AWARD N0. 444
Case No. CL-133-W

SPECIAL BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT N0. 605

PARTIES ) Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship
TO THE ) Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station
DISPUTE ) Employes
and
The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company
QUESTIONS 1. Did the Carrier violate the provisions of the
AT ISSUE: February 7, 1965 Mediation Agreement as
amended effective January 1, 1980, when it
suspended the protection of the Claimants
listed herein because they submitted notice
under the provisions of Rule 17-C(2)?
2. Shall Carrier be required to restore Claimants
listed below to protected status with all
rights unimpaired and to compensate them for
their loss of protective benefits from date
Carrier suspended their protective status?

D. F. Allen
D. A. Lehman
F. J. Zachman
R. D. Rager

OPINION
OF THE BOARD: Claimants

February 7,

D. M. May
T. W. Keathley
M. Silva
S. Keating

are protected employees under the 1965 Job Stabilization Agreement as


amended by an Agreement effective January 1, 1980. When the Carrier reduced its forces and abolished jobs, Claimants lacked seniority to hold a regularly assigned position on their seniority district. Consequently, Claimants were required to place themselves in off-in-force-reduction status. Thereafter, Claimants filed an application with the Carrier to limit their recall to designated points on their seniority districts as permitted under Schedule Rule 17-C(2) which was adopted pursuant to a May 19, 1976 Letter of Understanding. Immediately upon


Case No. CL-133-W receipt of the recall restriction filing, the Carrier suspended Claimants' protected status.

To justify its suspension of Claimants' protective benefits, the Carrier cited Article II, Section 1 of the February 7, 1965 Job Stabilization Agreement which reads:


The Carrier argues that the filing of Rule 17-C(2) recall restrictions automatically operated to suspend Claimants' protective benefits. In the past, the Carrier has consistently applied Article II, Section 2 in this fashion. Since Claimants refused to obtain an available position anywhere on their seniority district, they lose their protected status. Comparing the language in Rule 17-C(2) with Rule 17-C(6), the Carrier disagrees with the Organization's contention that employees restricting their availability for recall under Rule 17-C(2) may bid on an advertised position located beyond the points designated in the Rule 17-C(2) filing.


Case No. CL-133-W The Organization concurs with the Carrier that an offin-force-reduction employee who fails to exercise his seniority to obtain a regular assignment loses his February 7, 1965 job protection. However, the Organization asserts that the mere filing of a Rule 17-C(2) recall restriction by itself does not automatically trigger a loss of protection. Rather, the Organization argues that an employee must actually refuse a position before the Carrier can suspend Claimants' rights under the February 7, 1965 Agreement. Even after filing the 17-C(2) recall restriction, an employee may still bid on any regular position bulletined on his seniority district per Schedule Rule 11. Indeed, Rule 11 (B) grants senior off-in-force-reduction employees a preference over junior bidders when awarding regular positions. Under these facts, the Organization contends the Carrier prematurely suspended Claimants' protection.

The Carrier's application of Article II, Section 1 is overly broad. The Carrier's mechanical application of Article II, Section 1 to any employee who files a Rule 17-C(2) recall restriction improperly presumes that a position was otherwise available to the employee absent the Rule 17-C(2) filing. However, Article II, Section 1 speaks expressly to the availability of positions as opposed to employees. It is possible that the first available position will arise at one of the points designated by the employee on the Rule 17-C(2) form. The Carrier cannot suspend protection until the employee refuses an available position or his Rule 17-C(2) recall limitation actually operates like a refusal of an available position.




Case No. CL-133-W
By suspending protection simply because an employee
files a Rule 17-C(2) form, the Carrier prematurely applied
Article II, Section 1. Although Article II, Section 1 is the
source of its authority for suspending protection, such
suspension occurs only when "...an employe ... fails to
obtain ... a position available to him in the exercise of his
seniority rights..." [Emphasis added.] While the Carrier
alluded to a practice of suspending employee protective benefits
as soon as they filed a Rule 17-C(2) form, any past practice
cannot vitiate or unreasonably expand the clear language in
Article II, Section 1. Moreover, the May 19, 1976 Letter
Agreement preserved protected employees' rights as well as their
obligations under the February 7, 1965 Agreement. Under the
Carrier's unreasonably expansive interpretation of Article II,
Section 1, an employee's rights would never survive a Rule
17-C(2) filing which would effectively nullify the "rights"
preserved under the May 19, 1976 Letter of Understanding. The
Carrier relies on Award No. 96 but in that case, there was a
position held by a worker junior to Claimant on the seniority
district at the time Claimant restricted his availability. In
sum, the filing of a Rule 17-C(2) restriction may often coincide
with the employee's failure to obtain an available position but
the Carrier may not automatically assume that such a filing
immediately causes a cessation of benefits.

This Board is unable to formulate an appropriate remedy based on the record before us. Claimants may not be entitled to any relief. Their protected status might have been

                                        AWARD N0. 444

Case No. CL-133-W properly suspended simultaneously with or shortly after they filed their Rule 17-C(2) forms depending on the availability of positions on their seniority districts. Each Claimant retained his protected status until he either refused an available position within his designated area or his Rule 17-C(2) recall restriction actually prevented Claimant from occupying an available position on his seniority district. Consequently, we remand this case to the property for disposition consistent with our Opinion.


                          AWARD


The Answer to Question 1 is "Yes." Question 2 is remanded to the property per our Opinion.


John B. LaRocco
Neutral Member
Dated: July 29, 1987

-5-