PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 4402
PARTIES ) BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES
TO )
DISPUTE ) BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
1. The thirty (30) days' suspension imposed upon Track Foreman D.
R. Piurkowski and the fifteen (15) days' suspension imposed upon
Machine Operator R. D. Elliott for alleged `... violation of Rules 9
B and 35 of the Rules of the Maintenance of Way Department when
the Lorain 6 Rail Grinder struck Ballast Regulator BNX-60102 at
MP 284.71 on the Fourth Subdivision on November 25, 1986.'
was arbitrary and capricious, without just and sufficient cause and
an abuse of the Carrier's discretion (system File #2 Gr./GMWA 87
3-11).
2. The Claimants' records shall be cleared of the charges leveled
against them and they shall be compensated for all wage loss
suffered.
OPINION OF BOARD
At the relevant time, Claimants Piurkowski and Elliott held positions as Track
Foreman and Group 3 Machine Operator, respectively. As a result of charges dated
November 26, 1986, investigation held on December 8, 1986 and by letters dated
December 22, 1986, Claimant Piurkowski received a 30 day suspension and Claimant
Elliott received a 15 day suspension resulting from the collision of a Lorain 6 Rail Grinder
striking Ballast Regulator BNX-60102 on November 25, 1986.
On the day of the incident, Claimant Elliott was operating the ballast regulator in an
easterly direction working in conjunction with the rail grinder. Claimant Piurkowski was
on board the ballast regulator with Claimant Elliott. After clearing the main line at Stoddard
Siding (MP 286.6) for a freight train, the regulator continued with its work several minutes
ahead of the rail grinder. In the process of returning to its work location, the rail grinder's
crewman spotted what was thought by him to be a brush fire approximately one-quarter of
D. R. Piurkowski and R. D. Elliott
a mile to the east of the grinder which, in fact, was dust caused by the regulator. After it
became known to tte rail grinder operator that what was thought to be a brush fire was in
fact the regulator, the rail grinder was unable to slow down to avoid striking the regulator.
S. J. Schuler, the Loram employee who was operating the rail grinder, explained
(Tr. 34, 36):
A. ... I knew approximately where we were, not exactly. I was
depending on the caboose, the pilot, to let me know, and I
was getting close. I come around the curve, and seen
smoke, which was actually dust from the ballast regulator. I
was probably a machine or machine and a half before I knew
it was the ballast regulator. I thought it was the fire that I
was going to the next curve.
Q: Okay, but you did know that 'there was a ballast regulator
east of you, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Claimants unsuccessfully tried to outrun the rail grinder by placing the regulator in
reverse. Claimants were uninjured as they jumped to safety but some damage (estimated
by Roadmaster J. D. Haney at approximately $1600 (Tr. 4)) was sustained to the regulator.
Haney's F-27 report summarized the incident consistent with the testimony of the rail
grinder operator:
Ballast Regulator, BNX 60102, was working east. Loram Rail
Grinder No. 6 traveling east, thought there was a brush fire, which
was the dust of the regulator. Loram Rail Grinder went to put out
the fire and struck Ballast Regulator.
The collision occurred at MP 284.71. The record establishes (Tr. 9) that the rail
grinder should have started grinding at MP 285.1 but went past that point when it struck
the regulator. Further, at that time, the regulator's protected limits were from MP 287 to
MP 292. However, the rail grinder was operating within its protected limits when it struck
the regulator. Further, although the regulator was in radio contact with the rail grinder, no
yellow flag protection was established between the regulator and the rail grinder.
PLB 4402, Award 22
' D. R. Piurkowski and R. D. Elliott
Page 3
However, according to Roadmaster Haney (Tr. 5):
Q. To your knowledge, had there been instructions given from
the ballast regulator to the Rail Grinder that he was in the
area and to look out for him?
A. To my knowledge, there had been instructions, yes.
According to Schuler, who was operating the rail grinder (Tr. 36):
Q. In your radio transmission with Mr. Brown or whomever
you spoke with, was it understood that this ballast regulator
would be near the location where you would be stopping to
proceed grinding again?
A. I was told it was ahead of us somewhere ahead of us, and to
keep an eye ouL
Q. Yet you still assumed when you saw the dust and debris that
was a fire and couldn't be the %ballast regulator, is that
correct?
A. Yes.
Further, according to Assistant Foreman D. Brown (who was in the caboose of the
rail grinder unit) after coming out of the siding (Tr. 11):
Q. Did you notify ballast regulator Operator R. D. Elliott that
you were coming out?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What was his reaction?
A. He told me that he was working ... at that time he was
working east of the area that had already ground.
a~
Q. Did he [Claimant Elliott] instruct you to look-out for him or
anything?
A. Yes, he did.
The record also establishes that Claimant Piurkowski did not read the current line
up to other members of his crew. However, Claimant Piurkowski testified that he
instructed the crew that there would be a train coming and what to watch out for.
The Carrier's arguments for upholding the discipline given to Claimants are that the
PLB 4402, Award 22
' D. R. Piurkowski and R. D. Elliott
Page 4
regulator, which was under Claimants' control, was operating outside of protected limits;
no flag protection was afforded and that Claimant Piurkowski committed additional rule
violations by not reading the line up to all crew members. The Organization argues that
flag protection was not necessary because the grinder and regulator were worldng in
conjunction with each other-, the entire area had been flagged by the rail grinder; there was
direct radio contact between the regulator and the rail grinder; and, in this circumstance, it
was not "practicable" within the meaning of Rule 9B to have a flag between the grinder and
the regulator. With respect to Claimant Piurkowsld's failure to read the line up, the
Organization asserts that such a failure was a mere technical violation unrelated to the
collision.
Substantial evidence does not exist to support the imposition of discipline in this
matter. The Carrier recognizes (Carrier Submission at 8) that the collision "may not have
been totally the responsibility of Claimants actions and rule violations ...: ' The charges
against Claimants are specific in terms of the alleged misconduct. The investigation was
"for the purpose of ascertaining the facts
and determining responsibility
in connection with
Lorain 6 Rail Grinder striking Ballast Regulator BNX-60102, November 25, 1986, 10:30
a.m., at Mile Post 284.71 ...: ' [Emphasis added]. The record reveals, without question,
that the "responsibility" for the collision rested with the rail grinder operator and not with
Claimants: The evidence demonstrates that the rail grinder operator, although being made
fully aware that the regulator was ahead of him as a result of radio contact with the
regulator, nevertheless mistook the regulator's dust for a brush fire and then proceeded past
his designated starting point to put out that fire only to come upon the regulator performing
its normal duties. While the record reveals that, in accord with the Carrier's position, the
regulator may have been outside of its limits, there was no yellow flag protection (although
there was radio contact) and that the line up was not read to the crew, in light of the clear
and obvious error made by the operator of the rail grinder, there has been no nexus
. , PLB 4402, Award 22
D. R. Piurkowski and R. D. Elliott
Page 5
demonstrated between those asserted rule violations and the responsibility for the collision
which was the purpose of the investigation. Stated differently, in light of the rail grinder
operator's conduct, we are satisfied that even if Claimants followed the rules to the detail
argued by the Carrier in this matter, because of the rail grinder operator's error, there
nevertheless would have been a collision. Surely, Claimants are required to follow the
Carrier's safety rules. But, under the unique facts of this case with the error committed by
the operator of the rail grinder and, by the nature of its charges against Claimants, the
Carrier is still obligated to demonstrate the "responsibility" of the Claimants for the
collision. This record reveals that the "responsibility" for the collision belonged to the rail
grinder operator and not with Claimants. The discipline cannot stand.
AWARD
Claim sustained. The suspensions shall be rescinded and Claimants shall be
compensated for time lost.
Edwin H. Benn
Neutral Member
E. . Kallinen P. . anson
Carrier Member Organization Member
Denver, Colorado
March 11, 1991