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Contrawise, the Organization contends that while it has the indisputable right to withdraw claims from the docket of the Public Law Board, it is willing to restrict this right by requiring mutual agreement when the claim reaches the hearing stage. It asserts that Carrier has not proposed to limit or foreclose its right to compensate a pending claim before arbitration and that this correlative is conceptually analogous to the Organization's position. It argues that its interpretative posture is consonant with the spirit and intent of the Railway Labor Act 1926 as Amended relative to the prompt and orderly settlement of grievances and uniformly consistent with the language commonly found in other Public Law Board Agreements. Moreover, it contends that any claim which the Organization withdraws prior to a hearing will not be referred to the National Railroad Adjustment Board's Third Division or another Public Law Board. In essence, it notes, the claim would be moot.

 In considering this dispute, this Board recognizes the diversity of viewpoints on this issue. Clearly, Carrier is correct, at least pragmatically when it contends that methodically progressing a claim on the property requires time and painstaking preparation and should be adjudicated, when appealed to Arbitration, unless the parties mutually agree to withdraw it f=m the docket. Its assertion that a claim regarding the interpretation or application of a contested Rule should be litigated is plainly logical from an administrative perspective to facilitate the orderly management of human resources. But in this case, the record and prevailing legal authority, supports the conclusion that unilateral withdrawal of a claim by the Organization prior to hearing, is a permissible action that is widely observed in the railroad industry. Carrier's contention that the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal's holdings in New Orleans a d Northeastern Railroad Com anv EvkAl Union 612
 1~ 2F
1F2~ 18 1 2) are on point with this dispute, is incorrect. In the firse case cited, the Court compelled the nonaggrieved party to arbitrate a dispute, which it was contractually bound to do, and thus enforced the Agreement's grievance arbitration clause. In the second case cited, the Court ordered the same duty to arbitrate remedy, but noted that the word "may" in the clause, "the dispute may be submitted," meant that either aggrieved party had the right to require arbitration. However, the aggrieved party was the union, not the company and the Court enforced the demand for arbitration. But, importantly, the claim was filed by the union and progressed to arbitration by it. Under this holding, if the Company filed the grievance and progressed it through the Appeals process as per the Agreement's requirements, it could seek judicial enforcement of its arbitral demand. In the cases that reach the Public Law Board stage of the appeals process in the railroad industry, the aggrieved party is the Organization acting on behalf of its client-member and consistent with the aforesaid rulings, can compel arbitration. The interpretative thrust extends to the aggrieved party claiming

claiming an enforceable right under the existing contract. Thus, since Carrier was not the petitioning party in this instance, the rulings are not applicable.

 On the other hand, the record shows that two (2) prior Public Law Board decisions dealt with this precise issue. In Public Law Board 1681 vis Awards 13 and 14, the majority permitted the Organization to withdraw the two cases docketed with the Board. There were no contract prohibitions precluding pre-hearing withdrawal and the decisions are on point with the question before us. But of interest in Carrier's dissenting opinion in those cases, is its concern that the dismissal awards would restore the disputes to the status they occupied following their declination by the employer. In the instant case, we find no plausible basis for this apprehension. The Organization explicitly stated that once a case had been withdrawn from the docket of the Public Law Board prior to a hearing, it would not be referred to another Public Law Board or the National Railroad Adjustment Board. It disclaimed such action.

 In Public Law Board 1682, Award No. 48, the primary issue was whether a case could be withdrawn from a PLB docket, notwithstanding the presence of a provision in the PLB Agreement that required mutual consent for withdrawal only if the case had been heard by the Board. It was an identical provision to the one proposed by the Organization herein. While finding for the Organization, upon the clarity and unambiguous intent of the provision, PLB Board No. 1682 also referenced the determinations of PLB 1681. Similarly, the provision sought by the Organization here is not uncommon in other Public Law Board Agreements. In fact, it is routine language and reflects the widely held view in arbitral opinion that a complainant may usually withdraw a case at any point prior to the arbitration hearing, but that after the hearing has commenced, he may not withdraw it without mutual consent. It facilitates expeditious settlement without imposing detriment to the other party. We believe, upon the record, that this finding is legally and prcedentially the most persuasive and that PLB decisions carefully reviewed herein manifest an intellectual and legal consistency that we cannot disregard. The Organization can, of course, agree with Carrier's position and adopt more restrictive language. This is a voluntary decision between the partibs. In the absence of such mutual acquiesence, this Board must follow strictly the judicial holdings enunciated by predecessor tribunals in the railroad industry on identical issues and appropriately observe the principle of stare decisis. Accordingly, we permit the Organization to withdraw claims docketed with PLB 2668 before a hearing has begun without mutual consent.
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      FINDINGS


      Public Law Board No. 2668, upon the whole record and all of the evidence finds and holds as follows:


      1. That the Carrier and Organization involved in this dispute are, respectively, Carrier and Organization within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act;


      2. That the Board had jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.


                                A19ARD


      The Organization may withdraw a claim docketed with Public Law Board 2668 before a hearing has begun without mutual consent.


                      e'or,

                      org S. Roukis, Chairman and

                                    Procedural Neutral


                                                  9


      r C

      . D. .~ereaux, arrier Member S. . Bishop, Organizattio Member

      September, 1980

      ar