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PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 3303
Award No. 198
Case too. 236
system Docket No.i
' . ASKC-D-1968
Amtrak Service Workers Council
- and -
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation
STATEMENT OF CLAIM OF ORGANIZATION:
1. Albert Carlisle, Jr., Lead Service Attendant, was
unjustly dealt with by the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak) when he was dismissed from service
effective November 19, 1987, after an investigation
held on November 6, 1987, on charges filed against him
on September 16, 1987 for alleged violation of National
Railroad Passenger Corporation Rules of Conduct,
specifically Rule G, Rule O and Rule F-3.
2. Accordingly, the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation shall now be required to restore Albert
Carlisle, Jr. to the position of Lead Service Attendant
immediately, that he be made whole for all time lost,
with seniority, Health and Welfare, vacation and other
rights restored unimpaired. '
FINDINGS: Mr. Albert Carlisle, Jr., hereafter Claimant, was a
Lead Service Attendant, with a service date of July 31, 1974,
and at all times pertipqnt here was assigned at Chicago,
Illinois.
Claimant was removed from duty on September 14, 1987 and, by
Notice of Disciplinary Investigative Hearing ("DIH"), dated
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September 16, 1987, Carrier notified Claimant of the date, time
and place of a hearing, which hearing was subsequently postponed
by written notice to all concerned. The September 16 Notice
contained the Charges and Specifications of alleged misconduct,
and they are quoted in full as follows
"CHARGE 1: RULE G - Employees subject to duty,
reporting for dip,, or while on duty, are prohibited
from possessing,-uaing, or being under the influence of
alcoholic beverages, intoxicants, narcotics or other
mood changing substances, including medication whose
use may cause drowsiness or impair the employee's
responsiveness. .
In that on September 14, 1987 Chief Russ Hare allegedly
found a marijuana cigarette and an open can of bear in
the microwave of food service car #20033, on Train
#351. Subsequently, you submitted to a drug screen
which showed positive signs of cocaine and THC in your
system.
CHARGE 2: RULE O - Employees must report for duty
at the designated time and place and must attend to
their duties during assigned working hours. Employees
may not be absent from their assigned duty or engage in
other than Amtrak business while on duty or on Amtrak
property without permission from their supervisor.
Employees will keep the appropriate Amtrak authority
apprised of their current telephone numbers and
addresses and
will
promptly notify in writing, that
Amtrak authority of any changes: .
In that on September 14, 1987 you allegedly failed to
make your assignment as a Lead Service Attendant on
Train #351.
CHARGE 3: RULE F-3 - Conduct involving dishonesty,
immorality, or indecency is prohibited. Employees must
conduct themselves on and off the job so as not to,
subject Amtrak to criticism or loss of good will.
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In that on Train #359, September 13, 1987, you
allegedly sold Jewel brand hot dogs that you had
purchased prior to your trip on Train #358, this laic]
deprivi,ng the Corporation of revenues."
On November 6, 1987, AMTRAK-designated Disciplinary
Investigative Hearing Officer ("DIHO") John Anderson conducted a
hearing on Charges 2 & 3 quoted above (Claimant waived his right
to investigation regarding Charge 1 and its accompanying
Specifications), at which Claimant and his Union representative
were present. A transcript of this Hearing was prepared and
copies, along with exhibits accepted by the DIHO, were supplied
to Claimant, the organization, carrier, and this Board.
On p. 10, the DIHO noted that Claimant had executed a Rule
Waiver, which was accepted by Carrier and confirmed as "correct":
the assertion of Claimant's Union representative to the effect
that Charge 1 regarding " . . . use of drugs [had] no bearing o·
the decision [to be) rendered in the instant case."
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By letter dated November 19, 1987 to Claimant, with copies
to the organization and Carrier,
DIHO
Anderson stated his
Findings, and they are quoted:
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"1. At all times in question in this case Rules F
and O of the Amtrak Rules of Conduct.were in
effect and applicable to you as they are to
all Amtrak employees.
2. It was established in part but not exclusively, through the testimonies [sic] of Train
Chief Russ Hare and Station Supervisor Don
Muscat that you failed to appear for your
assignment as LSA on Train #351 on the date
in question.
3. Your own testimony, Mr. Carlisle, contained
admissions of guilt concerning the second
charge cited. Further, your union representative, Mr. E. Davis, stated for the
record that you were obviously guilty of
violating Rule 'O', since you didn't show up
to protect your assignment.
4. It was also established primarily but not
exclusively through the testimony of Mr. Hare
that non-Amtrak issue hot dogs were found in
your work station. Mr. Hare's testimony
reveals thot, upon inventory by him and
witnessed
by
Conductor J. Craig, nine less
hot dog buns were found to be on band than
Amtrak issue hot dogs, indicating that nine
non-Amtrak issue hot dogs were sold instead
I of Amtrak issue hot dogs. From the evidence
i supplied by Mr. Hare this same number - 9,
! was the number of hot dogs missing from
pack of ten (one, being still on hand) of the
non-Amtrak issue hot dogs.
All
of the above
logically substantiates the charge that you
wrongfully deprived Amtrak of revenue it
should have received.
5. Your own denials of misconduct in the
circumstances under investigation were not so
credible as the evidence presented by and the
testimony of Mr. Hare, in part but not
exclusively because you could offer no
explanation as to how the hot dogs arrived in
your work station and why Mr. Hare would
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fabricate charges against you.
Based on the foregoing Findings, and on the
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hearing record as a whole, it is my decision
that you axe guilty of charge 2 and 3 of the
above-quoted charges."
Appended at the end of the same November 19, 1987 letter of
the DIHO was a statement of Regional Director Passenger Services
A. L. McLaurin effectuating Claimant's dismissal, and it is
quoted:
"Based upon the decision of the Hearing Officer as
stated above, you are hereby assessed a discipline of:
Termination of your employment with the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation effective this date.
Please arrange to turn in all other items issued to you
by the Corporation to Mr. John Gillis in the Chicago
Crew Base."
Board opinion
The Board has carefully reviewed: the transcript of the DIH
of November 6, 1987= copies of the exhibits accepted by the DIHO
the ensuing correspondence between the organization and Carrier,
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pursuant to the Organization's exercise of its right of Appeal
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from a disciplinary determination provided for in Rule 19(i) and
(j); the written and oral arguments of both Parties presented at
' the Board Hearing of April 13, 1989; and the oral statement of
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Claimant, who, having been informed of the date, time and place
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of the Board Hearing and of his right to attend, was present
during presentation of the arguments of both Parties.
Based on the above-described review of the entire Record,
the Board has concluded that% Carrier has provided proof, as
measured by a preponderance of the evidence, of Claimant's
misconduct as detailed in Charge 2, and its related Specificsdons; that Carrier has not met its burden of providing proof, as
measured by a test of the preponderance of the evidence* as to
Charge 3 and its related Specifications.
in light of the footnote below, it is sufficient to say here
that, while it is understandable how DIHO Anderson could find as
he did regarding Charge 3, the organization's succinct comment on
those Findings, set forth on p. 10 of its written argument, has
much merit, and it is paraphrased as follows:
While vital and relevant, no analysis is provided here on the
difference between, on the one hand, the above standard of
proof--one in which the word "probative" is inferred as
a
modifier of the word "evidence"--and, on the other hand, a
standard of proof permitting disciplinary determinations to be
made on the basis of "circumstantial evidence" or
probable cause
.
Because countless books and articles have been written clarifying
the differences between these two standards, such analysis would
be redundant; and because such analysis here would, of necessity,
have to be brief, it would not prove illuminating.
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Carrier did not prove Claimant:
- purchased the hot dogs at or from Jewel=
- brought the hot dogs onto the train:
- sold any of the Jewel hot dogs.
In discharge cases, where an employee's job and livelihood
are at stake, DIHos have heavy responsibilities calling for the
utmost conscientiousness. In the Board's view, for DIHO Anderson
to conclude, as he did in Para. 4 of his Findings, that "Ail of
the above logically substantiates . . . " Charge 2 is naive
(emphasis supplied). It should be remembered that appearance
and logic, not facts or evidence, caused Galileo to be executed.
In a similar vein, note is made of DIHO Anderson's Findings
t.
in Para. S, which
stajq that:
"[Claimant's] . . . denials of misconduct . . . were
not so credible as the testimony of Mr. Hare . .
because [Claimant] could offer no explanation as to how
the hot dogs arrived at [his] work station and why Mr.
Hare would fabricate charges against (Claimant]."
i4ixipy4P4
.. a c4nnptpro,202;>~a .
~~#oyee to proavV
~.' tx~
. as, in
the instant matter, of how the Jewel hot dogs arrived in his work
station. '-Vhat
fu4di~Ai$(on
carried and it is improper for the
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DINO to shift it onto Claimant's shoulders and then to impugn
Claimant's credibility because he is unable to meet that burden.
similarly,'Lt is pure casuistry to find Claimant's testimony less
credible than Hare's because Claimant "could offer no explanation
. . . [as to) why Mr. Hare would fabricate charges against
[Claimant]."
First, it needs be noted that scrutiny of Claimant's
testimony does not reveal that Claimant stated that Hare
"fabricated" the charges against him; nor does it reveal that
General Chairman Davis* Claimant's union representative, in his
closing statement, charged Hare with fabrication.
But even if Claimant alleged that "Hare fabricated the
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charges," the test as to Claimant's credibility, as compared to
that of Hare's, is not the presence or absence of an explanation
stated by Claimant as to " . . . why Hare would fabricate the
charges." Claimant's ability or inability to offer an
explanation for another's conduct, like that of the rest of
mankind's, is highly circumscribed. To impugn a witness's
testimony on the grounds that he stated something which the
transcript contains no reference to, is, at best, carelessness=
( at worst, it is irresponsible. But to also impugn the same
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witness for not providing an explanation as to why Hare would
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fabricate charges, is, at best, naive; and, at worst, a
demonstration of a lack of knowledge of the nature of the duties
of a DIHO. Such assignment requires recognition that the
overwhelming bulk of human beings cannot provide explanations for
most of their own actions, not to speak of the actions of others.
For the DIHO to assert, fn error, that Claimant alleged that Hare
fabricated the charges, and, to then compound the error by
averring that Claimant's failure to provide an explanation for
such fabrication is grounds for a finding that Claimant's
credibility is less than Hare's in the instant case, makes a
travesty of the adversarial process and the functions and duties
of a DIHO. It demonstrates that this DIHO, and any others who do
likewise, lack the requisite ability, training or directives to
properly perform the task of making solidly grounded Findings*
it
the face of limited, purely circumstantial and conflicting
testimony and evidence.
For all of the above reasons, the Board finds and concludes
that the DIHO erred in his Finding as to Charge 3.
Since the days of classical Greece (350 B.C.), this complex and
difficult task has, as a rule, been assigned only to those.among
the most mature of the citizenry= those who possess the unique
skills and highly essential training to dissect, analyze and
weigh testimony and evidence with, of course, impartiality and
objectivity before reaching a determination.
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1`aPSe::,9~IWwr~111fIr~Y~aac
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it is well established that Carrier need not meet the
stringent test of providing proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" as
is required in the criminal courts. But it is Carrier's burden
to provide proof, as measured by the test of a preponderance of
the (probative) evidence,.that Claimant committed the acts set
forth in charge 3, and its accompanying Specifications; namely,
that Claimant obtained Jewel hot dogs; brought them to his work
station and placed them in the freezer; cooked them instead of
AMTRAK
issue hot dogs, inserting them in AMTRAK rolls; sold them
~to passengers, and pocketed the cash received from such sales.
Carrier has demonstrated that some nine hot dogs were
missing from the
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pack and that nine rolls were "missing"
from the total issued to Claimant. Can it be said that this
I1single piece of evidence constitutes proof, or compels the
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conclusion, that Claistant committed the requisite chain of linke
acts: procurement, transportation, placement, cooking, insertion
in AMTRAK
rolls, sale, and pocketing the receipts,-essential to
prove the misconduct specified in Charge 3?
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i Because Carrier has produced only this slender bit of
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evidence as proof of Claimant's misconduct, the Board has
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concluded that Carrier has not met its above-described burden of
proof that Claimant " . . . sold Jewel brand hot dogs that
IClaimant] had purchased prior to . . . [his] trip on Train #354,
thus depriving the Corporation of revenues" (Charge 3y. This
conclusion seems well warranted in light of Claimant's 15 years
of service with only a single reprimand. Therefore, the Board
will direct that Claimant be reinstated to employment in his
former classification as promptly as is administratively
feasible. The above determination is compelled by the fact that
the sole charge of misconduct for which Carrier provided the
requisite level of proof was violation of Rule 0, and by the
Board's view that discharge of Claimant for the first instance In
15 years of service for late arrival and missing his assigned
t
train constitutes harsh and excessive discipline. The Board
- finds fortification, if not compelling cause, for this
conclusion, in the fact that, though requested, Carrier was
unable to supply proof that discharge, solely for a single Rule C
violation, was the typical or standard discipline assessed over
the previous decade.
Unlike a simple Award directing reinstatement either with
full or no back pay, the instant case compels the Board to find ?
proper balance between two conflicting elements. On the one
hand, the Board has found Claimant's discharge was without just
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cause and to that extent he is entitled to be made whole. On th=
other hand, Claimant's failure to be aboard his train constitute=
serious disicplinable conduct, though not one warranting
discharge, especially when consideration is given, first, to the
fact that his tardiness was not compelled by an emergency; and,
second, to the potential negative impact of that tardiness on
passenger service. The latter was averted by the "heroic"
measure of drilling out locks and the last minute assignment of .
substitute for Claimant.
Disciplinary suspensions are not punative. Rather, they
ar:
imposed as essentially corrective in nature, designed to educate
employees to the point where repetition of misconduct will not
occur again, and dramatically draw to their attention that
repeated misconduct will lead to dismissal and loss of virtually
all the valuable
rights
flowing from employment.
in determining then quantum of discipline to be assessed, no
one is an expert because of-the large number of variables
requiring consideration. Neutral chairmen and arbitrators have
distinct but limited advantage in that they encounter, over a
lifetime of reviewing thousands of instances where they are
required to assess the appropriateness of suspensions in
ldifferent industries, with different traditions; where suspensio
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is imposed on employees with vastly different levels of
responsibilities--from airline pilots
,to
those-who rake leaves
it
parks. '
only rarely, and
in
egregious instances of excessive or
obviously disparate disciplinary assessment, do arbitrators or
neutral chairmen substitute. their,-judgment for that of the
employees' supervisors. Those impartials who exercise such
restraint do so for sound practical reasons. In most instances,
most of the immediate supervisors of grieving employees,
especially those with long service, possess the most intimate an
accurate knowledge of the incident, its impact, real or
potentials, of the employee, and the degree of discipline
necessary to focus the employee's attention on the infraction so
as to achieve significant and permanent change in attitude and
conduct.
It is believed pecessary to stress that the above is the
case for most, but not all supervisors. There are those to
supervision who tend to be hot-tempered or who.hay,e- been
inadequately trained and treat employees in an authoritarian
manner, requiring-a military type of instant obedience and
imposing stringent standards for measuring rule infractions.
The Board has been informed of the range of discipline
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traditionally assessed
by
Carrier for a first violation of Rule
of a Lead Service Attendant with 15 years of service, who had
been given & singlg ~jpximand for the equivalent of improper
stripping of a
lounge,
Claimant is to be made whole because
he was discharged without. just cause and therefore lost some 19
months of earnings. However, from that make-whole payment these
is to be deducted a sqla equal to 120 days for Claimant's
violation of Rule O, such period to be viewed as a disciplinary
suspension.
Dated: New
York, NY
June 27, 1989
II
AWARD:
The discharge of Claimant was not for just
cause and he is to be reinstated in his
former classification as soon as administratively feasible.
Claimant is to be paid full back pay for the
period from the day he was removed from
service until his actual return to employment
minus any earning s, unemployment insurance
or
welfare pay;pents made to him, and minus a sum
equal to 12§ days' pay to be viewed as a
disciplinary suspension for Claimant's
violation of Rule O.
L. D.
M ,er, Carrier Member Jo CzuczcAn,EmjPloyee Membc
(I
Concur)
-(-~-flf's881rtj-- (I
Concur) (I Dissent)
e Simons, Ch-airman and
Neutral Referee