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File: MTr7B-83-1-4H
T-W-213C
Public Law Board No. 4161
Parties to Dispute -
Brotherhood of Maintenance of )
Way Employees )
) Case No. 23
vs ) Award No. 19
)
Burlington Northern Railroad )
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
1. The thirty (30) days of suspension imposed upon
Track Inspector R. B. Himmelberger for alleged
violation of Rules 62 and 63 was unwarranted,
on the basis of unproven charges and in violation
of the Agreement.
2. The Claimant's record shall be cleared of the
charges leveled against him and he shall be compensated for all wage loss suffered.
FINDINGS
On June 23, 1982 the Claimant was advised to attend an investigation on July 1, 1982 to determine facts and place responsibility
if any, in connection with his alleged responsibility for a collision
between one of the Carrier's motorcars and an automobile at a grade
crossing at Pine City,Minnesota at 11:30 AM, June 17, 1982. After
the investigation was held as scheduled the Claimant was advised by
letter dated July 16, 1982 that he had been found guilty as charged
and he was suspended from service for thirty 0301 days. After this
discipline was appealed on property by the Organization in the normal
manner up to and including the highest Carrier officer designated to
hear such this case has been docketed before this Public Law Board
for final adjudication.
First of all, a procedural point is raised by the Claimant
at the hearing and this point is further underlined by the organization
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Public Law Board No. 4161 (Award No. 19; Case No. 23)
during its handling of the case on property. It is the position
of the Claimant that the claim should be forfeited because the
Carrier was in violation of Rule 40 (c) of the operant Agreement.
This Rule states, in pertinent part, the following:
(a)t least five (5) days advance written notice of the
investigation shall be given the employee and the
appropriate local organization representative in order
that the employee may arrange for representation by a
duly authorized representative or an employee of his
choice, and for presence of necessary witnesses he may
desire. The notice must specify the charges for which
investigation is being held. Investigation shall be
held, as far as practicable, at the headquarters of the
employee involved.
The notice of investigation with the charges contained therein
was sent to the Claimant by certified letter dated June 23, 1982.
Since the Claimant did not pick up the letter from his local
post office until June 28, 1982 he argues that the Carrier was in
contravention of the five day time-limit provision of Rule 40 (c)
cited above. A review of the record shows that June 23, 1982 was a
Wednesday. The investigation was scheduled nine (9) days later on
July 1, 1982 which was Thursday of the following week. The argument
of the Claimant basicly centers on difficulties he had in picking
up his mail prior to June 28, 1982 because of his hours of employ
ment. The main focus of the Claimant's argument is that the
Carrier should have known that his hours of employment would have
prevented him from receiving the certified letter before he actually
did so. This, however, implies that the Carrier would also have
had information at its disposal relative to the conditions under
which the Claimant normally received
his
mail, whether anyone else
besides himself was at his home to have collected his mail in his
absence and so on. Evidently, the rule of reasonableness does not
require employers to take such things into consideration, nor even
to have such information, when notices such as the instant one are
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Public Law Board No. 4161 (Award No. 19; Case No. 23)
sent to employees. Sending the notice some nine days prior to
the scheduled hearing by certified letter fulfilled the Carrier's
obligations under the Agreement and was a reasonable application
of "...the agreement() as written" (Third Division 22748). The
Board also notes that the Claimant refused, at the beginning of
the investigation which was held on July 1, 1982, to exercise his
rights at that point, or by means of a postponement which the
Carrier officer was willing to grant, to have representation by
the Organization. Such action was done at his own risk since he
had representation rights under the contract which he refused,
for his own reasons, to exercise. The procedural objection raised
by the Claimant with respect to notice time-lines is dismissed.
When the incident at bar occured the Claimant held the position
of track inspector between Hinckley and White Bear Lake with head
quarters at Hinckley. According to report #0326, filed on the
Wisconsin Division, Second Sub on June 18, 1982 motorcar 2296 of
the Carrier, operated by the Claimant and going in a westerly
direction at 11:30 AM on June 17, 1982 struck the right rearquarter
panel of an automobile driven by one Pauline Sells of Pine City -
which was stopped at a crossing. According to the report the motorcar
driven by the Claimant was traveling some three miles per hour.
Damage to the automobile was estimated at $400. Damage to the motorcar
was estimated at $100. In-the wire report by the Claimant on June 17,
1982 the Claimant stated the following: "(the Sells' car) stopped on
tracks then moved slowly away after being hitin right rear quarter
panel. Motor car was unable to come to complete stop to avoid hitting
stopped vehicle". During the investigation the Claimant refused to
answer any direct questions put to him by the hearing officer
relative to further specifics of what happened when his motor car
hit the stopped vehicle on the grounds that he was not obliged to
do so "...without a representative present". At the same time, he
refused to request a postponement to contact a representative as he
explicitly states in hearing at page 6 of the transcript. The Board
must, therefore, conclude in view of the record before it that the
Public Law Board No. 4161 (Award No. 19; Case No. 23)
Claimant is guilty, on merits, of violating Rule 62 which states
that "...track cars and on-track equipment must (be) ...prepared to
stop" when approaching all road crossings. Evidently, the Claimant
was not prepared to do such since he did not do so. Likewise, Rule
63 was violated by the Claimant. This Rule states, in pertinent
part, that:
(m)ovements over public crossings must be made in such
a manner that there is absolutely no chance for an accident...
This Rule further states that operators must be in "...complete
control" when approaching crossings. Absent evidence presented by
the Claimant to the contrary the record shows that he was not in
complete control otherwise there would have been no chance for an
accident. There may have been extenuating circumstances present
as cause for the accident. Since the Claimant would not present evidenc
at the hearing, however, and since he would not permit his organ
ization to assist him in presenting such, the Board has no alternative
but to conclude, on the basis of evidence of record before it, that'
the claim be denied.
AWARD
Claim denied.
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Date:
07