PARTIES ) MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS RAILROAD COMPANY
TO THE ) and
DISPUTE ) TRANSPORTATION-COUMUNICATION EMPLOYEES UNION
QUESTION
AT ISSUE: Does a protected employee whose preser
vation of compensation is computed under
Article IV, Section 2 sacrifice any com
pensation for the reason that, to retain
his protected employee status, he bid in
a regular position when such became avail
able to him after December 24, 1965?
This dispute involves the preservation of
compensation due to J. F. Miles. (Carrier
File 2563)
OPINION
OF BOARD: This case concerns Carrier's failure to preserve the
compensation of J. F. Miles, an Agent-Telegrapher,
subsequent to January 18, 1967.
In 1965 Claimant was a protected employee on the extra
board whose compensation was preserved under Article IV, Section
2, of the February 7 Agreement. In 1966 he bid and obtained a
temporary position as Telegrapher-Leverman. Subsequently on four
occasions in 1966 Carrier agreed to the organization's request
for a waiver of Claimant's obligation to bid into an available
regular position, and he continued to fill the temporary Teleg
rapher-Leverman vacancy.

For example, in its letter of August 19, 1966, carrier agreed to waive Claimant's obligation to bid a regular position stating, in part:



W :~r~



                Oklahoma, in accordance with his rights under the seniority rules, retaining his protected status under the February 7, 1965 Agreement; this to continue only until the next regular assignment on which he can place himself through exercise of his seniority rights becomes available to him...


                3. Any future cases involving requests of Telegraphers for waiver of the provisions of the February 7, 1965 Agreement with respect to their obligation to place themselves on permanent assignments to protect their protected status will be handled on their own merits...


In January, 1967, however, a regular position-of AgentTelegrapher at Welch, Oklahoma, was bulletined. Claimant bid for and was assigned the position. The Welch assignment paid a lower rate than the temporary vacancy which Claimant had been filling.

According to Carrier, since Claimant voluntarily exercised his seniority he was thereafter entitled to have his compensation preserved only at the lower rate of the position for which he bid. The Organization contends that Claimant was required to bid a regular position when one became available (absent the kind of mutually agreeable waiver which had been made four times during 1966), or else he would have lost his protected status.

Article II, Section 1, provides that an employee's protection ceases if he fails to "obtain a position available to him in the exercise of his seniority rights in accordance with existing rules or agreements." Question and Answer No. 3, on Page 9 of the Interpretations, state:

          Question No. 3: What are the obligations of

          extra employes with respect to obtaining

          or retaining a position in order to remain

          a "protected employe"?


                          -2-

                                AWARD NO.

                                Case No. TCU-77-W


            Answer to Question No. 3: If an extra employe fails to obtain a position other than a temporary position available to him in the exercise of his seniority rights in accordance with the existing rules or agreements, he will lose his protected status. It should be understood, however, that this does not prohibit the making of local agreements which will permit an employe to remain an extra employe if there is a mutual understanding that this action may be justified.


The Agreement imposes on extra employees the obligation to "obtain a position other than a temporary position." The alternative is loss of protected status. An employee faced with a choice of losing his protected status or placing a bid cannot be described as engaging in a voluntary exercise of seniority. His action is non-volitional. Carrier no doubt would be quick to discern the consequences of an extra employee's failure to place a bid on a regular position. Indeed Carrier's letter of August 19, 1966, warned that such employees must "place themselves on permanent assignments to protect their protected status."

No ambiguity can be found in Article II, Section 1, or in Question and Answer No. 3 on Page 9 of the Interpretations. Since the employee must bid to retain his protection, his bid is mandatory and cannot be construed to be a voluntary exercise of seniority. This obligation is unaffected by whether the rate of the regular position is higher or lower than the employee's earnings from the extra board or from the temporary position that he occupies.

Nothing in the Agreement indicates that an employee can lose his guaranteed compensation as a result of such an action. No nrovision of the Agreement suggests that an employee who has complied with it may have his status changed so that his compensation is preserved under Article IV, Section 1, instead of Section 2. Conversely, if the regular position which an extra employee obtains pays a higher rate than his preserved compensation, no change is made in the future method of computing

                          -3-

                                  AWARD NO.

                                  Case No. TCU-77-W


his guarantee; he continues to be protected in accordance with Article IV, Section 2.

Award No. 13 is not in point, since that dealt with a voluntary exercise of seniority, whereas in the instant case the Agreement required Claimant to bid in order to retain the protection it had afforded him.

Award No. 233 is also not analogous. In that case Claimant, who was protected under Article IV, Section 2, bid into a regular position while maintaining his Section 2 protected compensation. Subsequently, he voluntarily bid into a lower-rated position and, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, then no longer "was entitled to have his compensation preserved as provided in Sections 1 and 2." But that extra employee's original bid into a regular position, paying a lower rate than his Section 2 guarantee, had not caused a forfeiture of the guarantee, as Carrier here asserts should occur.

                        A W A R D


          The answer to the Question is No.


Milton Friedman
Neutral Member

Dated: Washington, D. C.
        March 17, 1972

                                    Interpretation of

                                    AWARD NO. 288

                                    Case No. TCU-77-W


            SPECIAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT NO. 605


PARTIES ) Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company
TO TIC ) and
DISPUTE ) Transportation-Communication Employes Union

QUESTION
AT ISSUE: Does a protected employe whose preser
-ation of compensation is computed under
Article IV, Section 2 sacrifice any com
pensation for the reason that, to retain
his protected employe status, he bid in
a regular position when such became avail
able to him after December 24, 1-965?
OPINION
OF BOARD: This is a request for an "Interpretation," the organi
zation claiming that Award No. 288 intended to direct
monetary relief for Claimant when the above Question
was answered in the negative. Carrier contends that the Com
mittee answered only the Question as submitted, and alleges
that there is an unresolved dispute over matters involving the
claim for compensation which was never raised or dealt with by
this Committee in Award No. 288.

Carrier challenges the timeliness of money claims submitted by Claimant, a matter which had never been adjudicated. The issue may be real or specious, but the subject never had been considered by the Committee--as would have occurred if there had been a request that Claimant be made whole.

Instead, the Committee dealt only with the Question submitted to it, all that it has a right to do under Article VII, Section 3, of the February 7 Agreement which states, in part:
                                    Interpretation of

                                    AWARD No. 288

                                    Case No. TCU-77-W


            ..The notice provided for in this Section 3 shall state specifically the questions to be submitted to the committee for decision; and the committee shall confine itself strictly to decisions as to the questions so specifically submitted to it.


Article I, Section D, of the "Procedures for Handling Disputes under Article VII," similarly states that the committee "shall confine itself strictly to decisions on the questions submitted." In accordance with a series of Awards ( mending back to Award No. 9, the Committee has often so held Thus, a Question submitted is answered directly and, unless ;:he Answer itself is unclear, the Committee's authority o it the issue has ended. It is functus officio for all purpo~ s. In the instant case the Question sought an interpretation, which was given.

In the Committee's recent deliberations the question
was asked: Did the Committee intend that the employee should
be paid whatever wds due him, rather than just to rule on an vow
academic question? No doubt the Committee assumed that an
employee would receive what was due him. But the Committee
intended to answer only the question put to it, in accordance
with the Agreement and Procedures under it.

So far as the Committee was aware, all claims could have been filed properly, or just some of them, they could have been handled without any disagreement on procedure, or held in abeyance by agreement. The parties might have mutually agreed on a course of action to be followed once the Award was issued. The Committee, however, decided no other issue besides the particular Question submitted to it, since nothing else was before the Committee.

Under the Agreement, matters arising out of or related to a submitted Question must be separately dealt with if they are to be enforcible as a Committee decision. Award No. 63 indicates that a submitted Question, restricted to an interpretation of the February 7 Agreement, does not automatically embrace a remedy for compensation lost. Each claim must be submitted in such a way that any dispute which it is designed to embrace is finally and definitively resolved by the Answer.

                          -2-

                                    Interpretation of

                                    AWARD NO. 288

                                    Case No. TCU-77-W


The Committee cannot now supplement its decision by directing monetary payments, where it never heard the substance of the issue. In effect, it would be making a new award under the guise of interpreting what was a final, complete and definitive award. This is beyond its power. So long as the Question posed to the Committee was answered directly, without any ambiguity, the Committee can have nothing before it to interpret.

                      AWARD


          The Question submitted to the Committee original:y has been answered without ambiguity, and the committee lacks jurisdiction to consider other, even related, Questions.


                        Milton Fribdman

                        Neutral Member


Dated: Washington, D. C.
March 22, 1974

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