PARTIES ) BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES
TO )
DISPUTE ) BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY

STATEMENT OF CLAIRI















OPINION OF BOARD



1987, the Carrier awarded a temporary position (approximately 90 days) described by the

Carrier as a "truck driver +16" headquartered at Ottumwa, Iowa to a truck driver in its

Track Subdepartment. The Organization takes issue with the Carrier's classification of the

disputed equipment as a truck and the assignment of die operation of that vehicle to an

employee in the Track Subdepartment. The Organization claims the equipment falls under

the jurisdiction of Group 1 machine operators in die Roadway Equipment Subdepartment.



The Organization describes die vehicle (which it calls a "newly designed model Kershaw

Combination Machine") as failing under "Combination machines (Boom, dragline,

backhoe, shovel, clamshell, pile driver attachments)" under die Roadway Equipment

Subdepartment: ,, . t :':r·.







In its submission, the Carrier asserts that the "primary use of the vehicle in question is as a truck". In the on-property handling, the Carrier described the- vehicle as:


Initially, the Carrier's argument that the assignment of the equipment involved in this matter to the Track Subdepartment does not constitute a "material change in work methods" or the establishment of a new position so as to bring the notification and dispute resolution provisions of Appendix F into play does not dispose of the matter. The Carrier's argument assumes the ultimate success of its position that the equipment is properly classified as a truck. In die context of this case, if the Carrier assigned sufficient work to truck drivers that properly belonged to Group 1 machine operators, we believe that such an action may well constitute a "material change in work methods" under Appendix F.
Similarly, the Organization's argument that the bulletin was deceptive because it advertised a truck driver's position does not require a sustaining award. The Organization's argument also assumes the ultimate success of its position that the equipment is properly classified as a Group 1 machine.
This is a case where labels are not dispositive. In light of what we can determine from tile descriptions and photographs of the equipment, the parties' disagreement concerning the proper classification is understandable..- Our review.-Of the photographs and

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the descriptions of the equipment compared to the various other pieces of machinery falling under Group I machines as well as those vehicles classified as trucks shows that the equipment is a hybrid and has the attributes of both a truck and a more complex machine typically found in Group 1. Consistent with the manner in which the parties have classified the differences between work in the Roadway Equipment and Track Subdepartments (i.e., through Rules 5 D and G and 55 N and P, machine operators are assigned to certain specified equipment and truck drivers are assigned by their "primary duties"), and absent agreement by the parties concerning the appropriate classification for this particular equipment, the answer to the instant dispute does not come from the generic label attached to this particular equipment, but must be determined after an analysis of how the equipment is used. If the equipment is used on a specific job primarily as a truck typically operated by truck drivers, then the Carrier's designation of the equipment as a truck is appropriate. If the equipment is primarily used performing the specific functions typically performed by a Group 1 machine, then the equipment is entitled to a Group 1 rating. Thus, in terms of a well-worn expression, with respect to this particular equipment it matters little if it looks or sounds like a duck. What is important is if it acts like a duck.
Turning to the specifics of the instant claim, i.e., that of the duties of the temporary position found in Bulletin OT-81, the record is devoid of material evidence concerning how the equipment was actually used on that particular job. Under traditional analysis in rules cases, the burden of proving a violation falls upon the Organization. We believe it was incumbent upon the Organization to make a sufficient showing that on this particular job the hybrid capabilities of the equipment were utilized in primary fashion in performing functions typically performed by a Group 1 machine. In this case, that showing was not made. Therefore, the affirmative relief sought by the Organization shall be denied. Absent agreement by the parties over how to specifically classify this hybrid machinery (which the Carrier represents in its submission is how references in the Agreement to specific equipment came to exist), each case in the future involving this equipment will necessarily
PLB 4402, Award No. 24 Page 4

rise and fall upon a demonstration of how the equipment is primarily used. However, in order to give the Organization the ability to determine whether the equipment is being used in conformity with this award, we shall require that in the future bulletins for jobs wherein this equipment is to be used shall specify that the job includes use of this particular equipment.
The Carrier's argument that the equipment has been used by a truck driver elsewhere in the system does not, by itself, require that the claim be denied. The record does not reveal whether the truck driver operating the equipment was performing primary duties typically performed by truck drivers. Nor are we satisfied that the record reveals the extent of that use was in sufficient degree to be considered a past practice. AWARD
To the limited extent set forth above, tire claim is sustained. The affirmative relief sought in the claim is denied.

.w:r. . L Q,,

Edwin Fl. Benn

Neutral Member


' . J. Kallincn
Carrier Member

11. S. Swanson
Organization Member

Denver, Colorado May 31, 1989