PUBLIC LAW BOARD NO. 5244
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYEES )
Case No. 15
and )
Award No. 3
NORTHEAST ILLINOIS REGIONAL COMMUTER
RAILROAD CORPORATION (A PUBLIC CORPORATION) )
Martin H. Malin, Chairman & Neutral Member
M.J. Schappaugh, Organization Member
J.S. Morse, Carrier Member
Hearing Date: August 26, 1992
STATEMENT OF CLAIM:
Claim of the System Committee of the Brotherhood that:
1. The dismissal of Trackman L. A. Parham for alleged
". . . failure to properly protect your position . . .
on April 4, 1990 and continuing.,,, violation of Rules
B, N(3) and Q, was arbitrary, capricious, without just
and sufficient cause and on the basis of unproven
charges (Carrier's File 08-13-101).
2. The Claimant shall be restored to a leave of absence
status with all rights and seniority unimpaired, and
all reference to this investigation shall be stricken
from his personnel record.
FINDINGS:
Public Law Board No. 5244, upon the whole record and
all of the evidence, finds and holds that Employee and
Carrier are employee and carrier within the meaning of the
Railway Labor Act, as amended; and, that the Board has
jurisdiction over the dispute herein; and, that the parties
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to the dispute were given due notice of the hearing thereon
and did participate therein.
On April 6, 1990, Claimant was notified of a formal
hearing to develop the facts relating to his alleged failure
to protect his position on April 4, 1990, in violation of
Rules B, N(3) and Q.
The hearing was held on April 24, 1990. On May 4,
1990, Claimant was advised that he was found to have
violated Rules B, N(3) and Q, and was dismissed.
On June 8, 1988, Claimant sustained an on-the-job
injury to his leg. He was out of work for two days,
returned to work for four of the next five days and then was
out until April or May 1989. During this extended period of
absence he underwent surgery.
In January 1990 Claimant again began to miss work. He
produced a doctor's note dated January 17, 1990, which
indicated that he was unable to work until further notice.
As a result of this note, Carrier referred Claimant to its
physician, Dr. Barry Fischer, who examined Claimant on
February 27, 1990, and, on March 13, 1990, reported his
findings that Claimant was fit to resume his normal job
duties.
As a result of Dr. Fischer's findings, Carrier ordered
Claimant to report for work on March 26, 1990. On March 24,
1990, however, Claimant reported to Carrier with a note from
his physician indicating that Claimant remained unable to
return to work. Consequently, Carrier ordered Claimant to
report to Dr. Anthony Brown for another physical
examination. Claimant complied.
Dr. Brown examined Claimant on March 29, 1990, and
found him fit for duty. Carrier then ordered Claimant to
report for duty on April 4, 1990. Claimant did not report
for duty as ordered. Instead, he telephoned the Division
Manager and advised that he remained unable to work. The
most recent medical evidence in the record consists of notes
from Claimant's doctors dated April 21, 1990, indicating
that Claimant remained disabled.
Claimant contends that the evidence established that he
was physically unable to report for work and therefore, his
failure to report for work as ordered was justified.
Claimant argues that he was not insubordinate. He reported
for all physical exams as required by Carrier and did
contact Carrier to advise Carrier of his inability to comply
with Carrier's orders to return to work. Claimant relies on
his doctor notes to establish that he was in fact disabled.
without prejudice to his arguments regarding the offense,
Claimant contends that his physical condition was a
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mitigating factor, in light of which, the penalty of
dismissal was excessively harsh.
Carrier contends that Claimant violated Rules B, N and
Q by failing to report for work as directed. Carrier relies
on the findings of its two physicians who agreed that there
was no objective reason why Claimant could not perform his
regular duties. Carrier contends that it has the ultimate
authority to evaluate the physical qualifications of its
employees. In Carrier's view, its order to Claimant to
report for work on April 4, 1990, was justified, and
Claimant's failure to report for work on that date justified
his dismissal.
Claimant and Carrier have each cited several prior
awards which they contend govern this case. We find none of
these to be controlling. The awards cited by Claimant do
not involve situations where the employee's medical evidence
of disability was contradicted by the carrier's medical
evidence. The awards cited by Carrier also do not involve
bona fide conflicts in the medical evidence. For example,
in Second Division Award No. 9813, the claimant was observed
engaged in off duty activities which were inconsistent with
his claim of disabling back pain. In Public Law Board 3721,
Award No. 1, claimant's own doctor indicated that he should
work, and claimant left work, not because of medical
disability, but instead to obtain medical documentation
after being denied permission to do so.
As an appellate body, we do not review the case de
novo. We have carefully reviewed the record and find that
substantial evidence supports Carrier's finding of the
alleged rule violations. Dr. B. Fischer examined Claimant
and found him fit for duty. When Claimant produced
contradictory medical documentation, however, Carrier did
not rely on Dr. Fischer's findings. Instead of insisting
that Claimant report for work as ordered, Carrier referred
Claimant to another doctor, Dr. Brown.
Claimant's medical documentation refers to three
allegedly disabling conditions: pain in the leg, swelling
and a separation in the bone which was healing but not yet
completely healed. Dr. Brown's report was quite thorough
and addressed each of these conditions. He found no
swelling in each area of the leg and foot that he examined.
He noted the separated bone in his report, but, nonetheless,
concluded that there was no objective reason why Claimant
could not report to work. Dr. Brown's finding that
Claimant's complaints were subjective in nature is supported
by his observation that although Claimant walked with a
cane, the cane appeared to be ornamental and lacking in a
medical purpose.
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Dr. Brown's report provided substantial evidence for
Carrier's conclusion that there was no objective disability
and its order that Claimant report for work on April 4,
1990. Claimant's telephone call on April 4 reiterating his
subjective complaints gave Carrier no reason to discount Dr.
Brown's report. The post-incident medical reports of April
21, 1990, merely reiterated the same conditions which Dr.
Brown considered in his report.
Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports Carrier's findings of violations of Rules B, N(3)
and Q. We next turn to the penalty. We do not overturn a
penalty unless it is arbitrary, capricious or excessive. In
the instant case, we are forced to conclude that the penalty
of dismissal was excessive.
The only conclusion which we are able to draw from the
record is that Claimant was acting in good faith. Claimant
complied with each of Carrier's orders to report for a
physical exam. Claimant never ignored Carrier's orders to
report to work. He responded to the first order with
medical documentation of his inability to work. He
responded to the second order by telephoning Carrier and
advising of his continued inability to work.
There is no evidence that Claimant's subjective
complaints were not real to Claimant. Furthermore, there is
no evidence that Claimant's doctors were acting in bad faith
in reporting Claimant's disability, even though the evidence ,
suggests that those reports may have been influenced by
Claimant's subjective complaints. Under these
circumstances, we find that discharge was an excessive
penalty, and that Claimant should have been given a lesser
penalty, which would have communicated to Claimant the
seriousness of his failure to report for work despite the
absence of an objective medical reason for not working.
Accordingly, we shall reduce Claimant's discipline to a
suspension for the period he was held out of service, i.e.,
for the period running from the date he was discharged to
the date he is reinstated in accordance with this award.
Claimant shall receive no back pay or other make whole
relief, although his seniority rights shall be unimpaired.
AWARD
Claim sustained, but only to the extent indicated in
the findings.
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ORDER
Carrier is ordered to comply with this Award within
thirty (30) calendar days of the date two or more members
affix their signatures hereto.
Martin H. Malin, Chairman
J. Morse M. . appaug
Carrier Member O gan ation Member
Dated at Chicago, Illinois, November 23, 1992.