PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 2960
AWARD N0. 54
CASE NO. 44
PARTIES TO DISPUTE:
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
and
Chicago & North Western Transportation Company
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood that:
(1) The Agreement was violated when the Carrier failed and
refused to compensate Foreman Leroy Sprinkle and Machine
Operator Dave Broehm at the overtime rate for time worked
preceding and following their regular assigned work periods
on July 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30,
31 and August 1, 1981.
(2) Foreman Leroy Sprinkle and Machine Operator Dave Broehm
shall each be allowed the difference between the straight
time and overtime rate for 13.5 hours. (Organization's
File 7 T - 2394; Carrier's File 81-19-257)
OPINION OF THE BOARD:
This Board, upon the whole record and all of the evidence, finds
and holds that the Employe and the Carrier involved in this
dispute are respectively Employe and Carrier within the meaning of
the Railway Labor Act, as amended, and that the Board has jurisdiction
over the dispute involved herein.
The basic facts are not in dispute. The Claimants are members
Award No. 54 -'_;2'q
Case No. 44
of Smoothing Gang No. 2 headquartered at Altoona, Wisconsin. They
were regularly assigned to work from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday
through Friday each week with Saturdays and Sundays designated as rest
days. On each date of claim, Claimants were directed to report to
Altoona one-half hour prior to their regular starting time, and then
travel to Menomonie, where they then performed service. At the end of
their day, Claimants returned to Altoona. On some dates of claim,
they were back at Altoona by 4:00 p.m., but on other dates did not
return until 4:30 p.m. On each date, Claimants claimed pay at the
overtime rate for all time outside their regular bulletined hours.
These claims were denied and Claimants were compensated at the
straight time rate.
The Organization contends that the employees were not properly
compensated at the overtime rate of pay for the overtime spent
preceeding and following the regular period. They claim a violation
of Rules 25, 30, and 34, which state:
Rule 25
"Employes' time will start and end at a regular designated
assembly point for each class of employes, such as tool
house, outfit car or shop."
Rule 30
"Time worked continuous with and following a regular eighthour period shall be computed on the actual minute basis and
paid for at time and 'one-half rate, with double time on
actual minute basis after sixteen hours of work in any
twenty-four hour period computed from starting time of
employes' regular shift."
Rule 34
"Employes required to report in advance of regular starting
time for work continuous with regular assignment will be
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Award No. 54
' Case No. 44
compensated at rate and one-half for such advance time, with
minimum of one hour."
The Carrier argues that the Claimants were properly
compensated at the straight time rate for the time consumed outside
their regular bulletined hours because such time was only used for
travel between their headquarters and their work location. Claimants
performed no service other than travel during this time. The basis
for this manner of compensation is clearly found in Rule 43 of the
Agreement which the Carrier argues as controlling. Rule 43 states:
"Rule 43-Travel. Except as provided in Rules 42 and 47,
employees who are required by direction of the Company to
leave their home station will be allowed actual time for
traveling or waiting during regular working hours. All hours
worked will be paid for in accordance with practice at home
station. Travel or waiting time during the recognized overtime
hours at home stations will be paid for at the pro rata rate.
If, during the time on the road, a man is relieved from duty
and is permitted to go to bed for five hours or more such
relief time will not be paid for, provided that in no case
shall he be paid for a total of less than eight hours each
calendar day, when such irregular service prevents the
employee from making his regular daily hours at home station."
The Board observes similar factual situations and questions of
interpretation relating to the apparent conflicts between Rules 43 and
34, 35, and 30, have been considered before by Public Law Board 1844.
The parties had made similar arguments in this record concerning these
rules. The analysis of Referee Eischen in Award 18 recognizes that the
conflict and the rules had to be resolved in line with the intent of
the parties. He also gave a detailed analysis to the myriad of other
arbitration decisions involving similar questions regarding the
"intent" of the other parties in the face of similar language conflicts.
Award No. 54
Case No. 44
One line of thought relied on "past practice" and the other school
of thought relied on the rule of contract construction which holds
that a special rule prevails over a general rule. For reasons he
explained, Referee Eischen found past practice to be the controlling
principle of construction. He then went on to apply the principle to
the facts he stated:
"Unfortunately, however, the apparently easy answer of reliance
upon practice to resolve the conflict in the rules is foreclosed
to us in this case. This is so because the record is
inadequately developed to permit a clear determination relative
to practice in similar fact situations,on this property in the
past. The Organization asserts and the Carrier denies such
practice but neither offers any proof. The onus of this state of
equilibrium falls upon the Organization as the party with the
burden of proof on the point.
Given the state of the record and in consideration of the
established precedents governing such cases, we are left no
alternative but to dismiss this claim for lack of proof. In so
doing we emphasize that our holding is dictated by evidentiary
inadequacies relative to past practice. We make no affirmative
determination herein relative to the proper reconciliation of
Rules 30, 34, and 43. Such a determination is not possible on
this record."
This Board has no basis to quarrel with Public Law Board 1844's
analysis of the controlling principles of contract construction.
Thus, we will approach the case in the same interpretive context.
With respect to the critical question of past practice, the
Organization claims that it is significant that this same crew was
compensated at the overtime rate under the same circumstances
beginning August 13 through August 20, 1981. They submitted copies
of the Employees work report to substantiate this (Employee Exhibit 7).
The Board has carefully considered the evidence of past practice
put forth by the Organization. First, it is noted the dates in Employee
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Case No. 44
Exhibit "C" are subsequent to the claim dates, and second, and more
importantly, there is no evidence that the documents comprising Employee
Exhibit "C" were ever handled on the property. Under the we11established rules of evidence, applicable to these and similar proceedings under the Railway Labor Act, the Board is without jurisdiction to
give any consideration to this evidence.
This leaves the Board exactly at the same point as Public Law
Board 1844 in their Award No. 18. There is no evidence of past
practice which would support the Organization's contention that the
intent of the parties in writing the applicable rules was to grant
overtime to employees in such circumstances. In view thereof, the
Claim must be dismissed for lack of proof.
AWARD: The Claim is dismissed.
Gil Vernon, airman
H.
b.
Harper, Employe Member 9,F-9-.-C`r-a-w-f`ord, Carrier Member
Dated:
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