Public Law Board No. 4161
Brotherhood of Maintenance of)
Way Employees )
) Case No. 9
vs )
Award No. 8
Burlington Northern Railroad )
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
1. The dismissal of Rank C Mechanic, H.S. Fisher for
alleged violation of Safety Rules 564 and 575 for
-- theft of company property was improper, without just
and sufficient cause and on the basis of unproven
charges.
2. The Claimant shall be reinstated with seniority and all
other benefits unimpaired and he shall be compensated
for all wage loss suffered.
FINDINGS
On August 28, 1981 the Claimant was advised to attend an
investigation on September 3, 1981 to determine facts and place
responsibility, if any, in connection with his alleged theft of
company property at Vancouver, Washington equipment repair shop
on August 25-6, 1981. After several postponements the investigation
was conducted on October 21, 1981. On August 28, 1981 the Claimant
was also advised that -he was "...being held out of service pending
results of this investigation". On November 4, 1981 the Claimant
was advised that he had been found guilty as charged and he was
dismissed from service. The discipline was appealed on property
up to and including the highest Carrier officer designated to hear
such before-this case was docketed before this Public Law Board for
final adjudication.
D
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PtAR 2 3 1987
UrrM.t
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Gr=NICRAL CHAIRMA14
Public Law Board No. 4161 (Award No. 8; Case No. 9)
At the time of the alleged incident the Claimant was a Rank
C Mechanic at the Carrier's Vancouver Equipment Repair Shop. The
Claimant was notified to attend the hearing which was ultimately
held on October 21, 1981 because of an investigation conducted by
Carrier's Special Agent J. M. Ruiter and Patrolman J. L. Stutesman
on August 26, 1981. This investigation was conducted because the
Security Department had received a call from Work Equipment Foreman
J. C. Johnson. The Foreman informed the Security Department that a
shop employee had been allegedly observed placing some company property
in his lunch pail. This same employee allegedly took the lunch pail
and placed it in the storage box on the back of his motorcycle which
was parked on company property. Foreman Johnson told the Security
Department that he had received this information "...from an anonymous
shop employee".
According to the report by the investigating officers to the
Division Special Agent, which included an interview with Foreman
Johnson and the Claimant, the Claimant admitted that he had taken a
used limit switch from company property prior to the date he was
allegedly observed putting a new one in his lunch pail. When the
investigating officers went later to the Claimant's home, on August
26, 1981 and searched his shop, with his permission, no used limit
switch was found nor was any other property belonging to the Carrier.
When the investigating officers searched the Claimant's motorcycle on August 26, 1981, with his permission, they found in his
lunch box a new Norberg GO Proximity Limit Switch, Model No. 43-100-C,
Part No. 7889-2000 which the anonymous tipster had allegedly seen
the Claimant put there. The Foreman put a value on the switch at
$147.00. According to the Special Agent's report, the Claimant
stated that he did not know how the switch got in his lunch box.
A review of the record before the Board shows that the
discharge of the Claimant was based, therefore, on two separate
considerations: (1) the taking of a used switch by the Claimant from
the Carrier's shop prior to August 26, 1981; and (2) the alleged attempt
on his part to take a new switch from Carrier's property on that date.
Public Law Board No. 4161 (Award No. 8; Case No. 9)
It is axiomatic that in discipline cases the burden of proof -.
rests with the Carrier as moving party. Innumerable Awards from the -
various Divisions of the National Railroad Adjustment Board have pre- -
cedentially established this principle (First Division 22407, 22439;
Third Division 14479, 15412, 15582 inter a _lia)..Such proof. must be
based on the criterion of substantial evidence which has been defined.
as such "...relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might-accept-as
adequate to support a conclusion" -(Consol. Ed. Co. vs Labor Board
305 U.S. 197, 229). It must be in this light, therefore, that the
Board must examine separately each of the issues on which the Claimant's
discharge is based. - -
The first issue deals with whether the Claimant was guilty of -
theft because he took the used switch from the company on "...August
24 or 25, 1981". Evidence that the Claimant did so is based uniquely -on his own admission. In view of this it is immaterial whether such
switch was found or not at the Claimant's home when his shop was searched
by officers from the Security Department on August 26, 1981. Such
would have been unnecessary corraborating evidence. With respect to
the issue of theft it must also beascertained, however, ifthe
used switch had any value, and what company policy was with respect to
used parts. The record establishes that the used switch came from
a hydraspiker, or a "spike driver" as it is called in the record, and -
that the switch was a used part. The Claimant referred to the switch,
during the hearing, as "junk". Although this is not disputed by the -
Carrier, the Foreman testified that the switch nevertheless had some .,
scrap value. Such scrap could be sold by the Carrier at 8fi a pound.
At 2 pounds, the used switch had a value of 164. Further, it was not -
Carrier policy to permit employees to purloin parts, new or used, for--their own personal use.
In railroad arbitration it has long been established precedent
that the value of Carrier property is of lesser importance than the
principle that such must not be treated by employees as if it was
personal unless there is a company policy to the contrary (Second
-4-
Public Law Board No. 4161 (Award No. 8; Case No. 9)
Division 6214, 6615; Public Law Board No. 3897, Award 17; Public
Law Board No. 3982, Award No. 1). Such company policy might be one
whereby various Carriers permit employees to take, for their personal
use, used railroad ties. In the instant case, however, the record
shows that the Claimant admits that he did not have permission to take -
the used switch, irrespective of its value, and that supervision
did not grant such permission. It is ultimately of little importance,
with respect to the deliberations of this forum, that the Claimant
testified that he could not remember what he even did with the switch
after he took it and that he only took it, apparently out of curosity,
in order to " break it open and see what was inside". According _
to the Foreman, such switches are sealed units and "...cannot be dis
assembled". The Claimant's motives here are of lesser importance,
however, than the fact that the Claimant took company property, in
violation of company policy. Dishonesty by employees has always been
considered a serious offense by arbitral forums in the railroad
industry (Second Division 7519, 7570, 7575). on merits, the Claimant
was in violation of the Carrier's Rules at bar with respect to this
first point.
The second point deals with whether the Claimant was guilty
oftheft of Carrier property because a new switch was found in his
lunch pail in the utility box of his motorcycle on August 26, 1981.
Although such can be logically deduced, it has never been factually
established, in the record, that the switch at bar was Carrier property.
Both the Foreman and the Security officer testified that they
assumed the switch belonged to the Carrier. The logical reasons
why the switch may have been Carrier property are that it was a very
specialized one used only on hydraspikers, and its serial numbers
matched those of a number of similar switches in inventory at the shop.
The Carrier, however, had no other inventory control system at this
shop than that new parts were ordered, apparently, when the supply of
them, on shelf, was exhausted. Although the Carrier could have presented
such evidence, this Board can surmise, by means of pay vouchers from
the shop in question the fact is that its inventory control system was
Public Law Board No. 4161 (Award No. 8; Case No. 9)
so loose, as evidenced by the testimony by the Foreman, that it was
never factually established that this _shop was missing the particular
part in question from its shelf on August 26, 1981. It is only on
logical grounds, therefore, that the Board can conclude, which is is
willing to do here on the record taken as a whole, that the switch
came from the shop's inventory in the first place.
The evidence presented by the Carrier in support of its
disciplinary action against the Claimant relative to this point is
that the Claimant was seen on August 26, 1986 putting the switch in
his lunch box by an anonymous witness, and the fact of its discovery
by the investigating officers on his motorcycle. Absent contrary
evidence arbitral forums have concluded that possession creates an
inference that the person in possession stole the property in question
if they are accused of theft (Second Division-3834, 8342; Public Law
Board No. 3986, Award 10). Such precedent has debatable application to
the instant case, however, for a number of reasons. First of all,
the Claimant simply denies that he took the switch. While arbitralprecedent does recognize that "...it is not unusual in cases where aperson is ...charged...to adduce no evidence other than to deny that"
what was alleged was not done (Third Division 13240), the denial of
the Claimant in the instant case has considerable corraborating support.
The Claimant explicitly testified during the hearing, after offering
no resistance to supervision nor to the investigating officers on
August 26, 1981 when they requested to examine his motorcycle, that
he found his lunch box open (with the new part in it), and that the straps
holding the motorcycle carrier box were tied differently than he usually
tied them to keep them from flapping in the wind because the box had no
lock. These details were neither pursued nor questioned, by the hearing
officer at the investigation. The Claimant was clearly implying, by
means of detailed testimony, that his motorcycle had been tampered with
on the day in question before it was examined, after lunch, by supervision and the investigating officers. Such inference is further
corraborated by evidence presented by the Organization by fellow employees of the Claimant who offered statements to the effect that they
saw a fellow employee near the Claimant's motorcycle prior to its
search after lunch on August 26, 1987. The fellow employee in question
P
-6Pubiic Law Board No. 4161 (Award No. 8; Case No. 9)
was one who, according to additional corraborating evidence, had made
threats to the Claimant to the effect that "...if (this employee) ever -
had the chance to get (the Claimant) fired he would do it and not
think twice about it". most disturbing to the Board, however, is that
the Carrier never permitted the Claimant to confront the anonymous
employee or employees who informed the Carrier that he (or they) saw
the Claimant put the switch into his lunch box. The Carrier knew who
these employees were since they were interviewed, on August 26, 1981,
by the investigating officers. In correspondence on property the Carrier
states that the eye-witness 1/"...for obvious reasons chose not to -_
sign a statement (that the Claimant was seen taking the switch) or to
appear at the investigation". This Board, as prior arbitration Awards
in this industry have concluded,finds such reasoning to be insufficient
to warrant the Claimant's accusers exclusion from the investigation.
In this respect it is both appropriate and applicable to quote, for
the record, the conclusions of both Award No. 25 of Public Law Board
No. 2960, and Award No. 6395 of the Second Division of the National
Railroad Adjustment Board. The former states the following:
The fact that employees who were eye witnesseswere
not called (at the investigation) distracts from and
casts significant doubt on the nature of the evidence.
In the face of contradictory and conflicting evidence
the hearing officer failed to utilize available evidence
that would have in most probability shed light on what
really happened. Without the testimony of these employees -
we cannot come to any meaningful conclusion as to what
really happened...
-1/ Carrier's correspondence dated September 24, 1982 refers
to "an employee" as anonymous source of information with respect to the -
theft of the switch. The transcript of the hearing, however, has
the Foreman testifying that the security officers " ..interviewed a
couple of the guys (who) were witnesses to the event...". Likewise
one of the security officers testified at the investigation that
"...the two (who) gave him the information ...wished to remain anonymous".
T
i I
- -
Public Law Board No. 4161_ (Award No. 8; Case No. 9)
The latter Award states:
(Since)(t)here is nothing in the record to show that
any effort whatsoever was taken (by the hearing officer)
to secure ...the presence (of the accuser(s)) at the
hearing at which they would (have been) subject to
proper examination... (such) ...absence...is a fatal defect going to the very essence of the Carrier's case.
In face of the Claimant's denial that he put the switch in his
lunch pail, which is supported by reasonable corraborating evidence
of record, it was the evidentiary responsibility of the Carrier, as
moving party, to prove him wrong. It had the means to do so by
producing his accuser or accusers at the investigation. It failed
to do so. In its correspondence to the Organization dated May 26, 1982
the Carrier states it was not possible for the Carrier to produce
such witnesses because such persons remained anonymous. Such is
not credible since the security officers interviewed these same
persons, as the transcript shows.On merits this part of the claim
must be sustained because the Carrier, as moving party, has failed
to sufficiently bear its burden of proof.
In view of the findings by this Board in the foregoing it must
address the issue-of the quantum of discipline. The Claimant is herein
found guilty only of taking for his personal use a used switch on
or about August-24 or 25, 1981. Numerous Awards emanating from the
National Railroad Adjustment Board precedentially establish that a
Claimant's past record should be considered when considering the
appropriateness of discipline assessed (Second Division 6632, 5790; -
Third Division 21043, 22320-inter;alia). At the time of his discharge
in 1981 the Claimant was a long-term employee with some 34 years of
seniority. During that time he had received one suspension of 10 days
and a prior discharge in 1979, with reinstatement in 1980. Given
this past record, as well as the minimal value of the property of
the Carrier which the Claimant took on August 24 or 25, 1981 the
reasonable discipline should have been a ninety (90) day suspension.
_8_
Public Law Board No. 4161 (Award No. 8; Case No. 9)
AWARD
The Claimant shall be reinstated to his prior position with
full back pay, minus a ninety (90) calendar day suspension from
August 28, 1981 which is the day on which he received the first notice
of investigation and from which day he was "...withheld from service
pending results of (the) investigation". Total payment due to the
Claimant shall be made in accordance with the principles laid out
by this Public Law Board in Award No. 1. Claimant's reinstatement
shall be with seniority unimpaired. The Claimant shall be notified
of his reinstatement rights, and of this Award in its other details
within thirty (30) days of the date of the Award. The Claimant is
ordered to cooperate fully with both his Organizational representative
and the Carrier in providing all appropriate information to the
Carrier in order that the Carrier might be able to properly calculate
what is due the Claimant.
Claim sustained only to the a ent outlined in the foregoing.
~!'~dward L. Suntrup, Neutral Member -
B. _jd. Potte _ Ca rier ,,em-ber
i _.
Karl P. tsen, ploy em er
Date:
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