PRO =auIr,GS
rrrczB
PUBLIC LAW BOARD No. 1540
parties Illinois Central Gulf Railroad .
to and
Dispute: International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Statement Can the Carrier discontinue the payment of meal expenses
of the Employes on. days when they are away from their
of Headquarters at meal time, but they start .nd end their
workday at their Yleadquarters.
C1_ a im
If the decision is no, the Carrier be ordered to ply .
all the employes for such meals that were not 'paid by
the Carrier.
ELI-Id.iras: The Board, upon the record as a, whole and all the evidence,
. finds that the parties hereto are Carrier
and
Employe within
the meaning of the .Railway Labor Act, as amended; that it
has jurisdiction and that, the parties were given due notice
of hearing.
On December IG, 1974 the Carrior, in a letter over the
signature of the Manager of Labor Relations, advised the
general chairmen of the various non-.operating unions, including the claimant herein, as fellows:
. . "ihe Internal Revenue Service has ruled that meals
are not a reinburseable expAnse unless overnight'
travel is involved.
"Therefore, ercept where provided for by agreement,
effective January 1, 1575, the company will not
reimburse employees for meals wnen an employee
starts and ends his workday at his headquarters."
This letter vas followed by a "Bulletin Notice",
dated December 1&, 1974, iron the Director, Communications
to "All Communication Workers", which reads as follows:
i
`'f` P.L. Board
NQ. 15'40
"The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that meals ,
not connected with an overnight lodging
ww
ny _ri~om
home are not a reimburseable expense.
"Therefore, effective January 1, 2975, employees
will not be reimbursed for meals vrhen they stpxt
and end their work day at their headquarters."
·The instructions in the above noted communications
were protested by the Organization which requested that
the Carrier return to the past practice of paying for
meals while away from headquarters under the agreement.
The Carrier in its letter of hebru-ry 13, 1975, in reply -
to the letter of January 31, 1976 from the General
Chairman, stated in part: -
"Apparentlys our difference of opinion concerning .
meal allowances is simply a hatter of defining
"necessary expenses". 'rn© Internal Revenue
Service has ruled that the purchasing of meals
- only becomes a "necessary expense" wheat the em- .
ployee is required to secure away.-from-home
lodging for the night. Your interpretation of
Rule 1't as outlined in your letter does not en- .
tail the'reimbursement of "necessary expenses",
but, in actualityf it entails the dispensing
of additional income. fur thermos e, it is ob
vious that your interpretation is based on past
practice, however, past practice c"nnot
rullIfy
- the clear stipulation of a rule."
Tn that letter the Manager of Labor Relations suggested
that if the Organization was not satisfied with Carrier's
position the requirement of handling at lower levels
would be waived and such matters could ba submitted to him.
The Internal Revenue Service ruling referred to 3n
Carrier's communications dated December 16 and 1S, 1974
. ( is found in the instruction book entitled "Your Federal
Income Tax", IRS Publication ho. 17 (1975) on pages 69 and 70,
-3- p. L. Board No. 1540
pursuant to the communications of December 16 and
Is,
1974, Carrier did not pay for meals during the month
of January 1975 but resumed doing so in February 1975.
Therenfter, the parties agreed to have the matter resolved by -this Board.
Because of the merger of the Illinois Central Railroad and the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad several agreemenu are involved in this dispute which pertains to all .
electrical workers who perform road work on the property.
The Organization relies on Rule 12 and 16, Illinois Central
y
Railroad (Section A Agreement);
Rule
22, 7, 9, 11 and 12,
Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company
(Section
A Agreement);
Rule 12C and 17, Illinois Central Railroad (Section B '
Agreement); and Article 4, Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad
(Section B Agreement). At the hearing the parties agreed
that Rule 12, effective April 1, 1935, Illinois Central Railroad Company (Section A Agreement), was representative of
all the rules involved as all deal with the same subject and
are essentially the same. Thus
iv
would not be necessary
to reproduce all the Rules in this decision. Rule 12 reads
as ,follows
"Where meals and.
lodgings
are not provided by the
rwilroad, actual expenses will be allowed and
employees will receive a21 expense allowance
not later than the time they are paid for .
services rendered."
However, reference is made to Rule 3.7
in
Carrier's letter
of February 13, 1975., l~ is part of the Illinois Central
Railroad (Section B Agreement), effective
April
1, 1935 and
.-~1
k~.
~.o
Board No. 152C__----.
while it is essentially the same as Rule 12y quoVod-ab;ve,
iv
Nvill
be reproduced here for clarity. Rule 1'T follows:
"Where vneF;is and lodging are nod: furnished by the
railroad, or when the service requireients make the
. , purchase of meals and lodging necessary wrhixo away
from home point employees will be paid necessary
expenses." .
The EFrgganization disputes Carrier's right to use the.
instructions for preparing tax returns in the above noted .
' IRS publication as a basis for varying the terms of the
agreements. Moreover, the Ear
ganiza cion
urges that. the
relied on Agreement provisions
and the past practice under
then require Carrier to follow the procedures of the
Railway Tabor Act, as amended, bofore changing the working
conditions of the employees.
Carrier on the other hand argues that the 5'rS ruling
or instruction is relevant·to the dispute and contends that
unless an overnight stay is involved meals are not necessary
expenses. It relies on
the
statement in the IRS instruction
which says
"only when you are traveling away from home
overnight on
business"
are
meals and lodging deductible.
Carrier, also argues,,
that
the aforementioned Rules 12 and
1? do not require
the
payment of meals where ran overnight
stay is not involved and the pest practice of paying for
such meals cannot nullify the clear provisions of the Rules.
Carrier alleges further that the term "meals and lodging_
must be read as an entity so that no liability for paying
l
for meals arises unless lodging is also required.
The
parties have subirritted Pvrards from this as well
ms other Divisions
bearing on the
question of the effect
·s.
»5- 8.1.. Board No. 1540
CO~e.~!
of past practice. 'these citations are not dispositive as
each case turns on the peculiar facts prosent in each dis
pute, However, to the extent that these cases stand for
the proposition that a clear end unambiguous rule cannot
be changed by a. practice and that a practice can shed
light on the intent of the parties where an unclear or
vague rule is involved, they are relevant and vie will
follow the teachings therein.
There is no dispute as to the practice of paying far
the meals involved. There is no dispute that the practice
of doing so goes back a substantial period of time.
Whether it goes back to
R
period before 1535, as the
Organization contends, is irrelevant as a practice dating
from approximately forty (t0) years is a substantial period
of time and negates, on its face, the validity ox the
argument raised by Carrier·that thevayraents for such
meals were gratuities. In fact, the tyro claims mentioned
in the record involving meal payment where employees returned to headquarters at the end of the day etere settled
in favor of the Organization. These settlements in 1967
and 10&8
serve to reinforce the parties'.interpretation of
the Rules involved as. they were settled based on the fact
that Carrier's survey revealed there was a practice of
paying for such
meals.
Examining the Rules in questions the find that the pay- .
ment of meals. vraere an employee returns to headquarters at
the end of the
day is not
specifically prohibited. Tn fact
the Rules are silent on this paint. In the Rules Carrier
-6- h, lr.
Board No. 1560
underta Ices to provide "meals rind lodging". 1'77hen
§.'t
does
not it agrees to reimburse the employees for. "expenses"
or "necessary expenses". The Rules, therefore, can be
said-to be vague and uncertain as to Carrier's liability
in cases where the employee returns to headquarters at the
end of the day. ?n such a, situation he woe:2d not have
incurred lodging expense but it is altogether possible
that he would expend money on me.-3s. The practice of
such long duration of paying fax such meals will resolve
the dilemma. The parties by their actions over the years
intended the years
ambiguous rintended here involved, to provide
for the payments sought by the Organization.
( Carrier's argument that tree expression
"meals and
lodging" requires,an overnight stay would have some
validity :ere it not for the practice of considering
meals mad lodging separately, i.e.r paying for meals
when
there ryas no lodging involved. Moreover., the term "meals
and lodging", 3n the absence of specific limitations such
as "When employee are unubie to return to their
head:-
quarters..." or other appropriate wards of limitation,
might be construed as a statement of the extent of
Carrier's liability to employees in the event it did
not provide the accomodatxons it agreed to provide in the .
Rules. In the face of the historical practice it cannot
be said that "meals" would be paid for only when "lodging"
was required. (Compare Award 180?l, THIRD D>yISION.)
' =7- P. La Board
ties 1540
There remains for consideration the proximate cause
of this dispute -- Carrier's interpretation of the IRS
instruction to taxpayers concerning necessary expense where
overnight stays are not involved to the_effect that meals
cannot be paid for unless an overnight stay is involved.
This Doaid, of course, is not qualified to discuss nor
to interpret IRS rulings and it does not attempt to do
so. However, we reject Carrier's contention that the
IRS definition of no "necessary expenses" without an
overnight`. stay resolves the issue. %'c
Is
noted that
- nothing in the IRS instruction, on which Carrier relies,
forbids the payments sought by the Organization. The
instructions merely delineate the tar:. liability which
may arise from certain reimbursement's. Therefore, we
hold that the IRS's definition of "necessary expenses"
as well as the tax liability of Carrier and employee
arising from payments made and receipt of such payments
to.be irrelevant to these proceedings.
On the basis of the foregoing,
we
will find that
Carrier's discontinuance of paying for meals pursuant
to its communications of December ZG and December 18, 3.874
was in violation of the agreements,
Accordingly, we :ill order that.
l
.~z
'°8®o L. Board 14o0 1540
1. Crier cannot, under the applicable rules
discontinue the payment of weal expense to
employees can days they are n r ay from their
.. headquarters at meal tim6s but they start
arid end their :workday at their headquarters.
2. Carrier rill reimburse employees for the
cost of heals with==held during the month of
January 1975. (The proofs herein show such
payments were made except for January 7975.3
-'ORDER: Carrier will rescind its letter of December 16, 2974
as it affects the herein Organization and the D:illetin
Notice dated December 18, 1974, by appropriate vTitten
notice nod;
later than July t.5, 1975.
Carrier rill reimhuwse employees r)io incurred relevant
meal expense in January 1975 not later than thirty (Sfl)
f.~s from date hereof.
C. ement~.~;"'L~'utI, r al Member
` ./ > · McDeVmciit. Employee`'Flem'- e~
`o
t` ea·, artier .e=er
-DATED: JULY j~, 1975
.( Chicago, Fll. -