PUBLIC LAW BOARD 4651
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION) DOCKET 240: 102JU
)
Va.
1 UTU CASE NOS' 81593-646-83
)
CHICAGO AND NORTH WESTERN CLNWT FILE·NQx ,96~r87-1593
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY )
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
Claim of S. E. Thomas, Central Division, for reinstatement to the
services of the Chicago and North Western Transportation Company,
with vacation and seniority rights unimparied, in addition to the
payment of any and all health and welfare benefits until reinstated,
and that he be compensated for any and all lost time, including time
spent attending an investigation held on September 22, 1987, at
Council Bluffs, Iowa.
FINDINGS
This Board upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that
the employees and the carrier involved in this dispute are respectively employees and carrier within the meaning of the Railway
Labor Act as amended and that the Board has jurisdiction over the
dispute involved herein.
On September 5, 1987, the Claimant was working as a brakeman on
Train BPRX, the Extra 7002 south at Sioux City, Iowa. The train
was clocked by radar at 31 m.p.h. in a 20 m.p.h. territory. Three
of the four members of the crew were tested for alcohol and drugs.
The Claimant's urinalysis tested positive for marijuana. Subsequently, he was charged with a Rule G violation and, after an investigation, dismissed.
The Organization protests the Carrier's April 27, 1986, revision of
Rule G. It contends this unilateral action consituted a change in
working conditions. Notwithstanding this assertion, this Board notes
that reference to an 8th Circuit Court of Appeals case (no citation)
involves litigation between the Carrier and the Brotherhood of maintenance of way Employees (BMWE), not this Organisition. Furthermore,
reference to an attorney's letter purportedly addressed to all
Chairmen indicating the Carrier had withdrawn the April 27, 1986,
Rule G is not dated nor is there a full copy of the text attached to
this record.
Reliance herein on the Rule G in effect prior to the Carrier's 1986
Amendment requires this Board to make ore of the following two conclusions; (1) that the Carrier's February 17, 1989, General Order
No. 50 retroactively repealed the April 27, 1986, revision of Rule G
and/or (2) that the Carrier's right to enforce the 1986 version of
Rule G versus the Organisation herein involved was prohibited by
Court action. Clearly, contemplation of the 1989 revision of Rule G
was not a subject of on-the-property handling. Nevertheless, General
Order No. 50 specifically states that Rule G is ^ . superseded by
the following Rule G." The word "superseded" cannot be found to
encompass a retroactive repeal of the 1996 Rule G. Careful analysis
of the disputed provision of the 1986 version and as ruled upon
PUBLIC LAW HOARD NO. 4651
Docket No. 1026A
Page
x
by the 8th Circuit indicates the underlying basis of the BF=
1,
challenge was the Carrier's attempt to regulate off duty conduct.
This Board notes the 8th Circuit noted that the District Court recognized the Carrier had unilaterally regulated employees' use of
intoxicants " .. while on duty, sub ect to duty, or on company
property, all under Rule G.` (Emp as s a ded7- The District court
stressed the Carrier had never before attempted to regulate off
duty conduct in the manner stated in its 1986 revision of Rule G.
The 8th Circuit clearly identified this distinction stating:
Conadon sense and this Court's prior cases indicate
that there are limits on the extent to which the
CNw may amend Rule G consistent with the history and
acquiescence of the parties in past amendments-
From the above, it is clear the Carrier's 1986 revision of Rule G
was challenged on a narrow basis and limited to the sentence:
The illegal use, illegal possession, or illegal
sale of any drug by employees while on or off
duty is prohibited.
The Board notes that applicability of the provisions of Part 219
of the Federal Railway Administration (rRA1 regulations are not
optional and failure to comply subjects a violator to civil
penalty. In essence, the Carrier's Alcohol and Drug Policy states
the employees subject to the Hours of Service Act will be governed
by the mandatory testing provisions of Part 219. We conclude there
if no factual basis or evidence to find the challenge to the
Carrier's right to unilaterally revise Rule G extended beyond the
harrow off-duty issue framed by the Courts involved.
The Organization challenges the procedures the Carrier utilized
to obtain a sample for urinalysis. It points to possible access
to the sampling kits prior to use, the common knowledge being that
sataples are mishandled.
Division Traveling Engineer Kritenbrink testified the Claimant was
the last of the three crew members to give a urine sample. Kritenbrink
stated the sample was taken in a small jar, and the jar was sealed
in the Claimant's presence. Rritenbrink indicated the seal was
signed by the nurse and the Claimant, and then the sample was placed
in a box for shipping along with the filled out chain of custody.
The record shows the nurse signed her name, and the box was sealed.
The seal bore the Claimant's signature. This sealed box was then
placed inside a Federal Express envelope and shipped to CompuChem
Laboratories in North Carolina. Given the specifics of the record
PUBLIC LAW BOARD N0. 4651
Docket No. 1026&
Page 3
on the collection and shipping of the Claimant's urine sample, the
Hoard is forced to conclude the burden of disputing the accuracy
of the chain of evidence must be supported by probative evidence
as opposed to speculation and/or unsubstantiated possibilities.
The Organization stresses the CompuChem report indicates a positive
showing of but 23 nanograms of marijuana. At best, the Organization
claims, the Carrier has shown the Claimant may have used a drug
within the previous sixty (601 days or was in the vicinity of someone else who was using marijuana; although the record is void of
any probative evidence to support a finding that a 23 nanogram level
could be explained by passive inhalation. The Board emphasizes'
the Claimant was offered the opportunity to submit to a blood test
which would more accurately pinpoint how recent usage was. The
Claimant's refusal deprived him of a possible defense and raised a
presumption of impairment under Section 219.309 of the aRA regulations. There is no basisto rule that the Carrier, in testing this
Claimant or considering the presumption of impairment, excersied
its managerial discretion in an arbitrary manner. Accordingly, we
will uphold the discipline issued.
AWARD
Claim denied.
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