PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 2720
Parties to Dispute: International Brotherhood of Firemen and oilers, A8'L-CIO
and
Consolidated Rail Corporation
Statement of Claim: System Docket CR-2057
Dismissal of D. P. Lewis
Opinion of Hoard:
Claimant was hired on December 12, 1978, as a Laborer at Carriar's Avon
Diesel Terminal, Avon, Indiana. The record, without specific documentation,
indicates that at the time of his employment and continuously thereafter Claim- ,
ant's true duties were as an undercover agent at the Avon. facility although he i
was assigned as a Laborer.
on April 29, 1981, Claimant was sent a directive by Carrier instructing him
appear for a trial on May 22, 1981, in connection with the following charge(s):
"#1 - Violation of Rule 13 of your controlling
agreement on April 25, 1981.
#2 ·- Unauthorized absence on April 25, 1981,
which in view of your previous attendance
record, constitutes excessive absenteeism.
#3 - Failure to complete a full tour of duty on
April 24, 1981, which in light of your previous attendance record, constitutes an
excessive loss of time from your assigned
position."
As per
organization and
Claimant's request, the originally scheduled hearing was
postponed and rescheduled fox May 29, 1981. Said hearing was held as per rescheduling, Claimant, however, did not appear. Pursuant to said hearing, Claimant was
adjuged guilty as charged and was dismissed. Said termination was appealed and
is now properly before this Board for resolution.
Organization's basics contention in this dispute is that Claimant's
termination
was motivated solely because his (Claimant's) identity had become known to other
employees and Carrier
believed
that he was no longer of value as an undercover
agent. Moreoever, Organization maintains that Claimant had received pe=ission
from his supervisor to leave work early on Saturday, April 24, 1981, in order to
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~~ao-3
attend a class in the Marion County Sheriff's Academy in Indianapolis, Indiana
which was part of an extended course of study in which Claimant had been enrolled
since March 1, 1981, and which he had attended every Saturday during that period.
Organization next contends that Carrier erred procedurally in that Claimant's
trial was conducted in absentia and ". . . Claimant was not notified of the time
and date the trial was
rescheduled for,
thus causing the Claimant a serious injustice of due process," Additionally, organization further argues that carrier
violated Rule 20 (1) of the current agreement by
considering in
its decision to
terminate Claimant incidents which occurred more
than
thirty (30) days~prior to
the holding of Claimant's trial.
Carrier's major contention is that there is sufficient, probative evidence
in the record to indicate that Claimant, ". . . violated Rule 13 . . . (failed to
properly notify his General Foreman of his absence as soon as possible)":
'. . .
that he was absent sans proper authority
on April
25, 1981; and that he failed to
complete a full tour of duty on April 24,.19$1." continuing, Carrier also asserts
that, when considered in light of Claimant's previous record Uour letters of warning regarding his poor
attendance; exceeded
four occurrences of absenteeism, tardiness and early quits in a six month period prior to his termination; and a fifteen
day suspension, deferred, for violation of
Rule £,
paragraph 5, by sleeping or
assuming an attitude of sleep while on duty on February 21, 1.981), the present
infractions warrant termination. In this same context, Carrier further
maintains
that it (Carrier) "_ . . has the right to expect and in fact demands (such)
diligence, faithfulness and availability from
an
employee . . . (and) . . .
Carrier has no obligation to 'forgive and forget', thereby jeopardizing its
operations" (See: Second Division Awards 5049 and '7348).
Regarding Organization's various procedural
allegations, carrier
agrues that
claimant's
hearing was
properly held in absentia because "Claimant did not personally request a postponement or give any satisfactory reason for his absence
from his trial
even
though he was
properly
notified by a letter sent certified
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mail of the time, date and place of the proceedings". Additionally, Carrier also
contends that reference to Claimant's previous record (incidents 30 days prior to
claimant's trial) was entirely proper because "(W)hen preferring such
a
charge
(excessive absenteeism) it was incumbent upon the carrier to
prove
that over a
protected (sic) period of time that Claimant was absent for an excessive period".
Such action, Carrier argues is supported by the following
Awards:
Second Division
Award No. 5431 and Award No. 39 of Public Law Board No. 2618.
Carrier's last major contention in this
dispute is
that reference to
any
material
which was contained in a denosition which was taken from Claimant after the hearing
was held on the property, cannot be considered by the Hoard at this time.
The Board
has
carefully read and studied the complete record in
this
dispute
and is convinced that Carrier's action was proper and, therefore,
will
remain
undisturbed.
As a point of departure, Organization's procedural objections are found to
be completely meritless. ::se record demonstrates that Claimant had already been
granted a postponement of his first trial; Carrier's notification, to Claimant of
the rescheduling of the trial was mailed to Organization and Claimant in accordance
with normal procedures; and there was no satisfactory reason adduced or even
suggested which would
have justified
a second postpon.--ent.
Concerning Carrier's .reference to incidents
which
miaht have occurred thirty
(30) days prior to
Claimant's
trial and Organization assertion that such reference
was in violation of Rule 20R, suffice it to say that said rule clearly applies to
the precipitating incident which has given rise to an immediate action, and in
no way precludes Carrier from considering previous infractions for purposed of
r
r
determining the appropriate degree of penalty
which is to be
assessed by Carrier.
such was Carrier's obvious motivation in the instant case and which, under
the
circumstances, cannot be faulted.
Turning to the merits portion of this dispute, our first area of concern is
'Carrier's objection to Organization's reference to any information Vnich may
have
been contained in Claimant's post-hearing depsition. l~egardless of organization's
assertion that Claimant was Improperly'denied the opportunity to testify at his
own trial and thus organization
had to
resort to this action in order to get
the
"facts" before the Hoard, the almost universal nature of the principle that the
party's respective case must be made "on the property" is so firmly
established
in railroad labor/management relations that any further consideration of this
particular issue is entirely unnecessary.l~
Having made the foregoing determinations, the disposition of any of the
remaining issues becomes an almost foregone condlusion. The facts of record
relating to Claimant's relatively short tenure with carrier and the unenviable
record which he amassed up to the point of his termination, convinces the Hoard
that Carrier's action herein was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse o£
Managerial discrection.
Award- ,
Claim denied-
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G.Y.
Welsh, carrier me "or
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Francisc, ZmployeeXmmber
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1.
Even if this Hoard was inclined to consider this particular offering (which it
is not), it might be )xelpful to the parties in future cases of a similar nature to
note that items tll, #12 and #13 thereof contain mueexaus,significant inconsistencies.
Particularly noteworthy in this consideration is that item #Il alleges ttist 5uper»
visor Tyler would not grant claimant "outright permission" to leave work early but
" . advised me
(Claimant)
to make
arrangements with my foreman . . -- However,
in items #12 and #13, Claimant thereafter states categorically that
MY.
Tyler gave
him (Claimant) permission to leave work early on the days in question.
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