PUBLIC LAW BOARD N0. 3460
- Award No. 42
Case No. 42
PARTIES Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
TO and
DISPUTE Burlington Northern Railway Company
STATEMENT "Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood that:
~ATL M
(1) The dismissal of Crossing Watchman Orville W. Ratley,
October 27, 1980, was unwarranted and without just
and sufficient cause.
(2) Crossing Watchman Orville W. Ratley be returned to
service with seniority rights unimpaired and claimant
be paid for all time lost from his work assignment,
including straight time, overtime and holiday pay."
FINDINGS
Upon the whole record, after hearing, the Board finds that the parties herein
are Carrier and Employees within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, as
amended, and that this Board is duly constituted under Public Law 89-456 and
has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter.
At the time of his dismissal, claimant had been working for Carrier as a relief
crossing watchman in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. He had been employed by
Carrier for sane 23 years prior to his dismissal. He was also a protected employee under the terms of the merger agreement of January 26, 1968.
By letter dated October 1, 1980, claimant was asked to attend an investigation
"for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and determining your responsibility
in connection with your alleged absence from duty without proper authority and
alleged failure to comply with instructions from proper authority on September 29
and 30 and October 1, 1980." Claimant's representative requested a postponement
of the investigation and it was rescheduled for October 13, 1980. Following the
investigation, at which claimant did not appear, Carrier found him guilty of the
PLB-3460 - 2 - Award #42
charges and in violation of Rule
702
for his failure to report for duty at a
designated time and place and being absent without authority on the three days
and, further, for violation of Rule
700
for failure to comply with instructions
by not requesting a leave of absence and for failing to furnish a doctor's
statement when it was known that he would be off work for an excessive length of
time. For these infractions, claimant was dismissed from service effective
October 27, 1980. Claimant had not worked since September 2, 1980, when he was
off due to illness. Rule 15C of the agreement provides as follows:
"A request for a leave of absence in excess of fifteen
(15) calendar days must be made in writing by the employee to his immediate supervisor."
Petitioner makes a number of arguments in support of its position. First, it is
alleged that Carrier was unreasonable in completing the hearing on October 13, 1980,
without the presence of claimant. Claimant arrived at the scene approximately onehalf hour after the hearing was to have been started, about 9:30, and found that it
had been concluded. The reason for his tardiness was claimant's allegation that
his eyes were troubling him and he was having problems reading and thought the
hearing was to start at 10:00 A.M. Petitioner argues that Carrier, in view of the
importance of claimant's testimony, should have rescheduled another hearing to
hear from him.
In addition, petitioner argues that claimant called Carrier's timekeeper on September
26 to inform him that he was under doctor's care for an eye problem and was unable
to work. Additionally, it is argued that other employees in similar situations to
claimant's have not been required to secure leaves of absence for absences of 15
days or more. As a further point it is noted that claimant was charged with absence for three days and not for an absence of 15 days, as specified in the rule.
For that reason, he did not need a written leave of absence to account for his
lack of presence at work. Furthermore, claimant had no reason to believe that a
written leave of absence was required to account for his absence. The Organization
argues that claimant was off work due to a serious illness. This fact is not in
dispute. He was filling an incapacitated employee's position under the rules and
was conducting himself, due to his illness, in the same manner as he had in the
past and in the same manner as other incapacitated crossing watchmen had done
also. There was no evidence introduced, according to petitioner, to establish
PLB-3460 - 3 - Award #42
that there was a written instruction to crossing watchmen concerning leaves of
absence or time off because of illness. There was no showing that claimant had
any reason to believe a written leave of absence was necessary. The Organization notes that the roadmaster involved had full knowledge that claimant had
serious eye problems and was off due to illness and there was no excuse for the
excessive discipline accorded claimant in this instance.
Carrier maintains that the roadmaster had repeatedly instructed claimant to secure
a written leave of absence, together with a doctor's note to authenticate his
absences. Carrier acknowledged the fact that claimant was i11 and incapacitated
but the leave of absence was required for the particular absences.' Additionally
Carrier maintains that claimant was afforded a fair and impartial investigation
and it was at his own peril that he did not appear at the investigation, nor did
his representative. No request for a postponement was ever made with respect to
the October 13 date.
Carrier argues that the evidence at the hearing indicated that the absence was in
excess of 15 days and that claimant had failed to follow instructions to supply a
written leave of absence request. Claimant clearly violated Rule 700 by this failure.
Carrier argues that claimant was charged with and found responsible for being absent without proper authority on the three days following the 27th of September.
Additionally, the roadmaster testified clearly that the claimant did not call in
to report his absences and had no permission for those absences. Thus, there was
a violation of Rule 702 as well.
This dispute is replete with inconsistencies and incomplete information. First,
there is no procedural flaw as alleged by petitioner with respect to the hearing
being conducted without the presence of claimant. He did not appear at the hearing even though fully aware of the time and place which had been furnished to him.
The fact that he had successfully sought and obtained a postponement from the
original date is ample evidence that he was able to understand the specifics for
that hearing. His absence, as indicated by Carrier, was at his own peril and
there was no need for Carrier to reconvene the hearing following his tardy
arrival. It is also noted that Carrier waited 15 minutes to start the hearing
with the hope that claimant would appear. He did not do so. The hearing was
completed by the time that claimant arrived at the scene. This was not a procedural flaw and cannot so be found.
PLB-3460 - 4 -Award I#42
Claimant's allegations with respect to a past practice are unsupported in the record.
One or two examples of an employee not having applied for a leave of absence (refuted
by Carrier's evidence) would not make a 'practice in any event.
With respect to the notification which Carrier received of claimant's impending
absence, there is considerable confusion. Since the information supplied by
petitioner was following the investigation, it changed in a number of respects over
the processing of this claim on the property. Whether claimant spoke to Roadmaster
Hovland or the timekeeper is not clear. The specific date on which this conversation allegedly took place is also not clear. Nevertheless, the telephone call was
never alleged to have taken place after September 26. Claimant's absences were
on September 29, 30 and October 1. For that reason, the telephone conversation on
September 26 is not relevant in any event.
From the testimony it appears that the claimant last worked on September 2, 1980.
However, his absenteeism without leave of absence was charged to cover just three
days, September 29, 30 and October 1. Carrier's position in this regard appears
to be contradictory. If claimant were required by the rules to secure a leave
of absence for absences of more than 15 days, this is inconsistent with the
charge of his absence without such authorization for a three-day period. Petitioner
correctly indicates that for a three-day absence a verbal authority from the
immediate supervisor is all that is required, not a written leave of absence. On
the other hand, Carrier asserts that claimant had been absent from September 2
on and, thus, a leave of absence is required. This inconsistency is not resolved.
Additionally, the roadmaster's testimony at the investigation indicates that he
had conveyed to claimant on a number of occasions the necessity for his filing a
formal request for a leave of absence. Unfortunately, in the testimony no
specifics were indicated as to when this conversation took place. Since claimant
had been having eye problems for some time, there is no evidence whatever to
indicate when and under what circumstances he had been informed of the requirement
that he file for a formal leave of absence.
On balance, after a careful examination of the entire record of this matter, the
handling of this disabled employee's problems was far from correct. His conduct,
on the other hand, was also quite suspect, particularly in view of a prior 15-day
suspension. It is this Board's view that even though claimant's conduct was
questionable in that he did not secure proper authority for his absences (either
PLB-3460 - 5 - Award #42
for a three-day or a fifteen-day absence) his guilt on this score is un-
questionable. However, in view of the known fact of his disability and his
many years of service for the Carrier, the penalty of dismissal was obviously
harsh, discriminatory and unwarranted.
The question of remedy in this situation is also beclouded. First, the factor
must be considered that this employee went on disability retirement under the
Railroad Retirement Act in February of 1981. Thus, his protective status in
any possible employee status ended at that time. The question then remains of
the period following his termination on October 27 up to the time that he went
onto disability retirement. As the Board views it, he should be compensated for
losses sustained during that period of time with the following major condition:
he must establish by competent medical records that he was able to work during the
period in question. In the absence of such medical evidence, which must be
readily ascertainable by reasonable men, he shall not be compensated for any loss
since the presumption would be that his eye problem, precluding his working,
persisted during that period of time. If there should be any question with respect to the reasonableness of the evidence presented concerning his status
during the months in question, this Board shall retain jurisdiction over this
matter to resolve such dispute. Therefore, claimant will be entitled to back pay
for losses sustained during the period from October 27 until the date of his
railroad retirement subject to the proviso that he present proof that he was
physically and medically able to work during that period of time.
AWARD
Claim sustained in part in accordance with the
findings above.
ORDER
Carrier will comply with the award herein within
ninety (90) from the date hereof.
PLB-3460 - 6 - Award #42
Lieberman, eutra -Chairman
'1
J ~
F. H. unk, Emp oye Member W. Hodynsky, grr' ember
St. Paul, Minnesota
MarchJj , 1986