PLB No. 3781 / Award No. 135- Cases Nos. 135, 195, 196, 197 & 215
iately preceding the holiday, which would have met the criteria in Rule 14, paragraph (a)
for holiday pay for "other
than regularly
assigned employees."
The Organization's suggested construction of Rule 14 plainly does not fit the
language of the rule and, therefore, the claim will be denied.
The Organization's argument appears to be based, at least in part, on the omission from Rule 14 of a definition of the term "regularly assigned employees". The lack
of such definition may present a problem in some circumstances; however, that is not
so in respect to the circumstances of record in this case, because the phrase "other
than
regularly
assigned employees",
Rule 14 (a) covers all employees except those regularly
assigned. The "other
than regularly
assigned" category of employees qualifies for holiday pay under Rule 14 by working eleven (11) of the thirty (30) days preceding the holiday and by having sixty (60) days of seniority prior to the holiday. Regularly assigned
employees are recognized in the Railroad Industry by several indicia, chief among them
being the award of a position pursuant to job bulletin; this category of employee qualifies
for holiday pay by working the day before and the day after the holiday.
The fact that the parties structured these criteria into Rule 14 leave no doubt that
the Rule 14 text covers the categories of employees that were intended to be covered
by the parties and in a manner that was agreeable to the parties. Furthermore, the text
provides no basis for an implied third category of employee, i.e. a quasi regularly assigned employee, that comes into existence as a result of a ruling in an arbitration
FRED BLACKWELL
ArroRNEYATLnw
award. Moreover, and most important, it is noted that granting the disputed holiday pay
19129 ROMAN WAY
GSHURG.
MARYLAND 20979 7
(301) 9773000
PLB No. 3781 / Award No. 135- Cases Nos. 135, 195, 196, 197 & 215
would have the effect of interpreting the Agreement as authorizing a changed status of
the Claimant's employee status, retroactively, to commence before the claimed holiday,
because they became the incumbents of the positions to which recalled, subsequent to
the holiday. However, the concept of retroactivity must be rejected because the Agreement provisions before the Board contain no method or authority whereby an employee's
status could be changed retroactively in the manner suggested by the Organization.
Accordingly, inasmuch as the Agreement provides no authority for retroactivity in the
confronting circumstances, and inasmuch as the Board has no independent substantive
authority, it necessarily follows that the Board has no power to issue a ruling that provides retroactivity where authority for same does not arise from the contract.
In view of the foregoing, and based on the record as a whole, the claim will be
denied for lack of record support.
Fred Blackwell