claims for compensation are to be handled in accordance with the rules, but adds, "provided that the t-_me lir.-;it
on claims involving an interpretation of the Agree-.ant shall
not begin to run until 30 days after the interpretation is
rendered." That last phrase apparently refers to the interpretations of November 24, 1965. Thus, where money claims require
an interpretation of the Agreement, the time limit do=s not begin
to run until December 24, 1965, 30 days after the parties issued
the Interpretations.
This provision could not mean 30 days aster any
interpretation of the Agreement is rendered by the parties or
by the Disputes Committee. For if that were so, one could sit
upon his rights for a decade or more, and then seek an interpretation of the agreement pertaining to a money claim, with the
time limit beginning to run
30
days thereafter. This would permit the stalest of claims and perhaps many years of retroactive
pay. It could mean an end to all expeditious handling of money
claims--and to all regular procedures--under the February 7,
Agreement, if an interpretation were required to dispose of the
claim.
Under the first paragraph of "Handling of Claims
or Grievances," time limits and other rules are inapplicable
to claims which do not involve compensation but concern only
an interpretation of the February Agreement, whereas the basic
rules continue to govern claims for compensation. It would be
patently absurd to believe that the parties intended time limits
on money claims involving an interpretation to run only after
a future interpretation is rendered by the Disputes Committee
or some other fori=. Where an absurd or unrealistic result is
obtained from one construction of an ambiguous provision, the
construction producing
the more reasonable result should ba
preferred. Practically, there is no reason why a money claim,
whether or not it requires an interpretation of the Agreement,
should not be filed in accordance with the rules, provided it
need not have been filed before December 24, 1965, 30 days after
the Interpretations were issued.
Since the sentence on page 18 of the Interpretation is ambiguous, it must be construed in a way which would
give the most rational and logical effect to its words.
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ATOARD NO.
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Case No. N:T-36-;9
A W A R D
Claim dismissed.
Milton Fr eaman, Neutral Member
Dated: Washington, D. C.
September
/U,
1969
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