BEFORE PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 5027
Case No. 4
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYEES
and
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY (FORMER MISSOURI-RANSAS
TEXAS RAILROAD)
STATEMENT OF CLAIM: Claim of the System Committee of the
Brotherhood that:
1. Carrier violated Article 23 of the Agreement
when trackman J. Webster was dismissed from service
on April 2, 1990.
2. The Claimant shall have his record cleared of
the instant matter, he shall be reinstated to the
Carrier's service with seniority and all other
rights restored and he shall be paid for all time
lost.
FINDINGS:
Claimant J. Webster was employed by the Carrier as a
trackman.
On February 28, 1990, the Carrier notified the Claimant to
appear for a formal investigation in connection with the
following charges:
. . your alleged failure to safely operate and
damage Company vehicle Unit No. 1561 at
approximately 11:05 a.m. on February 27, 1990, at
Eureka Yard, Houston, Texas while working as
trackman.
You are being withheld from service pending this
investigation.
On March 8, 1990, the Claimant was sent another notice of
investigation by the carrier as a result of the results obtained
from the claimant's drug test taken on the date of the accident
in question, February 27, 1990. The notice charged the Claimant
with a violation of Rule G as follows:
. . . violation of Rule
G
of the Safety, Radio and
General Rules for All Employees, while operating
Company vehicle Unit No. 1561 at approximately
11:05 a.m. on February 27, 1990, at Eureka Yard,
Houston, Texas while working as traclonan_
After several postponements, the hearing took place on March
27, 1990, in relation
to
the two notices with the Claimant
present but without Organization representation. On April 2,
1990, the Carrier notified the Claimant that he had been found
guilty of all charges set forth in the notices when he was being
assessed the discipline of dismissal.
The organization filed a claim on the claimant's behalf,
challenging his dismissal on the grounds that the Carrier's
actions on March 27, 1990, prevented the Claimant from being
assisted at the investigation by the representative of his
choice. The organization argued that the Carrier's action was a
violation of Article 23 and that the carrier did not prove the
charges leveled against the Claimant because the investigation
was held improperly.
The carrier argues that no procedural defect occurred during
the handling of the Claimant's grievance which warrants setting
aside the discipline assessed. Moreover, the Carrier contends
that it was clearly established that the Claimant was properly
found in violation of Rule G. The Carrier contends that the
Claimant did not object at the hearing that he did not have a
representative present.
The parties being unable to resolve the issues, this matter
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came before this Board.
This Board has reviewed the record in this case and we must
sustain the claim based upon the procedural argument raised by
the Organization.
The record reveals that the Claimant's hearing was scheduled
for March 27, 1990, after several postponements. The carrier
admits that the Claimant's representative, Mr. John P. Self,
contacted the carrier on March 24, 1990, and requested a
continuance because Mr. Self had been injured and would be unable
to attend the hearing on March 27, 1990. According the Mr. Self,
the Carrier agreed to the continuance. Mr. Self was surprised
and outraged when he discovered on March 28, 1990, that the
hearing had actually taken place in his absence. The Carrier
contends that it has reviewed the transcript and that it has
determined that the Claimant was guaranteed all of his due
process rights even though he had no representative present. The
Carrier contends that the transcript contains sufficient evidence
of the Claimant's guilt, and, therefore, there is no reason to
set aside the dismissal.
This Board has reviewed the transcript in its entirety and
we find that the carrier had no business going forward with the
hearing in the absence of Mr. Self.
First of all, the contract requires in Rule 3 that employees
be given the opportunity to be assisted by a representative. The
record reveals that the Claimant and the Carrier were expecting
Mr. Self to appear to represent the Claimant on March 27, 1990.
At the hearing on March 27, 1990, the Claimant was asked:
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Q: Mr. Webster, do you desire to have any representation
present in this
investigation? And
if so, would you
please state if he is present and his name.
A: He is not present. J. P. Self
is
supposed to be here,
but he is not present.
Subsequently, Mr. J. W. Skinner, the Carrier representative
stated:
....if Mr. Self should show up any time during this investigation, he will be allowed to enter; he will be allowed to
represent Mr. Webster. At any time that he should show up
and enter this investigation, he will be allowed to do so.
Subsequently, the claimant, who had 25 years of service
before his dismissal, was asked:
Q: At this time, Mr. Webster, are you ready to proceed on
with this investigation?
A: I guess we can.
This Board has reviewed the balance of the record and we
hereby find that the claimant was not afforded his contractual
right to a due process investigation and the right to a
representative. The record reveals that Mr. Self had requested
that the March 27, 1.990 hearing be continued until he recovered
from his injuries. It is not sufficient for the Carrier to
review the record of the hearing and determine on its own that
the due process rights of the Claimant were protected.
The failure of the Carrier to provide the Claimant with a
fair investigation represented by the representative of his
choice requires the sustaining of this claim. However, the
record reveals that the Claimant was ineligible for service at
the time that he was removed from service because he was under
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the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. In order to return to
work, the Claimant will have to pass a complete physical,
including drug and alcohol screening. If the Claimant
successfully passes the physical examination with the drug and
alcohol screening, he shall be returned to work but without back
pay- This Board finds that the record contains enough evidence
to support that the Claimant was properly removed from service
because he tested positive for cocaine and the Carrier cannot be
held responsible for the back pay since then since there is no
evidence in the record that the Claimant has been sufficiently
healthy and "clean" to return to work since his removal.
AWARD
Claim sustained in part. The Claimant shall be returned to
work without back pay as soon as he passes a Carrier physical
examination and drug and alcohol scr ning.
i
PETER . MEY S
Neutra M
Carrier Remb organizationfember
Dated:
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