PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 1795
Award No. 18
Case No. 18
PARTIES TO DISPUTE: BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
(Pacific Lines)
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
1. That the Carrier violated the provisions of the
Agreement between the Southern Pacific Transportation Company
(Pacific Lines) and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employes when, as the result of an unfair hearing held on
September 21, 1976, it suspended Mr. Marcello Y. Hernandez
for a period of four weeks, said action being unreasonable,
harsh, arbitrary and in abuse of discretion.
2. That Claimant now be compensated for all wage loss
suffered because of the wrongful suspension and that his
record be cleared of all charges.
STATEMENT OF FACTS: To avoid any confusion, it should be
stated at the outset that there are two men involved in this
dispute with the same last names. One is Marcello Y. Hernandez
who is the Claimant, and the other is Mr. R.V. Hernandez who
is the Roadmaster and directly in charge of operations in the
specific area here involved.
Claimant Hernandez has been in the service of
Carrier since June 23, 1953. As of February 4, 1971, Claimant
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was promoted to the position of Foreman and has held that
job until the present. On August 28, 1976 the Roadmaster
called Claimant and instructed him to report to the old
Colton Yard for the purpose of picking up and removing rail,
scrap-ties and various debris from the toe path and the
right-of-way. In the performance of these functions, three
operators came under Claimant®s supervision.
At approximately two p.m. the truck driver working
under Claimaintas supervision became involved in an accident
when the truck he was driving struck a concrete loading dock.
During the course of Carriers investigation of
this accident it appears that during the lunch hour (or lunch
half hour in which Claimant and the truck driver participated
at Olgafls cafe) they each consumed one can of beer with their
lunch. There is some disagreement as to whether Claimant drank
two cans of beer or one; but we believe, on the basis of
Claimantfls record until now, and his very candid admissions
at the investigation, that his statement that he recalls
drinking only one can of beer is worthy of credence.
In any event, as a result of what had transpired,
Claimant was advised by letter, dated September 3, 1976, to
be present on Tuesday, September 14, for a formal hearing to
determine the facts and place responsibility, if any, in
connection with the alleged violation of Rule G of the
Rules and Regulations,
which we
quote here Verbatim:
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"Rule G. The use of alcoholic
beverages, intoxicants . . . by
employes subject to duty, or their
possession or use while on duty, is
prohibited".
The specific charge relating to Claimant was
whether or not he was guilty of consumption of "alcoholic
beverages" while on duty or subject to duty on August 28, 1976.
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We mention this point here to dispose of a rather
simple issue. The fact that Claimant was having his lunch
does not mean that he was "off duty". As a matter of fact the
record indicates that he was being compensated for the time.
But, in any event, we consider that during the running course
of responsibilities and duties performed for Carrier, the
period devoted to lunch by an employe under certain circumstances is part of working time, and that certain pertinent
rules, particularly those of the nature and purpose of Rule G,
must be obeyed during that period as well as during all other
periods of "working time".
Thereafter the investigation was adjourned and was
actually held on September 21, 1976. Subsequently, by letter
dated October 4, 1976, Claimant Hernandez was advised by
Carrier that the evidence adduced at the hearing adequately
established violation of Rule G and, as a consequence thereof,
Claimant was further advised that he was being suspended without
pay for a period of four weeks.
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The Organization objects strenuously and raises
three issues in this dispute. Firstly, it contends there was
prejudgment at the hearing on the part of the Hearing Officer.
We must say that we find no evidence establishing that contention
to be factually accurate. Secondly, the Organization contends
that the evidence was based on heresay. This issue falls by
itself for one main reason. The Claimant actually conceded
that he drank one can of beer during his lunch. In the
face of that voluntary admission, whether it was obtained
through hearsay or in any other way is completely immaterial.
The issue of Claimants guilt is not at all involved. He
admits he drank one can of beer while having lunch. The other
issues are also comparatively immaterial.
The major issue, of course, is the assessment of
discipline and the contention of the Organization that the
discipline imposed is exceedingly excessive and of such extreme
nature as to negate these entire proceedings. There is an
additional issue raised by the Organization and that is that
the hearing itself was unfairly and improperly conducted. We
do not agree and, as pointed out above, this is not the major
issue before us. In point of fact, the hearing was properly
held, opportunity for cross examination was sufficiently given,
Claimant was afforded every opportunity to present his version
of the facts; and overall we find no prejudice to Claimant as
a result of any part of the way in which this hearing was
conducted.
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We stress the following points of testimony by
Roadmaster R.V. Hernandez:
1. The point at
which Claimant
was interrogated was some
time later and quite a distance away from the scene of the
accident previously mentioned, and had no direct connection
or relation thereto.
2. There is no question but that in so far as this dispute
is concerned, Claimant was on duty during his lunch period.
3. The Roadmaster testified emphatically that Claimant
was not intoxicated; nor that he showed any "signs" of
intoxication; nor that Claimant was in any manner "under the
influence of alcoholic beverages" during any of the times he
had ever seen him.
4. Moreover, Roadmaster Hernandez testified further that
never prior to this date had any evidence or intimation of
any kind ever been brought to his
attention that
the Claimant
had ever been seen drinking on the job or during his lunch
hour; nor, to his knowledge, had Claimant ever done so.
We mention, in passing, that Carrier has cited
Case No. 10, (a case
which is
part of this original Docket
and
which was
decided by this Neutral) as support for its
contention that substantial discipline should be imposed in
cases such as these. We do not agree that case No. 10 bears
materially on any of the issues in this case.
Case No. 10, from a factual point of view, was a
far cry indeed from the facts of this case. We must bear in
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mind that what we have here is simply the case of a man who
imbibed a can of beer during his lunch hour with no other
effect; with nothing involving any damage to property, nothing
involving any injury to individuals.
On the other hand, Case No. 10 involved a Carrier
employe who was a truck driver who had dozed at the wheel;
who, at the time of the accident
which was
involved in that
case, was driving between 40 and 60 miles an hour; who was
driving at an excessive rate of speed; and, although he had
clear and unobstructed vision, caused his large truck to come
into contact with a small vehicle driving directly in front
of him, which accident proved to be fatal to one passenger
and cause injuries to another. We should stress here that
that Claimant or that former employe (since he is no longer
with the Company) insisted that besides having "dozed at the
wheel" he was about 30 feet away from the other vehicle when
he first saw it and that he felt he was acting reasonably under
the circumstances.
We need hardly point out that Case No. 10 has
absolutely no relevancy whatsoever with the facts involved
in the case before us.
OPINION: We repeat the following general rules relating to
principles on discipline because they apply to this case as
they do to Case No. 16 in which they were originally set forth.
"Innumerable cases of the various divisions
of this Board, and in the field of Industrial
Relations generally, have established and
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applied, in basic essence, certain specific
principles in the assessment and imposition
. of appropriate penalties in discipline cases.
"As, for example:
(1) that the penalty should be reasonably
commensurate in punishment with the
nature of the violation or infraction.
On the latter account, the nature of the
specific individual involved as transgressor
should be taken into account to judge the
measure of discipline and to see to it
whether this may not have an effect on
avoiding repetition of individual similar
offenses in the future.
(2) The discipline must in no sense whatsoever be
primarily punitive in nature under any circumstances.
(3) The discipline must be designed, at least
to some extent by its impact upon others,
towards avoidance of similar offenses by
other employes.
(4) Whenever possible, and whenever warranted,
the discipline imposed should be coupled
with a positive program, medical and/or
professional if necessary, for inculcation
of remedial attitudes and their practical
application on a sound work-a-day basis,
towards improvement (or possible removal)
of the condition involved.
"As a general proposition, of course, discipline to
have any chance of being really effective must be
group inculcated regularly among those employes
affected, from an educational and realistic point
of view, towards establishing the purpose of the
rule involved and its practical impact upon the
employes, their job performance, their safety and
the efficiency factors which are necessarily involved."
We would readily agree that the most important of
the disciplinary principles detailed in part above, which are
more or less generally applicable, do not apply to this specific
dispute now before us.
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Specifically, in the case before us, of those
general principles cited above the first one seems most
applicable to the case of this Claimant. Particularly, is
this true in the face of his exemplary and outstanding record
of service with Carrier. The following will emphasize the
latter proposition: a) He has been in the employ of Carrier
since June 23, 1953, a period of over 23 years. b) On
February 4, 1971 he was promoted to Foreman and has been acting
in that capacity ever since. c) His 23 years of service have
been unmarred by anything in his record showing any violation
of the Agreement or any infraction of the Rules and Regulations.
d) He is described by Roadmaster R.V. Hernandez, his immediate
supervisor, as an "above average foreman." e) In short, he is a
highly exemplary employe and one deserving emulation.
In view of Claimants record, therefore, we are not
justified in concluding that the punishment inflicted by Carrier -
suspension of four (4) weeks without pay - is commensurate with
the violation of which Claimant was found guilty (which, incidentally, he does not dispute) - drinking one can of beer at
lunch. The Organization contends that Claimant2s actual
disciplinary loss of wages was the sizable sum $1158.79, which
is not disputed by Carrier.
We conclude that the penalty imposed is not only
grossly excessive and arbitrary, but, in effect, does not
comply with the standards of discipline above set forth.
We must measure this man, a first offender over a
period of 24 years, as against the offense committed, and
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we do not find that charging him with a "fine" of $1158.79 for
drinking a can of beer at lunch is in any sense fair or proper
or, what is most important, necessary in this case. We agree
that some form of discipline is necessary. Claimant is a
Foreman, a Supervisor of other employes, with a proud record
that is looked up to by others. His punishment may very well
serve as a detriment to others.
Accordingly, we are compelled in fairness and equity
to reduce his period of suspension to a period of one (1) week;
that he should be compensated for all wage loss suffered in
excess thereof; and that in all other respects his claim should
be sustained.
Actually, his imbibing one can of beer is now costing
him a loss of wages amounting to approximately $300. We consider
this sufficient punishment for the offense committed under
the singularly unique circumstances of this case.
AWARD: AS TO PART ONE: Partially granted in accordance with
foregoing findings.
AS TO PART TWO: Granted in all other respects.
LOUISVNORRIS, Neutral and Chairman
S.E. FLEMING, Organization Member
E.J. LL, Carrier Member
Dated: San Francisco, California
March 23, 1978