PARTIES TO DISPUTE
:
Transportation-Communication Division BRAG
and
Brie Lackawanna Railway Company
STATELVM OF CLAIM
:
Claim of the General Committee of the T-C Division, BRAC, on the Erie
Lackawanna Railroad Company, that:
1. Carrier violated the Agreement by not assigning senior extra
emplcyee to vacancy of operator-clerk position at Greenville,
Pennsylvania commencing on or about the date of September 25,
1966.
2. Carrier violated the Agreement by not assigning a junior extra
operator to vacancy of operator-clerk position at Greenville,
Pennsylvania commencing on October 23, 1966.
3. Carrier shall, because of violation in (1) above, be required
to cc-:rensace the senior idle extra operator a days wages at
the :::.r--rata rata of the position at Greenville for each day
of violation.
(a) In the event that there were no extra employees available to work the position, the Carrier shall compensate
the senior idle regular assigned employees on their rest
days, a day's pay at the time and one-half rate of their
own position for each day of violation.
(b) Carrier shall permit Joint check of records to determine number of days involved and names of claimants.
OPINION OF BOARD
:
The instant claim alleges a violation of the effective Agreement in that
the Carrier failed to assign the senior extra employee to the operator-clerk's
position on September 25, 1966; and, further, failed to assign the Junior extra
employee after the second bulletin expired and no application had been rec=:~ved.
In addition, the Organization alleges a violation of the sixty day time licit
provision due to the failure of the Superintendent to respond to the claim.
An analysis of the facts involved herein indicate that the regular incumbent of the operator-clerk's position at Greenville resigned September 11,
1966, to return to college. The vacancy was bulletined three times-August 24,
September 19 and October 13-without a bid, except on the last bulletin an
extra operator did bid but failed to qualify and the position was finally
abolished on November 29, 1966.
Award No. 51
3 J6-1
As the first part of the instant claim is concerned with a time limit
violation, necessarily, this facet will receive our initial attention. The
District Chairman filed a claim herein on November 7, 1966. On April 22, 1967,
the General Chairman wrote the Superintendent that the Carrier had failed to
disallow said claim within the sixty day tuna limit provision, therefore, he
requested the Carrier advise whether the claim would be allowed as presented.
The Superintendent on April 25, 1967, controverted the General Chairman's
allegation of the Carrier's failure to deny the claim and alleged a denial was
sent to the District Chairman on December 16, 1966, within the sixty day requirement. In turn, following a series of correspondence, the Organization on
June 23, 1967, wrote as follows:
"Superintendent Wogan indicates that claim was denied by his letter
under date of December 16, 1966. However, he failed to furnish any
proof that District Chairman Fair received his denial letter. District
Chairman
Fair states that he did not receive any denial of his
claim."
Subsequently, the Carrier submitted affidavits from the Chief Division
Clerk to the effect that on December 16, 1966, he dictated a letter to his
Secretary addressed to the District Chairman, copy attached, denying the claim.
In addition, the Secretary submitted an affidavit in support, stating that she
typed said letter, addressed it properly and placed it on the Chief Clerk's
desk for his signature. The latter further avers that he signed said letter
and placed it in the outgoing mail box that date. Each of these affidavits
were duly signed and attested to before a Notary Public.
In this posture, the Organization argues that the Carrier is required to
submit roof that the District Chairman received the Superintendent's letter
denying the claim. It is, thus, the Organization's contention that when the
General
Chairman
unequivocally states that "District Chairman Fair states that
he did not receive any denial of his claim", the Carrier is required to prove
that the District Chairman did receive same. As indicated, the Carrier submitted duly notarized affidavits whereas the Organization stands upon a bare
statement of denial. In support of its position by the Organization that the
Carrier, nonetheless, is in default, it cites Award 20384., First Division,
wherein the Referee held:
"The Organization categorically denies ever having received the letter
of February 6, 1961. There is a presumption that a letter sent is
delivered. But this presumption is overcome by the positive denial."
It also cites Award 16000, Third Division, wherein the Referee stated:
"We have previously held that the Organization is not charged with
the burden of establishing that it did not receive the claim denial.
Awards 10173 (Bailer). In this case such burden rests anon Carrier.
Award 10742 (Miller), 11211 (Miller), 11893 (O'Gallagher) and 15070
(Zack)."
Ergo, predicated on these Awards and others, the Carrier is in violation.
Somewhat reluctantly, we disagree with the Organization's conclusions and,
therefore, feel impelled to state what we believe to be the applicable rules.
Where the Organization initiates a claim via mail, that claim is effective
when actually received by the Carrier and the time limit rule begins to run
from that moment. As the Organization selected the medium of communication,
the Carrier's answer is effective when the denial is placed in the U.S. mail
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nL Q 1/P-1
box regardless whether the Organization receives it. At this juncture, of
course, the problem is bared. A positive denial by the Organization overcomes
the presumption as stated by Award 20384.. We do not quarrel with that statement. Thereafter, however, when the Organization alleges a failure to receive
the denial, the burden of going-for-ward with the proof shifts to the Carrier.
In the instant dispute, the Carrier submitted notarized sworn affidavits that
such denial was dictated, typed, properly addressed and mailed to the District
Chairman. It has met the positive denial. The burden of going forward, as
distinguished from the burden of proof which never shifts, is now upon the
Organization. The only statement we find thereon is from the General Chairman
reiterating that the District Chairman did not receive a denial of the claim -
without further substantiation or affidavit.
In Award 17227, Third Division (Supplemental), the following statement
contained therein is significant:
"The record contains affidavits from the Local Chairman, dated December 18, 1967, to the effect that he did not receive the denial
letters from the Supervisor of Signals and Communications, ---."
To the extent that the Organization has failed to meet the burden which
then shifted to it, it is our opinion that the Carrier has affirmatively
established that it is not in violation of the time limit rule and, therefore, under the circumstances herein, the denial claim was deemed effective
on April 25, 1967.
Insofar as the merits of the instant claim is concerned, the Organization
alleges that there were ten extra operators available who could have been
assigned under the rules. The Carrier, in turn, contends that after the
regularly assigned incumbent resigned, there were only five unqualified extra
men on the list--four college students and a teacher. Further,
"Carrier was aware that they also would resign shortly to return
to school, and that to force them to qualify and work at Greenville
would result in their earlier resignations. Because none of these
employees were at any time qualified for this position, Rule 19,
as amended, was not violated by the Carrier."
Hence, the Carrier denies that there were any qualified extra employees
available to fill the assignment. In lieu thereof, the Agent worked overtime
286* hours on the operator-clerk's position -an average of 6* hours daily
overtime at the Agent's rate of pay while performing the operator-clerk's
duties. Despite these facts, nevertheless, the Organization seeks additional
compensation for the senior, idle, extra Operator.
In our view, under the facts prevalent herein, we recognize that the
Carrier technically violated the Agreement. The parties have aptly phrased
it as follows:
"We did what we did because we had to do it."
"There is a Shanghai Rule in the Agreement but the Carrier failed
to comply."
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PL (3
l!~'7
FINDINGS
Upon the entire record and all the evidence, after hearing, this Board
finds that the captioned parties herein are Carrier and employee within the
meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as amended; that this Board is duly constituted by agreement; that the parties have had due notice of these proceedings; and that this Board has jurisdiction over the parties and the
dispute involved herein.
That technically the Agreement was violated without assessing a monetary
penalty.
AWARD: Claim denied per Opinion
Public Law Board No. 167
/s/ Murray M. Rohman
Murray M. Ro_hman, Chairman
Neutral Member
/s/ R. 0. Norton - Dissenting /s/ C. H. Zimmerman
R. 0. Norton, Employee Member C. H. Zimmerman, Carrier Member
Dissenting as to interpretation
of time limit rule.
Cleveland, Ohio
July 9, 1971
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