PUBLIC LAW BOARD
NO.
4244 Award
No. 313
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
PARTIES TO DISPUTE: and
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway
(Former ATSF Railway Company)
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood that:
1. The Carrier violated the Agreement on, March 27, 2003, when it dismissed
the Claimant, Mr. C. D. Rodriguez, from service for allegedly violating the
Carrier's Policy on the Use of Alcohol and Drugs, when he tested positive
for a controlled substance a second time within a 10-year period.
2. As a result of the violation referred to in part (1), the Carrier shall return
the Claimant to service with seniority intact, remove the discipline mark
from his personnel record, and make him whole for all time lost. [Carrier
File No. 14-03-0113. Organization File No. 110-1312-035.CLM].
FINDINGS AND OPINION:
Upon the whole record and all the evidence, the Board finds that the Carrier and Employees ("Parties") herein are respectively carrier and employees within the meaning of the Railway
Labor Act, as amended, and that this Board is duly constituted by agreement and has jurisdiction
of the dispute herein.
The Claimant, Mr. Charles D. Rodriguez, became employed by the Carrier in its Maintenance of Way Department in 1974. On June 22, 1995, he was required to undergo a Federally
prescribed random test for the use of alcohol and/or drugs. The test disclosed a breath alcohol
concentration of 0.144%. The Federal Regulations and the Carrier's Policy on the Use of Alcohol
and Drugs ("Policy") prohibits an employee from reporting for or remaining on duty with a blood
or breath alcohol concentration greater than 0.0=°ia.
Provisions of the Carrier's Employee Assistance Program permit an employee who tests
positive for the first time to be placed on a leave of absence for the purpose of evaluation,
treatment, and education. If they are determined to be free of a mental or physical disorder, and
can pass a return-to-work drug/alcohol test, they will be permitted to resume work, subject to
follow-up testing from time to time.
The Claimant appears to have satisfactorily completed the necessary requirements, and
was authorized to return to service. The record does not show the date of his return.
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On March 27, 2003, the Claimant was required to submit to another random test, and this
test disclosed his breath alcohol concentration to be 0.099%. This occurring approximately eight
years after his previous positive breath alcohol test, he was sent a letter by the Carrier's General
Manager on April 2, 2003, reading in part as follows:
I have been advised by BNSF's Medical Director's office that you have
violated Rule 7.9 of Burlington Northern Santa Fe's "Policy on the Use of Alcohol
and Drugs," effective September 1, 1999, for testing positive for alcohol for the
second time within a ten-year period. The pertinent part of Rule 7.9 reads as
follows:
"Any one or more of the following conditions will subject employees to dismissal: -More than one confirmed positive test either for
any controlled substance or alcohol, obtained under any circumstances during any 10-year period."
For the reason given above, effective immediately, your seniority and
employment with the BNSF Railway Company are terminated. If you dispute the
action taken, you are entitled to have a claim submitted on your behalf for reinstatement, which must be presented within 60 days from the date of this letter,
pursuant to Letter of Understanding dated June 24, 1991, between the Carrier and
the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees [sic].
A claim was promptly and timely submitted by the Organization, which argues that the
Letter of Understanding dated June 24, 1991, cited by the General Manager, was only intended to
amend an earlier Letter of Understanding dated April 1, 1990, because the Carrier had reduced
the period from 90 days to 45 days within which an employee must provide a negative test result,
following the first-time positive result. The Organization further argues that the Letter of
Understanding dated June 24, 1991 was not intended to be used as an instrument to dismiss
employees without an investigation, nor to endorse the Carrier's Policy on the Use of Alcohol and
Drugs ("Policy'). The Organization concludes that the Carrier acted improperly in terminating
the Claimant under the Policy, it being a rule outside the terms of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
The Organization also contends that the Carrier violated Agreement Rule 13 when it
denied the Claimant his right to an investigation. It cites several Awards of the National Railroad
Adjustment Board holding that Agreement rules prevail over a carrier's operating rules, and an
investigation is required before discipline is administered.
The Organization further argues that the breath alcohol test may have been affected by the
Claimant having rinsed his mouth with an alcohol-based mouthwash within 15 minutes before
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taking the test. The Organization further states the Claimant had ingested three beers and had
eaten a meal between 4:30 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. the night before he was tested. The record
indicates that he was tested at 6:34 a.m.
The Carrier responds that the laboratory test results clearly show that the Claimant twice
tested positive for alcohol within a ten-year period. It further contends that it properly used the
provisions of the two Letters of Understanding, which permitted it to dismiss an employee
without holding an investigation, although the Organization has an opportunity to present a claim
on the employee's behalf. The discipline was within the scope of both the Agreement and the
Policy. The Carrier rejected and denied all of the other objections, arguments, and claims raised
in the Organization's appeal.
The Carrier denied the Organization's claim, and the dispute has been referred to this
Board for its decision, based on the record.
The Board has given serious consideration to the Organization's suggestion that ingested
alcohol the night before, or the use of a mouthwash containing alcohol, may have yielded the
excessive breath alcohol reading. Since the Claimant was not afforded an investigation, in which
he could have presented an arguable defense and called witnesses, the Neutral Member has
engaged in independent research to determine whether there is merit in this suggested defense.
A law firm which specializes in representing over-the-road truck drivers advises its clients
that mouthwashes. cold medicines, allergy medications, and some prescription drugs, all contain
alcohol, and cautions against using these compounds before or while driving. It also cautions
drivers about what it calls its number-one problem - residual alcohol. Residual or "left over"
alcohol in a person's system can result in a test reading in excess of legal standards the "day
after." Depending on several factors, such as weight, metabolic anomalies, gender, genetic
characteristics, ethnic origin, alcohol tolerance, etc., it takes the body a certain amount of time to
process and get rid of alcohol. Even though the physical effects of alcohol, i.e., "drunkenness,"
may not be present nor observable, the blood may contain a measurably proscribed amount,
particularly in view of the low threshold prescribed by the Federal regulation, which has been
adopted by the Carrier in its own rules.
A study was conducted by the Department of Psychiatry, University of Alabama School of
Medicine (UAB), in Birmingham, to determine whether breath alcohol values attained following
mouthwash use pose a realistic threat to the accuracy of blood alcohol determinations by breath
analysis. Ten normal subjects were checked for breath alcohol measurements 2, 4, 6, 10, and 15
minutes after rinsing their mouths with three brands of mouthwash, all containing varying
percentages of alcohol content. The study concluded that the decay of breath alcohol values
following mouthwash use is sufficiently rapid that mouthwash use would not pose a realistic
threat to the accuracy of blood alcohol determinations by breath analysis under normal circum-
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stances. The use of mouthwash immediately prior to breath testing in a mistaken attempt to hide
the smell of alcohol or other substances, however, may significantly increase the measured breath
alcohol value. The Neutral Member also consulted an experienced law enforcement officer, who
stated that it is customary to wait at least 15 minutes to test the breath of a driver suspected to be
intoxicated, to allow the dissipation of anything taken orally, which might affect the test result.
Literature on the subject confirmed this officer's statement. That, too, is the reason the Federal
regulation, 49 CFR §40.251(a)(2), requires a period of at least 15 minutes between the screening
test and the confirmation test, i.e., to prevent an accumulation of mouth alcohol from leading to
an artificially high reading.
The Board is accepting the Organization's defense at face value, and concludes that it is
uncertain whether the mouthwash had any impact on the test value. The UAB study found that
the maximum breath alcohol values after 10 minutes were well below the usual driving-whileintoxicated range, 0.08%, for all three brands. Here, the screening test result was 0.100% at 6:34
a.m., and the confirmation test result was 0.099% at 6:54 a.m. Furthermore, the possibility that
there may have been residual alcohol in the Claimant's system cannot be discounted. The
possibility also exists that the Claimant may have misrepresented to the Organization the amount
of alcohol intake, or its time of ingestion. In any event, the breath alcohol reading, well beyond
the 0.02% cut off level, cannot be disregarded. In Award No. 27, Public Law Board No. 6102,
involving the same Carrier, Organization, and Neutral Member, that Board commented on the
reliability of breath alcohol test values:
When faced with the positive test readings on the one hand, and the Claimant's
denials on the other, one might wish for more evidence than the cold, emotionless
figures of the test values. But the fact is that the results of breath alcohol testing
devices are considered probative evidence in the courts of the land. Although
arbitrators are not bound by court decisions on evidence, they may look to judicial
rulings for guidance concerning scientific evidence, on the theory that courts have
had a much more extensive opportunity to determine whether such evidence is
reliable and competent. This is the method of determining alcohol impairment
prescn'bed by the Federal Regulations. Locomotive engineers, truck drivers, and
airline pilots may lose their licenses to work on the basis of this same technology.
It has become widely accepted because its accuracy has been proven. This is true,
even in the absence of corroborative evidence, such as breath odor, behavior,
speech, gait, and such like characteristics of one under the influence of alcohol
which are so easily recognized by the average citizen, lacking sophisticated
diagnostic skills. The two test result values are sufficient evidence of alcohol use
on duty.
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Public Law Board No. 4244 Award No. 313
Case No. 323
The only remaining issues before the Board are whether the Claimant was improperly
denied an investigation, whether the Maintenance of Way Operating Rules and the Policy are
superseded by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, and whether the discipline is excessive.
Rule 13, the Discipline Rule, in the Parties' Agreement, reflects a universally fundamental
right of represented employees in the railroad industry: "[N]o employee who has been in service
more than sixty (60) calendar days will be disciplined without first being given an investigation."
The Parties, however, over a period of years, have entered into letters of understanding which
provide exceptions to the pre-discipline investigation requirement. For example, in 1979, they
reached an understanding that an employee who accumulates 60 or more demerits might be
terminated without holding an investigation, provided the Carrier notifies the employee and the
Organization of each instance in which demerits were assessed. This letter states that the
employee's only recourse is the processing of a claim.
The April 1, 1990 Letter of Understanding reads as follows:
It is agreed that, effective April 1, 1990, the provisions of Rule 13 win not
be applicable to employees who are placed on medical leave of absence for sixty
(60) days as a result of testing positive for a substance prohibited by Carrier's
rules, and who, during the sixty (60) day period, fails to fitrnish a negative urine
sample. Such employee will be notified in writing by certified mail, return receipt
requested, after the sixty day period has expired of the termination of his seniority
and employment. The written notice shall contain an adequate statement of the
circumstances resulting in the employee's termination of employment. Copy of
this letter will be fiunished to the General Chairman together with copy of the
letters written by Carrier's Medical Director to the employee.
It was also understood that the above will not preclude the filing and
progression of claim filed on the employee's behalf for reinstatement which must
be submitted to this office within 60 days from the date he is notified of termination of his employment.
Clearly, this Letter of Understanding permits the Carrier to terminate an employee who
fails to provide a negative urine specimen during the period of his medical leave of absence,
subject only to the outcome of a claim filed on his behalf. The Organization's General Chairman
signified his concurrence by affixing his signature to this letter. When it was agreed that "the
provisions of Rule 13 will not be applicable," the Parties thereby agreed to waive all the terms of
that Rule, including the provision that employees may not be disciplined without first being given
an investigation.
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Public Law Board No. 4244 Award No. 313
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Then, on June 24,
1991,
the Parties executed another Letter of Understanding, which was
referred to in the General Manager's letter to the Claimant dated April 3, 2003. (See page 2,
supra). It reads:
This will confirm our understanding reached on June 20,
1991,
in connection with the application of Rule
9.0
of the Santa Fe's "Policy On Use Of Alcohol
and Drugs" which became effective March
1, 1991,
and which all Santa Fe
employees were notified by letter dated February 1, 1991, which reads as follows:
[Santa Fe's Rule 9.0 has been supplanted by Section
7.9
of the Policy, but its
provisions are substantially the same].
Effective June
1, 1991,
an employee who is subject to dismissal under the
aforequoted [sic] provisions of Rule
9.0
shall be notified in writing by Certified
Mail, Return Receipt Requested, to the employee's last known address, copy to
the General Chairman, of termination of his seniority and employment. The
notice shall contain ad [sic] adequate statement of the circumstances resulting in
the employee's termination of employment.
It was also understood that the above will not preclude the filing and
progression of claim filed on the employee's behalf for reinstatement which must
be submitted to this office within 60 days from the date he is notified of termination of employment.
The Letter of Understanding dated April
1, 1990,
will remain in effect.
If the above correctly reflects our understanding of the manner in which
Rule
9.0
cases will be handled, please indicate your concurrence by affixing your
signature on the line provided below.
The Organization's General Chairman signified his concurrence by affixing his signature to
this letter.
The Board has compared these two Letters of Understanding and considered the Parties'
respective arguments. The only essential differences in the two Letters are (1) the circumstances
which could result in an employee's summary termination, and (2) the reference to Agreement
Rule 13 in the first Letter and its omission in the second Letter.
Although the second Letter, unlike the first, does not contain the phrase, "[T]he provisions of Rule 13 will not be applicable," the Board has to consider whether it was intended, that
Rule 13 should be applicable to those employees who are the subject of the second Letter. The
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Public Law Board No.
4244
Award
No. 313
Case
No. 323
Carrier argues that the reference to the first Letter in the second Letter - "The Letter of
Understanding dated April 1, 1990, will remain in effect" - determines that no investigation is
required. The Neutral Member does not find the issue disposed of so easily.
If, however, the Parties intended in the second Letter to retain the provisions of Rule
13,
the Board is caused to question why the second Letter was written at all. If Rule
13
were
intended to be applicable under the circumstances described in the Letter of Understanding dated
June
24,
1991, the provisions for notice, an adequate statement of the circumstances, and the
manner of filing and progressing a claim, with its attendant time limits, would not be necessary.
Furthermore, there is no plausible reason why an investigation would be required before termination in the one instance, and not required in the other. One would expect to find consistency
among the Agreement's various parts. The Board holds that an investigation is not required
under the circumstances provided for in the Letter of Understanding dated June
24,
1991.
The next issue before the Board is whether a Carrier-promulgated Rule, such as those
provisions in its Policy, are superseded by the Rules in the Parties' Collective Bargaining
Agreement. The Organization quoted Third Division Award 15590, which reads, "We have ruled
on many occasions that agreement rules prevail over operating rules when there is a conflict." In
that case, an agreement rule provided that an employee had no right to claim work on the sixth or
se, enth day of his work week. The carrier's rule required employees subject to call to be in place
where they could be contacted. When the carrier attempted to call that claimant on the sixth or
seventh day of his work week, and he was unavailable, he was charged with a rule violation. The
Third Division held that he was not required to be available on those days, notwithstanding the
carrier's operating rule, because he had no right to claim work on those days, in accordance with
the agreement's rule.
In the instant case, the Board has considered whether any Agreement rule "prevails over"
Section 7.9 of the Carrier's Policy. Rule 13 is such an Agreement rule. Employers have the right
to promulgate rules for the guidance of their employees. The Policy is such a rule. When an
employer enters into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with its employees' designated representative, however, that Agreement may modify or even supercede the employer's rules if there is a
conflict. With respect to these Parties, Agreement Rule
13
provides such a modification. As to a
specific application, Section 7.9 of the Policy provides that an employee is "subject to dismissal"
for certain specified offenses. But the Carrier's right to dismiss is superceded by Agreement Rule
13, to the extent that "[Njo employee who has been in service more than sixty (60) calendar days
will be disciplined without first being given an investigation." As it happens, however, as the
Board observed above, the Parties agreed, in 1991, to forego the requirement that an investigation be held before discipline is imposed. Therefore, in a case of this kind, the Carrier is not
precluded from summarily dismissing an employee, but the Organization retains the right to file
and progress a claim disputing the Carrier's action. That is exactly what has been done here. The
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Public Law Board No. 4244 Award No. 313
Case No. 323
Board finds no Agreement rule which prevents the Carrier from dismissing an employee for
violation of the conditions found in Section 7.9.
The final question which remains is whether the discipline is excessive. The Claimant's
record of disciplinary actions indicate that he does not possess a record sufficiently clear of rule
infractions which might warrant any degree of leniency. He had five previous entries. His
positive test result in September of 1995, of course, does not appear on the record because he
was granted a medical leave of absence for treatment, education, and evaluation.
He was tested in compliance with the regulatory requirements of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, U. S. Department of Transportation. The Carrier's Policy is
consistent with those and other Federal regulations pertaining to drug and alcohol use in
transportation industries. The Board has no reasonable grounds to sustain the Claim; it will be
denied..
AWARD
The claim is denied.
Robert J. Irvin, Neutral Member
R B. Wehrli, Employe Member William L. Yeck, Carrier Member
-.-(0
'3-~1
Date
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