PUBLIC LAW BOARD t;0. 1344
 AWARD N0. 16
 CASE NO. $
 PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE




                  _Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood that:


        (1) The Carrier violated the Agreement when, on January 21, 1.976, it assigned the work of removing snow from the depot platforms at West Chicago, Winfield, Wheaton, College Avenue, Glen Ellyn, Lombard and Villa Park to outside forces (Carrier File $1-1-240).


        (2) Furloughed Machine Operator Rogelio Aguirre be allowed six rind one-half hours' pay at time and one-half rate because of the violation referred to within Part (1) of this claim."


Ol'I:4ICN OF BOARD:
 In the early morning hours of January 21, 1976 Carrier employed an outside contractor to remove the snow from suburban station platforms. The contractor used his own rubber-tired tractor which was equipped with a snow plow to remove the snow. At the time this work was performed Claimant who held seniority as a Commoo Mnctiine Operator was furloughed. The instant claim was filed on his behalf by the Organi zat; on alleging z violation of the Scope Rule and seeking coci1pens;1t..ion for. Claimant at the overtime race for the time expended in removing Lhe snow try the outside contractor. Tae claim was denied through the higiiese levels on the property essentially because Carrier maintains that the remov;,l of snag fro-la station platforms is not wur~: "customarily purfori,.ieu" by the ump loye,.~s covered by 1a;lc ?.
 Close examination of the language of Rule 1 shows that the standard principles far interpretation of Scope Pules arc of only limited assistance in this case. Generally we could find guidance in the principle that the Organization has the burden of showing reservation of work by express contract language or exclusive reservation by custom, practice and tradition. That general maxim of contract interpretation is of assistance in cases involving socalZed general scope rules. But here in Rule 1 we deal with a specifically
            4

worded Scope Rule and not one of the general variety. The record is additionally complicated because many collateral issues were discussed by the parties on the property and some were raised de nova before our Board but the care of this dispute remains the question whether the work in dispute is covered by Rule 1. If the =cork of snow removal on station platforms comes within the coverage of Rule ? then Carrier has the burden of showing that it gave requisite notice to the General Chairman before subcontracting said work and that the subcontractec work falls within one of the exceptions statud in Rule 1. If an the other hand the work is not covered by Rule 1 then Carrier is presumably free to exercise managerial discretion in allocating the work.
 The question before us may be further narrowed to a determination whether
 the removal of snow on station platforrls fairly falls within the description of
 work. rtacrvcEi to employees of the Maintenance of Way and Structures Department
 by Fine 1. The operative language from Rule 1 is as follows:
 "Rule 1 -- Scope
                          9k X ~C


          "(b) tangy>_lwe s it:c?ttEte_tt w_itttita_ttm scope of the A~rcc- iit ii the itaintE·n;tllcC of tJ<t,r~anEt StructLtrCa D(.!i)art1!1e1lt ,all perform _d_3 1 work in C_Ct_1t1t't'_t I U_t1 w i t.i2 tilt., coils t 2'tIC t l.atl, 1;'.,-t t ilt E.'t?:1Pr_C. , repair <Itla Ell::ttt,tttt.I'Itii~ WI CC:1C'.is;i, StCtICCt3rC>_aild oLIlCC faciJ it i.cr; ttscti iii t he cssl

          E·r:it iott of th<· t:~ ~~ tnv i tt tt?E)er-

          _fEit';:!.titt'y (O c'tti:,:at7tly arrlE'2- -E'rV.( C'E_ CLI1 L.I1C CS~E'_L`:tL i.i2.~.p:.~tJ~t'.r_L7

                                                      .


          This I;:tL-a;;t-:y)h ctocs not ItErrt:titl to~ t_IIE: -ibaiidonmienc: of lulu:;

          atttiu>rizwl C)Y~ Litc tatcr.;t;ttE? ('.J tat::E'rre C) II;;t;i.::sIo;t.(I:.^.t5(la;>is added)

Emphasizing the words underlined supra, and giving ttzose words their common
 ordinary meaning, we are persuaded that the rer.:ova? of snow from statiou
 platfor:-nis is work in connection with the ma:.ntenance of structures and or-tier
 facilities used in the operation of the company, etc. The express contract
 lan&uage constitutes an exclusive reservation hence the wards "all work" and
 ordinarily we would have no need for recourse.to past practice, custom or
 tradition in the face of such clear-and unambiguous language. Carrier however
 contends that the work granted to the employees by the above quoted language
 is in effect taken away by the first sentence of the second paragraph of
 Section tar) to wit "by agreement between the Company and the General Chairman,
 work as described in the preceding paragraph which is customarily perior~ed by
 employees described herein, may be. let to contractors and be performed by
 contractors' forces." With m;zhasis can the words ~' · ~';kkperforned by
 employees described herein" Carrier of!`urs ei'iticnce that the work. of platfortz
 station snow removal has not as a matter of custom, practice and tradition beer.
 performed exclusively in the past by ;i of W employees. Accordingly Carrier
 contencs that the cork is thereby taken out from caverak;e of Rule 1 and neither
 the work reservation provisions nor the notice and consultation for subcontract
 ing provisions are applicable in this case. Our primary obligation in this case
 is La detcr,:,i -ne tae intent and meaning of the language of Rule 1 as it was
 written by the parties. Analysis of Section qi) of that Rule shows that the first
 paragraph e>:pre::sly ruscrvus exclusively to m of. ;d e;~ployees certain specifically
 described work including "all work in connection with the r:ai.r,:c~nance of strt:eturc
 and otfmr facilities." Tkzu words could hardly he more clew -iiid that pm-::C,rapkz
 contains no separate qualification that said work rust have been custoc;:arily performed by the M of W forces in years preceding the et fectivc date. of the Agreement. The question thus becomes whether it is proper to construe the words of Paragriph 2 in Section(b) to impose such a qualification on the coverage of the Scope Rule-. Examination of Paragraph 2 shows that the subject matter thereof is a qualified right to subcontract Scope Rule work under certain specified conditions. Paragraph 3 also deals with subcontracting and imposes upon Carrier the obligation of prior notice and consultation before entering, into contracting transactions, even if subsequently the transaction is found to have come within one of the specific exceptions listed in Paragraph 2. Construing these contract provisions in context we cannot agree with Carrier that the first sentence of the subcontracting provision is intended by the parties to limit and qualify the coverage of the specifically worded work reservation set out in Paragraph 1 of Section (b). To do so would have the effect of transforming the specifically worded work reservation clause into a "general" scope rule in which custom, practice, and tradition become the sole governing indicator of coverage. If the parties had ynten4ud such a result they would not have agreed to a specifically worded work reservation clause. Thus we find it consistent with the manifest intent of the parties to construe the phrase in Section 1 of. Paragraph 2 ("wont. as dU ,C:r ibed in the preceding paragraph which is customarily performed by employee°. de::uribed hereitl") as words of description ratter than as words of lit-itation or qcrclifi_cation.
 Based upon the foregoing it is clear that the work of snow removal oil station platf orcrs Is covered by Rule 1. Accordingly the evidence of custom, practice, and Lrad i L l t ltt l)LS(:C7ttta larger,.' l rr~.'.le V:!ilt ill tile f"1ce (J f the C\prL'~s c0t'2traCL I :ingu ge. Sce h~..,tr~!5 .lS',1, lfi6?S, and 19976. The unrcfutcd ri~?cord slt~::,: that C::~;-ri..i ofticiraL: (id tio, pruvidc· tho notice aunt ta'=a:;itlt;tti«n required hy· Ritlo 1 b-fore
 contracting out this word. Assertions of e,°argency or, not persuasive on this
 record. `I-here is no question that Carrier thus violated Rule 1 when it failed
 to notify tire General Chairman of its plans to contract out the work. Having
 made thi£, finding there is no need to look behind the conflicting arguments
 relative to tire availability of equipment. These are r.=r>atters which the parties
 might have discussed under the procedure=s provided in Rule I for notice and
 consultation but they have no bearing on wh:~ther the notice should have been
 given in the first instance. See Awards 1905, 19399, 19657, 20071, and 20275.
 On the facts of record before us there wan in. this particular case <a proven
 loss of work opportunity by Claimant and we shall sustain the claim for monetary
 damages. Carrier assertions < t Claimant's ::eligibility to recover were
 raised de nova before our BoA: j and may not be considered. Perusal of the
 record shows no persuasive ha,is for the i,ay-em of damages at the overtime
 rate and consistent with the , ri nt i ple o> r whole damages we shall sustain
 the claim for six and one--half hours ;it the applicable ztro,rnto rate.

 FINDINGS:
 PLA11C Law Board No. LSh-'*, upon 1114' 1J;: it record and all of the evidence, finds and holds as follows:
 1. That the Carrier and Employee invo?.vcd in this dispute ,:re, respectively, Carr i c:- and Employee within tire meaning o t the Railway Labor Act;
 2. that the Board has jurisdiction over tile dispute involved herein; and

    3. that the Agreement was violated.

              AWARD


            The claim is su..-Lained to the extent indicated in the Opinion.


            ' Dana E. Eischen, Chairman


0. M. Berge, Fmp oyee Member R. W. Schmiege, CarImr

 Dated:

        r