PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 2406
*
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK) * CASE NO. 49
*
-and-
* AWARD NO. 49
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYEES
*
Public Law Board No. 2406 was established pursuant to the
provisions of Section 3, Second (Public Law 89-456) of the ,
Railway Labor Act and the applicable rules of the National
Mediation Board.
The parties, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak, hereinafter the Carrier) and the Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employees (hereinafter the Organization),
are duly constituted carrier and labor organization representatives
as those terms are defined in Sections 1 and 3 of the Railway
Labor Act.
After hearing and upon the record, this Board finds that
it has jurisdiction to resolve the following claim:
"(a) The Carrier violated the effective agreement dated May 19, 1976 on March 4, 1981, by unfairly
and unjustly dismissing Claimant Felix Morgan.
(b) Claimant Morgan be reinstated to service
with seniority unimpaired and compensated for all
wage loss."
i
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CASE/AWARD NO. 49
PAGE TWO
The Claimant, Felix Morgan, entered the Carrier's service
on April 11, 1977. .On December 11, 1980, the date of the
incident giving rise to this claim, the. Claimant was a Trackman.
By letter dated January 31, 1981, the Carrier informed the
Claimant that as a result of an incident on December 11, 1980,
it was revoking his Rail Travel Privilege,Card for 180 days.
By. notice dated February 9, 1981, the Carrier instructed tire
Claimant to attend a trial on February 19, 1981 in connection
with the following charges:
"Alleged violation Rule O Amtrak. Rules of Conduct
that-part which reads, 'Employees . . .traveling
on a free or reduced rate basis shall neither dress
nor. conduct themselves in a manner-.which could -
embarrass the company or is objectionable to other
passengers.'
Specification.: (a) In that you conducted yourself
in an unfit manner on Train #41 on December 11, 1980
disrupting passengers and subjecting the company to
embarrassment while traveling on your Rail Travel
Privilege Card."
The trial was held as scheduled on February 19, 1981. The
Claimant was present and-accompanied by a duly designated representative of the Organization. By notice dated March 4, 1981,
the Carrier informed the Claimant that it had found him guilty
of the charges and dismissed him effective immediately.
The Carrier contends that the trial record contains sufficient evidence to establish that after the Claimant used his
Rail Travel Privilege Card to obtain a ticket for an Amtrak
train, he became drunk, disorderly and distrubed other passengers
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,PAGE THREE
on the ensuing trip. The Claimant maintains that he cannot
recall the time period of his alleged misconduct, and he should
not be held responsible for his actions because he-was involuntarily drugged by wine given him by another passenger on the
train.
The Organization also raises two procedural defenses on
behalf of the Claimant. First, it contends that the trial- was
defective because the Carrier did not issue the notice of trail
within 15 days of the alleged incident as required by Rule 71(a).
The Organization notes that a trainman filed a report concerning
the alleged incident on the very date it occurred, and there
existed no reason why the Carrier could not have issued a timely
notice of discipline. Secondly, the organization maintains that
the Carrier placed the Claimant in double jeopardy when it
disciplined him for the alleged incident by revoking his Rail
Travel Privilege Card, and then subsequently dismissed him for
the same incident. The Carrier argues that the organization's
procedural defenses are without merit. The Carrier contends
that it did comply with Rule 71 by issuing a notice of trail
within 15 days of the Division Engineer becoming aware of the
incident. The Carrier maintains that the Division Engineer
did not become aware of the Claimant's misconduct until January
28, 1981, when he received a memo from the Chairman of the Pass
Abuse Review Panel. The Carrier also denies that it disciplined
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CASE/AWARD N0. 49
PAGE FOUR
the Claimant twice for the same incident, as it contends that
the revocation of the Claimant's pass privilege was not discipline, but the suspension of a privilege it unilaterally
bestowed.
The Organization also asserts that dismissal is too harsh
a penalty for the alleged violation. The Carrier believes that
discharge is an appropriate penalty for the proven offense,
especially in light of the Claimant's past disciplinary record.
The record establishes that the Claimant used his Rail
Travel Privilege Card to obtain a ticket for an Amtrak train
traveling between Philadelphia and Chicago on December 11, 1980.
The-Claimant had been drinking beer and was "feeling all right"
at the time he boarded the train. He was not on duty. The
Claimant continued to drink alcoholic beverages on the train.
He was observed swearing out loud to himself and walking through
the train falling on other people. Other passengers complained
to the Amtrak crew about the Claimant's behavior. In response to
the Claimant's actions, Trainman John Itinger took the Claimant's
Rail Travel Privilege Card and filed a report that day concern
ing the incident. -
The Claimant testified that he has no recollection regarding
his alleged improper behavior. After boarding the train, he
accepted a drink of wine from an unknown passenger sitting next
to him. He presumes the wine was drugged, because he can recall
nothing else until the trainman was removing his Privilege Card.
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CASE/AWARD NO, 49
PAGE FIVE
The Claimant stated that he was robbed of $220.00 and a pair
of socks during the period of the blackout.
This Board has concluded that the Organization's procedural
oboections are not sufficient to warrant sustaining the claim.
This Board has previously ruled that the Carrier does not automatically violate Rule 71 when it fails to issue a Notice of
Trial within 15 days of an alleged incident. In certairr-cases,
the responsible Carrier official may not become aware of an
incident until sometime after the date of the alleged offense.
In the instant case, there exists no evidence that the Division
Engineer had any knowledge of the incident prior to January 28,
1981. The Carrier then issued a notice of trail on February 9,
1981, within the 15 days allowed by Rule 71. Although other
Carrier officials had knowledge of the incident shortly after
its occurrence,. the matter was initially investigated and
considered by the Pass Abuse Review Panel. The delay occasioned
by the review of the Panel was not dilatory, but was responsible
action on the part of the Carrier. This Board has also concluded
that the Carrier did not subject the Claimant to double jeopardy.
Although we agree with the organization's argument thar revocation
of an employee's Privilege Card is a form of discipline, we do
not find that a subsequent timely investigation by the Operating
Department that results in formal discipline is impermissible.
Actions by the Pass Abuse Review Panel are restricted to
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CASE/AWARD NO. 49
PAGE SIX
revocation of pass privileges, and are separate and apart from
any further warranted discipline which is imposed by the
Operating Division.
This Board has also determined that the record contains
substantial evidence to support the Carrier's finding that the
Claimant became voluntarily intoxicated on December 11, 1980,
while travelling on an Amtrak train, and this intoxicatio;rr
resulted in his unacceptable behavior. The Claimant admitted
he had been drinking prior to boarding the train, and continued
his drinking during the trip. Although the Claimant's case is
somewhat helped by testimony from trainmen who were on the
train that the Claimant's behavior was not unacceptable, Trainman
Itinger personally observed the Claimant being disorderly and
disturbing other passengers. Although the Claimant presumes his
behavior was caused by his being involuntarily drugged, the
most likely conclusion is that he was simply "sloppy drunk."
His resulting behavior constituted a violation of Rule 0.
This Board considers the Claimant's actions to be a -serious
breach of the Employee Conduct Code. The Carrier correctly
notes that it is proper to consider the employee's past record
when determining the appropriate measure of discipline to impose.
The Claimant's record is poor. Although this Board overturned
one of his previous disciplines in a very close case, the
Claimant had previously been suspended three times for serious
offenses. However, as the measure of discipline for the instant
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CASE/AWARD NO. 49
PAGE SEVEN
case was in part based on his previous record, since modified
by this Board, in this case we shall reinstate the Claimant
without back pay. The Claimant shall also receive a strong
warning, and shall be placed on notice that any further violations of Carrier rules shall warrant dismissal.
AWARD: Claim denied. However, the Carrier shall reinstate-the
Claimant without back pay. The Claimant shall receive a strong
warning for his violation of Rule O and is to be placed on notice
that it is his final warning. Any further violation of the
Carrier's Rules shall warrant dismissal of the Claimant.
L. C. Hriczak, arrier Member W. E. LaRue, Organization Member
C
D (SS6NT/^JG) (DISSENTING)
Richard R. Kasher, Chairman
and Neutral Member
March 10, 1984
Philadelphia, PA
Uo 6-
L(g
DISSENT OF THE EMPLOYE MEMBER
AWARD N0. 49
PUBLIC LAW BOARD N0. 2406
The Board has erred in the interpretation of Rule 71, as amended,
which reads as follows:
"Advance Notice of Trial
An employee who is accused of an offense, and who is
directed to report for trial therefor, shall within fifteen
(15) days of date of alleged offense, be given notice in
writing of the exact charge on which he is to be tried,
and the time and place of the trial,."
The rule provides that an employee must be charged within 15 days
of the offense, and such charges must be in writing. The Board has
amended this rule by Award No. 49 to read that the 15 days is not from
the date of the offense but 15 days from the date the Carrier allegedly
has knowledge of the offense.
The agreement to establish this Public Law Board, dated April 30,
1979, made provisions in Paragraph 3 of that agreement to provide that
the Board is not authorized to change existing agreements, governing
rates of pay, rules and working conditions and shall not have the right
to rewrite any rules.
In this case should the Award No. 49 be accepted as written, Rule 71
of the agreement would have been rewritten in that the Carrier would now
be allowed the time limit of 15 days starting from the date of knowledge
of the alleged offense.
Therefore, the Carrier's argument in this matter would be without
merit since many such agreements on their property have included such
a rule, stating from the time the Carrier had knowledge of the offense.
This the Carrier has not done, and the rule does not provide for such.
Similarly, in PLB 1376 - 19, BRAC vs. Penn Central Transportation
Company, Referee Sickles rendered the following:
"Claimant did raise the procedural issue at the trial.
The fact that he refused an offer of recess does not cure
the deficiency, because of the mandatory nature of the contractual obligation.
The parties have determined, in the agreement, that
time limits may be extended under certain circumstances;
but none of those circumstances are present here. This
CARRIER MEMBER DISSENT
PUBLIC LAW BOARD 2406
AWARD NO. 49
The Carrier agrees with the conclusion of this Board that an
employee may both have pass privileges revoked and be formally
disciplined based upon the same event and that such an employee
is not placed in double jeopardy thereby; however, the Carrier
feels compelled to comment on the statement of-the Board that
pass revocation is a form of discipline.
It is well established that the granting of pass rights is a
gratuity. Emergency Board No. 106, in 1954, considered the
matter of free transportation and found the following:
"The Board doubts if free transportation comes within
the language of the Railway Labor Act relating to 'rates of
pay, rules, and working condition.' It is also the belief
that, on the merits, this subject should not be required to
be the subject of collective bargaining. It is a gratuity
except when directly related to the employees' services and
such should be left under the control of the Carriers."
Further, the Courts have upheld the emergency Board's
determination that issuance of passes is a gratuitous action
(McDougal v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. 21 Misc. 2nd 946, 198 N.Y.S.
2nd 91) .
Without belaboring the point, the Carrier finds Fourth
Division Award 3733, Referee Franden, summarizes the Carrier's
position in this regard.
"We do not find that claimant was entitled by contract to
pass privileges, and the revocation of such privileges does
-2-
PLB 1376 - 19 (continued)
"author, and numerous other Referees, has refused to allow
a Claimant to rely upon a time limit defense when the Claimant himself has stultified the import of the agreement by
deliberate action of avoidance, evasion and/or the like.
But, again, such is not the issue presented. Carrier miscalculated, and its effort to rectify the error was directly
blocked by another contractual prohibition. While this result may appear to be unduly technical in nature, we hasten
to point out that it was the parties - not the Board - who
wrote the agreement language in absolute and mandatory terms -
and our jurisdiction is limited to interpretation of existing agreements: it does not permit a rewriting of contractual
obligations."
In similar cases, Third Division Award Nos. 18335, 18352, and 18354
held favorably of the
employes, in
that such violation, as set forth in
Award No. 49, was
considered .a
violation of the agreement and discipline
should therefore be set
aside.
William E. LaRue, Employe Member
Public Law Board No. 2406
not
151
This
Award No.
Carrier's
Electrical
3
constitute discipline. See First Division Awards 11727,
0; Third Division Awards 9316, 13217 and 14130."
finding was cited with favor by Neutral Member Quinn in
1 of Public Law Board 3355, established on this
property with the International Brotherhood of
1 Workers, System Council 7.
The Carrier submits, therefore, that the Board erred in
stating, in the instant Award, that revocation of pass
privileges is a form of discipline and to that extent the
Carrier registers dissent to this award.
Board's decision in this
It is clear
case that pass revocation-is
of discipline coming within the purview of the Labor
L. C. Hriczak
Carrier Member
r from the
not a form
Agreement.