Claimant, at the time of the dispute in question, was employed as an Electrician at the Adams Maintenance of Way Base in Carrier's New York Division. By letter dated January 14, 1985, the Organization filed Claim on behalf of Claimant seeking compensation on the basis that Carrier violated the Agreement by refusing to allow Claimant to fill a temporary position per his seniority rights. The Claim was denied by Carrier.
violated the Agreement by denying Claimant an opportunity to fill the position in question.
The Organization contends that Carrier was obligated under Rules 4(a) and (b) of the Agreement to allow Claimant to fill a temporary position at the Morrisville Sub-station. The organization initially alleges that Claimant was entitled to fill the position in question under Rule 4(a) and (b) since he was the "senior available employee" eligible for the position or to displace onto the position.
The Organization further contends that there is no question that the position in question existed, and cites a series of "Electric Traction Work Reports" to support its allegation that an employee (T. Robbins) was being used at the Morrisville Substation. The Organization additionally cites a claim paid by Carrier on December 12, 19'84, which it alleges constitutes an identical claim to the one at hand. The Organization argues that the December 12, 1984 settlement, where Carrier awarded Claimant two hours per day compensation, further indicates that the present claim for the same level of compensation is not excessive as alleged by Carrier.
Finally, the Organization contends that the Claim is properly a continuing claim under Rule 64(e), since Carrier's refusal to allow Claimant to fill the position in question led to a situation resulting in daily violations. PLB 3932 - Award No. 10
failed to demonstrate any contractual support compensation. Robbins' work records indicate travel period from Morrisville to Adams.
Additionally, the Organization has failed to establish any basis for even one hour compensation, except as a penalty payment for rule violation. We reject such a penalty payment, both because it lacks contractual support and because the facts are sufficiently in doubt to render such a payment unwarranted. Finally, Carrier is not bound by its prior acceptance of the Claim since that Claim was allegedly allowed in error by a subordinate Carrier officer. We agree with those awards holding that such prior error does not serve as binding precedent in later proceedings.
The Employees take exception both to the Board's factual finding that no temporary position existed at Morrisville, Pennsylvania; and the Board's conclusion that the Carrier need not be bound by decisions made by subordinate officers later found to be "erroneous" by higher carrier officials.
The Board did find that, factually, employee Robbins reported to. the Morrisville, Pennsylvania location on a substantial number of dates in December 1984 and January 1985. It is axiomatic that where an employee's time starts is his assigned headquarters. Rule 41 of the confronting Agreement merely confirms this principle. Since it is undisputed that employee Robbins started his time at Morris ville, Pennsylvania on at least some of the dates claimed, it must follow that Robbins was filling a new position located at Morrisville. Any comment that a majority of Robbins' duties were performed away from the Morrisville location is irrelevant to a determination of this Award. It is not an unusual practice in the MW Departments for employees to report to their headquarters, start their time, and then be transported some distance to a new location to perform work. Indeed, following the logic of Awards Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Board, the location where employees actually perform service is little related to their assigned headquarters.
The facts conclusively show that a new position existed at Morrisville, Pennsylvania. The Claimant was a senior employee to Robbins and should have been allowed to so exercise his seniority to= fill that position. He was aggrieved in two ways; first he had to= undergo additional off-duty travel time to work and second, his-
Employees' Dissent to Award No. 10 Page 2 of 2seniority rights were not fully honored by the Carrier. These are grounds enough for the penalty demanded by the Employees.
The Board's decision to allow the Carrier to overturn a previous determination of this issue on the merits as "erroneous" establishes a bad precedent for stability in the handling of grievances on the property. The Employees, as do other labor organizations, rely on the ability to have claims settled and contractual issues resolved on the "first" and "second" levels of dispute handling on the property. If such "first" and "second" levels of dispute handling on the Carrier's part are to have no binding precedent on the Carrier; then their inclusion in the collective bargaining agreement as steps in the grievance procedure is pointless. As the Board held in Award No. 6, agreements must be interpreted to obtain reasonable results. An Award that holds that "first" and "second" level Carrier decisions are not binding on the Carrier, merely advisory, is to give an unreasonable interpretation to the grievance handling procedures set forth in Rule 64.
For the foregoing reasons, the Employees must dissent from this Award No. 10, Case No. 10, Public Law Board No. 3932.