SPECIAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT N0. 605
AWARD N0. 428
CASE NO. CE-115-W
PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE
:
WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
and
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE AND STEAMSHIP
CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION
EMPLOYES
QUESTION AT ISSUE
:
(1) Did the Carrier violate Article II Section 1 of the February 7,
1965 Mediation Agreement when it failed to fully restore
Mr. Herbert Rupprecht to the status of a protected employs on
October 29, 1979, the date of his reinstatement?
(2) If the answer to Question No. 1 is affirmative, should
Mr. Herbert Rupprecht be made whole for the differential loss
suffered as a result of the Carrier's refusal to reinstate
his proper protected rate from October 29, 1979 to the present?
OPINION OF BOARD
:
Under the terms of the February 7, 1965 Mediation Agreement, as updated
between the Western Pacific Railroad Company and BRAG by a Memorandum Agreement
of August 18, 1978, Mr. H. Rupprecht became a "protected employe" with a protected rate as Quality Control Inspector at Milpitas, California. On
February 28, 1979 an incident arose out of which Rupprecht was charged by
Carrier with certain misconduct. Following an investigation into !he charge,
he was found guilty and dismissed from service on March 21, 1979. A claim
for his reinstatement with full back pay and benefits was filed and handled
to resolution on the property short of arbitration by an understanding
referenced in a letter of October 12, 1979, as follow:
2
October 12, 1979
CM
Case No. 11772-1979-BRAG
Local Case No. 5558
Vol
freight Claims
Mr. William R. Miller
General Chairman, BRAC
4053 Farmer Way _
North Highlands, CA 95660
Dear Mr. Miller:
This will confirm understanding reached in conference October 11,
1979 in connection with the claim on behalf of R.. Rupprecht, GM Case No.
11772, your Case No. 2328.
Mr. Rupprecht will be restored to service with his
original
seniority date as soon as he has passed the re-entry physical examination. His restoration to service will be on a leniency basis without
compensation for time held out of service and upon the condition that he
transfer to Seniority District 18 and exercise his seniority to the Oakland
Extra Board.
The above understanding constitutes full and final settelement
of
GM
Case No. 11772, your Cue
no.
2328.
Very truly yours,
10/
t. ii. Bridges
cc: Mr. L. F. Battaglia
in consequence of the foregoing settlement, Rupprecht exercised his
seniority in Seniority District No. 18 and obtained a position on the
Guaranteed Extra Board
(GIB).
It appears that his first payday ther;:after
occurred on or about October 29, 1979, at which time he was compensated at
the prevailing rate for a Clerk off the GEB. The present claim was filed
promptly alleging that Carrier's failure to compensate Rupprecht at the
higher rate of his former Quality Control Inspector position on and after
l
October 29, 1979 Was a violation of his rights under the February 7. 1965
Mediation Agreement. The matter remained unresolved in handling on the
property whereupon the Organization submitted the Question at Issue supra
fur determination by this Board.
As a primary position, the BRAC maintains that since the reinstatement
of Claimant to service was silent regarding the protected rate, the express
language of Article II, Section 1 of the February 7, 1965 Agreement requires
that Rupprecht be "made whole" for the difference between his GEB compensation
and the protected rate of his former Quality Control Inspector position.
In support of this view, the Organization Cites Special Board of Adjustment
No. 605, Award No. 108 (Nicholas Zumas). Carrier rejoins that neither
expressly nor by implication does the reinstatement agreement or the February 7,
1965 Mediation Agreement require compensation of Ruppracht at the rate of the
position from which he was disqualified as a condition of returning to service.
Carrier urges that Rupprecht's voluntary acceptance of the leniency reinstatement with restricted services constituted an implicit waiver of the rate of the
Quality Control Inspector position; albeit a retention of "protected status"
pursuant to Article II, Section 1. In support of this view Carrier sites
Special Board of Adjustment No. 605, Award No. 259 (Milton Friedman).
We are faced in this case with a set of facts which fall somewhat between
those which produced directly countervailing conclusions by two well-respected
neutral arbitrator colleagues serving as Neutral Members on this Board. In
Award
No.
108,Raferee Zumas held that acceptance by a dismissed employe of a
leniency reinstatement conditioned only upon a temporary limitation of bidding
rights had "no relevance to his protection under the February 7 Agreement."
In Award No. 259, Referee Friedman emphasized differences betwen the conditions of the reinstatement agreement in Award
No.
108 and those in his case
4
wherein a dismissed Train Director accepted leniency reinstatement to a
18041
Leverman position and permanent disbarment from a Train Director job. He
also imputed to the,parties an implicit incent to treat the acceptance of
conditional reinstatement to the lesser rated position as the equivalent of
a bid for purposes of Article II, Section 1 of the February 7, 1965 Agreement.
We find compelling the similarities between the facts in the present case
and those which produced the rationale developed by Referee Friedman in
Award No. 259, as follows:
The Train Director's position was relinquished by Claimant
as part of the understanding restoring him to work. Certainly
the intent of that understanding was not that he would bt: compelled
to occupy lower-rated position and receives a guarantee of co:apensation at a higher rate. 7his would constitute a reward rather
than the punishment which was manifestly intended both by his
period of suspension without pay as wali as by the restriction
on the exercise of his future seniority.
~ w
The Organization and claimant need not have acquiesced in
the settlement, but could have' sought an adjudication which
yeither would have sustained the Company's action or would have
restored him to his full rights. Instead, a mutually agreeable
compromise was found to be more desirable. Claimant must take
the bad with the good. He cannot be rewarded as he seeks, since
the parties agreed otherwise, as they had a right to do.
Not only the evident intent of the settlement but Question
No. 1 on Pages 14 of the interpretations of November 24, 1965,
demonstrates that Claimant's guaranteed compensation should not
be that of Train Director. The Question is:
If a
"protected employee" for one reason or
another considers another job more desirable
than the one he is holding, and he therefore
bids in that job even though it may carry a
lower rate of pay than the job he is holding,
what is the rate of his guaranteed compensation thereafter?
5
The answer is given as "the rate of the job he voluntarily
bids into." For his own reasons Claimant Loop considered a move
into the Le·:erman's job more desirable than efforts to reta_r.
the Train Director's job by successful litigation. He chose the
voluntary downgrading, which could not have been imposed unilaterally by Carrier, and he cannot ha held entitled, therefore,
to retention oz a guarantee at the Train Director's rate.
While Claimant Loop's protected status and other rights
remained unimpaired as a result of the settlement, he obtained
no greater rights than are generally available to employees
covered by the February 7 Agreement. What was in effect a volun'
tary bid into a lm-er-rated job does not permit retention of the
guaranteed compensation of a higher-rated position.
Faced with a choice between the two approaches to such cases, we find
Award No.
259
much more analogous to our own case on the present record.
Based upon all of the foregoing. we find that the Question must be answered
in the negative.
AWARD ,
1) The answer to Question 1 is No.
2) The answer to Question 1 obviates Question 2.
Dana E. Eis n, Neu al Nember
Date: January 10, 1983